Entries by aseansc

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong: Digital Transformation is the Future of ASEAN Integration

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ASEAN’s 50th anniversary should be addressed by nurturing digital integration, says H.E. Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, former ASEAN Secretary-General in FISIPOL UGM  (27/7).

Speaking as a Keynote Speaker at an International Seminar held by ASEAN Studies Center UGM, Ambassador Ong highlights the importance of ICT development in future ASEAN integration, which has been set up since his tenure as ASEAN Secretary General.

“Today we face rapid technological development following the rise of ICT platforms in the region, particularly in Indonesia. ASEAN needs to foster digital innovation and strengthen local economies through digital platform,” said Ambassador Ong.

He highlights the progress that has been advanced in ASEAN since early 2000s, which involved the creation of ASEAN ICT Masterplan and other regional policy frameworks in tackling digital divide.

“ASEAN is indeed not perfect, but we are keep progressing and ASEAN is the only regional organisation we have now”, said Ambassador Ong.

The International Seminar on ASEAN’s 50th Annivesary was held in conjunction with the 2nd ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Program (AYIEP), an annual program by ASEAN Studies Center UGM to foster social awareness among ASEAN youths. The program is held from 23-29 July 2017 in Yogyakarta, following the success of the 1st AYIEP in August 2016.

Several prominent figures in ASEAN are invited to deliver speech and lectures. Besides Ambassador Ong, the speakers are Ambassador Djauhari Oratmangun, Senior Adviser for Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Stuart Shaw (Political Counsellor at Canadian Mission to ASEAN), Alfatih Timur (Founder and CEO of Kitabisa.com), and Makshud Manik (Founder of Youthop.com). Ambassador Foster Gultom (Senior Official at the Directorate-General for ASEAN Cooperation) and Dr. Poppy S Winanti (Vice Dean of FISIPOL UGM) were also present to chair the sessions.

There are 24 participants from neighbouring ASEAN countries and outside the region who participate  at the Program, including from Vietnam, Phillippines, Japan, Egypt, and Indonesia. Several exchange students from African countries also joined the program. They will exchange ideas at Working Groups and visit some digital hubs in Yogyakarta as a part of the program.

 

Digitalizing ASEAN (2): Three Key Pillars

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In the second of two-series article, we introduce ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme, a one-week program for ASEAN Youth organized by ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. The theme of the program is “Digitalizing ASEAN”, which will be explained in this article and the following article.

We have acknowledged the importance of “digitalizing ASEAN” as an inseparable part of ongoing regional integration. What is to be done in the future? What would ASEAN youths do to socially integrate people across the region  through emerging digital platforms?

In this context, we develop three pillars of “digitalizing ASEAN” that encapsulates the need for digital integration in ASEAN, namely (1) digital diplomacy; (2) digital activism; and (3) digital citizenship.

Where do we start? Standard understanding on ASEAN and regional integration project usually depart from the relationships between “state” and “society”. Two positions are in contention. The first view perceives ASEAN as merely “state project”. Diplomatic practices makes ASEAN. Diplomats represent ASEAN. The future of ASEAN, from this viewpoint, is the future of statecraft and diplomacy.

We argue that understanding ASEAN merely from a “statist” lens is not sufficient. ASEAN is also built upon the “people” –businessmen, activists, academics, youths, religious leaders and many other elements in a complex society. This is the virtue of the second view, that perceives ASEAN as a relationship between state and non-state actors.

Thus, we need to go beyond “traditional” understanding of ASEAN as merely “state-led project” to ASEAN as a complexity. This is how “digitalizing ASEAN” should be perceived. “Digitalizing ASEAN” isn’t merely a state-led program; it should also be at the heart of people-to-people interaction in the future

This is where the role of young people is essential.

From this viewpoint, we could identify two key pillars of “digitalizing ASEAN” in the future: importance of digital diplomacy in ASEAN and the growing digital activism across the region. Both of them are intertwined. The complexity between the two pillars be framed under the idea of digital citizenship: a complex relationship between state, markets, and civil society in a newly established digital environment in Southeast Asia.  

First Pillar: Digital Diplomacy

The traditional conception of “diplomacy” often refers as the relationship among states conducted by a formal representative. However, in this globalized era, the important of citizens role in could not be neglected. For example, civil society organisations have used diplomatic apparatuses to advance their interest to embrace ‘alternative regionalism’. Various elements of peacemakers have been involved in the so-called “multi-track diplomacy”. Recently, multinational corporations have also considered as an actor of diplomacy through lobbying and trade.  

It is thus safe to say that emerging digital landscape creates opportunity for a new platform for diplomacy, too. Jan Melissen calls this  trend as ‘digital diplomacy’. Indonesian Foreign Minister, HE. Retno LP Marsudi, has also used similar term in one of her speech.

Digital diplomacy come as a solution to address the complexity of regional politics. In Digital Diplomacy, the growing use of ICTs and social media platforms by a diplomat is acknowledged as a part of diplomatic practices. As a consequence, a diplomat needs to engage with ‘digital native’. Diplomatic pratices have since transformed: from a formal roundtable meeting to livetweet; from an official press conference to a live Facebook video.  

The instrument might be changing, but the purpose is still the same: to achieve foreign policy goals. It benefits not only diplomats, but also ordinary citizen. This is obviously an opportunity to further bring ASEAN at the heart of its citizen.

Second Pillar: Digital Activism

As the diplomatic practices have been evolved, our understanding of state-society relations in ASEAN should be updated, too. ASEAN not only encompasses state-facilitated activities through ‘formal’ diplomatic practices, but also through social movement. We need to acknowledge  the rise of social movement and NGO activism in ASEAN, including youth.

ASEAN has also witnessed the rise of various youth movements that take part in advocating youth-related issues in ASEAN. The rise of these movements is also accompanied by the use of technological devices, such as mailing list and other forms of media and communication.

Rapid technological development brought by ICT industries in the region connect the people across the region. However, it is not necessarily new. In Indonesia, the Reformasi itself has been the very product of the use of internet in driving social change. The internet connects not only pro-reform activists in Indonesia but also with broader social movements abroad .

In emerging youth activism in ASEAN, the growing uses of ICT is inevitable. Telegram, Whatsapp, and Facebook has been the main medium of interaction among the young people. They publish the program through Instagram, Twitter, and connected Website. Some of them uses it for political purposes –a campaign to release Mary Jave Veloso, for example.  Some of them merely spread the opportunities for regional events. Some of them are embracing social entrepreneurship. And so on.

It is thus necessary to understand how social activism in ASEAN is forged through the medium of ICT. Let us see this happen in ASEAN.  

Third Pillar: Digital Citizenship

What connects the first and second pillar? We introduce the third pillar, digital citizenship. This might be a complex concept. Put it simply, we regard digital citizenship as a complex relationship between state and society in the region. It connects digital diplomacy and digital activism in everyday life.

The emergence of ICT industries has raised further questions over civic engagement and political life. So does in ASEAN. It brings us questions as to where the rapid digital advancement would be heading to. Would it tackle inequality among the people? Or would it instead raise racist sentiment in social media?

As the digital society is taking further steps forward, a good sense of digital citizenship is required. ASEAN should raise a sense of ‘collective identity’, which is lacking in the people across the region due to the lack of regional engagement in the past.

Taking together the idea of digital diplomacy and digital activism, the ICT development in the region should not be merely understood as a part of growing ‘regional market’. It should be seen as a tool for cultivating active citizens participation, too. Moreover, both digital diplomacy and digital activism should craft a more vibrant sense of belonging between ASEAN citizens.

Thus, we put the idea of digital citizenship as a part of our call for ‘social integration’ in ASEAN. It should be embraced by all ASEAN people in the future. Information and Communication Technology should not be put as an end in ASEAN integration. Instead, it should be utilised as a means to put forward deeper integration among ASEAN citizens and redefine our identity through engagement with technology.

The Rationale for AYIEP 2017

So here were are. We attempt to incorporate these key pillars by introducing the The 2nd ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme (AYIEP) in 2017, which will be held between 23-29 July 2017 in Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta. All of the programs are organised along these key pillars. We hope it consistently brings the participant to take part in our call for “digitalizing ASEAN” throughout the programs.

The 1st AYIEP has been successfully put forward the agenda for bringing social awareness among ASEAN youths, with various visits to NGOs in Yogyakarta and Working Groups. Critical thinking is at the heart of our event.

The 2nd AYIEP embarks upon the success of the previous program to bring social awareness and embrace critical thinking through digital platform. We intend to address the need for regional integration by bringing about youths across the region. To do so, we adapt three sub-themes engage all of the elements of youhts from all ASEAN countries, as well as other regions that might be interested with ASEAN-related issue.

We have a simple mission here. We pledge to pave the way for “digitalizing ASEAN” through youth engagement. So that, ASEAN could be more “people-oriented” and “people-centred” in the future. Let us see this happen in the future!

 

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Digitalizing ASEAN (1): What It is and Why It is Important

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In this first series of article, we introduce ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme, a one-week program for ASEAN Youth organized by ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. The theme of the program is “Digitalizing ASEAN”, which will be explained in this article and the following article.

ASEAN is now 50 years old. We are now witnessing the age of rapid technological development as well as greater connectivity in the region. We are also stepping forward into ASEAN Community, which has been implemented since 2015.The rapid development on regional economic cooperation under the so-called ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) demonstrates high commitment of ASEAN member countries to become not only the largest market, but also to establish a form of collective identity.

ASEAN has declared to be a “people-oriented” and “people-centered” organization in 2015. The consciousness of shared culture, geography, and history at the community level has bound the peoples together. the importance of ASEAN as a regional organization is now becoming a vehicle to create a more cohesive and united regional community.

The complexity in world politics necessitates ASEAN to embrace a form of ‘social integration’. The recent regional outlook from ASEAN Studies Center UGM has showed that the current trend in 2017 has showed a decline of regionalism, the rise of intra-regional problems related to economic growth, social cohesion, and some degree of political uncertainty.

ASEAN, therefore, needs to embrace a non-traditional form of integration. This is where the idea of digital integration comes to the fore. Digital integration does not only means greater connectivity among people across the region –it also calls the young people to embrace a sense of collectivity. Digital integration supports ASEAN to be a ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centered’

Against this backdrop, we call for the further steps towards ‘digitalising ASEAN community’. This notion constitutes the central theme of ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Program, an annual event of ASEAN Studies Centre, Universitas Gadjah Mada that will be held in 23-29 July 2017.

Why digital integration?

Information and Communication Technology is the most important issue in the world politics in at least the last two decades. The invention of the worldwide web, the growing IT systems, and connectivity across the world, as well as rapid use of technology have largely contributed to the advancement of global society. It connects, along with a globally-connected IT systems, a quantum leap in people’s ability to communicate both one-to-one and one-to-many and also access to knowledge, are unlimited.

Klaus Schwab called this recent phenomenon as the fourth industrial revolution. It raises questions over how to deal with Big Data, not only in terms of ‘technological advancement’, but also in terms of the changing international order.

It also necessitates International Relations scholars to rethink the relationship between digital revolution, intergenerational changes, and the transformation of international order.

The concept of ‘digital revolution’, however, is not necessarily new in International Relations. Following rapid ICT development in some countries, several global governance institutions has brought about the issues of ICT governance as their main programme. The United Nations, for example, set up a task force on Information and Technology and several initiatives to address digital divide since 2000.

ASEAN is also adapting to this trend by establishing the ASEAN ICT Masterplan (AIM) in 2009. The first completion report was due in 2015 and was continued until 2025. It aims to bring ASEAN member states towards a ‘digital revolution’ by 2025 through many digital platforms and programs—the “smart city”, financial technology, as well as e-commerce.

Yet, we need more. With growing ‘digital integration’ in regional level, ASEAN still needs to deal with increasing development gap in the regionASEAN is also struggling to resolve the classic ‘digital divide’, as well as enhancing the participation of young people across the region.

ASEAN ICT Masterplan, so far, has only a little to offer to overcome these problemsm, given the limit of ASEAN integration.

But it does not mean ASEAN should abandon the ongoing ICT-related regional projects. With a large and youthful population increasingly equipped with smartphones, ASEAN has an opportunity to pioneer the development of new digital services, especially advanced mobile financial services and e-commerce. These sectors are likely to give rise to digital champions that will lead the way for the broader economy.

What ASEAN needs to do, nevertheless, is to integrating the ongoing digital integration in regional level with rising youth participation in the region. The future of ASEAN lies in the development of digital technology. It also necessitates ASEAN to embrace young people –those who are considered as ‘digital native’— to consider their special attention to the task of connecting community in ASEAN. Digitalizing ASEAN also can increasingly enable citizens to engage with governments as voice their opinions.

The advancement of technology should be a good platform for ASEAN to foster connectivity among people. This is also useful to embrace a culture of good “digital” citizenship, thus ensuring the realization of “people-oriented” and “people-centred” ASEAN.

Nevertheless, the rise of digital technology should also be followed by critical perspectives. Recent series of article by OpenDemocracy and Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute showed that the emergence of digital use in everyday economy (which is also renowned as ‘gig economy’) also creates many problems in workforce, labour-related issues, and broader socio-economic aspects in everyday life.

In Indonesia, for example, several start-up companies operating in transportation, such as Grab, Uber, or Gojek have clashed with ‘conventional’ ojek or Taxi drivers. Digital integration, therefore, does not entirely positive. Various social problems emerged from this development, which necessitates further analysis on how to resolve it. Addressing this issue requires creative and critical thinking from the young generation.

Here lies our challenge to talk about digital society in regional context. This is why we desperately need a more concrete action for “digitalizing ASEAN” in the future.

 

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center

Bincang ASEAN Discusses EU and ASEAN Model of Integration

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM held the sixth meeting of Bincang ASEAN in Friday (19/5), which invited Prof. Janos Vandor (Professor at Budapest Business School) and Suraj Shah (Graduate Student at King’s College University of London) to share interesting views on whether on European Union can serve as an integration model for ASEAN as there has been several attempts to achieve integration outside of Europe, including ASEAN. However, how do EU model integration suits ASEAN?

Shah Suraj begin the discussion by examining the Varieties of Capitalism Approach (VoC) applied by EU and ASEAN. Suraj pointed out ASEAN and EU has a different path to select related to VoC. EU develops supranational institutions that suit a Liberal Market Economies (LME), whereas ASEAN develops intergovernmental institutions that suit a Co-ordinated Market Economies (CME). Reviewing the condition of ASEAN recently, Prof Janos Vandor from Budapest Business School who paid a visit to ASEAN Studies Centre added that EU and ASEAN develops a different political will. ASEAN shows no indication of sovereignty sharing and a high chance of competitiveness within the members — a striking contrast to EU.

Recapitulating the international political economy, EU and ASEAN shares different mechanism. To enforce the mechanism, EU established European Parliement and European Courts which determine all member states to adhere to this and can not pursue their own bilateral agenda. While, ASEAN constructs ASEAN centrality that allows members to engage outside of the region, and make their own trading agreements on a bilateral level.

Suraj also mentioned that so long as ASEAN maintains the institutional form of the ASEAN Way, there is no way to enforce or socialise system coordination or institutional complementarity that would allow for supranational integration. In conclusion, Prof Vandor and Suraj agreed that ASEAN must find its own path towards integration based on its institutional form as a limited access order and economic model of a coordinated market.

ASC Discusses Global Discourses on Rohingya

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM held the fifth meeting of Bincang ASEAN in Friday (12/5), which invitedHadza Min Fadhli Robbi, S.I.P.  (alumnus of the Department of International Relations who is currently completing a Master’s program at the Eskisehir University Osmangazi, Turkey) to share information about the geopolitical issues of the Rohingya community. Held at BC building room number 207, the discussion was initiated with the issue of global discourse and political contestation in Rohingya-Arkan, looking at the issue from the discourse of countries such as Myanmar, ASEAN, China, West and Turkey.

Hadza began by arguing that Myanmar tends to place the Rohingyas as “radical others”. It makes the Rohingyas regarded as unworthy human beings. The Rohingyas have no civil rights like any other ethnic group in Myanmar.

ASEAN as the second closest actor in this case also wants to be involved in resolving the Rohingya conflict. However, this is hampered by the sensitive norms. ASEAN is still considered lack of will and empathy. Countries in Southeast Asia mostly see the Rohingyas problem with the point of view of illegality, and not in the perspective of human rights.

“The Chinese in Rohingya’s problems tend to be pragmatic. As a country that has a giant corporate partnership, China sees the Rohingyas as a poison that hinders growth for Asean as well as China, ” said Hadza. In the similar vein Western countries such as America, England, Australia who sees the conflict Rohingya from the liberal norms of democracy. Western countries wish to protect both Rohingya and the government of Myanmar.

Turkey, in this case, hold a different approach based upon historical connections. Both Myanmar and Turkey had a good relations in the past. The Turkish government with its state-centered approach is very cautious in helping to resolve the sensitive conflicts of Rohingyas. Various aids, such as refugee and logistics tents, have been distributed to the conflict area. In an effort to support Rohingya, Turkey also often broadcast the Rohingya conflict on Turkish cooperation media. (/in)

ASEAN Economic Community: In Search of a Single Production Base

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A key motivation behind the pursuit of a comprehensive ASEAN Economic Community is to establish a single production base. By doing so, ASEAN member states hope to increase their competitiveness, which in turn will boost exports and continue to attract investment to the region. However, whilst ASEAN has been successful in tariff reduction, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) impede a truly single production base and ASEAN Economic Community. Given the slow progress at the regional level, ASEAN members must individually take unilateral action in addressing NTBs, as well as advancing trade facilitation measures, such as coordinating and sustaining investment in infrastructure with a regional orientation.  

Why does ASEAN need to establish a single production base? In the last decade, the way that the globalised economy conducts trade has undergone dramatic transformation. Whereas in previous decades goods were produced from their initial to final production stage in one country, we have now moved to global production sharing. Trade is now increasingly intra-firm, with design, trading of parts and components, and final assembly conducted across global production networks. The place of a country in the value chain of global production involves specification in a certain task based on relative cost advantage, which determines production locations and trade flows. Furthermore, the division of production has become more fragmented and no longer solely confined to the production of goods, with the growth of the service sector that goes into the production of final goods.

ASEAN members are integrated into these production networks given their export led growth models. However, the relatively smaller economies of ASEAN member states have not been large enough to produce products from start to finish in one country competitively. Through this process, ASEAN members struggle to move up the production chain into value-added production. Furthermore, import substitution measures in previous decades that have sought to address this have shown to be inefficient and impede rather than advance economic growth, whilst failing to move countries up the value chain sustainably.

Furthermore, the huge and growing internal markets of China and India, as well as other regional trading arrangements such as the Single Market of the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have created structural change in the global political economy. For ASEAN members who value foreign direct investment for economic development, these structural changes have led to trade and investment diversion away from their economies, and ASEAN has received a diminishing share of foreign direct investments. This has acted as a driving force for ASEAN economic integration, as establishing a single regional production base would allow ASEAN to exploit economies of scale and increase the region’s competitiveness.

Achieving this goal has never been so relevant for ASEAN. Regional production sharing creates opportunities for participation in the international division of labour, with factor endowments and relative prices determining which country produces what components. Small and developing ASEAN member states can choose to specialise in a stage of production, and a regional production base further allows for small and medium enterprises within ASEAN to specialise in any one part of the value chain to engage in global trade. Developing member states in ASEAN should engage in the way trade increasingly takes place in the form of ‘tasks’ at the regional level rather than goods being produced from beginning to end in a given country to exploit comparative advantage.  

However, political and institutional constraints have impeded the realisation of this goal. On the one hand, ASEAN members have not been ready to liberalise their markets as their members economies are competing rather than complementary. Furthermore, politically sensitive sectors continue to be protected. Despite attempts to liberalise trade since the 1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) such as complex licensing regulations, quotas, and corrupt customs procedures continue to be significant impediments to regional free trade. Furthermore, ASEAN has been institutionally weak in addressing NTBs, given the lack of a coercive mechanism to ensure compliance and limited monitoring capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat.   

Non-Tariff Barriers in ASEAN create an environment that is inefficient and increases the costs for engaging in regional production. Alternative and non-complementary sets of rules, uneven product standards, and mixed tariff measures under bilateral and weak multilateral agreements prevent harmonisation, and act as serious impediments to regional integration and discourage investment. As a case in point, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have become the leading vehicle for ASEAN member states to enter global production networks. However, ASEAN members have been increasingly unattractive to MNEs to engage in regional production due to the extra costs of production sharing through non-tariff barriers, poor infrastructure and connectivity, and the difficulty of coordinating activities regionally into the production of a final good. These associated costs often outweigh the gains of lower labour costs, where ASEAN members often derive their current comparative advantage.

Thus establishing an integrated single production base seeks to address these issues. Trade based on regional production sharing, through networked trade or value chains, functions more efficiently through a regional trading system with one set of rules, standards, and market access commitments. By creating a single production base with tariff free movement between ASEAN members, the costs of producing goods from start to finish in the region will be significantly reduced. This would enhance competitiveness that would boosts exports, and make the region a more attractive for investment.

To realise a single production base and true ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN needs stronger institutional governance. However, given the slow progress on this at the regional level, ASEAN member states should act unilaterally in tackling NTBs. In complementing the pursuit of a single production base, ASEAN members must continue to invest in infrastructure and improve regional connectivity. Through better infrastructure, the costs of producing goods and services regionally will be significantly reduced. This allows for trade facilitation that allows for better regional integration and improves competitiveness.

Having said this, ASEAN has made some positive steps towards establishing a single production base, however much is left to be achieved if ASEAN is to achieve a truly single market and ASEAN Economic Community.

 

Suraj Shah is a Visiting Fellow at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Marawi’s Crisis Requires ASEAN’s Centrality, Not External Intervention

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Since the past two weeks, Southeast Asia has been putting a serious concern to its security and stability caused by the state of crisis in Marawi and Mindanao. Isnilon Hapilon, appeared to be a famous criminal who has committed itself in a global crime featured in the list of targeted person by FBI, becomes the reason why Armed Forces of Philippines started its fire in Marawi. Currently, the AFP has been fighting against 400 militants of Islamist fighters in Marawi, including foreign fighters, causing almost 200,000 civilians flee away from the city. By placing the entire Mindanao under martial law, President Rodrigo Duterte perceived that this approach would end the crisis soon.

Even this issue was considered as a topic for discussion during the annual regional security forum, The Shangri-La Dialogue. This topic was brought by the Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen, who is afraid if the situation in Marawi and Mindanao is not immediately resolved under the framework of cooperation between ASEAN member countries, Southeast Asia would have to bear the responsibility for a greater spill-over effect to the region.

Amidst a belief that President Rodrigo Duterte would have been successful to ‘solve’ his national security crisis alone, the transnational nature of Islamists insurgency and radicalism needs a significant role of ASEAN, not only to have a prompt response against potential security threat, but also to prevent the growth of radicalism and transnational crime.

Practically, ASEAN member states have stepped up cooperation as the threat from Islamic State increases. They planned to utilize spy planes and drones to stalk the movement of militants. The existing trilateral joint maritime patrol between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines will be intensified. Even the United States through U.S.-ASEAN meeting seeks an entry point to ‘help’ ASEAN whether it is intelligence, information, or else. Let alone Duterte has been offered a help by Russia to fight drugs and terrorism, and he himself demands for military assistance from Russia.

In this sense, ASEAN needs to learn from the case when Southeast Asia was regarded as ‘second front’ of the US Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). George Bush pushed to implement a regional counterterrorism consensus considering all terrorism-related activities into one bucket. On the other hand, the nature of Marawi’s crisis is more multifaceted with crosscutting issues involving separatism, Islamic radical movements, and global crime network. In this sense, if Russia and the United States intervene more in this regional issue let alone putting a similar doctrine like GWOT, it is plausible that the Philippines will become the ‘Syria of Southeast Asia’. ASEAN member states should keep in mind that the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism remains prime as a guideline to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism in all forms. In this sense, the involvement of external parties should be considered carefully.

This does not dwell on defeating the militants per se, but also to close the gap for separatism. ASEAN needs to learn from the case of Indonesia, back to the end of 1990s where Indonesia lost East Timor. The indirect interventions from Australian government to support the insurgency of FRETILIN led by Francisco Xavier do Amaral had successfully foiled the two-decade Lotus Operation launched by Indonesian Armed Forces.

In fact, it is arguably that Duterte should realize that the case should be addressed to ASEAN as a regional body instead of ensnaring greater involvement from great powers. The larger involvement of great power in ASEAN’s regional security problem will only pave a way to a more complex political-security environment in ASEAN. In this sense, it provides a criticism that the ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention must be further question to reflect the current security and stability crisis in the region, especially the Article III and IV of ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism concerning the principle of non-interference and preservation of sovereignty.

ASEAN needs to be more fluid to encounter the transnational nature of threat. Having said that the nature of this threat is transnational, ASEAN member states need to realize that sovereignty is the primary cost to be paid. If ASEAN does not begin to put concern about ‘shared sovereignty’, not only is ASEAN’s increasingly lost relevance in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security issues, the fall of the country to the hands of radical groups is not inconceivable.

Therefore, we may see the future challenge for ASEAN‘s security issues is not only in the way to manage and solve the primary security crisis in the South China Sea, but also to maintain security and stability in Marawi under the existing ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. By not pulling in external parties to solve this issue, ASEAN will not lose its relevance to ensure the regional security and stability.

 

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

ASC Welcomed Professor Anders Uhlin from Lund University

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On Monday (6/5), ASEAN Studies Center received a visit of Professor Anders Uhlin from Lund University, Sweden. He visited our institution in conjunction with his agenda to be a speaker for the academic roundtable discussion, in which he had the opportunity to present his book entitled “Civil Society and Regional Governance”, taking place in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Welcomed by our Director Dr. Dafri Agussalim and staffs, Professor Anders Uhlin was glad to have the opportunity discussing about the current condition of how civil society involves in the making and changing of regional governance. He underlined that whether regional institution is challenged or not, civil society should remain at the center of regional governance. Coming up with the idea of “legitimization” and “de-legitimization”, he perceived that the legitimation of global or regional institution is in general coming from civil society. Therefore, studying regional governance and institutionalization is inconceivable without considering civil society at the core.

ASEAN Summit 2017: A Conclusion to South China Sea?

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In April this year, the ASEAN Summit kicked off at the heart of the Philippines – Metro Manila. With the theme entitled “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World”, this summit was well attended by all the head of states and government officers of the member-states. This then will be followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit, both later this June and November.

The recent concluded summit indicates that the focuses are more on the on-going of member-states’ concerns. Of which this window of opportunity has been taken to set the tone of this year’s summit. It is not unusual practice though, for the issues of concerns to receive more prominence. In fact, this is in line with ASEAN’s raison d’être, which it has a broad agenda that includes regional economic cooperation, promoting defence relations and socio-cultural cooperation, serving its purpose as the central role of regional body.

Notwithstanding, as much as the issues of concerns have been raised, and to some extend advocated, such as the importance of international trade, as articulated by Singapore, a drug-free region by the Philippines, rights of migrant workers and Rohingyas by Indonesia, amongst others, there lies one pertinent issue that is conspicuous but admittedly, helpless – the South China Sea.

The China’s lobby efforts to remove the mentioning of land reclamation and militarisation efforts at the manmade islands have received limelight global coverage. The Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte mentioned, “It cannot be an issue anymore. It (Chinese presence) is already there. What would be the purpose also of discussing it if you cannot do anything?” It refers to the event whereby he had to succumb to Chinese’s will. The ASEAN diplomats also admitted that China had lobbied hard and the delayed joint ASEAN Statement speaks for itself.

Whilst the ASEAN countries are divided over the South China Sea contentious issue, even though they managed to maintain their unity by eventually releasing the final version of the Statement, it tells one thing for certain and indeed has raised the eyebrows of many – that ASEAN countries are gravitating even closer to China’s orbit as day passes by and the latter’s influence is irresistible, especially through this summit.

However, this might not be the case if among the most pressing issues in ASEAN is properly and successfully addressed – the unbalance economic development of all ten member-states, even though this is only amongst the bigger picture of Sino-ASEAN relations’ picture.

Indeed, regional cohesion remains a distant dream, which according to the consultancy firm McKinsey, especially when the economic chasm between the richest members Singapore, with a per capita income more than 50 times higher when compared to Cambodia and Myanmar, and 30 times higher than Laos. Furthermore, intra-regional trade through the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community even stand less than half the share that of NAFTA and EU. It indicates that the economic barriers are still strong, even though among the ASEAN member-states themselves.

By addressing the economic needs, the tendency to gravitate to China’s orbit may be less likely. If only certain ASEAN countries are not highly dependable on China and possesses its own diversified economy income. Even though last week saw a meeting in Hanoi to speed up the negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), after six years no less, and the revival of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), the hurdles on both economic agreements are remain.

Duterte of the Philippines for instance, followed by his visit to China last year, returned home with USD 24 billion in deals and this summit saw no-mention on the tribunal award that highly favorable to the Philippines. China also has invested a gigantic amount of money to Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, amounting to more than 10 billion as of last year. Undeniably, the China tentacles control the South China Sea through economic projection. Recently, China has warned the Philippines not to conduct any drill for oil in a disputed part of the South China Sea and not to enforce an arbitration ruling.

Despite the effort of the consultation mechanism on the South China Sea, both on ASEAN platform and bilaterally, further resolution on the issue is further from sight. After 15 years, Sino-ASEAN agreed on Wednesday (May 18) a draft framework on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Whilst the first meeting of Sino-The Philippines on Friday (May 19), only provided the backdrop of addressing concerns and handling incidents in an appropriate manner.

On the other hand, the contending power on the China’s projection – the US, however, the South China Sea dispute may not be the immediate agenda. Because the US needs China to rein in the aggressive Pyongyang on the ballistic missiles and the likelihood of developing the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities that could possibly reach the US mainland in the next course of years.

Therefore, the South China Sea dispute is hardly on the US’ urgent list, and which is why it is unlikely for both ASEAN and by extension the US to reach any major breakthrough or agreement over the South China Sea dispute beyond a generically worded statement.

 

Nik Luqman is a Graduate Student in Strategy and Security Studies at the National University of Malaysia

Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and the New Politics of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

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China officially launched the Belt and Road Initiatives on May 2017. Attended by 29 partner countries (with the absence of some prominent neighbours such as India), the launching of the initiative has marked a new direction in China’s foreign policy, with scholars has signalled this initiative as a new shift in international politics.

The so-called “Belt and Road Initiatives” (BRI), however, is not Beijing’s new foreign policy project. It has been formulated since 2014, which was coincided with the establishment of Chinese-led initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Unlike AIIB, however, Beijing’s direct involvement is more prominent in the BRI, in which the initiative was directed and strongly controlled by Beijing, whilst the AIIB tended to be multilateral and based on expertise.

 

The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Regionalism

The rise of BRI has raised some questions over the future of regionalism in many parts of the world. In 1995, Andrew Hurrell theorised the resurgence of ‘new regionalism’, which witnessed the political order into a new form of interstate cooperation based on geographical and spatial proximities. New Regionalism, he argued, emerged because of world reordering after the Cold War, which witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union and some new patterns of cooperation, which is different with the past.

However, some new developments in the 2000s have also showed stagnation and, more recently, signals towards reversal. Prior to the launching of BRI, the world has witnessed the crisis in the European Union (EU) with the United Kingdom called for exiting the EU through a referendum in 2016. On the other part of the world, ASEAN has also showed stagnation in the negotiation over South China Sea (although the diplomatic fora still continues until present) and the talks over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

This is not to mention the shift in United States’ foreign policy under President Donald Trump, who seems not to be interested in maintaining the liberal world order, which is arguably central in the US foreign policy in the last decade.

The rise of Chinese-led AIIB and BRI therefore should be understood in this historical and political trajectory. At least three keys explanations pave the way of ‘the rise of China’ and its infrastructure project.

First, we need to understand ‘the rise of China’ as an effect of the 2008 global financial crisis that put the Anglo-American power, which has arguably been established since the Second Bretton Wood, at stake. The global financial crisis in the US and Europe has hit the most fundamental foundation of Anglo-American ‘structural power’, namely the financial architecture. As a result, many states are forced to adjust their key financial policy into the macro prudential reform that gives more power to the state to regulate national financial environment.

Yet, the recovery from the 2008-2009 crisis is not as smooth as analyst and scholars predicted. It contributes to the unrest in Greece, the rise of right-wing populism in many European states, as well as to the recent Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. China, in contrast, has showed not only resilience to the crisis, but also its power to navigate the world political economic order through state-led industrial and developmental policies. With the decline of Anglo-American ‘neoliberal’ order, China has slowly gained prominence in world politics.

Second, the rise of China has also enabled by what Andrew Baker said as ‘ideational shift’ in the construction of world political and economic order. Since 1980s, the so-called Washington Consensus” has been taken seriously as the only alternative to manage the world economy. However, with the decline of neoliberal order amid the global financial crisis, the idea of free-market social liberalism that constitutes the foundation of liberal political-economic order has also been declined.

Interestingly, in early 2010s, the World Bank released a new document that redefines the framework for economic development, namely “New Structural Economics”. Authored by the Bank’s then Chief Economist, Justin Yifu Lin, the document has challenged the prominence of free-market mechanism and called for the return of the state in supporting industrial projects through constructing infrastructural cooperation. The framework may be debated among Economist, but it has undoubtedly re-framed political economic order into a new state-led direction, with many scholars referred as the return of ‘Keynesianism’ in world political economy.

Third, the rise of China could also be interpreted as the transformation of ‘territorial logic’ of regionalism to a new ‘infrastructural logic’ brought by the AIIB and BRI. I argue that this transformation has been enabled by the changing countours of world political economy with the decline of the neoliberal order and the rise of ‘new structuralism’ in world politics. The AIIB and BRI utilised this transformation to create a new basis for Chinese ‘structural power’ in world politics.

 

The Changing Logic of Territoriality

Theorists of new regionalism and the liberal institutionalists tended to argue that regionalism is crafted by a process of integration, which occurs in a set of geographical and territorial boundaries and unites the states within the boundaries to cooperate each other to maintain stability and avoid conflicts. It is the case with the ASEAN, in which the result to respondthe Cold War conflict and establish cooperation in a set of territorial boundaries, namely ‘Southeast Asia’.

However, missing from their argument is the historical origins of the ‘territorial logic’ that underpins this regional integration. Yet, in the 1990s, several Indochinese countries have agreed to join ASEAN, which marked the extension of territorial boundaries of the regionalism project. It shows that the ‘territorial logic’ that underpins regionalism, particularly in Southeast Asia, is constructed historically and socially. It was socially constructed by the changes in international political order and historically constructed by the similar political background with other ASEAN member states.

The Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiatives, I shall argue, challenges this old ‘territorial logic’ and offers a new framework of regionalism based on the infrastructural and, furthermore, industrial cooperation. This form of cooperation is not new; ASEAN has attempted to establish such cooperation in the 1980s. However, the so-called ‘ASEAN Industrial Project’ was soon replaced by ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was based upon the ‘neoliberal’ logic of cooperation.

With the decline of neoliberal order and the rise of this mode of infrastructural cooperation, it will not be surprising to see the return of more complex form of regional infrastructural and industrial cooperation in the future. The infrastructural cooperation will arguably leads into a deeper connection of regional project, regardless the geographical locus of cooperation, with China leads the way to finance the cooperation.

Consider, for example, China’s involvement in Africa. With growing multilateral projects on African infrastructural development, China has showed that regional cooperation could also involve external partners, particularly when it comes to development project. As Justin Yifu Lin and Andrea Goldstein has recently argued, the rise of infrastructural cooperation could lead into ‘African Industrial revolution’, which obviously re-frame African economic cooperation in the region.

Moreover, the rise of Belt and Road Initiatives necessitates a new understanding of regionalism in world politics. It is clear that logic of regionalism is on the way for being challenged by the rise of new pattern of cooperation brought by China. However, regionalism is still far from crisis. It is the task for scholars who study regionalism in Southeast Asia to lay out future research programmes to respond this new politics of regionalism in the future.

 

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada