By Truston Yu (Picture: ASEAN Twitter)

Today, one could easily come up with the universally accepted definition of Southeast Asia – the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members plus Timor-Leste. However, it could be said that the notion of Southeast Asia is an imaginary which has taken its form only in the previous decades. On the occasion of ASEAN Day in the Year of ASEAN Identity, this article looks into the evolution of the concept of “Southeast Asia” as well as a regional identity.

In his book The Spectre of Comparisons, Benedict Anderson stated that “Southeast Asia” as a politically significant term only came about in 1943 with the Louise Mountbatten Southeast Asia Command. An interesting feature is that the notion of “Southeast Asia” at that time included Ceylon and the Northeastern part of India, but not present-day Indonesia or the Philippines. This was a response to the fact that all of present-day Southeast Asia, from Burma to New Guinea, were brought under the same flag of Imperial Japan.

Though none survived in the end, various regional organizations have consolidated the concept of this Southeast Asian subcontinent: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and Maphilindo. The ASEAN, by rejecting Sri Lanka’s membership application, further consolidated today’s conception of Southeast Asia that this article began with.

Southeast Asia has been a victim of the Cold War. The annexation of Timor-Leste, Singapore’s Operation Coldstore, and other significant incidents in Southeast Asia’s recent history have all taken place against the backdrop of the struggle for hegemony between the Soviet and the Western blocs. The study of this region became a point of interest as the Americans sought to exert their influence here. Southeast Asian Studies, as an institutionalized field, emerged in 1947 with Yale University’s pioneering academic program. Very soon, Cornell and other institutions followed, and this Studies became a burgeoning subject which would consolidate the picture of a “Southeast Asia”.

The above historical incidents show that the current notion of “Southeast Asia” is a recent construct, under much influence from powers outside of this region. These have led to skepticism within and beyond Southeast Asia. Why view a constructed identity with such great importance?

Southeast Asia is by far the most diverse region the world has seen, most significantly in the aspects of politics, language, and religion. Southeast Asia has seen military governments, dictatorships, monarchies, democracies, sultanates, and systems in between. Singapore’s parliamentary system is based on Westminster, though they have devised and introduced unique elements into the polity; the Philippines has adopted an American system, with a House of Representative and Senate making up the Congress.

In a small region like ours, it may be unexpected that we have an abundance of languages drastically different and mutually intelligible: Burmese, Thai, Vietnamese, Lao, Khmer, and the varieties of Bahasa. Under the colonial influence, English and Portuguese are official languages used in Singapore and Timor-Leste, respectively. There are also various indigenous languages and dialects scattered across the subcontinent, as well as languages used by immigrant communities.

Both Thailand and Myanmar have a Buddhist majority; Timor-Leste and the Philippines are predominantly Catholic; Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia are largely Islamic, and there are folk religions in Vietnam and Laos. In between all these, there are still minorities who practice Hinduism, Protestantism, and other faiths.

Instead of becoming a line that divides us, our diversity is a treasure that we cherish; Despite the many differences, there are still many common denominators across all of Southeast Asia. The cuisine is one of such examples – we all have a taste for rice, spices, and perhaps sweets as well.

Historically, we might not be that different either. The boundaries of Southeast Asia were somewhat ambiguous and dynamic until the European colonizers imposed on us their form of sovereignty, carving out borders in which the modern Southeast Asian states have emerged from. However, territories hoisting different national flags today might have been under the same banner of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and other ancient kingdoms. Boundaries have never stopped the interaction of peoples across them.

It is undeniable that the ASEAN’s establishment has had much to do with anti-communism rhetoric in the era of the Cold War, as a joint project by its founding fathers Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. However, it has grown into a vibrant community encompassing the political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of this subcontinent.

If one is to challenge the Southeast Asian identity based on the grounds that it is imagined and constructed recently, the same can be applied to the states in Southeast Asia too. The Philippines was not one monolithic nation prior to the arrival of the Spaniards, which grouped them into the Spanish East Indies. Some Indonesian nationalists like to invoke the story of Majapahit to prove that we were once the state encompassing all of Nusantara before. Yet, on the other hand, we did not actually have a uniting native language before the founding of our state – Malay was more of a lingua franca for the purposes of trade and commerce, up until a variant of it was declared the national language known as Bahasa Indonesia. In this sense, like the Philippines, the Indonesian identity as we know it today is also largely a modern construct. This does not mean we should not celebrate, and certainly has not stopped us from celebrating our own national identity.

Like many of its modern nations, the idea of a Southeast Asian identity is an imagined community and a recent construct. And as we strive to preserve our own identities and appreciate each other’s heritage, let us also come together to celebrate the Southeast Asian region, culture, and community.

Truston Yu is a research assistant at the University of Hong Kong. His primary research interest is Southeast Asian Studies, including the concept of regional identity. He could be reached at their e-mail: trustonyuofficial@gmail.com

By Alifa Salsabila, SH (Picture: Council on Foreign Relations)

In April 2020, the Rohingyas were denied entry to Malaysia due to the country’s fear over Covid-19 transmission. Recently, around a hundred people of the Rohingyas reached Indonesian soil and are locally received by Indonesian citizens while the government has not yet decided any further legal nor diplomatic action aside from having them (the Rohingyas) in Aceh.

The Rohingyas, for the past few years, have become quite a concern of the international community. They were first labeled as “boat people,” signifying phenomena of hundreds of people struggling to reach the nearest shores outside of their home country, Myanmar, which later were identified as the “Rohingyas.” Geographically, the Southeast Asian neighboring countries such as India, Thailand, and Indonesia are the nearest runaways for them.

But it is miserable to learn that the phenomena of the ‘running away Rohingyas’—which have been discovered by international media for more than ten years ago—are still happening today as efforts on diplomatic progress to end oppressions toward the Rohingyas are running sluggish. At the regional level, ASEAN focuses to repatriate hundreds of the Rohingyas. But this effort would never be enough to resolve the case. This article would provide a different approach in helping out the Rohingyas under the ambit of international criminal law.

Roots of the Problem

There are many facets to explain the oppressions to Rohingyas. But all might agree that the oppressions toward them are rooted in the long-time dispute over Myanmar’s historical records that delivers a contestation over the Rohingyas’ legal status whether they are considered as an indigenous group of Myanmar or a group of foreign settlers coming to reside in the country throughout the nineteenth century (Irish Center for Human Rights, 2010).

Myanmar’s government and citizens refer to the Rohingyas as “Bengalis”. For them, the “Bengalis” are groups of Indian laborers and merchants migrating from India hundreds of years ago during the British colonial rule and making them (the Rohingyas) considered as “illegal immigrants” (Southwick, 2018) who take advantages to reside in Myanmar. The Rohingyas are thus known to be the most persecuted minority group in the world (Mohajan, 2018).

In its early days, the oppression toward the Rohingyas was led by an operation in May 1978. The government of Myanmar—having the military backup—launched a fatal operation called “Naga-Min” or translated as “Dragon-Min” Operation whose order was to dispel as many illegal immigrants as possible found residing in Myanmar, which by all means, included the Rohingyas. Arguably, the operation had the Rohingyas as their primary targets (Khairi, 2019). The operation has since then always led and developed the oppressions to the Rohingyas until today.

On the other hand, it is unfortunate to learn that the oppressions to the Rohingyas are driven and fueled by ‘Buddhist nationalism.’ Buddhist nationalism first emerged in Myanmar as a response to fight against the British colonial rule in the region. Back then, Buddhist nationalism significantly contributed to the country’s fight by mobilizing the people of Myanmar—who were referred as the Burmese—through identifying and embracing their Burmese culture whose majority were—and still are—Buddhists. Today, Buddhist nationalism is arguably no longer a pack of cultural values nor historical memories associated with Buddhism. Buddhist nationalism has been brought into contestation over ‘life and death’ matter in which the country’s economics and politics are taking significant parts in. It has now changed the cultural-historical records into narratives of an unbalanced local economic growth and security issues between Myanmar’s citizens in general and the Rohingyas. It is also learned that Buddhist nationalism, in a way, provokes the fear of Islamophobia that Moslem people in Myanmar—which fundamentally signifies the presence of the Rohingyas—would one day take over the country and thus people have to prevent this from happening.

As result, the Rohingyas have been suffering from many kinds of discrimination and a wide range of abuses for so many years. They are denied citizenship rights, limited access to education, healthcare, freedom of mobility, and even giving births (Khairi, 2019). In other cases, they are also suffering from deportation and forced transfer and displacement, rapes, and sexual violence. But, among these all, one form of oppression is less identified than the rest: forced labor that indicates enslavement. As a side note, both forced labor and enslavement are identified as crimes, international crimes, and forms of modern slavery (Siller, 2016).

Forced Labor: Enslavement as A Crime Against Humanity and A Form of Modern Slavery

Enslavement to the Rohingyas is carried out in the form of forced labor. According to the Rome Statute, enslavement is as a crime against humanity which is widely and systematically committed against civilians—which in the case of the Rohingyas is. As enslavement, ‘forced labor’ here is understood as a form oppression that does not target a particular person nor group of people, rather people in general as “civilian population.” The ‘forced labor’ here distinguishes itself from a ‘mere’ forced labor which purely targets workers based on exploitation for profit orientation (money and pleasure) of the employers that takes place in common workplaces.

The legal framework of forced labor as enslavement could be found in Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute. In the Rome Statute, enslavement is explained as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.” Historically—prior to having the International Criminal Court (ICC) established—enslavement was included as a crime against humanity in the Article 6(c) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Nuremberg Principles (Principle VI), Control Council Law No. 10, Article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Article 3 of the statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It is known that in the ICTY, the judgment of the Krnojelac case decided that “enslavement constituted a crime under customary international law.” The Chamber reiterated that “forced labor, when operating outside of the permissible exceptions under international humanitarian and human rights law, is an established indicator of enslavement.”

In the Rakhine State, the enslavement of the Rohingyas is committed by NaSaKa, a security force formed by the Myanmar government (Southwick, 2018). The enslavement is carried out in the forms of labors that could be conducted seasonal or perennial, including (but not limited to) construction of roads, bridges, model villages and military facilities, camp maintenance, guard and security functions, forced cultivation and agricultural laboring, and even arbitrary taxation. The labors do not distinguish gender roles nor ages—a male or a female and a child or an adult—each of the Rohingyas has to endure the misconduct, difficulties, and mistreatment in their workplace (Farzana, 2017) which the government officials claim are done voluntarily. Consequently, this form of oppression situates the Myanmar authorities namely government officials and military apparatus as the alleged perpetrators (Lee, 2019). This situation seemingly answers questions upon why and how oppressions to the Rohingyas have been so legit to be carried out for long.

Furthermore, forced labor as enslavement is articulating a practice or form of “slavery.” According to Article 1(a) of the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Forced labor delivers a particular realm of modern slavery, slavery-like practices, or contemporary forms of slavery (Allain, 2012). Forced labor becomes the root to identify enslavement as a form of modern slavery, which in the ambit of international law, is customary and strictly prohibited. Having laws forbidding forced labor began along with the commitment of ending slavery as well as practices similar to it.

At the end of the day, even though Myanmar is a non-state party to the Rome Statute, the path to serve justice to the Rohingyas does not end just yet. International law—specifically, international criminal law—provides other options and mechanism to still hold these perpetrators responsible, through the ICC or other courts having international legal personality. As efforts to try the perpetrators from a non-state party at the ICC might sound difficult (but is not impossible), perhaps ASEAN needs to utilize its own body and commitment first. Because apparently, its very own regional mechanism is not able to take enough part in solving the problem, let alone addressing the roots of it, since everything seems to be blocked by the non-interference principle ASEAN is very proud to perform.

As part of the community, the Rohingyas should have had ASEAN as their utmost sanctuary following Myanmar’s failure in providing the protection needed. It has been a common sense in international law that even the non-intervention principle should never be applicable to exceptional circumstances as in humanitarian crises such as what happens to the Rohingyas. The forced labor of the Rohingyas—as a crime against humanity and a portrayal of modern slavery—is among exceptional circumstances needing immediate responses to overcome the emergencies. Therefore, ASEAN does need another approach in resolving the case.

Conclusion

The forced labor here is understood as enslavement. As enslavement, it requires perpetrators to have the crime widely and systematically committed to civilian population rather than to a particular person or group of people, as well as the emphasis on power as an oppression rather an exploitation—and that it targets the Rohingyas—making it categorized as a crime against humanity. At the same time, forced labor is included in slavery-like practices. Moreover, having enslavement as a form of modern slavery could also strengthen the legal framework of international criminal law to prosecute the perpetrators, end the oppression to the Rohingyas, and ‘serve justice to the table.’ Despites the diversities ASEAN has in carrying out the technicalities, forced labor as enslavement articulates modern slavery, common senses, and universalities which international community—including ASEAN—should admit and uphold.

Alifa Salsabila, SH is an American Studies graduate student at Universitas Gadjah Mada. Currently, Alifa is a research intern in Research Division, ASEAN Studies Center UGM. Alifa could be reached at her email: alifafauziar@mail.ugm.ac.id.

REFERENCES

Allain, Jean. (2012). The International Legal Regime of Slavery and Human Exploitation and its Obfuscation by the Term of Art: “Slavery-like Practice”. Civilian Research Development Foundation, 27-42.

Farzana, Kahzi Fahmida. (2017). Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees, Contested Identity and Belonging. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Irish Centre for Human Rights. (2010). Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas.

Khairi, Aizat. (2019). Supply Chain and Human Trafficking of Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia. International Journal of Innovative Technology and Exploring Engineering 9, 4561-4565.

Lee, Ronan. (2019). Myanmar’s Citizenship Law as State Crime: A Case for the International Criminal Court. State Crime Journal 8(2), 241-279.

Mohajan, Haradhan Kumar. (2018). History of Rakhine State and the Origin of the Rohingya Muslims”. IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2(1), 19-46.

Siller, Nicole. (2016). Does International Law Distinguish between Slavery, Enslavement and Trafficking?”. Journal of International Criminal Justice 14, 405-427.

Southwick, Katherine. (2018). Straining to Prevent the Rohingya Genocide: A Sociology of Law Perspective. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 12, 119-142.

By Fadhil Haidar Sulaeman (Picture: Peter Paul Rubens)

This essay will discuss intra-ASEAN regional disputes and their impact on more significant economic and political integration in the region. Since ASEAN was built in 1967 by the first five countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines (and then joined Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999), ASEAN has to face the challenges of political security and economic instability. ASEAN came to aim at promoting economic growth, social and cultural development, and strengthening security in the Southeast Asian region. This condition led to the formation of ASEAN by signing an Amity and Cooperation Agreement, which involved principles and norms upheld by every ASEAN member to date, including respecting any sovereignty, not interfering in other members’ domestic matters, and consensus agreements. In fact, until the late 1990s, ASEAN was recognized as a successful organization in hiding problems such as territorial disputes between ASEAN members and conflicts in Cambodia (although not yet members) through informal and formal means or the so-called “ASEAN Way.”

Nevertheless, a dispute in disguise is still a dispute, and states could not just abandon it altogether. Unlike the dispute between ASEAN member states and the People’s Republic of China, this dispute has a little airing time on the mass media. However, the minimum coverage that it got was not proportional to the effect that it imposes towards the unity of ASEAN. These disputes create distrust and malign intentions between member states, which leads towards an emerging security dilemma to compel each state in arming themselves against the possibility of aggression from the others. This intra-ASEAN security dilemma, in return, hinders a cohesive and united response towards external security challenges, such as the South China Sea dispute.

The foundation of the emerging security dilemma could be traced to the suspicion that each contending states have suspicion over one other. Ever since the European states colonized Southeast Asia, the modern-day state border was established based upon the lines that the colonizers made of them. In other words, the ethnic and religious groups that live in a particular area would be separated by the border without their considerations or opinion.  For instance, the current separatist movement in the Pattani region of Southern Thailand is rebelling since the majority of people that live in that area are predominantly Muslims and Malays, whereas the majority that live in Thailand were Buddhist and Thais.  Moreover, the region used to be a sovereign nation called “The Sultanate of Patani” until Thailand invade and annex the region under the Burney Treaty. Hence, tension still exists between Thailand and Malaysia over the insurgency in Southern Thailand, and ASEAN prefers to keep the issue of the discussion in its meetings or summits.

Similarly, the issue of North Borneo is also contested by Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Malaysia and Indonesia are conflicting to determine the sovereignty of Ambalat island, and several incidents have erupted where the armed forces of both nations are involved in a military confrontation.  On the other hand, the Philippines and Malaysia are still disputing the status over the State of Sabah, as Manila claims that the province was leased towards the British North Borneo Company while Malaysian believes that the 1878 Agreement was a transfer of sovereignty.  In 2013, a military conflict occurred between the Malaysian Royal Armed Forces and the militants loyal to King Jamalul Kiram III of the Sultanate of Sulu, based in the southern Philippines. As a result, these developments raise a sense of insecurity between the three nations and force them to restraint themselves in the ASEAN to preserve order and stability in the region. Even then, the Southeast Asian states still have to deal with the Chinese onslaught in the South China Sea. With China building military bases in the Spratlys and Paracels, Beijing is directly confronting Southeast Asian claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

Even though the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is present and active, its implementation by signatories states could be seen as a deviation from its original purposes, such as the recent standoff between the Chinese oil survey ships and the Vietnamese coastguard. With the tension boiling in the region, the United States intervene under the pretext of ‘maintaining the freedom of navigation’ as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. By sailing its Carrier Battle Group through the South China Sea and conducting naval exercises with ASEAN member states, America has challenged the Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea by conducting a show of force of its military might. In other words, the U.S. can attack Chinese installation in the South China Sea and increase suspicion in Beijing about the real U.S. intention.  Therefore, all stakeholders in the South China Sea issue have suspicion towards each other. If this situation is not addressed, then the region would face a similar fate that it endures in the Colonial era: chaotic, divided, and conquered.

Fadhil Haidar Sulaeman is an International Undergraduate Program student at Universitas Gadjah Mada, majoring in International Relations with a concentration on Global Politics and Security (GPS). Currently, he serves as a Research Division Intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He could be contacted through email: fadhilf50@gmail.com

By Rafyoga Jehan Pratama Irsadanar and Muhammad Aziz Irfanuddin (Photo: Indonesian Ministry of Defense)

Unlike some other countries which utilize military measures to push the people to stay home under the social distancing plan, the Indonesian Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto makes a minimalist appearance in public. As others are deploying troops to prevent riots or to shoot lockdown offenders down, many have questioned the absence of Prabowo in the battle against coronavirus. The critics are asserted by the notion that COVID-19 is considered as a non-military threat against national security, in which people assume that it is within the Ministry of Defense domain to deal with. However, earlier in his administration, Minister Prabowo highlighted a concept of Total People’s Defense (Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta) as the central tenet for the national security. That military doctrine could be a sidekick to lead the people battling the outbreak.

Total People’s Defense and Coronavirus

The core idea of Indonesian Total People’s Defense was initially introduced in article 27 of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution, stating that every citizen has the right and obligation to defend the country. The principle was advanced in Indonesian Constitution no.3 of 2002 as it the article 2 states “the national defense system is a total defense system involving all citizens, territories and other national resources, and is prepared by the government and is carried out in a total, integrated, directed, and continuous manner to protect state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nation’s security from all kind of threats.” In the sense of traditional war, it will require all layers of Indonesian citizens to be part of the battle.

Even though it was criticized for being outdated when Prabowo planned to amplify the concept through country defense program (program bela negara), Total’s People Defense could be a good deal in combatting the outbreak. Through Regulation no. 23 of 2019, the concept explains that Indonesia’s total defense system is divided into three components; the main component, secondary component, and the supporting component. The classification works as an inclusive parameter easing citizens to participate in the defense system based on their roles and occupations. So even when the citizens are not incorporated in the military forces, they will still be able to fulfill their obligations based on their specialty among the three clusters.

Contextualized with COVID-19, the main component would be carried out by the Ministry of Health as the frontline to stop the virus spreading through its leadership, expertise, and authority. The secondary component will be the Indonesian army as well as relevant stakeholders and related ministries to support the logistic distribution. Indonesian citizen will be the supporting components to stop the spread of COVID-19 by enforcing the physical distancing and to follow the government regulations.

In a pandemic, the Total People’s Defense is accurate to execute the concept where the ‘enemy’ is literally in front of everyone. It also requires collective practical participation from all layers of society to combat it, ranging from essential key workers in the frontline to corporate workers working from home. Regardless of the invisibility of the virus, everyone’s life is as stake without the collective actions.

Supporting Central Government Leadership Crisis

In the current crisis, the manifestation of the defense doctrine could support the lacking central government leadership in facing the outbreak. The mismanagement of the outbreak and controversial statements made by the Indonesian Health Minister has revealed the flaws of government leadership. Even though Prabowo admitted that he was not trained to face the ‘unseen’ such as to cure a pandemic, but the retired general was prepared in leading people to face the worse situation in crisis. This military trait should be able to back the government, regaining the people’s trust.

The military doctrine has the potential to mobilize people to stay at home. As characterized earlier, the Total People’s Defense could make everyone feels significantly involved in defending the country. It fits the context of Indonesian society where the people are more likely to be swayed by a personal approach, as many campaign strategists are making the candidate personally attached to voters during elections. This trait could be taken advantage of in dealing with coronavirus, as the current measures are making the society as the object by forcing them to stay home, sometimes against their will. The Total People’s Defense will make Indonesians the subject against coronavirus as they feel personally involved in flattening the curve.

Despite the aptitudes, raising the awareness to battle the virus is difficult when the vulnerable are not protected yet. As what is happening around the world, many are not able to stay home as they worked daily jobs, forcing them to break the rules for social distancing. However, many are not self-quarantining themselves due to the lack of information. The latter group could be the initial target of the Total People’s Defense narratives in flattening the curves. As the most significant active internet user in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian government should massively campaign the military doctrine to increase its people’s awareness and reaffirm its leadership amidst this health crisis.

From the government standpoint itself, the government must be transparent and establish effective coordination among its ministries, preventing contradictive policies in stopping the COVID-19 pandemic. Unified policies by related ministries and agencies should be made harmoniously under the Ministry of Health and COVID-19 Task Force strategy, with the President Office taking the command. Rather than focusing on resource-wise, as the central government has proven to be able to pay influencers to boost tourism amidst coronavirus, they could readjust the focus to campaign the Total People’s Defense against coronavirus. Such a budget could be allocated to support the frontline workers as the main component of the national defense and to subsidize the vulnerable actors.

Rafyoga is Monbukagakusho Scholar in Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies (GSICS), Kobe University. Prior joining GSCIS, he was a research intern and research assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Muhammad Aziz is scholarship grantee in Indonesia Defense University. He is a post-graduate student in the Faculty of National Security, Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution.

By Muhammad Diaz Kurniawan (Photo by: Lemparbatu)

Whether doctors, nurses, administrative officers, kitchen staff or janitors at quarantine centers, all are at the frontline of handling the COVID-19 pandemic that willing to take risks to save patients’ lives. Many out there play the ultimate role of fighting for the safety of those who are still healthy as those who recover will develop herd immunity once the recovered have been discharged from the hospital.

The success of those at the frontline of the COVID-19 is paramount in the handling of the pandemic, which was first reported at the end of 2019. Therefore, sustenance for them should be made priority by the government and private sectors with social support from the general public, as each party has a role to play in further preventing the spread of this virus.

However, instead of receiving this critical support which they require, health care workers face various difficulties in carrying out their duties. The situation is further complicated by the scarcity of essential Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as surgical masks and hazmat clothing which is causing an increase of exposure to healthcare workers. The Indonesian Doctors Association (IDI) has announced that 24 doctors and 12 nurses have died so far during the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily because they did not use adequate PPE due to the scarcity caused by hoarding of the supplies and also panic buying by society despite the WHO regulations giving the right to PPE for health workers during the COVID-19 outbreak.

Additionally, healthcare workers are not able to exercise the freedom to carry out their duties. For example in Jakarta, doctors and nurses are not being allowed to enter houses because the community is worried that they will spread the virus. It has also been reported that communities have banned health workers who have died due to exposure from the coronavirus to be buried in the local cemeteries despite receiving guarantee that the condition of the bodies comply with health regulations. It is very clear that, at this point, even the right to be buried humanely has been deprived from those who have fought against this pandemic. An underlying cause of this is stigma.

Stigma in handling the COVID-19 pandemic could have implications for the decline in the performance of the healthcare system. Limiting the movement of healthcare workers, their rejection by the community and community selfishness in the form of hoarding and panic buying of PPE will adversely impact the availability of health facilities and the performance of healthcare workers in treating patients.

This situation almost resembles the social stigma which has been reported in the cases of HIV/AIDS. Stigmatization and discrimination not only occur from the surrounding community with which they intersect, but also from the healthcare workers who intensively interact with them.

From research conducted by the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada in collaboration with SHAPE-SEA in 2018 on discrimination against the community living with HIV/AIDS, the stigma primarily arises from incomplete dissemination of information on what it means to be HIV/AIDS positive. Further this misinformation has encouraged assumptions-based understanding and a misjudgment of this health condition. The two are also present across cases of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Paranoia is stoked by misleading news and media that highlights the numbers of infections, deaths and recoveries like some sort of competition. The panic created encourages people to resist restrictions and reject the healthcare workers, leading to the discrimination against them.

The key to this situation is to respond. More needs to be done to educate the community in order for this growing social stigma to be avoided. A social campaign such as #ClapForOurCarers, that brings people to appreciate the work of healthcare workers could be an example of alternative way to educate communities about the important role of healthcare worker and as well as maintaining a positive social psychology for everyone. By responding to this growing stigmatization, we are effectively addressing the discrimination against the rights of our healthcare workers, which is a much-needed form of support at the moment. It is time that the community work hand in hand and focus on playing their respective roles in battling the COVID-19 pandemic as it is the only way to bring it to an end and see the community out of the dark.

References