Rifki Maulana Iqbal Taufik

The 50th anniversary of ASEAN is the right moment to evaluate every achievement and the projections for the future. An evaluation is not limited only to the implementation of program but how ASEAN is being presented in the society. ASEAN’s approach, so far, appears more elitist / state-centric, rather than people-oriented. This resulted in the lack of community understanding on ASEAN, what it does and how it affects their lives. In the context of Indonesia, based on data collected from ASC UGM 2014, about 65% of the people in Yogyakarta have never heard of ASEAN. If that is the case in a city as big as Yogyakarta, what about those living in remote areas? How the ideal of ASEAN Community can be accomplished if the at the ‘real’ community level, an understanding of ASEAN is limited. In other words, it is necessary to start bringing ASEAN to a more community level, involving the whole elements of the country, not just the government, to realize the aspirations of ASEAN Community 2015. At this point, ASEANization is first and foremost.

ASEAN as an Identity?

The Sociological conception of identity is also known as a collective identity. The basic assumption is that collective identity plays as narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors, The macro-theoretical argument says that the more a human society is differentiated, the more it needs a collective identity.

ASEAN has a large and culturally diverse population. In the other side, every country of ASEAN has developed the discourses about itself (national identity). It can be both opportunities and challenges at the same time

In its 50th anniversary, there are still many people who do not understand about ASEAN. Most of them know the existence of ASEAN but do not understand the role and function of this organization. This regard, one can say that ASEAN integration only exists at the state level but not at the community level.

So the most important thing today is how to make ASEAN identity as a normative character that is presented and institutionalized. Identity as an analytical concept covers all these elements: identity emerges by linking the past social relations with those in the present.

To reconstruct the identity of ASEAN, we can refer to history through the identification of structural boundaries and opportunities for historical connectivity. Let us depart from the historical narrative of the past. The kingdom of Southeast Asia has been connected long since the seventh century. The story of this period can be used as a reference in shaping the idea of ASEANization.

Just imagine, various cultures and empires in Southeast Asia interact, connect with each other and create a unity of ASEAN culture and identity. Therefore, it is important to understand that constructing ASEAN’s collective identity is not impossible since it has been historically formed for a long time. Institutionally, ASEAN needs to provide (establish) the institution that focuses on “ASEANization”.

ASEANization: Digital and Youth

With cultural diversity within ASEAN that have co-existed for centuries. The main thing to do is how to make the ASEAN identity is, therefore, understood as a narrative network embedded in social relations among people who live within ASEAN. Digital space can serve as a bridge for the ASEAN community. Increased interest in digitalization changes both social and economic life of human beings. Today, in the digital age, there is no limit to humanity. This phenomenon creates a new pattern of our participation as citizens. Moreover, today, digital space became the foundation of social interaction. Technology has changed social relationships and may have produced forms of identity beyond national boundaries. The existence of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media can be a factor encouraging the public participation to guard oversee ASEAN. This indicates that technology has a significant role in human nature and is regarded as one of the societal importance. In the end, it can be concluded that technology can be used as a tool for ASEANization. Youth are connected very strongly with technology. Hence, the internet as one part thereof is the way for them to accumulate, analyze, disseminate information and knowledge. The most important thing now is to take advantage of this reality, connecting youth through technology and make them the main agents of ASEANization.

Rifky Maulana Iqbal Taufik is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Dio Herdiawan Tobing

Unlike other regional or international organizations, ASEAN possesses its own model of diplomatic engagement: the ASEAN Way. For so many years, the ASEAN Way has always been a very heated topic of debate among the academics, government officials, and policy-makers. Now that ASEAN has reached its golden anniversary, the remained question is whether the ASEAN Way is still relevant, or must the organization employ other tools to foster its members’ cooperative behavior in agreed institutional arrangements.

In most academic literature, the ASEAN way is always to blame for any wide-array of cooperation failures, for instance: Indonesia on the haze problem, Myanmar on the Rohingya crisis, and the absence of ASEAN centrality in the South China Sea dispute.

The ASEAN Way is defined a shared of norms, principles, and values governing the interactions of ASEAN member states. It is more of a loosed concept but strictly embedded in the practice of ASEAN diplomacy. The problem is, in many kinds of literature the ASEAN Way has always been incorporated with ASEAN’s strict adherence to the principle of consensus-building, informality, non-interference, and respect to national sovereignty.

Indeed, from a strictly legal perspective, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation serves as the formal foundation of the ASEAN Way, whereby on Art. 2(c) of the agreement, it is emphasized that “In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”. However, the ASEAN Way is not defined as narrow as what enshrined in the treaty.

This is what one keeps on forgetting and neglecting in the kind of literature; as the ASEAN Way is not the goal, but rather a means of achieving collective interests. Hence, the process of norm and values sharing is dynamic and never been stagnant.

On the one side story, criticisms are frequently directed at the gameplay of ASEAN, which often pays too much respect for the above-mentioned principles. Nevertheless, the ASEAN Way is the only possible method that could be employed by the regional institution and its members, as it is shared on daily basis beyond the limits of their consciousness. Intriguingly, the ASEAN Way is neither a failure nor a weakness. As many are not aware of, on the other side of the ‘blame’, lies a powerful instrument: the ASEAN Constructive Engagement.

The ASEAN Constructive Engagement

ASEAN utilized the Constructive Engagement (CE) at Myanmar in the 1990s to foster democratization. It was not introduced as an alternative of the ASEAN Way, yet inseparable for they share the same ‘blood’. The CE prefers a bilateral or multilateral method of engagement by favoring dialogue, opposing the policies of compulsion including sanctions and diplomatic isolation employed by the west.

As matter of fact, the CE is not only utilized by ASEAN in Myanmar’s case. In any other issues, CE informally and unconsciously uses as a method of engagement among ASEAN Countries, whether it is facilitated by ASEAN Secretariat, bilateral or multilateral engagement under the greater umbrella of ASEAN cooperation, or in any diplomatic forums.

Furthermore, CE does not offer a sudden policy shift of any ASEAN member states to adhere towards regional goals, but rather emphasizes on the ‘engagement process’. This is why, in the f by any government in ASEAN.

Some may view this as a disadvantage. However, CE is a promising tool in offering gradual changes in dispute settlement mechanism without harassing any conflicting parties in public spaces.

Two concrete examples of the result of CE can be seen from the policy change of Myanmar towards the Rohingya and Indonesia’s accession to the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement as presented below.

Constructive Engagement: A Tale of Two Case Studies

Even though CE was introduced in early 1991 to induce Myanmar’s cooperative behavior to ASEAN, the effort continued even after Myanmar become one of ASEAN members, especially to persuade Myanmar to become more open to the international community and not treating the Rohingya minority group violently.  

The result was not instant. From 1991 to 2008 there was almost no change in Myanmar policy towards the Rohingya. The country insisted the Rohingya massacre has nothing to do with their country for the Rohingya is not part of the Burmese community. Not until in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, which resulted in the first attempt of regional “humanitarian intervention” to assist Myanmar in recovery. It is imperative to note the regional assistance set up by ASEAN and its members to help Myanmar had broken the problematic stigma of ASEAN’s ‘fixed price’ devotion to the principle of non-interference and traditional concept of sovereignty.

The successful attempt of ASEAN to assist Myanmar recovering from the impact of such humanitarian disaster, served as the pathway to improve the government’s openness to the regional community. In fact, as per 2009, Indonesia played a leading role in opening a bilateral talk with the Burmese government, calling for a greater attention to this Muslim minority. Surprisingly, this occasion functioned as the turning point where the Burmese government finally admitted that the Rohingya problem also belongs to Myanmar. Prime Minister Thein Sein, stated that “in principle, the Myanmar is willing to accept the Rohingyas back if they can prove they are indeed the people of Myanmar”.

Another breathtaking result also occurred in late-2016. At the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of ASEAN on September 30, 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi, finally asked “constructive support” from Myanmar’s regional neighbors to resolve the crisis in the country’s troubled western Rakhine state. The step was then followed by the establishment of a special panel of an investigation, headed by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.

In the Southeast Asian haze catastrophe, ASEAN also utilizes similar approach to persuade Indonesia to pay attention towards the issue. Resulted from thorough bilateral and multilateral discussions, there were at least three events which marked Indonesia’s non-defensive behavior to ASEAN. First, Indonesia had never blocked ASEAN from adopting any resolution, since the Singapore Declaration, where the haze issue was first mentioned, to the making of haze agreement. Second, Indonesia signed the agreement in 2002 and third, in late-2014, Indonesia concluded its accession to the agreement.

It certainly is a long process. In the case of Myanmar, it took more or less 25 years for the Burmese government to acknowledged Rohingya as a problem that needs further attention and finally called for regional arrangements to assist Myanmar in solving this humanitarian catastrophe. For Indonesia, it needs 11 years for the government to finally decide to abide the law.

Conclusion

Through a long norm and values-sharing process, though many kinds of literature discredit how the ASEAN Way’s strict adherence to consensus decision-making, non-interference, and sovereignty hinders the organization to pursue progress in some areas of cooperation, one must understand that it is the ASEAN Way that has led ASEAN to reach its 50th anniversary.

Blaming the failure of cooperation in ASEAN on the ASEAN Way will prevent us from seeing how ASEAN has made progress since the organization was formed. Furthermore, what many kinds of literature have forgotten is that the ASEAN Way embraces CE, which emphasizes on a non-confrontational approach of diplomacy but offering gradual changes, even in some areas of cooperation that seen to be very sensitive by ASEAN.  What needs to be understood is the non-incorporation of the ASEAN Way in assessing ASEAN will never be the right case. Therefore, after the 50th anniversary, the ASEAN Way and CE will always be the nature of ASEAN cooperation because it does not matter if the ‘tool’ is still relevant or not, yet there will be no ASEAN without the ASEAN Way.

*) Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He will start his LLM in Public International Law at Leiden University in September.

Dendy Raditya A.

On August 8th this year, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will celebrate its 50th anniversary. This is the right time to reflecting on what had been done from 1967 until now and what need to do in the future, not only by ASEAN as an organization but also by the whole elements within ASEAN.

What could be reflected from the 50 years of ASEAN and the studies associated with this organization? Historically, the embryo of studies about this region –which historian Anthony Reid called as ‘the lands below the winds’ could be traced back to the colonial era. The study of Southeast Asia originally developed at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes founded in Paris around 1795, followed by the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands at 1864, and finally the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London in 1917.

After the end of the colonialism, Modern Southeast Asian Studies, likes the study of other regions, was born from the interests of Western countries (especially the United States) post-World War II to understand the social, cultural, political and economic aspects of countries in Southeast Asia in a postcolonial context.

It is important to first, understand the difference between the ASEAN and Southeast Asian Studies. The most visible difference is the scope of studies: ASEAN Studies focus more on ASEAN as an institution and tends to be more policy-oriented, while Southeast Asian Studies focus more on social, cultural, economic and, to some extent, political aspects of society in the region.  

Likewise, the Southeast Asia Studies faces challenges in its development. There are three interesting issues faced by Southeast Asian Studies (and also ASEAN Studies): The problem of inequality between Western countries and ASEAN countries in the terms of knowledge production; the problems of studying Southeast Asia from within; and the position of contemporary Southeast Asian Studies between state’s and market’s interests.

The disproportion between the Western countries and Southeast Asian countries (as a locus of Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies) is evident in the production of political-economy knowledge of this studies. Achmad Firas and Iqra Anugrah argues that this problem exists since the early days of the formulation of both Southeast Asian studies and ASEAN Studies. Instead by their own people, the knowledge of Southeast Asia was generated by social institutions and scientists from Western countries.

Syed Farid Alatas once wrote that the inequality of knowledge production has resulted in a growing dependence of the scientist and social science institution in Southeast Asia on the Western world. These dependencies include the idea dependence, media dependency to disseminate ideas, the dependence of educational technology, dependence on research and education funding, and dependence of Third World social scientists (including Southeast Asia) on employment in the scientific field of the Western countries.

The other problem is in regard to the possibility of Southeast Asian to study about the Southeast Asia and ASEAN of their own. According to Ariel Heryanto, there at least four issues faced by Southeast Asian researchers who came from this region itself.

First, the status of researchers as an “insider” of the  Southeast Asian societies, creates a dilemma: sometimes they are too qualified in language, living experience and knowledge of their own communities, but less qualified in analytical thinking and academic theorization.

Second, the dominance of English as the language of instruction in the Southeast Asian studies, with the lack of use of the regional languages itself. One fact behind this condition is that the main consumers of the ASEAN and Southeast Asia studies are those who come from the Western countries, not from Southeast Asia itself.

Third, there is a discrepancy between the institution’s objectives, the Southeast Asia Studies Center, on what to look for and the method to use with the social reality in Southeast Asia. It leads to the fourth issue, namely the patronistic relationship in research. Ariel Heryanto illustrates it in a condition when a senior researcher “forced” his junior to quote his work.

There is also the issue of a pitfall among the interests of states and the market. The social disciplines of Southeast Asia post-independence era became a tool of the state to legitimize the policies adopted by rulers. In Indonesia for example, the use of social science for the sake of power was evident in the era known as the “New Order”, when many public intellectuals served as bureaucrats within the regime. The New Order era also put forward the idea of developmentalism and modernization, which in turn eliminating critical paradigms such as class-based analysis and critical theory.

The collapse of many authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia does not necessarily make the study of Southeast Asia more developed. This happens because nowadays, the interests of the market along with the ideology of neoliberalism has penetrated into the realm of scholars around the world. It causes marginalization and limited access to research funding, especially those from scholarships that are deemed to have no “impacts”.

Although the problems faced by the Southeast Asian Studies had made it difficult for them to academically develop in a post-authoritarian scene, there are efforts to bridging the difficulties by various Southeast Asian Studies and Review institutions. The establishment of numbers of institution in Singapore for example, such as the ISEAS (Institute for Southeast Asian Studies), ARI (Asia Research Institute) at NUS (National University of Singapore) and RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies) at the NTU (Nanyang Technological University); Thailand with the ASEAN Studies Center at Chulalongkorn University; and Indonesia with the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies  and the ASEAN Studies Center at Universitas Gadjah Mada can be considered as part of these efforts.

Coinciding with the ASEAN golden anniversary, I suggest that we should rethink about the future of ASEAN Studies besides, of course, Southeast Asian Studies. ASEAN now faces many challenges such as the emergence of many new issues: the digital society, demands for inclusive and sustainable development inside ASEAN Community, global terrorism, identity conflicts, migrant and human trafficking issues, maritime governance, and more. It is necessary to further investigate these issues rather share ASEAN’s relevance in world politics.

Thus, it is important for researchers from the ASEAN and Southeast Asian studies to undertake a critical and theoretical research—and not only the policy-oriented one. It is also important to dismantle the ‘established’ concept and policy reference narrative in the existing studies. ASEAN Studies needs an emancipatory as well as practical dimension.

At the end of the day, the shout goes to all Southeast Asian researchers, especially throughout Indonesia. Call for them to keep on reading, writing and researching to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ASEAN!

*) Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito is an Undergraduate Student at the Department of Public Policy and Management, Fisipol, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Suraj Shah

Several ASEAN member states such as Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia have sustained impressive growth rates in recent decades. Whilst this is a good news for ASEAN, they are also trapped in a pattern where the growth based on low cost comparative advantage is curtailed as incomes rise. Political economists called this pattern  “Middle Income Trap”.

This issue has been increasingly important as ASEAN moves forward after its 50th anniversary. In moving from middle to high income status, middle income countries (MICs) must move their factors of production from capital and labour intensive (intrinsic) production to knowledge and innovation-driven production.

Are Middle Income Countries (MICs) able to make this transition smoothly? Not necessarily. MICs are finding it increasingly difficult to make this transition, as they are sandwiched between the  lower cost competitors, and high income economies who have the institutional and human capital bases to drive innovation and technology.

They thus find themselves uncompetitive and trapped in this pattern of income.

Some have put forward regional economic integration, such as through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), as a strategy to avoid the middle income trap. However, the AEC is unlikely to provide a route to escape the MIT, and national strategies are likely to remain the priority for individual ASEAN governments.

Over time, ASEAN members progressed through the value chain by upgrading production processes and investing in human capital. It is worth noting that ASEAN’s success in maintaining security and stability in the region has been a key to unlocking the economic benefits regional stability brings.

This cannot be sustained forever, however. As illustrated by the Lewis Turning Point, when these economies have exhausted their surplus labour, wages begin to rise. This income growth erodes comparative advantage of low cost labour if wage rises are not accompanied by increasing productivity and technological upgrading. Growth rates subsequently slow as countries become uncompetitive.

Consider, for example, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. They have not seen growth levels as experienced before the Asian Financial Crisis.  Future growth is also of no guarantee. In essence, economies who experience this process become ‘trapped’, as they reach a certain level of income but find it difficult to move to high income levels. Only 13 out of 101 countries have moved from middle to high income since 1960.

ASEAN economies are facing significant challenges in relation to the MIT. In particular, innovation in ASEAN is low, which is indicated by the origins of patent registration. Data shows that the majority of patents registered in ASEAN economies come from multinational corporations, whose profits often flow back to the high income economies.

In addition, research and development funding in ASEAN economies is significantly low. For example, Indonesia under invests in Research and development, with only 0.1% of GDP spent in this sector and 0.3% on higher education. This contrasts with South Korea who escaped the middle income trap, and spends 4.4% of GDP on research and development, ranked first in the OECD.

We could see a problem here: Middle income ASEAN members are stuck in the middle, with higher labour and logistical costs and imperfect institutions making them uncompetitive. They are also lacking in innovation capacity and human capital for technological capabilities.  

What could be done to resolve this problem? As Gill & Kharas convincingly argued, there is a need for institutional reform in areas of finance, governance and legal systems. ASEAN members need to become more specialised in what they produce –as well as shift from investment driven to innovation driven growth. This necessitates another factor: a structural transformation in ASEAN economies.

But could ASEAN provide a regional strategy for such transformation? Whilst ASEAN does provide some institutional anchoring, the AEC –regional platform for economic integration—are not institutionally deep enough to bind countries faster to reform. Rather, ASEAN tends to become a trend follower instead of a trend setter.

This is evident from various economic agreements and integration strategies adopted by ASEAN. To sum up, ASEAN’s institutional design are made to increasingly attract investment from to the region. Therefore, they are relying upon Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rather than building up a more ambitious regional strategy.

This strategy might be relevant to facilitate transitions for some lower middle income nations –Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines— to middle income or from low income to lower middle income status like Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. But still, it does does not represent the structural transformation necessary to escape the middle income trap, as growth continues to heavily rely on FDI rather than innovation.

The institutional weakness of ASEAN economic community has, to some extent, prevented the transformation from middle income countries higher to high income economies.

In light of this, the ASEAN Economic Community would have the potential to increase income growth for its member states. They could also allow economies to transition from lower middle income to middle income status. But the prospects of a regional strategy to transition from middle to high income do not hold as much promise, given the institutional weakness of the ASEAN Economic Community.

ASEAN member states who are seeking to avoid the middle income trap will need to unilaterally focus on their own political and institutional reform processes rather than relying on a regional commitment such as the ASEAN Economic Community. ASEAN policy makers should concentrate on implementing current agreements rather than focussing on grand designs.

As ASEAN is a trend follower rather than trend setter, middle income member states should focus on unilateral reform whilst keeping cooperation with neighbours in mind. This would provide fertile ground for ASEAN to follow. But it also provide future prospects of regional strategies for avoiding the middle income trap for current lower income members.

Let us see this happens in the next 50 years of ASEAN Economic Community.

*) Suraj Shah is MSc Candidate in the Political Economy of Emerging Markets, King’s College London and Visiting Fellow at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

122 members of the United Nations, including Indonesia, voted in favor for the adoption of an international treaty eliminating the use of nuclear weapons, at the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons on Friday (7/7).

The treaty, called the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, was finally adopted after last December, with an overwhelming majority of UN member states approving a resolution to begin negotiations. It is the first document after the end of World War II, that calls for the prohibition and dismantling of nuclear weapons.

Elayne Whyte Gomez, president of the UN conference, stated that, “The world has been waiting for this legal norm for 70 years,” after the first atomic bombs were deployed to target Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The negotiation for the treaty was scheduled last March and continued from the 15th of June to the 7th of July, with the participation of governments, international organizations, and civil representatives. 129 countries, which represent two-thirds of the total UN membership, were present at the conference to negotiate the substantive materials of the treaty.

Unlike the previous nuclear treaty, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this treaty sternly prohibits any nation to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. According to Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the treaty is a clear categorical prohibition of nuclear weapons, and is firmly rooted in humanitarian law.

With strong provisions enshrined in the treaty, a greater challenge awaits, as the adoption of the treaty does not necessarily mean that the struggle to eliminate the use of nuclear weapons has come to an end.

Indonesia’s Longstanding Interest on Denuclearization

Indonesia has a strong interest in nuclear disarmament, and this does not automatically come to an end after the adoption of the new Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons treaty.

Indonesia’s ambitions in denuclearization became increasingly visible between the 1970s and 1980s under President Soeharto’s leadership. Together with Malaysia, Indonesia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The idea was formally raised and presented at Jakarta’s ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in 1984.

For Indonesia, the enactment of the SEANWFZ, also known as the 1995 Bangkok Treaty,  was a historic achievement. The Bangkok Treaty consists of two legally binding instruments; the main treaty and its protocol. The main treaty is aimed towards all States comprising the territories of Southeast Asia and the protocol is open to signatories of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), namely the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

In addition, It is aimed commit signatories to refrain themselves from undertaking nuclear weapon activity against any State party to the Treaty, and/or within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

On 8-12 August 2011, for the first time ever, under Indonesia’s leadership, ASEAN officials met with representatives from the NWS to discuss the further accession and ratification of the Bangkok Treaty. Intensive negotiations with the NWS were continued at the 2011 ASEAN Summit, where ASEAN member states finally resolved substantive differences and concluded negotiations to enable the five NWS to accede to the Treaty.

At a later date, when the NWS met in Washington D.C. in the fall of 2016 as part of the UN Security Council meeting, they reaffirmed “their readiness to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone [SEANWFZ] at the soonest possible time.” However, despite Indonesia’s reputable leadership in ASEAN, to this date, none of the NWS have become party to the treaty.

Indonesia and ASEAN: Post-International Nuclear Ban Treaty Adoption

The successful attempt made by the international community to create an international framework to abolish the use of nuclear weapons must not sway Indonesia and ASEAN’s effort to promote the accession of the NWS to the Bangkok Treaty.

Though the document was successfully adopted, ratification will only commence on September 19th, at the annual meeting of the General Assembly, and will be put into force 90 days after successful ratification from 50 countries.

Only the Netherlands voted ‘against’ the adoption of the international treaty eliminating the use of nuclear weapons. However, immediately after the treaty was adopted, the Permanent Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France released a Joint Press Statement emphasizing that they have not taken part in the negotiation of the treaty and do not intend to sign, ratify, or become party to the treaty.

Their standpoint is clear: “There will be no change in the legal obligations of our countries with respect to nuclear weapons”,  as mentioned in the Joint Press Statement.

With Indonesia currently drafting national legislation on ‘nuclear security’ to align the Bangkok treaty action plan with domestic policy, it is imperative that Indonesia continues its nuclear disarmament diplomacy efforts and negotiations at both the regional and international level. This would ensure that the NWS recognize the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

The ASEAN executive committee met on the 25t May 2017 to review the progress of implementation and accession of the five NWS to the treaty. Furthermore, the recent adoption of a global treaty on the total elimination of nuclear weapons that will be opened for signatures in September, the 24th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to be held in August 2017.

This combination is seen as a strategic platform to further discuss the progress of the SEANWFZ Plan of Action. In particular, Indonesia should encourage the 9th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament to be hosted during the ARF Ministerial Meeting, and take a leading role to further open discussion on the practical matters in regards to the accession of the NWS to the Bangkok Treaty.

*) Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He will start his LLM in Public International Law at Leiden University in  September.