Entries by aseansc

Marawi’s Crisis Requires ASEAN’s Centrality, Not External Intervention

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Since the past two weeks, Southeast Asia has been putting a serious concern to its security and stability caused by the state of crisis in Marawi and Mindanao. Isnilon Hapilon, appeared to be a famous criminal who has committed itself in a global crime featured in the list of targeted person by FBI, becomes the reason why Armed Forces of Philippines started its fire in Marawi. Currently, the AFP has been fighting against 400 militants of Islamist fighters in Marawi, including foreign fighters, causing almost 200,000 civilians flee away from the city. By placing the entire Mindanao under martial law, President Rodrigo Duterte perceived that this approach would end the crisis soon.

Even this issue was considered as a topic for discussion during the annual regional security forum, The Shangri-La Dialogue. This topic was brought by the Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen, who is afraid if the situation in Marawi and Mindanao is not immediately resolved under the framework of cooperation between ASEAN member countries, Southeast Asia would have to bear the responsibility for a greater spill-over effect to the region.

Amidst a belief that President Rodrigo Duterte would have been successful to ‘solve’ his national security crisis alone, the transnational nature of Islamists insurgency and radicalism needs a significant role of ASEAN, not only to have a prompt response against potential security threat, but also to prevent the growth of radicalism and transnational crime.

Practically, ASEAN member states have stepped up cooperation as the threat from Islamic State increases. They planned to utilize spy planes and drones to stalk the movement of militants. The existing trilateral joint maritime patrol between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines will be intensified. Even the United States through U.S.-ASEAN meeting seeks an entry point to ‘help’ ASEAN whether it is intelligence, information, or else. Let alone Duterte has been offered a help by Russia to fight drugs and terrorism, and he himself demands for military assistance from Russia.

In this sense, ASEAN needs to learn from the case when Southeast Asia was regarded as ‘second front’ of the US Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). George Bush pushed to implement a regional counterterrorism consensus considering all terrorism-related activities into one bucket. On the other hand, the nature of Marawi’s crisis is more multifaceted with crosscutting issues involving separatism, Islamic radical movements, and global crime network. In this sense, if Russia and the United States intervene more in this regional issue let alone putting a similar doctrine like GWOT, it is plausible that the Philippines will become the ‘Syria of Southeast Asia’. ASEAN member states should keep in mind that the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism remains prime as a guideline to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism in all forms. In this sense, the involvement of external parties should be considered carefully.

This does not dwell on defeating the militants per se, but also to close the gap for separatism. ASEAN needs to learn from the case of Indonesia, back to the end of 1990s where Indonesia lost East Timor. The indirect interventions from Australian government to support the insurgency of FRETILIN led by Francisco Xavier do Amaral had successfully foiled the two-decade Lotus Operation launched by Indonesian Armed Forces.

In fact, it is arguably that Duterte should realize that the case should be addressed to ASEAN as a regional body instead of ensnaring greater involvement from great powers. The larger involvement of great power in ASEAN’s regional security problem will only pave a way to a more complex political-security environment in ASEAN. In this sense, it provides a criticism that the ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention must be further question to reflect the current security and stability crisis in the region, especially the Article III and IV of ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism concerning the principle of non-interference and preservation of sovereignty.

ASEAN needs to be more fluid to encounter the transnational nature of threat. Having said that the nature of this threat is transnational, ASEAN member states need to realize that sovereignty is the primary cost to be paid. If ASEAN does not begin to put concern about ‘shared sovereignty’, not only is ASEAN’s increasingly lost relevance in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security issues, the fall of the country to the hands of radical groups is not inconceivable.

Therefore, we may see the future challenge for ASEAN‘s security issues is not only in the way to manage and solve the primary security crisis in the South China Sea, but also to maintain security and stability in Marawi under the existing ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. By not pulling in external parties to solve this issue, ASEAN will not lose its relevance to ensure the regional security and stability.

 

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

ASC Welcomed Professor Anders Uhlin from Lund University

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On Monday (6/5), ASEAN Studies Center received a visit of Professor Anders Uhlin from Lund University, Sweden. He visited our institution in conjunction with his agenda to be a speaker for the academic roundtable discussion, in which he had the opportunity to present his book entitled “Civil Society and Regional Governance”, taking place in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Welcomed by our Director Dr. Dafri Agussalim and staffs, Professor Anders Uhlin was glad to have the opportunity discussing about the current condition of how civil society involves in the making and changing of regional governance. He underlined that whether regional institution is challenged or not, civil society should remain at the center of regional governance. Coming up with the idea of “legitimization” and “de-legitimization”, he perceived that the legitimation of global or regional institution is in general coming from civil society. Therefore, studying regional governance and institutionalization is inconceivable without considering civil society at the core.

ASEAN Summit 2017: A Conclusion to South China Sea?

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In April this year, the ASEAN Summit kicked off at the heart of the Philippines – Metro Manila. With the theme entitled “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World”, this summit was well attended by all the head of states and government officers of the member-states. This then will be followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit, both later this June and November.

The recent concluded summit indicates that the focuses are more on the on-going of member-states’ concerns. Of which this window of opportunity has been taken to set the tone of this year’s summit. It is not unusual practice though, for the issues of concerns to receive more prominence. In fact, this is in line with ASEAN’s raison d’être, which it has a broad agenda that includes regional economic cooperation, promoting defence relations and socio-cultural cooperation, serving its purpose as the central role of regional body.

Notwithstanding, as much as the issues of concerns have been raised, and to some extend advocated, such as the importance of international trade, as articulated by Singapore, a drug-free region by the Philippines, rights of migrant workers and Rohingyas by Indonesia, amongst others, there lies one pertinent issue that is conspicuous but admittedly, helpless – the South China Sea.

The China’s lobby efforts to remove the mentioning of land reclamation and militarisation efforts at the manmade islands have received limelight global coverage. The Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte mentioned, “It cannot be an issue anymore. It (Chinese presence) is already there. What would be the purpose also of discussing it if you cannot do anything?” It refers to the event whereby he had to succumb to Chinese’s will. The ASEAN diplomats also admitted that China had lobbied hard and the delayed joint ASEAN Statement speaks for itself.

Whilst the ASEAN countries are divided over the South China Sea contentious issue, even though they managed to maintain their unity by eventually releasing the final version of the Statement, it tells one thing for certain and indeed has raised the eyebrows of many – that ASEAN countries are gravitating even closer to China’s orbit as day passes by and the latter’s influence is irresistible, especially through this summit.

However, this might not be the case if among the most pressing issues in ASEAN is properly and successfully addressed – the unbalance economic development of all ten member-states, even though this is only amongst the bigger picture of Sino-ASEAN relations’ picture.

Indeed, regional cohesion remains a distant dream, which according to the consultancy firm McKinsey, especially when the economic chasm between the richest members Singapore, with a per capita income more than 50 times higher when compared to Cambodia and Myanmar, and 30 times higher than Laos. Furthermore, intra-regional trade through the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community even stand less than half the share that of NAFTA and EU. It indicates that the economic barriers are still strong, even though among the ASEAN member-states themselves.

By addressing the economic needs, the tendency to gravitate to China’s orbit may be less likely. If only certain ASEAN countries are not highly dependable on China and possesses its own diversified economy income. Even though last week saw a meeting in Hanoi to speed up the negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), after six years no less, and the revival of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), the hurdles on both economic agreements are remain.

Duterte of the Philippines for instance, followed by his visit to China last year, returned home with USD 24 billion in deals and this summit saw no-mention on the tribunal award that highly favorable to the Philippines. China also has invested a gigantic amount of money to Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, amounting to more than 10 billion as of last year. Undeniably, the China tentacles control the South China Sea through economic projection. Recently, China has warned the Philippines not to conduct any drill for oil in a disputed part of the South China Sea and not to enforce an arbitration ruling.

Despite the effort of the consultation mechanism on the South China Sea, both on ASEAN platform and bilaterally, further resolution on the issue is further from sight. After 15 years, Sino-ASEAN agreed on Wednesday (May 18) a draft framework on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Whilst the first meeting of Sino-The Philippines on Friday (May 19), only provided the backdrop of addressing concerns and handling incidents in an appropriate manner.

On the other hand, the contending power on the China’s projection – the US, however, the South China Sea dispute may not be the immediate agenda. Because the US needs China to rein in the aggressive Pyongyang on the ballistic missiles and the likelihood of developing the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities that could possibly reach the US mainland in the next course of years.

Therefore, the South China Sea dispute is hardly on the US’ urgent list, and which is why it is unlikely for both ASEAN and by extension the US to reach any major breakthrough or agreement over the South China Sea dispute beyond a generically worded statement.

 

Nik Luqman is a Graduate Student in Strategy and Security Studies at the National University of Malaysia

Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and the New Politics of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

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China officially launched the Belt and Road Initiatives on May 2017. Attended by 29 partner countries (with the absence of some prominent neighbours such as India), the launching of the initiative has marked a new direction in China’s foreign policy, with scholars has signalled this initiative as a new shift in international politics.

The so-called “Belt and Road Initiatives” (BRI), however, is not Beijing’s new foreign policy project. It has been formulated since 2014, which was coincided with the establishment of Chinese-led initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Unlike AIIB, however, Beijing’s direct involvement is more prominent in the BRI, in which the initiative was directed and strongly controlled by Beijing, whilst the AIIB tended to be multilateral and based on expertise.

 

The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Regionalism

The rise of BRI has raised some questions over the future of regionalism in many parts of the world. In 1995, Andrew Hurrell theorised the resurgence of ‘new regionalism’, which witnessed the political order into a new form of interstate cooperation based on geographical and spatial proximities. New Regionalism, he argued, emerged because of world reordering after the Cold War, which witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union and some new patterns of cooperation, which is different with the past.

However, some new developments in the 2000s have also showed stagnation and, more recently, signals towards reversal. Prior to the launching of BRI, the world has witnessed the crisis in the European Union (EU) with the United Kingdom called for exiting the EU through a referendum in 2016. On the other part of the world, ASEAN has also showed stagnation in the negotiation over South China Sea (although the diplomatic fora still continues until present) and the talks over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

This is not to mention the shift in United States’ foreign policy under President Donald Trump, who seems not to be interested in maintaining the liberal world order, which is arguably central in the US foreign policy in the last decade.

The rise of Chinese-led AIIB and BRI therefore should be understood in this historical and political trajectory. At least three keys explanations pave the way of ‘the rise of China’ and its infrastructure project.

First, we need to understand ‘the rise of China’ as an effect of the 2008 global financial crisis that put the Anglo-American power, which has arguably been established since the Second Bretton Wood, at stake. The global financial crisis in the US and Europe has hit the most fundamental foundation of Anglo-American ‘structural power’, namely the financial architecture. As a result, many states are forced to adjust their key financial policy into the macro prudential reform that gives more power to the state to regulate national financial environment.

Yet, the recovery from the 2008-2009 crisis is not as smooth as analyst and scholars predicted. It contributes to the unrest in Greece, the rise of right-wing populism in many European states, as well as to the recent Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. China, in contrast, has showed not only resilience to the crisis, but also its power to navigate the world political economic order through state-led industrial and developmental policies. With the decline of Anglo-American ‘neoliberal’ order, China has slowly gained prominence in world politics.

Second, the rise of China has also enabled by what Andrew Baker said as ‘ideational shift’ in the construction of world political and economic order. Since 1980s, the so-called Washington Consensus” has been taken seriously as the only alternative to manage the world economy. However, with the decline of neoliberal order amid the global financial crisis, the idea of free-market social liberalism that constitutes the foundation of liberal political-economic order has also been declined.

Interestingly, in early 2010s, the World Bank released a new document that redefines the framework for economic development, namely “New Structural Economics”. Authored by the Bank’s then Chief Economist, Justin Yifu Lin, the document has challenged the prominence of free-market mechanism and called for the return of the state in supporting industrial projects through constructing infrastructural cooperation. The framework may be debated among Economist, but it has undoubtedly re-framed political economic order into a new state-led direction, with many scholars referred as the return of ‘Keynesianism’ in world political economy.

Third, the rise of China could also be interpreted as the transformation of ‘territorial logic’ of regionalism to a new ‘infrastructural logic’ brought by the AIIB and BRI. I argue that this transformation has been enabled by the changing countours of world political economy with the decline of the neoliberal order and the rise of ‘new structuralism’ in world politics. The AIIB and BRI utilised this transformation to create a new basis for Chinese ‘structural power’ in world politics.

 

The Changing Logic of Territoriality

Theorists of new regionalism and the liberal institutionalists tended to argue that regionalism is crafted by a process of integration, which occurs in a set of geographical and territorial boundaries and unites the states within the boundaries to cooperate each other to maintain stability and avoid conflicts. It is the case with the ASEAN, in which the result to respondthe Cold War conflict and establish cooperation in a set of territorial boundaries, namely ‘Southeast Asia’.

However, missing from their argument is the historical origins of the ‘territorial logic’ that underpins this regional integration. Yet, in the 1990s, several Indochinese countries have agreed to join ASEAN, which marked the extension of territorial boundaries of the regionalism project. It shows that the ‘territorial logic’ that underpins regionalism, particularly in Southeast Asia, is constructed historically and socially. It was socially constructed by the changes in international political order and historically constructed by the similar political background with other ASEAN member states.

The Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiatives, I shall argue, challenges this old ‘territorial logic’ and offers a new framework of regionalism based on the infrastructural and, furthermore, industrial cooperation. This form of cooperation is not new; ASEAN has attempted to establish such cooperation in the 1980s. However, the so-called ‘ASEAN Industrial Project’ was soon replaced by ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was based upon the ‘neoliberal’ logic of cooperation.

With the decline of neoliberal order and the rise of this mode of infrastructural cooperation, it will not be surprising to see the return of more complex form of regional infrastructural and industrial cooperation in the future. The infrastructural cooperation will arguably leads into a deeper connection of regional project, regardless the geographical locus of cooperation, with China leads the way to finance the cooperation.

Consider, for example, China’s involvement in Africa. With growing multilateral projects on African infrastructural development, China has showed that regional cooperation could also involve external partners, particularly when it comes to development project. As Justin Yifu Lin and Andrea Goldstein has recently argued, the rise of infrastructural cooperation could lead into ‘African Industrial revolution’, which obviously re-frame African economic cooperation in the region.

Moreover, the rise of Belt and Road Initiatives necessitates a new understanding of regionalism in world politics. It is clear that logic of regionalism is on the way for being challenged by the rise of new pattern of cooperation brought by China. However, regionalism is still far from crisis. It is the task for scholars who study regionalism in Southeast Asia to lay out future research programmes to respond this new politics of regionalism in the future.

 

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

UAE-ASEAN Relations: Beyond “Emirates’ Diplomacy”?

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In the past several years, there is an increasing tendency among the countries of the Gulf to direct their foreign policies towards the growing economies of Asia. Despite relatively unreported, the UAE’s relationship with ASEAN exemplifies this trend. This article attempts to highlight the UAE-AEAN relations and what could be offered to improve this relations in this future

The formal diplomatic relations between the UAE and the ASEAN member countries began during the 1970s, although this took place in midst of the prevailing geopolitical constraints of the Cold War and mainly be guided by the GCC’s patterns of political ties with the region. Even though there have been long-standing diplomatic representatives between several countries of ASEAN such as the Philippines and Malaysia, most of the expansion in the diplomatic networks occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

This was complemented by the growing high-level exchanges resulted from the increasing economic partnership and institutional frameworks noticeable by the signing of a number of important agreements including the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, as well as various MoUs on tourism, investments, agriculture, aviation, and others.

Although remains limited, the ASEAN-UAE relations have increasingly gone beyond state-to-state engagement and include direct organisational relations with the ASEAN body. The most important indication is that the latter has established an ASEAN Committee in Abu Dhabi since 2011, while the former has an accredited envoy to ASEAN since 2013. The ties have also been strengthened by active engagements of the two sides in other multilateral theatres such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).

The political relations between ASEAN and Abu Dhabi have been maintained not only through institutional bodies, but also by the UAE’s involvement in political issues in the ASEAN region. For example, the Emirati government has a record of supporting the Philippines’ negotiation efforts with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) since the 1990s and has promoted Manila’s entry to the OIC as an observer. Reportedly, the UAE has also been holding joint military exercises with Malaysia and pursuing defense partnership with Indonesia.

UAE-ASEAN Economic Relations

The primary dynamic to determine the nature of the present ASEAN-UAE relations appears to be the salience of economic issues, which have come to dominate the bilateral agenda and dictate the terms of cooperation between ASEAN and the UAE to a great extent. Energy is the most defining component of this economic engagement. The UAE, for instance, is a major oil supplier for Thailand, around 33 percent of the country’s total imports. Meanwhile, Singapore’s ample trade with the Emirates, stood at $27.2 billion, is mainly comprised of oil imports. A number of Emirati energy firms such as Dubai Drydocks and the Emirates National Oil Company have made their way to ASEAN, constructing and developing refineries, as well as involving in joint exploration ventures across the region. There was also plan for cooperation on renewable energy.

Non-energy trade and investments have grown considerably in the past years. This is driven not only because of the changing economic interdependencies resulted from the growth of the ASEAN and the UAE’s economic standing as the second largest economy of the Middle East, but also caused by a number of political occurrences in the regional and global contexts such as the September 11 attacks and the “War on Terror” policy that followed has enabled the pursuance of “East Look” shift in the UAE’s foreign policy. Dubai’s fortification as an international trading and re-shipping hub connecting different regional countries is also a crucial factor. Presently, the UAE is one of most important trading partners for ASEAN countries and investments have increased considerably. This is also indicated by different companies such as the Dubai International Capital, Thuraya Satellite Communication Co., and the First Gulf Bank that have expanded to the region.

This, however, is not one way. The UAE has attracted considerable interests from firms and investors from ASEAN. Government policies and institutional frameworks such as the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce partnering with the Abu Dhabi – Singapore Business Forum and the Malaysian Business Council with the Abu Dhabi Corporation for Specialised Economic Zones have contributed to this growth. The most prominent economic presence from ASEAN in the UAE seems to be Singapore, with over 300 of its companies involve in different sectors such as banking, electronics, real estate, energy, and utilities. It is reported that Indonesia and Vietnam also have considerable investments in the Emirates, a reality that could be credited to their hefty diaspora in the UAE.

“Emirates”, Tourism, and Diplomacy

Undeniably, the UAE-ASEAN relations have expanded beyond economic realms. It is of note that the Emirates has increasingly emerged as an attractive destination for ASEAN tourists. On the other hand, people from the UAE have also made their way to ASEAN, mainly for medical and tourism purposes. These growing exchanges, which also comprised of business people, academics, and professionals, have been facilitated by the UAE’s major air carrier services, Emirates Airline and Etihad Airways, that now run weekly seats from and to ASEAN with frequent daily trips to major regional destinations such as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

Complementary links between the UAE and ASEAN continue through other channels. As with many of its partners, the Emiratis have been utilising aid and assistance to foster a relationship with the ASEAN bloc. In 2013, for example, the UAE offered direct assistance through the Red Crescent Society following major typhoons that hit some parts of the Philippines. These, however, were not the first time for the UAE to demonstrate its generosity. Several Emirati charity organisations and institutions, such as the Sheikh Zayed Foundation, the Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan humanitarian and charity network, as well as the UAE’s General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments frequently help running a number of Arabic and Islamic programs in schools, mosques, and centers in Malaysia and the Philippines.

Future Outlook

As for the Emirates, the ASEAN, with around 625 million populations, is very enticing energy and consumer markets for Emirati exports and a hub to expand to the wider Asia. While its neighbors in the UAE continue to face instability and turmoil, the UAE is likely to continue upheld its ‘Look East’ policy and shifting towards ASEAN would be a reasonable move.

There is a possibility that the UAE-ASEAN relationship might contribute to the further multilateral ties between ASEAN and the GCC as regional bodies. In the past several years, the inter-regional relationship between the two regions have been primarily dominated by bilateral connections among regional member countries. The subject of inter-regionalism in the context of ASEAN has been mainly concentrated on ASEAN-EU ties. As the two regional entities’ member countries are increasingly pursuing bilateral relations, both GCC and ASEAN must realise the need to strengthen their approaches in multilateral theatre.

Muhammad  Zulfikar Rakhmat is a Ph.D  Candidate at the University of Manchester. His research focuses on China/ASEAN-Middle East Relations

‘Brexit’, the European Union, and the ‘Communication Deficit’: A Lesson for ASEAN

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‘Brexit’ has created shockwaves through the European Union and called into question whether regional integration is sustainable, and ASEAN is watching developments closely. A key issue that ASEAN must learn from ‘Brexit’ is to address the ‘Communication Deficit’ by engaging in social integration.

The ‘Communication Deficit’ refers to the difficulty European institutions and actors have in disseminating information to the citizens of Europe. A lack of information often creates suspicion and skepticism, and undermines the trust society has in its institutions. Indeed, common criticisms of the European Union point to its elitist, highly bureaucratised and complex structures. Furthermore, communication administered by the European Union is of an academic nature consisting of technical jargon, reducing accessibility for the nonprofessional. From the British perspective, the elitist nature of the European Union has been popularised by leading Eurosceptic Nigel Farage, who in 2010 questioned the leadership credentials of the President of the European Council Herman Van Rumpy and the democratic structures of the European Union:  

“You have the charisma of a damp rag, and the appearance of a low grade bank clerk. And the question that I want to ask, that we’re all going to ask, is who are you? I’ve never heard of you, nobody in Europe has heard of you. I would like to ask you Mr. President, who voted for you?… And what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove you? Is this European democracy?”

The notion of a ‘Communication Deficit’ in the European Union has been acknowledged for some time. In Bernd Spanier’s 2012 chapter entitled ‘Europe, anyone?’, he tracks the use of popular voting in individual member-states to decide on European wide issues in the period between the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 until the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Poignantly, he argues that such voting systems are ‘problematic when member states which usually adhere to a representative model of democracy, suddenly resort to direct, plebiscitary models whenever fundamental decisions about Europe are to be taken.’

A key issue that Spanier highlights is that the lack of clarity of information regarding the inner workings of the European Union significantly raises the political transaction costs in seeking policy ratification at home. From a European perspective, this often leads to unfavourable outcomes, where political processes often distort the realities of European governance. Indeed, political game theorist highlights where ministers in council agree to unpopular measures, and then blame these unpopular measures on Brussels on their return home to retain their own political capital. Finally, the lack of pan-European media outlets to report on the European Union mean that national media outlets disseminate information to the public, creating space for a nationalist version of events.

The European Union has attempted to address this problem, though with little success. The Commission’s 2005 White Paper on Communication Policy proposed to move from ‘institution-centered’ to ‘citizen-centered’ communication. Furthermore, the European Parliament’s 2006 Herrero Report called for improving general knowledge regarding the European Union amongst its citizens. However, Britain’s referendum outcome in favour of ‘leave’, and in particular the character of the debates leading up to the referendum, show that the European Union has failed in addressing the ‘Communication Deficit’.

A key theme of the debates in the run up to the referendum was that traditional arguments based on economic reasoning did not have the desired persuasive effect of encouraging undecided voters to vote for ‘remain’. Indeed, one could argue that Chancellor George Osborne’s hyperbolic claim that households would be £4,300 worse off as a result of ‘Brexit’ served to alienate and create further distance between the voters and pro-European political classes.

Instead, arguments that created greater resonance amongst the electorate were those that focused on ‘values’ rather than economic reasoning, with Michael Gove’s now (in)famous quote “The British people have had enough of experts.” Political rhetoric instead focused on immigration, sovereign democratic values and competing visions of Britain’s sense of nationhood, and the ability of Britain to ‘take back control’ to model a future of its own making.

Why did the debates escalate into the less tangible issue of ‘values’, rather than focusing on the material issues at hand? One could argue that the ‘Communication Deficit’ means that European Citizens are largely unaware of how the European Union affects their daily lives. Indeed, surveys have frequently shown a significant proportion of the electorate were not entirely sure of what the EU is, does, or how it functions. What appears to be counter intuitive was that some of the regions that voted most heavily in favour of Britain leaving the European Union were those in receipt of the most EU development funding per person. Thus, the battleground became one of competing visions of what Britain’s underlying ‘values’ were, and whether or not they were compatible with the values of the European Union.

These constructivist elements of ‘values’ and the ‘Communication Deficit’ are especially pertinent in the British context. The rhetoric behind the founding of the European Union often highlights the efforts between France and Germany to establishing long lasting peace, which it has certainly been successful in this goal. These primary values that underlie the supranational institution of the EU, create value commitment for the French and German’s to the EU. However, this has not been the case for Britain. Indeed, rhetoric often focused on how Britain was an awkward participant of the EU, joining later only in 1973, retaining the pound in currency and not participating in the Schengen area. In light of this, British electorate felt they had less of a stake in the EU project. Thus in retrospect, Britain was especially susceptible to the negative effects of the ‘Communication Deficit’ and the failure of the European Union to communicate with the British electorate at the grassroots level has contributed to feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement.

This focus of the debate on ‘value’ rather than economic reasoning is often decried by those who campaigned to ‘remain’. However, in the complex processes of institution building, the importance of values should not be discounted. Institutionalists such as Douglas North argue that formal institutional design is the constitutive expression of the underlying values of a society, no matter how immaterial or intangible they are. One could argue that the ‘Communication Deficit’ of the European Union has led to a failure in constructing shared values, in that the British people had a stake in a union with Europe, thus contributing in favour of a ‘leave’ vote.

Lessons from ‘Brexit’ and the ‘Communication Deficit’ for ASEAN

One could argue that Brexit has legitimised ASEAN’s institutional form. Critics of ASEAN often decry ASEAN’s lack of supranational structure, whilst also criticising the norms of decision making by consensus, meaning that ASEAN can only move as fast as its slowest member. However, leading figures in ASEAN, such as former General Secretary Surin Pitsuwan, point to the high levels of diversity in ASEAN in terms of political forms, income levels and cultural differences that impede the pace of regionalism. Thus, ‘Brexit’ plays a part in legitimising the notion that there needs to be higher levels of common ground between member states when seeking closer cooperation. In light of this, ASEAN should take advantage of the slow top down regionalism process, and engage with the bottom up regionalisation process to construct common values and the idea of a South East Asian community in pursuit of regional integration.

Brexit has shown that integration based on economic and elite level political factors alone whilst ignoring social implications creates feelings of skepticism and disenfranchisement amongst the population. Similar to the European Union, ASEAN also carries an image of being an elitist political project, designed to expand market opportunities for big business whilst preventing information regarding decision-making processes being disseminated to the wider public. If ASEAN does seek closer cooperation with popular support, then it must address the ‘Communication Deficit’ in regards to regional integration. This issue is especially pertinent with democracies such as Indonesia. However, it is also highly relevant for the hybrid regimes in other ASEAN member states who derive legitimacy from economic wellbeing.

In light of this, the concepts of ‘Social Integration’, as proposed in the ASEAN Studies Center’s  monograph, ‘ASEAN in 2017: Regional Integration in an Age of Uncertainty’, is especially timely. ASEAN must create the idea and primary values of a Southeast Asian community with common goals in pursuing integration. Furthermore, this should not only be targeted at the elites in society, nor solely through universities and business associations. Communication must be extended to the grassroots level. This should be conducted through a more people-centered institutional form.

The European Union has acknowledged that it should move from ‘institution-centered’ to ‘citizen-centered’ communication. However, the failure of the European Union to do this effectively has led to catastrophic repercussions, with the disenfranchisement felt by large sections of British society resulting in a vote for leaving the European Union. As argued by Umar, ‘Brexit’ revealed the gap between the EU and the British people. Thus, if ASEAN is to avoid the fate of regional disintegration it too must learn from ‘Brexit’, and in seeking closer regional cooperation and integration it must address the ‘Communication Deficit’ and focus on a more people-centered and people-oriented institutional form.

Suraj Shah is a Visiting Fellow at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and a Graduate Student at King’s College University of London.

Has ASEAN Moved Away from ZOPFAN?

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From April 26-29, Manila hosted the 30th ASEAN Summit. The summit is expected to make progress on the current geopolitical crisis which affects the Southeast Asian region. Among the rests, the situation in the Korean peninsula and South China Sea dominates the negotiation. However, ASEAN decided to leave the South China Sea off the negotiating table.

On Thursday (27/4), Philippine President and Current ASEAN Chairman, President Rodrigo Duterte, stated that there is no point raising China’s contentions activities in the South China Sea in the Summit as nations are helpless to stop them.

Duterte has been blamed by the previous administration of showing defeatist position on China. Since coming into power, he forged closer diplomatic relations with China to attract more investments in large infrastructure projects. In contrast, his predecessor, Benigno Aquion III, filed a case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2013 that resulted in the PCA’s decision affirming China’s nine-dashed line unlawful.

The Philippines’ newly established relation with China, leading to disunity in ASEAN as the regional organization, is unable to impose a unified stance against China. As the 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila is expected to produce a strong stance in the South China Sea, with China’s influence on the Philippines, the issue is not set as an agenda.

Furthermore, Beijing’s continual negotiation to Duterte and Manila’s strong influence over ASEAN Chairman’s Statement resulted in the alteration and exclusion of specific references to the militarization and island building in the South China Sea. It is reported that Chinese diplomats in Manila sought to lobby the Philippines’ officials over the content of the communique.

With China’s strong pressure on the Philippines obstructed the creation of ASEAN’s communique, it is shown that ASEAN had moved further away from its original purpose in creating a regional order free from external interference. This natural purpose of ASEAN creation is embedded in 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN). The ZOPFAN was adopted by ASEAN to ensure that the region is free from external force, in that period, the United States and the former Soviet Union.

The existence of external powers and possibility of interference were considered as an urgent matter at that time as ASEAN members did not share similar ideological and historical backgrounds. As ASEAN emerged at a time of ‘bipolar world’, only without external interference ASEAN could preserve its identity, independence, and integrity in achieving its goals.

Thus, the absence of ASEAN policy toward the case of South China Sea displays the existence of external force (China) disrupting ASEAN unity and as the Philippines taking stage as ASEAN Chairman with China’s back this year, ASEAN moved a further away from what they declared four decades ago.

Given the ongoing geopolitical crisis, can ‘ASEAN unity’ return?

Despite ASEAN’s hopelessness to form a stronger view towards the South China Sea, a chance to boost up ASEAN unity still persist. A lesson can be drawn from the 30th ASEAN Summit as on Friday (28/4), through ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting (AMM), ASEAN successfully expressed their grave concern over the escalating tension in the Korean Peninsula by adopting a statement.

Through the statement, ASEAN Foreign Ministers supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urged the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations arising from all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and international laws in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. The adoption of the statement reflects that ASEAN members carry similar burden and feel the necessity to stand together to get rid of the ongoing crisis.

This is what is viewed necessary to maintain ASEAN unity. ASEAN members must ensure that centrality is put upon ASEAN when dealing with intra- or extra-ASEAN problems. With Indonesia’s shifting away from multilateralism and seeking on bilateralism (See: Foreign Ministry to establish bilateral affairs unit for ASEAN countries) maintaining bilateral relations for the ASEAN member states, Timor Leste, Palau, and the Marshall Islands and Duterte’s preference for bilateral discussion to settle the South China Sea dispute, it is rather difficult to see that ASEAN could maintain its unity.

Instead of abandoning multilateralism, ‘ASEAN natural leaders’ should pay attention on the increasing ASEAN’s legitimacy to maintain a united regional order. Therefore, a deep concern on the disappearance of ASEAN centrality among its members would highly appreciated, especially to consider a way on re-establishing ASEAN unity without external influence and interference.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Why ASEAN Needs to Regulate Land and Water Grabbing Issues

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Political stability and food security are inter-related both at national and regional level. The distortion of political instability would eventually affect food availability and distribution. On the one hand, food scarcity, which will increase food price and shortage, could provoke political instability. During the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN have been projected its institution as the global food granary. In fact, the ASEAN countries today are still facing issues on land and water grabbing. To solve this issue, ASEAN must help member countries to address the problem of land and water grabs by developing regional regulation to support investment on agriculture.

In the context of regional integration, ASEAN has defined itself to focus on agricultural partnership. ASEAN had its existing platforms on ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework (AIFS), which is supposed to be the springboard in providing solution for food supply, and agricultural land. The goals of AIFS Framework are ensuring long-term food security in ASEAN, and improving the livelihood of farmers in ASEAN.

The ASEAN Summit 2009 pledged to embrace food security as a permanent policy priority. It is extended on the 2015-2025 Strategic Plan. The Summit adopted AIFS Framework to systematize its approach to food security. Its vision is to integrate programs of stabilizing national and regional food prices and supply, and to help member countries to cope with food emergency.

In this sense, the background of developing AIFS rests on ASEAN’s ability addressing famine effectively, especially in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, and Vietnam.

The report of United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization in 2013 indicated that Southeast Asia region has shown decreased number of undernourished people from 140 million in 1990 to 64.5 million in 2011. However, 64.5 million is still a huge number of people, in which it needs to be reduced and resolved.

The phenomena of water grabbing in Mekong Basin has showed how resources should be managed by regional institution. Mekong river is a water stream that flowing through several nations, including: Cambodia, Thailand, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. It means when a country conducting a project in the Mekong River, the other would get its externalities. For instance, the dispute on Thailand’s hydropower development happens to constrain Vietnam, Lao PDR, and others livelihood, especially in agriculture. The other phenomena also happen in Indonesia on the dispute of land grabbing Semen vs Samin.

To address this situation, I believe that to enhance ASEAN integrated food security framework, the institution should establish ground rule and consent on facing land and water grabbing issues as well.

Substantively, one of the strategic thrust of AIFS frameworks stated, “identify policies, institutional, and governance mechanism for nutrition-enhancing agriculture development in ASEAN member states.” It aims to increase the awareness and recognition on the importance of nutrition on food, agriculture, and forestry by the national stakeholders.

Subsequently, it would implicate the national policy mechanism. In contrary, the ASEAN countries still have no clear regulated acquisition on monitoring and maintaining farmland and water resources. Some evidences, such as displaced farmlands and community forests into commercial industry purposes as in mining, or food crops plantation in the region.

As a consequences, the action to achieve ASEAN as the world’s food granary is still going to be a long run. We can see on how ASEAN is still relying on food security preventive action in ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR).

APTERR is a regional cooperation between ASEAN and China, Japan, and Korea. This cooperation is focusing on agriculture and forestry to secure food availability within its member, through the main function of assistance for food aid, and building nation’s confidence during food crisis. Unfortunately, APTERR only regulates the subject of earmarked rice reserve. I believe that to ensure food security in the cooperation of ASEAN+3 the regulation should also establish monitoring on agricultural land and other resources. The agreement should cover the issue of land and water grabbing.

To achieve the-so-called ASEAN’s food granary, AIFS Frameworks need to focus on multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder engagements.

AIFS should be able to engage with the sub-regional organization, academia, local governments, private-public partnership, social enterprise, civil society organization and non-governmental organization, etc. The objective of its engagement is to enhance commitment, participation, and social responsibility of ASEAN peoples to benefit the community.

The notion would not be only about resolving hunger in the region, but more importantly about how to maintain and enhance food security in the region.

In conclusion, the ASEAN institution and community should take land-grabbing issues as serious problem to food security. The projection on AEC blueprint 2025 indicates food security agenda as priority to ASEAN institutional enhancement.

Ruth Tarullyna Simanjuntak is a research intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and an undergraduate student at Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Developing Halal Tourism within IMT-GT Sub-regional Cooperation

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Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand held the 10th Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle in Manila, Philippines. Represented by the presence of Indonesian President Joko Widodo, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak, and Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, these three contiguous countries addressed many potential economic field for cooperation, such as trade and investment, infrastructure and transportation, tourism, halal products and services, human resources development and agriculture, and agro-industry and environment.

While the meeting has likely focused on infrastructure cooperation reflecting from the attendance of Ministry of Transport from the respective countries, Halal tourism as the new agenda can serve as a push-factor for both national and sub-regional economic growth.

Growth triangles are a unique form of international cooperation, which takes advantage of hitherto cross-border complementarities within geographical propinquity. Like Special Economic Zones (SEZs), they receive additional policy focus as a designated geographical area with the goal of accelerating economic activity.

However, they differ because growth triangles straddling two or three state borders, and exploiting economic complementarity between a metropole and periphery. The metropoles have strong industrial sectors, financial markets and infrastructure, and highly skilled labor. At the same time, it suffers from a shortage of unskilled labor and land, where periphery grabs this supportive role.

Looking specifically on the issue of Halal tourism provides a view that these three countries have adequately put its concern to this issue as one of many potential economic field for national economic growth.

Committed to establish itself as a center of Islamic civilization, Malaysia has enacted the “Halal Master Plan” program. The program is organized into three phases, namely establishing Malaysia as a world center for Halal integrity and prepares for industrial development (2008-2010), establishing Malaysia as one of the favorite locations associated with Halal business (2011-2015), and expanding the geographic footprint of Malaysia as the center of Halal development companies (2016-2020).

Furthermore, there is also an instrument of standardization of services in Malaysia, the MS2610: 2015—Muslims Friendly Hospitality Services—Requirements. The regulation contains three important components related to the supply chain of Halal travel, namely the principle of providing accommodation, tour packages, and tour guides based on Islamic principles.

In addition, the establishment of standardization rules is not initiated by the Malaysian government. Rather, it comes from the voluntary actions of actors in the tourism sector.

Actors involved in the drafting process of standardization include Islamic Tourism Centre (ITC), Malaysian Association of Hotel Owners (MAHO), Malaysian Association of Hotels (MAH), Malaysian Association of Tour and Travel Agents (MATTA), Bumiputera Travel and Tour Agents Association of Malaysia (Bumitra), and the Malaysian Tourist Guides Council (MTGC).

For Thailand, up to 2015 there are some 3,600 companies in Thailand hold the overall Halal certification, which covers 120,000 kinds of products, with export volume increase of 10 % per year in order to maintain Thailand’s position as world’s fifth biggest exporter of Halal products.

The Halal industry in Thailand is predominantly controlled by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICOT), which is supported by several institutions, such as the Halal Science Center (HSC) Chulalongkorn University and the Institute of Food Research and Product Development (IFRPD) Kasersart University.

Up to this time, CICOT has issued three regulations related to Halal products, namely National Halal Standard THS 24000: 2552, Halal Products Standard Certification Process, and Regulation of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand Regarding Halal Affair Operation of B.E. 2552.

In contrast, Indonesia does not show any significance in its Halal tourism. Although it has achieved prestigious awards in 2015 and 2016 for the nomination of the Best Halal Tourism Destination Awards through the initiative implemented by West Nusa Tenggara province, Indonesia possesses minor practical development.

Having Asnawi Bahar the Head of Association of Indonesian Tours and Travel Agencies, he mentioned that the winning of such international awards do not represent any practice for the development of Halal tourism. Rather, it works to frame that Indonesia is a country with major population of Islam.

In fact, RI Ministry of Tourism has repealed the only one regulation related to Halal tourism last year, namely Regulation of the Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy No. 2/2014 on Administration Guidelines of Sharia Hotel.

In this sense, the question thus dwells in whether Halal tourism can be institutionalized at the sub-regional level for the sake of ‘shared’ economic cooperation for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Having Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand put serious concern on the development of Halal tourism the cooperation between these three countries will promote Southeast Asia as a ‘halal hub’ for the global Halal market.

However, in our forthcoming chapter in book, my Malaysian colleague Ho Yi Jian and I perceived that the asymmetric relations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are unlikely to advance the trilateral economic cooperation.

In general, we argue that the Malaysian approach towards this sub-regional cooperation is a specific synthesis between establishing a political project for its own capacity building domestically, and as a way to create regional ties, but remains resolute to maintaining the centrality of the sovereign, unitary state.

In fact, Indonesia should be more ready to develop its Halal tourism if only Malaysia and Thailand are unlikely to disperse the potential of this new niche markets.

Dedi Dinarto, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Book Review: ASEAN in 2017, Regional Integration in an Age of Uncertainty

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Studying ASEAN as a region, its policy, relations among member countries, and geopolitical situations has attracted many scholars to inscribe their ideas and analysis. ASEAN in 2017: Regional Integration in an Age of Uncertainty, an outstanding monograph recently published by ASEAN Studies Center Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Gadjah Mada is one of them.

This monograph offers numerous important points about uneven regional development, which I shall address in this part. One of the example is trade regime, which serves as the core of ASEAN economic integration. Since the beginning, I strongly believe that a trade agreement is a political alliance. Either it is bilateral or multilateral to see ASEAN trade agreement as a product of political negotiation, which represents national interest remains important. In these circumstances, we know that ASEAN+6 (Australia, New Zealand, India, Republic of Korea, Japan, and China) has on-going negotiations on RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) at hands. The RCEP already failed twice to meet its deadline, which is due to the end of this year.

Dr Jeffrey Wilson once noted on his paper then at his public lecture (21 March 2017) that RCEP is like a ‘noodle bowl problems’. Unlike TPP, RCEP has standard issues on environment, labour workers, intellectual properties, etc. However, Shane Preuss offers clear ideas about how to deal with, for example, the labour workers issue. Even if the sending labour states made a consensus with the receiving labour states, the government (with or without aid from NGOs) must promote it in the most efficient and effective mechanisms. It nevertheless would be a good starting point if each nation fully aware about what their most potential resource and start cooperating from that aspect. Once they realize what it is, then give the most attention on it.

I shall start with lessons from European Union on work labour. Would it work in ASEAN? Consider, for example, cultural different between both entities. The European society already passed a long journey from functional cooperation, which I doubt would go immediately in Southeast region. However, the author already put some attention that we could not just apply the exact policy in ASEAN and yet the EU’s experience would still beneficial for us to learn.

What I shall disagree with the arguments made in the book is that if the only things we should do is to provoke socio-cultural purpose with people-oriented and people-centred approaches. In the age of anthropocentrism, I argue that we should not pay attention with merely human-made problems, but also in a wider environmental perspective. We should lead ASEAN to put more attention on environmental issues, rather than merely focusing on ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centred’ ASEAN.

Paul J. Crutzen, an atmospheric chemist, is the person who popularise the ‘Anthropocene’ term. In 2000, Crutzen stated that anthropogenic activity (every human behaviour) in 21st century affects the atmosphere. It could be related to recent condition as the time when anthropogenic activity has a significant effect to the ecosystem. Probably, it started since the 18th century, right after the Industrial Revolution.

Consider, for example, haze issues in the region. Remember when the peatland in Borneo (Kalimantan) and Sumatra were burned down because the El Ninocyclic in 2015. Neighbour states such as Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia spoke up to press the government to take a quick and efficient action. However, environmental problems have its own characteristics. It needs integration and commitment from every nation in the region, since the excess will affects not only one country, but also the whole region. The effect was devastating. If you would not to inhale smoky air in the morning, you have to track where the fresh air is coming.

There is a real-time satellite imageries from Global Forest Watch about the burning events, actually when its peak on 14 October and its downfall on 14 December 2015. That is a reason why Carbon-tax regulation is important and we need to struggle for this from now on.


Carbon dioxide gas was produced naturally in three ways. First, from volcanic mountains both on earth surface and on deep below ocean. Second, as the result of deep ocean organism metabolic process, which would float to the sea surface in summer. Third, from fossil fuel or coal burning from anthropogenic activity (economic activity).

We could not (or less) doing anything to control carbon dioxide gas from the first and second producers. Yet, we absolutely could do something to produce less carbon dioxide gas from our activity, and carbon-tax regulation could be a solution to the problem.

Carbon-tax regulation is a set of rules to control the price of carbon dioxide emission (as a fee) produced from a certain party. Private corporations and state-owned corporations, especially in industrial and transportation, every goods from export-import activities, also every Indonesia citizen needs to be taxed. Precisely, with different charge. The regulation would give most impact to the export-import trade. Goods could not be imported from a country that does not apply the regulation unless they pay a high tariff or they could apply the same regulation in their own country to pass the goods.

However, the addition fee would raise up the price of goods or service. However, the good news is, money from the tax would be shared (as a dividend) to every citizen on the same amount. Everyone would receive it in a certain period and does not depend to one’s carbon dioxide emission produced. The government, along with every state-owned enterprises does not receive any rupiah of it. Generally, the people would be helped in transition from fossil fuel and coal dependence.

The RCEP negotiations include reducing export-import tariff, which could means a good thing since it would increase corporations and factories to produce more goods, and stimulating economic growth. We should also consider the contribution of increased economic growth to environment. More goods produced (with recent technologies) means more waste produced too, if we still use fossil fuel or coal as two main energy sources.

I do not say that the government needs to ban all economic activity that includes fossil fuel or coal as the energy sources, since the effect would be economically damaging. However, we should start to consider not just our future, but our next generations too. Would they live in a world when they have to fighting with others just to drink a glass of water? An age when they have to wear a gas mask all the time because the contaminated air to be inhaled?

Implementing the regulation should be accompanied with more research on renewable energy sources, and in the same time, we could raise campaign to using less plastic and using more eco-friendly stuff in our daily life. We have to raise environmental awareness not just in Indonesia, but also in the whole region. This is the problem that we should work together to solve.

Here I am not arguing that socio-cultural purpose with people-oriented and people-centred approaches is unnecessary. Nevertheless, I shall say that it is not the only important thing to be consider of. If we pursue a premise ‘to fulfil basic rights’ in the last article by Ahmad Umar with a more philosophical thought, I wonder if we could achieve it in the near future. If one could not get what he or she needs, would it be ASEAN member-states’ duty to provide it for the people?

Viny Alfiyah is an Undergraduate Student at Department of Chemistry, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada