Entries by aseansc

Bincang ASEAN Discusses “Politics in the Boardroom”

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM held the second meeting of Bincang ASEAN in Friday (17/3), which invited Indri Dwi Apriliyanti (Lecturer at Department of Public Policy and Management, FISIPOL UGM and PhD Candidate from University of Agder, Norway). The meeting discussed Indri’s dissertation paper about the Politics in the Boardroom, which draws upon her on-going research about state-owned enterprises in Indonesia.

In her paper, Indri develops a theoretical framework to examine the relationships between decision making process and dynamics between Board in emerging market’s state-owned enterprise. She explained some issues related to diverse power distribution of Board members, decision making style, and attentional selection that was resulted from dynamics in the boardroom. She argues that effective decision can be obtained when there is balance of power, the majority of Board uses rational approach, and good corporate governance is operated within the company.

She concluded that Boards is inseparable part in national politcal economy, and more researches is needed to understand state-owned enterprises in emerging market countries, including Indonesia.

Next meeting of Bincang ASEAN will be held in Friday (31/3) to discuss IORA and Possible Shifts in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy.

Why Indonesia Needs to Reform Maritime Security Governance

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President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) seems not to show any significant progress in the aspect of maritime security governance. The reason lies under the ignorance towards the existence and role of maritime security governance as a guarantor of Indonesia’s maritime economy development. As if we invite and let people invest in our company, President Jokowi did not realize that there has been a high rate of crimes occurring inside the company, which will be taken into consideration by investors. To that end, President Jokowi needs to gaze slightly the issues of maritime security governance in Indonesia before figuring the way to reform it.

Indonesia as a maritime country holds two roles: First, Indonesia plays key role  as a bridge of the global shipping and trade through Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia. Second, Indonesia could also become a hotbed of pirates in Southeast Asia. According to the report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Indonesia was ranked 8th from a total of 80 developing countries with unloading capacity to 9,638,607 TEUs of containers in 2012, 11.27345 million TEUs in 2013, and 11,900,763 TEUs in 2014. Through this potential contribution of 200 trillion rupiah per year for Indonesia’s GDP (Jompa, 2014), Indonesia has the opportunity to be a stopover point for global shipping and trade.

However, Indonesia arrived as the first-rank country for piracy and armed robbery against ships incidents. Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is highly vulnerable to the pirate attacks. Moreover, ports have served as a conquerable spot for most of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Indonesia. The percentage incident happening at ports has respectively reached 65% of total cases in 2012, 79% in 2013, 77% in 2014 and 82% in 2015. These findings assure that port is the vulnerable areas targeted by pirates.

Thus, the question lies in whether the Jokowi’s government has seen the importance of maritime security governance. If so, how has the maritime security governance been progressing?

Maritime security governance, as a policy system, consists of three main aspects, namely the legal framework, institutions, and resources. In the context of Indonesia, there has been no adequate legal framework. Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime and Law No. 17/2008 on Shipping do not regulatethe function and role of maritime security institutions in combating piracy. Even so, it cannot be ruled out that Indonesia has shown an early commitment in terms of maritime transportation security by authorizing the Draft Law on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 into a law to ensure the safety of the crew.

In term of institution, Indonesia experienced a fairly problematicalissue in managing the existing maritime security institutions. After the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, there is a mixed response from the stateswhich have intensively utilized their maritime domain. One is preparing its civil maritimelaw enforcement agency, such as marinepolice and coast guard, where some are involving naval armyfor maritime patrol and law enforcement. However, in the case of Indonesia, it remains equivocal.

Law No. 32/2004 on Marine has clearly dictated the role of Badan Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) as a civil maritime law enforcement agency and the TNI-AL as an institution whose role is to manage, maintain, and protect national sovereignty. However, in practice, TNI-AL perceives that the function of law enforcement at sea remains the duty of TNI-AL through the successful apprehension of pirates who hijacked KM Hai Soon 12 in Tanjung Puting, South Kalimantan, where the Head of the Information Office of the Indonesian Navy First Admiral Edi Sucipto explained that the TNI-AL as a law enforcement agency at sea must prevent all forms of violence within the jurisdiction, and always exercising patrols to maintain security in the territory of Indonesia.Although according to the former Chief of Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Army Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo, the function of law enforcement in national waters must be carried out by civilian law enforcement agencies. This situation indicates the problem of coordination among Indonesian maritime security institution,in which requires a significant political role of President Jokowi to dictate agencies in accordance to the authorized role.

The last is the resources issue including fleets’ capabilities and system, as well as personnel with ample experience and training. Bakamla obtained financial support from the government with a budget of 520 billion rupiah per year plus three patrol boats, which is then be added with the approval of the Parliament of 726.3 billion rupiah per year with an additional 30 units patrol boats. However, Bakamla is experiencing a shortage in human resources aspects. According to the Head of Operations Management of Bakamla Colonel Andi Achdar, human resources persists as main problem.

The small number of human resources encroaches the performance Bakamla covering many aspects, such as the formulation of national policies in the field of security and safety, the implementation of early warning systems, custody and supervision, monitor execution, and so on. With these limitations, carrying out all the functions in a wide range of work areas by Bakamla is unlikely for a country with huge maritime size like Indonesia.

At this point, it is necessary for Indonesia to consider the maritime security governance reform by performing two-level efforts.

At the national level, the Indonesian government needs to consider the availability of a legal framework that specifically regulates the issue of maritime security with the aim of establishing a strong legal basis and to facilitate the creation of laws derivation into specific instruments, such as the making of action plan and blueprints. Indonesia should also strengthen the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency despite the high stake of TNI-AL whose deterrence effect may exacerbate the border disputes in Southeast Asia’s waters. Moreover, lifting the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency will be much more effective and efficient using affordable commercial-standardized fleets to subdue pirates.

At the regional level, Indonesia needs to intensify the existing maritime security cooperation, such as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and newly-established Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative (SSPI), overcoming resource limitations in the maritime security governance through joint training and exchange of knowledge and manpower.

Given such condition in which Indonesia possesses limited resources, Indonesia needs to consider an involvement in a particular area or sector in international relations. President Jokowi along with the ranks of government can build a prototype of a policy initiative where the issue of the maritime economy can be associated and overlaid with maritime security issues, thus promoted in the region as a mechanism of cooperation to face common non-traditional maritime security threat.

Finally, this complexity signifies the importance of Indonesia to regard maritime security governance. Otherwise, Indonesia may experience the loss of its potential strategic ports as a transit point, and the breakdown of its image as a maritime nation.

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Is Indonesia Choosing the Indian Ocean Rim Association Over ASEAN?

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Indonesia’s substantial involvement in IORA signifies a stage of crisis for ASEAN.

From March 5 to 7, Jakarta played host to the leader’s summit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which was also commemorating its 20th anniversary. Given the chance to lead the summit, Indonesia has pursued significant initiatives, including the enactment of the IORA Concord, or so-called Jakarta Concord. This document, which will be used to govern the Indian Ocean and IORA members, highlights several important agendas, including maritime safety and security, the blue economy, and gender empowerment.

Indonesia’s substantial work to play a leadership role in the vast Indian Ocean, however, also indicates the failure of Indonesia’s natural leadership in ASEAN.

Why did IORA become important for Indonesia? IORA can be seen a new forum that is strategically aligned to the Nawa Cita, President Jokowi’s nine-point leadership agenda. IORA not only is a platform to attract investment for accelerating Indonesia’s infrastructure development policies, it also provides an opportunity for Indonesia to show its teeth as a “global maritime fulcrum.” As Ibrahim Almutaqqi has pointed out, through a series of economic cooperation policies contained within the IORA document, Indonesia has become actively and strategically involved in IORA to explore the potential of new economic markets and investments.

However, in evaluating Jakarta’s contributions to IORA, it is necessary to look back on the argument that Indonesia has turned away from ASEAN as a multilateral forum, instead focusing more on strategic bilateral cooperation (see: Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?). In this context, Indonesia might see IORA as an alternative means of regional cooperation. Desra Percaya, the Asia Pacific and Africa directorate general at the Foreign Ministry, has expressed his concern that IORA not let any conflict similar to the South China Sea disputes happen in the Indian Ocean. This apple-to-apple way of thinking signifies that Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry sees a new opportunity in the Indian Ocean, an opportunity that a divided ASEAN can no longer present. At this point, Indonesia’s foreign policy maneuver hints that ASEAN has entered a state of crisis.

Indonesia has appeared to lose interest in its position as the natural leader in the region. During the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos, Indonesia presented no serious initiatives to find an alternative solution to the lack of agreement on a joint communique. This stands in contrast to 2012, when then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa conducted shuttle diplomacy to the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore in order to craft a unified statement on the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. In 2015, Natalegawa emphasized that Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN cannot be seen as an event but rather as a process.

ASEAN’s current leadership seems to be ready to accept the stalemate, rather than actively pursuing a breakthrough. The current ASEAN chair, the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, has not provided any certainty for the region, only calling for the code of conduct (CoC) to settle down the South China Sea disputes. Manila is unlikely to use its legal victory in a Permanent Court of Arbitration case from last year to solve the conflict and instead is likely to repair its economic relationship with China. The Philippines perceives that they it engage in war, but remains hostile if China’s activity seems to affect the Philippines’ interests. It is difficult to see Manila playing an important role under the ASEAN framework due to the Duterte’s nationalist approach, which includes a foreign policy accommodating China’s economic interests.

If Indonesia continues to set aside the importance of ASEAN as a multilateral body, while looking more toward the IORA, it will jeopardize its history of deft diplomacy in the region. Since ASEAN has entered a stalemate, Indonesia must consider taking up its “natural” role in promoting dynamic and fluid negotiations in ASEAN. Instead of celebrating its successful bid to establish the IORA’s governance, Indonesia should look to the political future of its neighborhood, which, if neglected, may disrupt its economic-oriented foreign policy.

 

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

This article has been published in The Diplomat.

ASEAN Economic Community Today: From Neo-liberalism to New Structuralism?

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In 2010, the World Bank published a book that shed light on a new framework for world development: New Structural Economics. Authored by the Bank’s Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin, this book aims to combine old neoclassical economics with the tradition of structuralism in political economy.

This attempt was resulted in what Lin called as “new structural economics” (NSE).

Basically, this idea is not necessarily new. During 2000s, some idea of ‘neostructuralism’ has also been developed by Latin American economists to refer to the economic strategies undertaken by extractive-rich countries, which did not follow neoliberal prescription. The idea was soon dissolved after the low commodity price in 2010s, which leads the regional economy in crisis.

There are, of course, critiques and debates over NSE particularly among economists. From China itself, there is Weiying Zhang, who challenges Lin’s Keynesian prescription with his libertarian thinking. In the West, some leading political economists, such as Dani Rodrik or Ben Fine put forward some critical comments against this idea.

However, the most interesting point within international political economy (IPE) framework is not about the economic ideas that NSE offers. Rather, it was because NSE comes amid the concurrent global crisis, which makes global leaders to rethink the current political and economic framework that governs world politics.

I argue that NSE is important for two distinctive reasons. First, NSE offers a new theoretical framework to resolve the concurrent crisis in global political economy, which was marked by global financial crisis and low commodity price in stock market.

Second, NSE has recalled the ‘old’ debate in IPE whether the state should be given prominent rules in managing economy. NSE strongly called for strong state intervention in maintaining industrial policy, which goes side-by-side within its role providing good infrastructures for industrial purposes.

It is precisely the topic, in which Weiying Zhang, a prominent Chinese economist from Peking University, disagreed with Lin’s argument. A Hayek-inspired economist, Zhang demands for a bigger role for Chinese entrepreneurs in economy with minimal state intervention.

Whatever the result of the debate is, NSE seems to slightly put an alternative against the old-style neoliberal regimes in world politics, including ASEAN Economic Community.

For instance, Yifu Lin recently wrote for Project Syndicate over ‘African Industrial revolution’, in which he argues that Africa desperataly needs a significant industrial policy to catch-up with global economic development. He suggests that government needs to revitalise its role in spurring industrialisation based on state’s comparative advantages. Through this scheme, state-led industrialisation could lead African states to catch other regions in more developed countries.

On the other hand, the question over industrial policy should start with one key variable: how could the state finance the industries? The question is thus straight-forward: international cooperation. It is through cooperation with Multinational Companies (MNCs) and other governments, as Yifu Lin argues, that the ‘industrial revolution’ could be financed.

Yifu Lin’s illustration over Africa has raised another question on ASEAN: does ASEAN also pave its way for renewing industrial policy, which therefore abandons the ‘free-trade’ regime that was established through ASEAN Economic Community since 2003?

In 2015, ASEAN member states has agreed to renew their commitments over ‘ASEAN Economic Community’, which is centred over four key points: (1) a highly integrated and cohesive economy, (2) a competitive, dynamic, and innovative region, (3) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation, and (4) a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centred ASEAN.

These points shown that the idea of ASEAN Economic Community is still a continuation of integration commitment that was agreed in 2003 (Bali Concord II) and 2009 (the first blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community).

However, since 2011, ASEAN has also stepped forward a commitment for ‘industrial cooperation’, which was among others marked by the establishment of ASEAN Infrastructure Fund through partnership with Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is coincided with growing ‘infrastructure-related’ initiatives among ASEAN member states, including Indonesia.

Since the reign of Jokowi, for example, Indonesia has put forward some commitments to improve infrastructures and build national industries in many areas, particularly in Java Island.

It is of course not without cost. Several international cooperation schemes, as well as maximising tax revenues, have been set out by the Government to finance infrastructures and industries. It is in this context the intellectual leadership of Sri Mulyani, Jokowi’s Finance Minister and former World Bank’s Managing Director, plays significant role.

This new trends are also initiated by some other Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Indochinese states. In four Indochinese states (Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam), some cooperation schemes to boost infrastructures have resulted in the fast growth and modernisation in those countries.

So, will ASEAN undergo some shifts from neo-liberalism to the new trend of ‘new structuralism’ in the future? Even though some integration agenda in ASEAN Economic Community still maintains some classic ‘neoliberal’ agenda, such as free trade or competitive economic region, the ‘new structural’ wave is also move slowly within the region. It takes place bilaterally, under Chinese leadership in providing infrastructures and supports for industrialisation, rather than through regional economic integration.

This wave needs to be taken seriously by everyone who concerns with ASEAN development. Will these new waves of ‘new structuralism’ provide a better chance to narr0w development gap in the region? Or, in contrast, is it only ‘the same old wine in a new bottle’?

Whilst the idea of ‘industrial cooperation’ is not new for ASEAN (similar initiatives have ever been initiated in the 1980s) we still need to rethink the future of economic integration. It is because what happen in the region will affect the future of our country—as the 1997 financial crisis taught us.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Migration-Development Nexus: The Launching of Bincang ASEAN in UGM

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM has launched Bincang ASEAN,  a regular event that provides critical discussions over recent development in ASEAN. The first discussion was held in Friday (3/3) in BC 207, FISIPOL UGM, and discussed Migration-Development Nexus: Migrant Labours and the ASEAN Economic Community. At the meeting, Dana Hasibuan (Lecturer at Department of Sociology, FISIPOL UGM) presented his recent research on Indonesian migrant labours in Wonosobo and East Lombok.

Dana’s research, which was funded by FISIPOL UGM Research Grant in 2016, uncovered the relationship between local development and the constitution of political subjectivity of migrant workers in these Districts. Drawn upon an extensive fieldwork during 2016, he found that economic motivation matters among Indonesian migrant labours from this areas, which was overwhelmingly led the Migration of people abroad as TKI after the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community in 2003. “The case clearly shown that capital penetration has already been embedded even in a small village”, he added.

Through a poststructuralist lens, he argues that the constitution of labour migration is inextricably linked with the process of local development and the transformation of statehood in Southeast Asia under neoliberal regime. It was strengthened by the fact that there are thin boundaries between legal and illegal migration, as well as narrow political exposure during the process of migration. “The government, therefore, needs to consider this issue as a political problem, not only about economic or local development issues”, Dana concluded.

The next meeting, which will discuss ‘Politics in the Boardrooms’ with Indri Dwi Apriliyanti (PhD Candidate at the University of Oslo), will be held on Friday (17/3) at BC 207.  (Rr/Armu)

ASEAN Studies Center UGM Leads Review of ASEAN Charter

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM, in collaboration with the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security arranges a Focused Group Discussion to the discuss the review of ASEAN charter, which will be brought into discussion at the upcoming ASEAN Summit.

Dr Dafri Agussalim, the Head of ASEAN Studies Center UGM, spoke on some issues related to Human Rights in ASEAN.

Dr Dafri spoke alongside Dr Edy Prasetyono (University of Indonesia), Dr Riefqi Muna (Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Mr Sanga Pangaribuan (staff of Indonesian Permanent Representative in ASEAN) and several staffs from Directorate of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation. This forum was also attended by several staffs from various Ministries and Directorates, as well as researchers from ASEAN Studies Center.

The Focused Group Discussion is conducted on Friday, February 24 th 2017, which takes place in Dean’s meeting Room FISIPOL UGM. In this meeting, the speakers debate the possibilities of revision in ASEAN Charter, particularly with recentupdates in ASEAN institutional development.

Pengumuman Hasil Seleksi Wawancara ASEAN Studies Center 2017

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Yth. Kepada seluruh peserta internship ASC 2017,

Setelah melalui proses seleksi yang panjang dan dengan kompetisi yang tinggi, kami mengumumkan hasil lolos seleksi wawancara Program Internship ASEAN Studies Center 2017, sebagai berikut:

No. Nama
1 Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha
2 Siti Widyastuti
3 Diaz Kurniawan
4 Ruth Tarullyna Simanjuntak
5 Imas Lu’ul Jannah
6 Pinto Buana Putra
7 Tiarra Dya Arma Lucita.
8 Annisa Maulia Fahmi

Bagi nama yang telah disebutkan diatas, kami telah mengirimkan pengumuman kepada e-mail masing-masing.  Bagi yang tidak mendapatkan email, kami dengan berat hati menginformasikan bahwa anda belum diterima pada periode internship kali ini. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya.
Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseansc@ugm.ac.id

Pengumuman Wawancara Internship Program 2017

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Berikut adalah peserta yang lolos seleksi berkas beserta jadwal wawancara yang ditentukan. Wawancara akan diadakan di kantor ASEAN Studies Center Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Gedung BC ruang 209.

NO. NAMA TANGGAL WAKTU
1 Flory Rahmah Abiwawanti 6 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
2 Nina Arina 6 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
3 Khairunnisa Simbolon 6 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
4 Zahlul Pasha 6 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
5 Erwin Mansyur U. Saraka 6 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
6 Wahyunanda Kusuma Pertiwi 6 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
7 Andi Muhammad Ibnu Aqil 6 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
8 Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha 6 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
9  Muhammad Ridwansyah 6 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
10 Hafidhotun Nabawiyah 6 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
11 Syifa R. Wibowo 6 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
12 Fitriyani 6 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30
13 Siti Widyastuti 7 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
14 Sahid Maani 7 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
15 Diaz Kurniawan 7 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
16 Kadhung Prayoga 7 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
17 Ahmad Iffan 7 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
18 Andreas Nugroho Rahardyanto 7 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
19 Evan Sapentri 7 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
20 Muhammad Hafiz Noer 7 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
21 Aura Fadzila 7 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
22 Dendy Raditya 7 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
23 Annisa Maulia Fahmi 7 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
24 Siti Komariah 7 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30
25 Khoir el Umar 8 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
26 Mochammad Fajar Akbar 8 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
27 Anggun Dina Putri Utami, 8 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
28 Shofiyanto 8 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
29 Halimah Garnasih 8 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
30 Ruth Tarullyna Simanjuntak 8 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
31 Jasmine Nadhira Lathifazaputri 8 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
32 Randi Kurniawan 8 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
33 Imas Lu’ul Jannah 8 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
34 Pinto Buana Putra 8 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
35 Tiarra Dya Arma Lucita. 8 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
36 Gusti Agung Bagaskara 8 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30

Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseansc@ugm.ac.id

ASEAN Countries Should Find a Solution to End the Persecution of Rohingya

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Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar – Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s non-intervention is aggravating the plight of ethnic Rohingya Muslims suffering widespread abuse by the Burmese military in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Rohingya are one the of the world’s most persecuted ethnic minorities.

Human Rights Watch reported the Burmese military launched a campaign of killings, rape and arson against ethnic Rohingya following attacks by militants against government border guards in Rakhine State on October 9, 2016. HRW reported in December that, since the day of the attack, at least 1,500 homes have been burned in retaliation, displacing thousands of Rohingya people.

The United Nations has expressed concern about the military operations against the Rohingya. One UNHCR official reportedly called the attacks “ethnic cleansing”. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights, Yanghee Lee, is visiting Rakhine State. But the Myanmar government is denying her access to some areas and reportedly only allows her to speak with individuals it has pre-approved.

In a closed-door meeting in Yangoon in December, ASEAN’s foreign ministers discussed the violence following the October attack. But they avoided talking about the issue in human rights terms.

Among leaders of ASEAN member states, only Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, has condemned the violence in Myanmar. He described the military operations as “genocide”.

In Indonesia, despite pressure from rights groups and Muslim groups in the country, President Joko Widodo stopped short of condemning Myanmar, but offered humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees.

Regional problem

The persecution of ethnic Rohingya is a regional and global problem. Thousands of stateless Rohingya fleeing persecution end up in refugee camps in Bangladesh or become victims of human trafficking. They have been held ransom in death camps in Thailand and Malaysia, and sold to work in plantations or on fishing boats.

In 2015, a crackdown against human traffickers in Thailand prompted traffickers to abandon their boats. Thousands of Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants were left stranded in the Andaman Sea. The plight of the Rohingya people hence become a regional problem, sparking debate among Southeast Asian leaders.

At least 1,500 homes of ethnic Rohingya have been burned since October 2016. Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters

Where do Rohingya belong?

Historically, the Rohingya people have inhabited Burmese lands for hundreds of years. This dates back to before the British colonial age in Myanmar, which began in 1824. But the Burmese mostly still view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

When Myanmar gained independence from the British in 1948, it enacted a citizenship law that excluded the Rohingya people as one of the country’s many ethnicities. Almost 140,000 Rohingya people have been displaced and between 800,000 and 1.3 million Rohingyas are without citizenship.

Bangladesh, which borders Myanmar, also does not accept them, although thousands have escaped and sought refuge in Cox Bazaar, a border town within the country.

ASEAN’s non-intervention approach

Myanmar has insisted that the problems in the Rakhine State are a domestic matter. Within ASEAN, countries commonly refrain from intervening in domestic issues.

But ASEAN’s state-centric nature has prevented the regional organisation from protecting the rights of all people in the region.

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the main human rights institution in the region, could not even form an investigation committee to look into the problem. This is because, according to AICHR’s Terms of Reference, the commission does not have any mandate to carry out such an investigation. Any decision made by the commission should be accepted by all state representatives.

ASEAN members’ non-intervention approach has effectively blocked ASEAN’s own institutions – AICHR and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre – from protecting human rights.

Despite the change of political regime in Myanmar – with the appointment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi as de-facto prime minister – the persecution of the Rohingya continues. Soe Zeya Tun

Forging a caring and sharing ASEAN community

Talks among ASEAN leaders are often limited to political and economic issues, pushing problems with deep social and cultural roots like the persecution of ethnic Rohingya to the margins.

This should not be the case. Since 2015, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, with the aim of forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society in the region. ASEAN states adopted the ASEAN Vision 2025, which put forward the idea of a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN in the upcoming decade.

Forging a common platform for socio-cultural regionalism should not leave out state protection of human rights. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that the state bears responsibility to protect basic individual rights. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN that’s people-oriented must go hand-in-hand with the protection of human rights.

Yet, to date, ASEAN member states have not discussed a “people-oriented” mechanism to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

ASEAN member states should discuss the crisis in the upcoming ASEAN summit in the Philippines. ASEAN should combine these diplomatic talks with non-state initiatives, such as advocacy networks and humanitarian organisations.

We could learn from community initiatives in dealing with the Andaman Sea crisis in 2015. When governments were slow to rescue Rohingya and Bangladeshi people languishing on boats off the coast of Indonesia’s Aceh province, the local fishing community saved them from drowning. NGOs gave the refugees shelter. The strong role of non-governmental organisations and community-based initiatives to deal with humanitarian issues prompted the governments to sit down and find a solution.

ASEAN has equipped itself with various institutional mechanisms that encompass political security, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This means that ASEAN should not only deal with matters relating to economic growth and a free ASEAN market. It should also tackle issues relating to multiculturalism, be that religion, national identity, or ethnicity. Otherwise, we will only be waiting for Godot to end the persecution of ethnic Rohingya.

This article has been previously published by The Conversation

The Future of ASEAN-Russian Relations

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Content - Porto - Research Advo

Shane Preuss, Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s strength is demonstrated by its ‘convening power’ and its ability to attract the courtship of the world’s great powers. However, these strengths also present challenges, as ASEAN must not only navigate its relations of these powers, but also the various relationships of its individual members with respective powers. In light of this, significant commentary has been dedicated to the threat of rising US-China tensions for ASEAN’s unity and coherence. These tensions, often centered on the South China Sea dispute, are set to amplify as President-Elect Trump establishes a firm, even aggressive position toward China.

There is, however, another great power in the region, whose increasingly eager courtship of ASEAN, combined with its complex and evolving relations with both China and the USA, is set to play a significant role in the region’s geopolitics; Russia.  

The Origins of ASEAN-Russian Cooperation

Russia became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996 and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. It has since gained membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. The First ASEAN-Russia summit was held in 2005, and the second in 2010. The third Russia-ASEAN summit to commemorate the 20th anniversary of their dialogue relations was held in Sochi, in 2016.

Despite these developments, Russia-ASEAN relations have remained relatively unfruitful and Putin has shown a lack of interest in the region. This has been evidenced by his lack of presence at the East Asia Summit, the modest level of achievement yielded by first ten years of the Russia-ASEAN action plan, and the relatively low level of trade with ASEAN, especially when compared to other major powers, China and the USA.

In 2016, however, there were clear indications that this trend is beginning to shift. Russia is now eagerly engaging with the regional body and its member states. Over the two days of the Third ASEAN-Russia Summit, from May 19-20, Russia held bi-lateral members with every ASEAN member. The summit culminated in the announcement of a ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action’ to promote a cooperation between ASEAN and Russia in the areas of political-security, economic, socio-cultural and development cooperation. This increase in diplomatic activity was followed on December 23, when the UN General Assembly approved, by consensus, a Russian co-authored resolution, for Cooperation between the UN and ASEAN.

At the 2016 Russian-ASEAN ministerial conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined Russia’s approach to security, while recognizing, and supporting ASEAN’s centrality in the region. Russia, he said is building ‘a modern security architecture in Asia-Pacific,’ while ‘staunchly and consistently’ defending the role of ASEAN in regional affairs.

In the first week of 2017, two Russian warships Russia also made a visit to the Philippines. Eduard Mikhailov, deputy commander of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, signaled Russia’s desire to cooperate on military exercises in the South China Sea, with the Philippines, other ASEAN states, such as Malaysia, as well as China.  The expression of interest was well received and it was announced on Monday, 9th of January 2017, the Philippines and Russia and are in the process of finalizing a security deal, which allows the countries leaders to exchange of visits and observe military drills.

Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said the MOU between the countries opens the prospect for joint exercises. However, he also assured Washington the military agreements will not permit the rotational deployment of Russia troops and is not comparable to the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Philippines and the USA. Nevertheless. the development is significant on the back of President Duterte angry outbursts against President Obama and his decision to scale back military ties with his countries traditional ally while deepening engagement with China and Russia.

Russia has also begun developing regional economic agreements throughout Asia. The Russian-led, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), compromised of several former Soviet states, was established in 2015 and has already signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam and memoranda of cooperation with Cambodia and Singapore. ASEAN and Russia also agreed to launch a joint feasibility study of a comprehensive free trade area between ASEAN and EAEU.

Great Power Relations and the Future of ASEAN

Russia approaches to ASEAN and ASEAN states are part of a broader pivot to Asia, which, while effectively announced several years ago, began to take shape in 2016.  In addition to the strengthening ties with ASEAN, Russia has also sought to deepen its partnership with China. In June 2016 the EAEU and China signed a joint declaration on the negotiation of a trade and economic cooperation agreement and reach an agreement to integrate activities of the EAEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.

Russia’s decision to look East for new economic and security partnerships must be understood within the context of the Kremlin’s increasing estrangement from Western powers. While not necessarily, or causally, connected, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the West has marked a major rift in their international relations. This will considerably reshape Russia’s strategic posture and leanings for the coming years.

It remains to be seen what lasting effects recent will tensions between the US and Russia have on the relations between the two powers. These include allegations of Russian interference in 2016 US elections and Obama’s decision to retaliate by expelling 35 Russia diplomats. Putin received plaudits for his strategic nous for deciding not to retaliate, and, instead, express his intention to wait for the Trump Presidency to begin before making any decisions on the future of US-Russia relations.

However, while Trump and Putin appear to have shared warm relations over the election period, it is uncertain whether Trump will maintain this tone during his time in office. In light of these uncertainties, Russia’s increasing engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN members, coupled with its evolving and shifting relationships with other major powers, will be a major point of interest in the study of ASEAN geopolitics.