Written by: Muhammad Rasyid Ridho

On 18 October 2021, ASEAN’s Framework for Circular Economy for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was promulgated at the 20^th AEC Council Meeting. It signifies the importance of the circular economy (CE) as part of the AEC. This system is ostensible as an environmental-friendly alternative. However, ASEAN’s decision on this issue after six years of AEC establishment brings a simple question, what does “CE” mean, since it is quite a novel term for this region? Besides, how will this concept fit into the more extensive framework of AEC?

There is plenty of definition regarding CE. The most popular one is from the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2012), a restorative industrial economic system to ensure the effective flow means of production and rebuild the used resources. The very purpose of this approach is to “close the loop” of the production process for attaining sustainability of the environment (Winkler, 2011). The “closure” is needed since the “linear economy” prevails as the major production process, which is characterized by “take-make-dispose”, dependent on new material use, and with no concern for the potential value generation of waste, which leads to the accumulation of waste as its negative consequence (Rathinamoorthy, 2019). The basic principles of CE are reduced, reuse, and recycle, sometimes with other additions such as repair, refurbishment, remanufacture, and repurposing.

Indeed, there are already many attempts from Southeast Asian scholars to explain CE. Most of the research is focused on its technical implementation and potential in the future in various fields. The level where it is operated also ranges from the village to the national level. However, despite the different nature or scopes of those research, it is to be noted that several kinds of research from these countries bring out similar tone-related factors of CE adoption and the recommendations. In the factors of adoption or consumption, it includes the willingness of stakeholders, personal attitude, economic cost and benefit, public acceptance or support, government incentives and support, company culture, and consumer demand (Pasaribu, 2006; Ngan et al., 2019; Jan 2022; Gue et al., 2020; Akkalatham & Taghipour, 2021; Piyathanavong et al., 2021; Tseng et al., 2021; Abbasi et al., 2022).

These researches also point out the recommendations such as: putting the commitment into long-term legal, regulation, and masterplan favoring CE with its enforcement; giving incentives in the forms of funding, grants, or tax to practicing-CE enterprises; raising public awareness; coordinating between stakeholders (between government agencies or government-private-society); campaigning awareness; and supporting research and development (Pasaribu, 2006; Ha, Levillain-Tomasini, Xuan, 2019; Wichai‑utcha & Chavalparit, 2019; Adi & Wibowo, 2020; Abdul-hamid et al., 2020; Dung et al., 2020; Dung & Hong, 2021; Hoa & Khanh, 2021; Khor & Teoh, 2021; Taghipour & Akkalatham. 2021; Vân, 2021; Vu et al., 2021; Bueta, 2022; Mangmeechai, 2022). While these researches are conducted in different countries, which automatically only puts emphasis on their respective countries. Thus, there is still a limit on how CE could be seen from a regional perspective. In addition, the other CE common principle that is being implemented in these countries is the 3R (reuse, reduce, recycle) approach (Rahmadi, 2020).

As explained by Anbumozhi and Kimura (2018), while the linear economy is the motor of ASEAN growth, it cannot solve the problem of diminishing natural-nonrenewable resources, inequality, and climate crisis. It has become one of the reasons why the Framework of CE was recently promulgated. Of the strategic priorities contained in the Framework, one that needs to be put into focus is standard harmonization. It is deemed necessary to fulfilling this aspect in the right platform and focus because its absence would be one obstacle to further coordination of regional CE practices, which possibly lead to deeper regional integration in the future (Kojima, 2019).

However, since there are a lot of areas in which sector needs to be great, thus ASEAN perhaps could pick an urgent sector on which it needs to be focused. Regarding this issue, then revisiting the report of Akenji et al. (2019) would be appropriate since their report brings a fresh outlook on regional CE practice, especially on the issue of plastic. He proposes several points regarding the position in which ASEAN could involve, which are: a regional guideline of plastic use; a network of research and development; technical standards for products and recycling; agreement on plastic pollution. Plastic waste has become an issue due to the total ASEAN contribution to plastic waste is 31 million (Trajano, 2022). The timing could not be better; in the same year, ASEAN announced the Framework of CE in AEC and the ASEAN Regional Action Plan for Combating Marine Debris in the ASEAN Member States (2021-2025. The framework could serve as a big umbrella, and the action plan complements the specific aspect. Thus, integrating these two frameworks should promote CE as the long-term remedy for the plastic problem.

It is mentioned briefly in the Framework that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are considered on CE practices in ASEAN. The inclusion of SMEs is essential due to their vast numbers in the region, which is approximately 71 million (Tan, 2022). They contribute 97% of total business activity and employ 67% of the working population (Tan, 2022). It is found that enterprises which implement CE practices are more resilient to global economic shocks than others due to their inclination to shorten the supply chain and follow local business situations (Rishanti & Suharyadi, 2020). In relation to the previous discussion, MSMEs need to be catered to in the framework relating to CE and the plastic issue. They need to be supported because it is evidently easier for the bigger company to transition to the CE scheme, while it is another problem for MSMEs due to its perceived high cost. In this regard, then we can revisit OECD’s (2021) suggestion of “greening the SMEs”. The suggestions include capacity support, availability of low-interest financing; incentives through tax exemption or deduction; and government-backed and free consultancy for these MSMEs to give needed information on technical or cost calculation of CE adoption. These are the area where the private sector, MSMEs, and society are essential to tackle the plastic problem at its root while simultaneously creating a circular chain -especially related to plastic- in the region. The intended consequence of MSME inclusion in the CE scheme is more public exposure to CE and a reverse of the known trend that only limited knowledgeable people who are eager to consume CE-based products (Dinh & Nguyen, 2018). Indeed, as a sign of a stronger commitment, the top-down initiatives in form of a more legally binding agreement to translate into national policy serves as the cornerstone for the thriving CE and MSME.

 

About Writer:

• Muhammad Rasyid Ridho is an Research Assistant at Centre for World Trade Studies Universitas Gadjah Mada (CWTS UGM). His particular research focuses are international political economy, Southeast Asia, and China. For further inquiries, he could be contacted at rasyid.ridho95@gmail.com

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Written by: Seonyoung Yang

Indo-Pacific has been one of the most spoken buzzwords regionally and globally. Discourses for conceptualizing Indo-Pacific are still in progress. The rift caused by exacerbated US-China rivalry, the Ukraine crisis, and energy and food prices ensued complex enigmas for all stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly for ASEAN. This essay, therefore, analyses the embedded meaning of various Indo-Pacific strategies, including the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, and suggests how ASEAN should maneuver the strategic reefs in Indo-Pacific.

The Asia’s Geopolitical Circumstances

The US-China tit-for-tat has gotten only worsened since the Ukraine crisis. The US, EU, and its allies have criticized Russia for its horrendous attack and supported Ukraine in an unprecedented manner not only in humanitarian aid but also militarily, albeit the very foundation of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community, aiming to deter the war under any circumstances.

A mammoth in the room, China has never been quiet per se, but its tone and demand have been stronger over recent years. Xi Jinping even started proposing new initiatives such as Global Development Initiative to regain respect worldwide after overcoming a century of humiliation[1]. From the trajectory of power dynamics, though, it is natural to observe such frictions between existing and emerging ones.

In this inimical dynamic, small and middle countries across Indo-Pacific squirm to avoid being entrapped. Amitav Acharya (2021)[2] defined that “‘Asia’ was built by nationalists, ‘Asia-Pacific’ by economists, ‘East Asia’ by culturalists, whereas ‘Indo-Pacific’ by strategists’”. This definition is succinct yet clear to understand why some countries are in favor or against ‘Indo-Pacific’.

Paradigm Shift

Geographically speaking, China is nestled within the Asia-Pacific region. Since China prioritizes economic development for regional cooperation, such as Belt and Road Initiative, hence tenaciously sticks to Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, as defined by Archarya, Indo-Pacific, encompassing two vast oceans, the maritime strategy is a salient feature. It is worth remembering Wang Gungwu[3] (2019) argued that the maritime domain has been the historians’ and strategists’ core interest for colonial expansion leading to globalization and, furthermore “the focus of global power” (p 129).

Asia-Pacific is arguably obsolete, although China and Russia grapple with holding on to it. Wang (2019) also acutely analyzed that Indo-Pacific would shed more light than ever in the era of paradigm shift[4]. He further argued that ASEAN, therefore, would be given a central role and closely watched by superpowers in the Indo-Pacific domain[5]. Conceptual geographical shifts in parallel with paradigm shifts are being occurred. Therefore, we may need to put howling arguments aside but collect heads to think of paradigm shifts within Indo-Pacific and decode various strategies, outlooks, and frameworks available until today.

ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific

The champion of ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP)[6] is undoubtedly Indonesia. As the biggest archipelago in the world, encompassing the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, Indonesia’s ambition to become the global maritime fulcrum is intrinsic. Some naysayers quickly gnaw at the AOIP’s four main areas by belittling those as nothing an inch closer to so-called a strategy. The four main areas, namely maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, and other areas, are indeed functional but clearly what ASEAN needs in high demand.

Pragmatists are dissatisfied with the progress of AOIP. They even vilified that incompetence as ASEAN’s chronic disease. The moderate argue that ASEAN threw a dummy in the name of AOIP to collect ideas and tighten its grip, a convening power, to explore, define and develop ideas of Indo-Pacific. Bearing such arguments, Endy Bayuni (2022)^[7]calls on superpowers to reconsider Indo-Pacific as a multi-player poker game, not a duel chess game. ASEAN does not wish to judge but remains relevant within and beyond Indo-Pacific to exercise its leeway and leniency for every player, whether big or small, to take part without being neglected.

Earlier this year, Indonesia proposed to mainstream AOIP in all ASEAN-led mechanisms. Still veiled to dialogue partners, this would not be a meticulous manual. Instead, it would suggest a loose guideline allowing maximum flexibility among all parties interested in implementing AOIP with ASEAN on lead. Even though EAS is explicitly mentioned twice as the relevant implementing mechanism in the AOIP, this leaders-led forum does not befit the ASEAN’s initial plan, given the challenging geostrategic circumstances. Alternatively, ASEAN might begin its ‘mainstreaming’ AOIP by incorporating the four main areas in each ASEAN+1 mechanism. In doing so, ASEAN may have multiple options and means to concretize the AOIP. This choice, however, might lead to ambivalence which may turn out as competition among dialogue partners but overlapping and redundancy on the other hand.

Psychological approach

In order to decode ASEAN’s ways of thinking, psychological approaches might be useful. Richard Nisbett wrote an eye-opening book, ‘The Geography of Thoughts[8]‘. Long story short, he argued that Westerners, precisely Europeans, and North Americans tend to think they are in control of their surroundings. They often consider that the rules and laws governed in society are concluded from lengthy discussions and subsidiary decision-making processes. Therefore rules-based and lawful society should not be interfered with or distorted by any supremacy. Asians, on the other hand, think nothing is permanent; hence adaptability to change and environment is crucial rather than sticking to control. Rules and laws are therefore meant to be changed constantly. ASEAN, in this regard, is eager to create a conducive environment where different actors and ideas could be freely floated but not necessarily conflicted. ASEAN would like to be a respected moderator who can exercise adroitness and wisdom to encourage everyone, even dichotomous actors, to try to seek a middle way. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC^[9]) is a prime example in which ASEAN has paved the way to consolidate its identity and suggest means under six fundamental principles as a proactive regional group pursuing peace and prosperity. Established in 1976 by five founding member-states, 49 countries^[10] are listed as high contracting parties within and beyond the region. TAC suggests six principles that are characterized as highly flexible yet adamant on sovereignty, independence, non-interference, and peaceful settlement. Accession to TAC is a prerequisite for any external parties to tie a knot with ASEAN. Such conditions optimize ASEAN’s leverages to set the agenda for starting businesses in ASEAN Way by maximizing flexibility and inclusivity. Leaving space for maneuvering is ASEAN’s disposition in diplomacy, which is more pronounced in dealing with external partners.

External partners’ contribution to the AOIP

Thus far, Japan, the US, Australia, and the EU, including France, Germany, and the Netherlands, have announced Indo-Pacific strategies. Among ASEAN Dialogue Partners, Japan[11] and India[12] adopted the Leaders’ Statement on pledging to seek concrete cooperation for implementing AOIP.

Dr Shofwan[13] argued that all major powers label strategies or frameworks for their Indo-Pacific concepts while ASEAN retains low-key, using a neutral term, ‘outlook’. Unlike AOIP, major powers’ strategies or initiatives outline values such as freedom, openness, and democracy. These liberal values are embedded in AOIP to some extent but not outspokenly. These values are selective depending on the areas of cooperation or even partners ASEAN wishes to work with. Clearly, options are vast and never limited.

The US allies and partners have published Indo-Pacific initiatives besides the Republic of Korea. The incumbent government has announced a plan to announce its own Indo-Pacific framework underpinning “a pivotal global state, with a focus on promoting freedom, peace, and prosperity based on Seoul’s liberal democratic values[14]” (Ramon Pacheco Pardo, 2022). Concerns and questions have loomed over the continuity of Korea’s full-fledged support to ASEAN under the New Southern Policy. Nevertheless, ASEAN is considered the centerpiece of its newly unveiled Indo-Pacific framework later this year.

Conclusion

Indo-Pacific is arguably the busiest area where multipolarity would be revealed sporadically. As long as ASEAN remains relevant as a regional group, harsh skepticism over ASEAN’s disunity or being a toothless talk shop would gradually fade away. How ASEAN could safely stay relevant in the Indo-Pacific realm lies in ASEAN’s wisdom. ASEAN needs to be more eclectic to garner various Indo-Pacific strategies and concepts to revisit and detail its very own AOIP step by step. ASEAN never rejected proposals from elsewhere bluntly, and it never will. Conflicting or coalescing into something better is up to ASEAN’s call. For the latter, ASEAN cautiously calculates its psychological strengths and weakness to converge various Indo-Pacific concepts on the ‘middle way’ to encourage ASEAN’s role in the era of paradigm shift.

About Writer:

• Seonyoung Yang Senior Research Officer at the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN (2013-Present), MSc of EU Studies and Communication Science from Vrije Universiteit Brussel (2011-12), Graduate Diploma in International Relations from London School of Economics (2016-17), BA of Linguistics from University of East Anglia (2006-9)

Bibliography

1. The Diplomat (2020, August 20), ‘China’s ‘Never Again’ Mentality,’ Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/
2. Amitave Acharya (2021, July 8), Retrieved from https://twitter.com/amitavacharya/status/1413139276561145861
3. Wang Gungwu (2019), ‘China Reconnects: Joining a Deep-rooted Past to a New World Order,’ Singapore: World Scientific, p. 129
4. Ibid (2019: p. 161)
5. Ibid (2019: p. 18)
6. ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific’ (2019) Retrieved from https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/
7. Endy Bayuni (2022, July 19) ‘Poker, not chess, is the name of the game in the Indo-Pacific’ available on The Jakarta Post, Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2022/07/19/poker-not-chess-is-the-name-of-the-game-in-the-indo-pacific.html
8. Richard E. Nisbett (2003), ‘The Geography of Thoughts: How Asians and Westerners think differently,’ New York: Free Press
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020, November 12), ‘Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,’ Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100114942.pdf
10. ASEAN Secretariat (2022, August 16), ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),’ Retrieved fromhttps://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-tac/#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Amity%20and,in%20the%20region%20and%20beyond
11. ASEAN Secretariat (2021, October 28), ‘ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region,’ Retrieved from https://asean.org/asean-india-joint-statement-on-cooperation-on-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-for-peace-stability-and-prosperity-in-the-region/
12. Habibie Center Youtube (2022, July 6), ‘Talking ASEAN on “The US’ New Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Future of Taiwan’s Strait Stability,’ Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNXuEeJ66Rs
13. Ramon Pacheco Pardo (2022) ‘South Korea as a global pivotal state: the role of partners’ https://brussels-school.be/publications/policy-briefs/south-korea-%E2%80%9Cglobal-pivotal-state%E2%80%9D-role-partners Brussels: CSDS Policy Brief 07/2022

Written by: Ferdian Ahya Al Putra

Indonesia should be proud after successfully organizing the Asian Games and Asian Para Games in 2018. Now Indonesia is assigned to host the ASEAN Para Games 2022. ASEAN Para Games is the largest disability sports party or event in Southeast Asia (Kemenko PMK, 2022). This time, the ASEAN Para Games will be held on 30 July – 6 August 2022 in Central Java Province, including Solo City, Semarang City, Sukoharjo, and Karanganyar (Kemenpora, 2022).

Inside the ASEAN’s structure, they have ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Sport (AMMS). To support AMMS, ASEAN organized the Senior Officials Meeting on Sports (SOMS). In short, they agreed to assist AMMS in enhancing cooperation in sports or related activities towards balanced sports development in ASEAN; Promoting a healthier lifestyle among citizens of ASEAN Member States through sports, encouraging more interaction among peoples of ASEAN, thus fostering friendship among the ASEAN  Member  States,  as well as contributing to ASEAN integration and community building; Advocating and promoting the role of sports in regional development, peace and stability; and Promoting sportsmanship,  competitiveness and an ASEAN  culture of excellence in sports at the regional and international levels (ASEAN, 2011). This ASEAN Para Games could be one of the programs they organized to achieve the objectives.

Sports Diplomacy Concept

 The ASEAN Para Games can be used as momentum in introducing culture and tourism, especially in Solo or the cities around. This goal is closely related to the term sports diplomacy. In a review published by the European Union, it is understood that Sports Diplomacy is an aspect of public diplomacy, and it can be used as a soft-power tool for an increasing number of purposes (Murray & Prince, 2020). Murray also defined “Sports Diplomacy” as a new term that describes an old practice: the unique power of sport to bring people, nations, and communities closer together via a shared love of physical pursuits (Murray, 2020).

Based on this concept, it can be understood that sport can be a tool to achieve diplomatic goals. The 2022 ASEAN Para Games is an excellent opportunity to attract tourists, especially when Solo is the location for the event. As in Yogyakarta or Bali, both have strong cultural elements which are a big attraction for foreign tourists. Meanwhile, Solo is also a city with cultural tourism. In other words, this event is the right opportunity to introduce Solo to the international scene especially tourists who have come to watch the ASEAN Para Games. The packaging of the ASEAN Para Games this time also cannot be separated from the cultural elements attached to Solo. For example, the 2022 ASEAN Para Games logo also includes cultural elements, namely the illustration of ‘gulungan’ as part of the wayang, a Javanese puppet symbol. A dagger in the logo’s center further emphasizes the event’s cultural element. In addition to the logo, the committee also presented the Rajamala Mascot, which Rojomolo read according to the Javanese accent. Rajamala is known to be unrivaled and is symbolized as the power to resist evil or a negative aura. Rajamala is also a palace heirloom in the form of a can think that symbolizes the greatness of the Surakarta Palace (Jawapos, 2022). This shows that the committee is trying to push cultural diplomacy through sports.

Logo and Mascot of 11th ASEAN Para Games (Foto: Jawapos)

Culture, Tourism, and Culinary in Solo

Talking about culture and tourism, Solo has various cultural sites worth visiting by both local and foreign tourists. In Solo, there are two symbols of royal history: Kasunanan Palace and Mangkunegaran Palace. The Giyanti Agreement signed in 1755 divided the Sultanate of Mataram into two powers, namely the Surakarta Sunanate and the Yogyakarta Sultanate (Darmawan, 2017). While the Mangkunegaran Palace is the place where the kings or dukes of Mangkunegaran reside. This palace was built by Raden Mas Said or Prince Sambernyawa, the founder of Mangkunegaran who holds the title Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Arya (KGPAA) Mangkunegara I (Ningsih, 2021). In addition, tourists can visit other cultural sites as alternatives, such as the Heritage Batik Keris, the Press Monument, the Nusantara Keris Museum, and so on.

Furthermore, Solo has Batik industrial centers, especially in two Batik villages in the Laweyan and Kauman areas. As we all know, Batik is a world heritage site in Indonesia. The recognition of batik as a world heritage has been in effect since the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established Batik as Masterpieces of the Oral and the Intangible Heritage of Humanity on 2 October 2009 (KWRI UNESCO, 2017). In addition to culture, Solo has various distinctive culinary delights with a high taste. The local culinary potential includes Nasi Liwet, Soto, Gudeg, Selat, Pecel, Timlo, Bestik, Tengkleng, and so on. Saeroji and Wijaya (2017) mention that Solo has great culinary potential. They mentioned, for example, that in the Banjarsari sub-district, there are 12 culinary destinations, in Serengan 7 culinary destinations, in Jebres 7 culinary destinations, six culinary destinations in Laweyan, and three destinations in the Kliwon market area. Therefore, visiting Solo is a good opportunity to get to know or buy Batik directly from the industrial center and become a unique attraction for tourists to taste its exceptional cuisine.

Festival in Solo: Solo Batik Carnival (Foto: Instagram/ solobatikcarnival_official)

In other words, this time, the ASEAN Para Games can be an opportunity to introduce Solo’s culture and tourism. Sports expert at Universitas Sebelas Maret (UNS), Febriani Fajar Ekawati, M.Or., Ph.D., mentioned that the event has the potential to revive Solo’s economy. The two main sectors that will be affected by the implementation of the 2022 ASEAN Para Games are the industry and tourism sectors. She also mentioned that the benefits of the ASEAN Para Games for the tourism sector could occur in 2 types, tangible and intangible. The tangible benefit refers to the hotel sector that had fallen due to the pandemic, which will be booked for ASEAN Para Games athletes, coaches, and officials. The hotel is full of guests, and the shops around the hotel can also sell daily necessities and souvenirs. The guests will undoubtedly ogle the culinary sector.

Meanwhile, intangible in nature, namely the icon of Solo, will be worldwide. Several international media will report interesting things about Solo so that this city will be known to the broader world community (UNS Public Relations, 2022). This view is also supported by Solo’s mayor, Gibran Rakabuming, who stated that he wants Solo, a small city with a solid cultural background. The world can see how successful it is in organizing sporting events such as the Asean Para Games (Herdyanto, 2022). In addition, Solo is known as a ‘festival city’ where they already host various cultural festivals such as Solo Batik Carnival, Solo International Performing Arts, Festival Jenang (Traditional cuisine display), etc. This will also enhance the attractiveness of Solo itself.

Based on the concept above, the ASEAN Para Games can help the government to introduce Solo and its tourism to the international view. Relevant parties, from the government to the committee, it is essential to pay attention to the elements contained in the implementation, such as by displaying cultural elements in it or serving special cuisines from Solo for consumption for athletes, officials, journalists, and spectators. It is also important to distribute information about tourism and culinary in Solo along with access if a tourist wants to move from one place to another, for example, through information boards, social media or other digital platforms. This aims to reach the ASEAN pillar, namely the economic pillar, where one of the points to be encouraged is to optimize the tourism sector.

ASEAN Para Games, in this case, is not just a sports party. In a more social realm, this can be an opportunity to strengthen solidarity between ASEAN countries by upholding sportsmanship when competing. This is appropriate with Murray’s argument that sport can bring people and nations closer through sports competition. This is also a place to show off athletes with disabilities. This also emphasizes that sport can be inclusive, which means that everyone has the same opportunity to compete where the motto of this event is “Striving for Equality”. In this context, sport influences the relation among ASEAN members as the concept of sports diplomacy is mentioned. The most crucial point is upholding sportsmanship and fair play value at first, then it will be followed by how sport can strengthen engagement among the member countries of ASEAN.

 

About Writer

• Ferdian Ahya Al Putra is a Programme Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He finished his bachelor’s degree at the International Relations Department, Universitas Sebelas Maret, and his master’s degree at International Relations Department, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He is also an LPDP Scholarship Awardee from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia. He can be contacted through email: ferdian.ahya.al@mail.ugm.ac.id or ferdianahya@gmail.com

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ASEAN Football Track Record  

Football is one of the most popular sports in the world, and ASEAN is no exception. However, ASEAN football is considerably still at the developmental stage compared to football in other regions or countries, such as Europe. Such a view exists due to the fact that the achievements of football teams from ASEAN Countries are still relatively unimpressive within the Asian and world football scenes. The success of both national teams of Myanmar U-19 and Vietnam U-19 that reached the semifinals of the AFC Asian Cup U-19 in 2014 and 2016, has been a remarkable achievement for ASEAN football in the age-group tournament. These results finally made Myanmar and Vietnam national teams eligible for competing in the FIFA World Cup U-20, which was held in 2015 and 2017, respectively. But unfortunately, they did not perform impressively during each tournament and became caretakers in the final standings of the group. While in the senior football group, no ASEAN representative has ever qualified for the World Cup. So far, the best achievements of ASEAN representatives are shown through the success of several national teams that were able to advance to the third round of the Asian World Cup qualification, including Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand in the 2014 World Cup qualifiers. Thailand for the second time managed to survive in the World Cup 2018 qualifiers, and now recently followed by Vietnam in 2022 World Cup qualification. 

Japan’s Football Achievement 

The achievements of ASEAN football today can be said to be very much different from the achievements of other Asian football countries, such as Japan. It is safe to say that Japanese football can be considered as one of the most advanced or even the best ones throughout Asia in recent days. This is evidenced by Japan’s success in winning the AFC Asia Cup four times, back then in 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2011. Aside from that, Japan has never missed out on any World Cup matches since 1998. In addition to making achievements in Asian Cup and World Cup competitions, Japanese national football also managed to score achievements at the London 2012 Olympics and the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, by successfully occupying fourth place. Nowadays, there are many Japanese football players who are playing in the top European leagues. For instance, in the Premier League (England) there are Takumi Minamino and Takehiro Tomiyasu who join with Liverpool and Arsenal. While in La Liga (Spain), Takefusa Kubo and Gaku Shibasaki also joined RCD Mallorca and CD Leganes, respectively. In the Bundesliga (Germany), there are Makoto Hasebe and Daichi Kamada who both play for Eintracht Frankfurt. While other two Japanese football players, namely Maya Yoshida (U.C. Sampdoria) and Eiji Kawashima (RC Strasbourg), are playing in Serie A (Italy) and Ligue 1 (France). By this, it is not surprising if Japanese national football team is now considered 50% stronger than ever, as it eventually shows that Japanese football is very advanced compared to the ASEAN’s football league. 

 Asian Eleven for the Future of ASEAN Football 

Japan’s remarkable achievements in Asia –and even in the world– have encouraged this country to become the role model in Asian football (46 Asian Football Associations) scene by enhancing Japan’s football players’ skills. Southeast Asia is a region that received more attention from Japan, especially in the field of football. This could be seen through the Football Exchange Project which was established in November 2014. The project was formed based on a memorandum of understanding between The Japan Foundation Asia Center, the Japanese Football Association (JFA), and the Japan Professional Football League (J.League), which was also supported by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within its implementation in 2019, the Football Exchange Project was later known as Asian Eleven. The Asian Eleven essentially intended to accommodate talented players under the age of 18 as well as local ASEAN coaches. The main objective of the program is to foster football talent among ASEAN countries and Japan, promote mutual understanding among people, especially among youth through football, and share experiences that Japanese football has learned and developed so far. 

In an attempt to achieve maximum results, there are two main projects carried out in the Asian Eleven collaboration, namely Project in the ASEAN Nations and Project in Japan. The Project in ASEAN Nations has two focal points that are of concern within the project’s implementation. First, the long-term deployment of personnel, namely Japanese coaches and staff who are sent to stay in one of the ASEAN countries for more than one year. The main goal is to raise the level of national football through engagement with local youth players and coaches. Second, the dispatch of short-term trainers. The coaching staff of each J.League club will be sent to an ASEAN country once to twice a year for a period of approximately one week. It aims to encourage the J.League club’s coaching staff to engage in player training and network with local football personnel. 

 

Photo source: jfac.jp 

The project in Japan has three focal points. Firstly, Invite Players, which allows players to concentrate on learning Japanese football in a period of approximately one month. The aim is to develop and increase their level and provide an opportunity to get to know Japan. Secondly, Invite Coaches, which aims to train coaching staff who are responsible for fostering player development, especially in improving national team football. Lastly, Invite Personnel related to the league, which provides a forum to share knowledge to develop and strengthen football leagues in ASEAN countries. 

Asian Eleven 2019 ended with the holding of two friendly matches as the highlight of the event. Asian Eleven 2019 ended with the holding of two friendly matches as the highlight of the event. The JapaFun Cup was the first friendly match to be held between Asian Eleven U-18 and the Tohoku U-18 Selection Team at J-Village Stadium, Fukushima on June 22, 2019. The Asian Eleven U-18 team was a combination of representatives from ASEAN countries and Timor Leste as a country observer (each country nominated 2 players). This match ended with a score of 0-0 and continued through a penalty shootout that was won by the Asian Eleven U-18 team. The second friendly match was the Japan Foundation Bangkok Cup Asian Eleven U-16 (which consists of representatives of Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and ASEAN observer country Timor-Leste) and the U-16 Thailand national football team, on November 3, 2019. This match ended with a score of 2-2, which then followed with the penalty shootouts that finally led the Asian Eleven U-16 team to victory. 

Asian Eleven 2019 has run very well and was expected to continue in 2020 and in the following years. As it is believed that the program will not only increase the level of ASEAN football but also can strengthen the relations between Japan and ASEAN countries (both regionally and bilaterally), especially through sports. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic, both ASEAN countries and Japan are now prioritizing the health conditions of the players, coaches, and all parties involved. This results in the postponement of the Asian Eleven program for an indefinite time, and it is hoped that as soon as the world gets better the Asian Eleven program could be held again. 

 

About Writer 

• Munawar Wahid Sugiyarto is a Media and Publication Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Social Sciences majors in International Relations with particular focuses on Southeast Asian and European studies, and also about sports, especially football. He can be contacted through e-mail: munawarmws@gmail.com. 

Southeast Asia is a growing, full of potential, yet contested region. The population of Southeast Asian countries combined makes the world’s third-largest market. However, the region also struggles to address its economic, social, and political problems. The complexity of the region requires us to learn and understand issues facing the region more in-depth.  

ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada just concluded a series of online movie screening events, Bincang ASEAN, titled Reading, Learning, Investigating Southeast Asia through Movies (also known as ReaLISM). Through interesting engagements with filmmakers and experts in Southeast Asian countries, not only did ReaLISM deepen the audience’s understanding of the issues in the region, but it also enabled the audience to discuss the issues more critically. Acknowledging documentaries as a representational medium, audiences do not only take for granted the (re)construction of reality in the past as represented in documentaries. They also have the capacity to imagine the present and the future concerning realities (re)constructed in documentaries.

To have a closer look at the region’s issues, ReaLISM successfully screened three documentaries in three different Southeast Asian countries. The three screened documentaries are Standing on the Edge of a Thorn: A Family in Rural Indonesia (Robert Lamelson, Indonesia, 2012); SITTWE(Jeanne Hallacy, Myanmar, 2017); and An Online Citizen (Calum Stuart, Singapore, 2019), respectively. Considered participatory documentaries, while these three movies zoomed in to the reality of the documentary’s subjects, filmmakers are also included within the narratives.

These three movies represented the complexity and diversity of issues in the region. Lamelson (2012) through his documentary, represents the life of a family in rural Indonesia grappling with poverty, mental health, and the sex trade. Through SITTW, Hallacy (2017) exposed the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state in Myanmar, through the lens of two youths representing both opposing sides. Meanwhile, Stuart’s (2019) an Online Citizen documented a story of an independent online journalist in Singapore fighting for freedom of the press amid the rise of authoritarianism

In this circumstance, making sense of Southeast Asia means looking at the everyday reality of individuals (re)constructed in each documentary and to the ways in which their reality reflects a broader picture of Southeast Asia. What did these movies tell us? At least there are three things we learned from the three movies.

       

In the past and local, yet now and regional

Documented within a certain timeframe in the past, we should recognize the temporal dimension of the issues represented in the three documentaries. Considering the temporal aspect of the realities of those individuals filmed in the movies, one might ask them what is happening now (or would happen in the future).  

In this case, one of the three filmmakers, Lamelson, recently came back to Indonesia and filmed the subjects of his documentary Standing on the Edge of a Thorn to discover what happened to the family in 2012. During the documentary discussion, Lamelson conveyed that what happened to the family in 2012 is something that he wouldn’t have thought of before. The mother (Tri) chose to leave her husband (Iman) for someone else; Iman remarried a 16-year-old girl in the village, and the daughter (Lisa) got married to a guy she met on social media. While Standing on the Edge of a Thorn captured the issues of poverty, poor mental health, and the sex trade which grappled by the family, the family appeared to be happier since 2012, although other issues such as divorce and child marriage occur.  

Not only should we take into account the temporal dimension of documentaries, but we should also consider their spatial dimension. Documented specifically in a particular geographical location within three Southeast Asian counties (Indonesia, Myanmar, and Singapore), the issues represented in the movies are situated locally. However, issues such as poverty, poor mental health, sex trade, ethnic conflicts, and declining freedom of the press are certainly not exclusive problems specific to these geographical locations. Rather, these issues are regional (or even global) issues. For instance, Stuart expressed that declining freedom of the press appears to be a global issue facing journalists worldwide. Budi Irawanto, one of the discussants in ReaLISM #3, compared the issue in the context of Indonesia. He explained that the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (also known as UU ITE) had been used to criminalize journalists.  

Education for social change

The second lesson learned from ReaLISM to make sense of Southeast Asia is that education plays a key role in social change in the region. In discussing her documentary SITTWE, Hallacy pointed out that lack of education (read: illiteracy) became a prominent cause of ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Thiha, a youth activist from Myanmar, discussed the conflict trajectories and explained how disseminating (mis/dis)information had triggered the conflict. Information literacy is therefore important to prevent conflicts in the future.  

Two young teenagers from both sides in SITTWE expressed how the conflict has changed their lives. While pointing out the devastating consequences of the conflict, Hallacy engaged with teenagers from opposing sides, asking what they wanted to be and the kinds of future they wanted to have. The documentary ends with a famous quote from Malala Yousafzai: “If you want to end the war, instead of sending guns, send books; instead of sending tanks, send pens; instead of sending soldiers, send teachers”. 

The importance of education for social change is also echoed in Standing on the Edge of a Thorn. Approaching the end of the documentary, the daughter (Lisa) voiced her hope of making a better future for herself and her family after pursuing higher education. 

Where is ASEAN?

A similar theme across the three documentaries that the audiences engaged with is a reflection on ASEAN’s presence (or absence) in addressing the issues. This critical assessment matters because ASEAN is well-known as an intergovernmental organization in the region. The role of ASEAN has been particularly explored in discussing SITTWE by Irawan Jati, a scholar in ASEAN studies. He claimed that with the fundamental principle of national sovereignty in ASEAN, such a regional institutional arrangement is difficult to play a key role in conflict resolution.  

Meanwhile, the exploration of ASEAN’s role appears to be lacking (or absent) in the discussion of two other movies. This, too, shows that ASEAN does not play a significant role in addressing the issues represented in the documentaries, although ASEAN has established, adopted, and developed institutional arrangements, declarations, conventions, regional plans of action in relations to poverty, child abuse, gender inequality, and even protection of human rights.  

To conclude, ReaLISM (Reading, Learning, and Investigating Southeast Asia through Movies) becomes an alternative way to make sense of Southeast Asia. Documentaries on Southeast Asian countries are a representational medium that enables those who watch them to engage with everyday realities in Southeast Asia that they generally cannot experience themselves. Three lessons learned discussed previously should be understood in the context of the three documentaries. We could learn different lessons and enrich our understanding of Southeast Asia from other Southeast Asian documentaries of which we witness growing in numbers.  

 

About Writer

• Muhammad Ammar Hidayahtulloh is a PhD Student at School of Political Science and International Studies, the University of Queensland. He is also an initiator of Bincang ASEAN – ReaLISM. He can be reached at muhammadammarh@outlook.com.