Entries by aseansc

ASEAN After 50: Social Integration and the Challenges of New Geopolitics

 

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar and Karina Larasati B. Riyanto

What should ASEAN do in the next 50 years? For ASEAN, its survival for the last 50 years is a great achievement. Although some people said that ASEAN has undergone slow and steady development, its survival during the last 50 year has proved ASEAN’s resilience to political changes in global.

But could ASEAN survive for another 50 years? ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada has presented a series of article on “ASEAN after 50”, which comprises reflections on what has ASEAN achieved in latest 50 years and what should be done in the future. Many authors shared optimism –alongside critical viewpoint—on the future of ASEAN.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar kicked-off by arguing that the future ASEAN integration needs to move beyond political and economic integration. He suggests that ASEAN needs to take into account broader issues other than traditional free trade, security, or political integration issues. ASEAN needs to deal with oft-neglected issues such as Middle Income Trap, Sustainability, Human Rights, or Gender.

Suraj Shah, for example, argues that ASEAN needs to rethink its approach to development and industrial strategy in order to escape the Middle Income Trap. Economic integration attempt to pave the way for such initiative, but the perceived ASEAN way among the member states constrained the implementation.

Taking a more critical stance, Jakkrit Chuamuangphan calls ASEAN to pay more attention to Human Rights defender. The case of forced disappearances in many Southeast Asian states (most notably, the Sombhat case in Laos) should be tackled by ASEAN by functioning its Human Rights Commission, which has been established since 2009. Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha highlights the many languages of gender discrimination in the region, which ASEAN is still unable to respond with proper policy frameworks.

From a sustainability perspective, Ibnu Budiman reflects the need for ASEAN to rethink its approach to agricultural sector due to the danger of climate change. Moreover, he suggests that ASEAN should start to protect the rights of smallholder farmers through investing in climate action. A more participatory approach with farmers in each ASEAN member states is therefore necessary.

Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito raises more questions as to how we should reconsider ASEAN studies in the future, given the existing social and political challenges in the last 50 years. For example, as Dio H. Tobing has critically asked, is such notion like ASEAN Way –a perceived diplomatic culture among ASEAN member states based on non-intervention principle—still relevant in the future? The answer yes, given the historical importance of such norm in the past.

Nevertheless, according to Rifky Maulana Iqbal Taufik, ASEAN should also consider establishing a more complex form of collective identity to bring the idea of ASEAN Community ‘down to ordinary people’. This is where paradiplomacy is increasingly important for ASEAN. Ario Bimo Utomo explains that which the practice of diplomacy is not only dominated by the central government, but also the local government. This new framework should also be considered by ASEAN in the future. This necessitates further capacity development and inclusion of ‘good governance’ in ASEAN’s institutional design, according to Pinto Buana Putra.

In the end, the trend of Asian international politics in the 21st century shows geopolitical challenges that ASEAN cannot deny. The geopolitical context in Asia is changing. The rise of China after nearly forty years of reforms evokes the signs of uncertainty, security instability and also, expectation, within the region.
On the one hand, China’s presence as the new global economic force altered the direction of bilateral relations in Asia by reducing the dominance power and influence of the United States within the region. China rise to power succeeded in providing new nuances in regional cooperation including export activities of Southeast Asia countries. On the other hand, as suggested by many analysts, rising power usually emerges as revisionist rather than status quo powers or simply maintaining the balance of power. With China outgrowing as a regional power and on its way through the global stage, its opening up the possibility of creating a new order in the international system.

China’s economic ascent and therefore, military strengthening raises concerns about the possibility of war outbreak between the two great powers and the deteriorated conflict in the South China Sea, involving China and most of the ASEAN member states. As a matter of fact, what is seen to date, instead of peace and stability as promised, there is an increase of tension and China’s arrogance in securing its state’s interests.

Another challenge for ASEAN in this geopolitical shift is to maintain the neutrality and unity of ASEAN member states. It is worth noting, China’s growing economic relations with ASEAN member states is remarkable but the US is an irreplaceable element of regional balance because it is the US that has brought prosperity to the region. The competition of two or more great forces within the region has, indirectly, divided regions over different frontiers. With the faded unity among ASEAN member states, ASEAN has increasingly lost its relevance and power to act as a stabilizer between the competition of the two great powers.

The geopolitical shift and the rise of China are inevitable. To deal with this challenges, ASEAN needs to wisely benefit on the opportunities and fight against any possibilities that might deteriorate regional peace and stability. The generous goal of China in establishing Asia as an independent region should be put to good use.

This is where ASEAN needs to strengthen its cooperation with China as well as the other countries to counterweight China’s power in the region, as argued by Gabriel Lele,  ASEAN should not become a ‘passive actor’ in crafting cooperation with China. Rather, ASEAN should negotiate in many relevant aspects, one of which is the cooperation based on history past and similarity on culture.

 

*) Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center UGM and
Karina Larasati is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

ASEAN After 50: ASEAN and Good Governance

Pinto Buana Putra

ASEAN is a regional organization that is build to accelerate cooperation between member states in regional level. Within ASEAN there is no uniform political quality that would permit generalization about shared political values, culture, and institutions. There is no ASEAN analogy to the “social democracy” like the European integration. Instead, ASEAN is commonly known with the system of governance. Consensus-building and consultations are hallmarks of ASEAN decision-making. For example, in the case of promoting regional economic integration, ASEAN has been working closely with the private sector through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the ASEAN Business Forum and specialized or sectoral groups such as the ASEAN Federation of Mining Associations and the ASEAN Ship Owners Association, among others.

In social science, governance is not always about politics. According to Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance involves interaction between the formal institutions and those in civil society. Governance refers to a process whereby elements in society wield power, authority and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life and social upliftment. And today, governance has become an important subject among policymakers and mass media. In my opinion, governance is an institution and process by which state exercises its authority. And to make a “good” governance, it needs substanstial key.  

The key to establish a good governance in ASEAN is the leadership’s political will and political capacity. Political will is the conscious intention of leadership to act in a way conducive to good governance. While. The political capacity refers to leadership’s ability to move the political, bureaucratic, and military institutions of the state in the direction of good governance. An evaluation of the quality of governance is a relative judgement, but it is based on performance according to Weathherbee

In the scope of ASEAN, Singapore is one of the best example of good governance.  Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in his speech said that good governance in Singapore was built on three interrelated factors: accountability and transparency, long-term social orientation, and social justice. Good governance is reflected in the policies that are formulated for a sustainable long term. The motto for state policy in this case is flexibility and adaptability in anticipation of pragmatic change.

H.E. Ong Keng Yong states that consensus-building and consultations are the hallmarks of ASEAN decision-making. For example, for the purpose of promoting regional economic integration, ASEAN has been working closely with the private sector through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the ASEAN Business Forum and specialized or sectoral groups such as the ASEAN Federation of Mining Associations and the ASEAN Ship Owners Association, among others.

Good governance in this term is not only about the output of policy, but also about the implementation of that policy. Policies are designed to meet the long-term good., therefore it requires

strong leadership with a vision and clear direction. For that, an independent, truthful and efficient civil service are important, which can be attained through good education, meritocracy, and incorruptibility. According to Asian Development Bank (ADB), good governance involves norms of behavior that help ensure that governments actually deliver to their citizens what they promise to deliver. This is the true meaning of good governance. These norms include accountability, transparency, participation and predictability. The fundamental underpinning for good governance is the rule of law. Only with the rule of law the other requisites such as accountability, incorruptibility, and transparency could be guaranteed.

Furthermore, the quality of governance must be followed by the quality of corruption counterwork. The costs of corruption in terms of good governance are too high. Corruption encourages inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce economic and social resources. In fact, according to Survey Global Corruption Report 2001 even Singapore which we point as a the best governance is not immune from corruption. Like other indicators of a poor quality of governance, the consequences of corruption are far more serious. In this case, ASEAN must take a strong position to fight against corruption in order to ensure that governance in ASEAN can be enhanced properly.

If this inadequacy continues, the future looks very blurry. Almost all ASEAN countries have symptoms of falling state. If this could have an adverse impact on the region, what should we do? There are many prescriptive solutions offered for ASEAN; From rule of law, transparency, civil service reform, judicial reform, to the idea of bureaucracy reform. However, the end result will always depends on political will and capacity. In the end, it is very important for ASEAN to train and maintain the technocrats for the desired system to be effective and efficient. At the same time, there is a need for nation’s leaders to oversee the organization’s performance in order to achieve good governance goals

 

Pinto Buana Putra is a research intern at ASEAN Studies Center

ASEAN After 50: Mainstreaming Paradiplomacy in ASEAN

Ario Bimo Utomo

During the last few decades, sub-state entities have been rising to prominence due to the increasing level of globalization. Anthony Giddens argues that this phenomenon is caused by two colliding forces of globalization, namely the upward force and the downward force. The upward force, as Giddens describes, is a force which diminishes the traditional state boundaries by creating an increasing interconnectedness among states.

On the other hand, the downward force of globalization is a force which encourages local entities to realize their own positions in this increasingly connected world—forcing states to provide them with channels to express their own interests. The involvement of sub-state entities in the foreign affairs is known as paradiplomacy.

Paradiplomacy, an abbreviation of “parallel diplomacy”, is a concept which depicts the ability of sub-state entities (cities, provinces, autonomous regions) to engage in international affairs with their foreign counterparts. Andre Lecours states that paradiplomacy can be conducted within three different scopes: (1) economic, (2) cultural, and (3) political. Intuitively, paradiplomacy is possible to enhance the quality of democracy as it makes policies less elitist by putting the decision-making authority closer to the people.

Paradiplomacy constitutes one prominent issue in this 50 years anniversary of ASEAN. However, we can examine that paradiplomacy is relatively unknown in most scholarships about the organization. We may notice that states are still positioned as the most prominent actors. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been popular for having its own unique principles which essentially champions state-centric norms such as non-interference and respect for sovereignty—a set of principles which is dearly called as the ASEAN Way. This stance has sparked debates regarding its relevance in this increasingly-interconnected world.

It is difficult to envisage a diplomatic mechanism which positions sub-state entities as other actors in alternative discourses about ASEAN. Therefore, it leads us to our main question: can ASEAN—with its ASEAN Way—embrace paradiplomacy?

ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities

The organization, however, does not stipulate explicitly how sub-state engagement can be conducted. In the ASEAN Charter, yet, the organization has already outlined a vision that ASEAN shall be a “people-oriented” society which everyone can benefit from its integration (Point 13 of the Article 1). Through the Blueprint of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, ASEAN has also indicated its commitment to building a more “inclusive, sustainable, resilient, and dynamic” community.

Those factors indicate that sub-state engagements are not impossible to be done within the current ASEAN framework.

As a matter of fact, it is incorrect to say that the paradiplomatic activity is completely unknown to this organization. Despite its essential focus in state-to-state relations, the organization has already got a platform which paved a road for sub-state entities to be positioned as actors. In this case, we can pick an example from a program called the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities.

During 2009-2015, the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities was intended to be a part of the wider ASEAN Socio-cultural Community Blueprint. According to the ASEAN official website, the program is a manifestation of ASEAN’s mission to promote a quality living standard in urban areas. Thereby, this program aimed to ensure that “cities/urban areas in ASEAN are environmentally sustainable while meeting the social and economic needs of the people”. The program involved 25 cities from the different 10 ASEAN member states. The cities picked are described as “smaller and rapidly-growing” urban areas.

Within this program, there are some activities such as the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on the Environmentally Sustainable Cities, ASEAN Model Cities Program, and the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities Award. The two latter examples were utilized as an incentive as well as benchmarking measures for the respective cities to develop.

As Southeast Asia is a home to the increasingly-urbanizing 580 million people, it is understandable that ASEAN puts a bigger emphasis on cities. The increasing role of urban areas as the bridge between the regional aspirations and the grassroots level, consequently, cannot be ignored.

In a bigger picture, cities have a significant role in localizing international goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) stipulated by the United Nations. Such efforts are harder to attain when the states cannot accurately translate the needs of their smaller constituent units.

Sub-state engagements can be done without necessarily breaching the core ASEAN principle which upholds sovereignty. With the lack of ASEAN awareness remains a haunting problem in realizing a Southeast Asian socio-cultural community, paradiplomacy offers a channel which connects people with the organization. In this case, the ASEAN Way should not be perceived as a stumbling block.

In contrast, the core ASEAN principles can be a common identity which brings a special colour toward the ASEAN paradiplomacy, enabling the parties to realize their shared identity and to achieve their collective interests in a peaceful manner.

Fifty years since its establishment, ASEAN has shown its progress as a dynamic and forward-looking regional organization. However, it also signifies that ASEAN still has more to offer in responding to the modern diplomatic trends. In this case, paradiplomacy can be a solution. Mainstreaming paradiplomacy can be a future investment for the organization to stay relevant with the needs of its heterogeneous constituents.

This can be done by creating new programs which give more portions to the local entities to participate. Member states, on the other hand, should also be committed to encouraging its sub-state units to stay on track with the regional vision in creating an inclusive community through an extensive public diplomacy.

 

*) Ario Bimo Utomo is a former research assistant at the ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He earned his master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Sydney, Australia.

ASEAN After 50: The Language of Gender Discrimination in Southeast Asia

Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha

Why talk when you are a shoulder or a vault

Why talk when you are helmeted with numbers

Fists have many forms; a fist knows what it can do

Without the nuisance of speaking; it grabs and smashes

From those inside or under words gush like toothpaste

Language, the fist proclaims by squeezing is for the weak only

-Margaret Atwood-

In arguing the necessity of language, feminist theorists assume that language has never been neutral. It only serves the dominance in the social world where women are not counted. A poem by Margaret Atwood above illustrates how women are undervalued in language practice, which places them nowhere.

As Winant argues, “women have no mother tongue” which refers to such belief that no language suited to women’s position in sexist society. Language may manipulate reality which manifests ideology of male-dominated society. It seems that language inherits political structure which embedded in social relations whether it maintains the status quo or reform it.

This language practice reflects in a word of manhood or mankind which is currently used to address human being. These words maintain the high status of man which has the fullest authority over the control of the world. Job seekers are also familiar with gender marking following the type of the profession. The term lady doctor or female lawyer borders the working space of men and women.

The language also deploys performance, Cameron (1985) pointed out that a word of penetration shows men’s power towards women. While, penetration from women’s perspectives will be appropriately uttered as an enclosure, surrounding, or engulfing. However, it is rarely used. This kind of language practice fosters unequal gender relation.

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of ASEAN, with all of its achievements in the midst of globalization and the splendor of gender equality at the global level, how unfortunate that gender equality is still a major problem in Southeast Asia. For example, it is reflected in the use of language that describes gender discrimination. In Vietnam, the use of the unisex pronoun “em” does not guarantee that it treats equally men and women in language. Although, the pronoun “em” can be used to refer either men or women, most of the time “em” places women as a subordinate. Culturally women in Vietnam are trained to call themselves as “em” when they are talking to their husband. “Em” as a pronoun contains man’s social and sexual power. These practices lead to women’s inferiority as the social identity of Vietnam women.

It was also highlighted by women’s identity in Folklore. The stories of Folklore illustrated the reality of women in Vietnam. The Folklore depicts women in a tragic and straining notion of self-sacrifice and human struggle. The influence of Confucianism which places “women at the bottom of Confucian hierarchy” also plays an important role in maintaining the distinction between male and female in society. Vietnam proverbs reflect male-dominating society through discriminatory language.

Tai gia tong phu, xuat gia tong phu, phu tung tu (At home, serving the Father, upon marriage serving the husband, after the death of husband serving the children).

Women in Vietnam seems to be treated as an object and their future is decided in the hand of men. This condition also occurs in much of daily life in Malaysia where women treated unequally through language.

In Malaysia’s media, the word man and he generalize people as a whole. This generalization reflects privilege to a particular group, which is the man.

Women in Malaysia are also described by their relationship to men. Women as a belonging of men are recognized by the use of preposition ‘of’ for instance mentioning the death of women and men. In death, women are not usually recognized for their achievement or accomplishment. They are recognized as being a wife. While men are followed by their achievement in death.

Singapore which mainly populated with Chinese has also been assessed to be gender bias language (in particular, an older form of Chinese language). Usually, the names for females are associated with flowers, beauty, and softness while names for males portray success, prosperity, greatness, and brilliance. In addition, in Chinese language, nicknames for unmarried women have a negative connotation which is frequently referred to laochunu ‘old virgin’ or ganmianbao ‘dried up bread’. Meanwhile, wanglaowu means ‘old single eligible men’ or danshen han or guang gun which means ‘rod’ or ‘pole’ which have a positive connotation within the Chinese community.

Likewise in Indonesia, gender stereotyping in everyday language is undeniable. In Indonesia, the insertion of the word mother rarely precedes the word father in the structure of parallel sentences, for instances ‘father and mother’. This word position reflects power relation between men and women in real life. Moreover, adjectives play important role in identifying men and women. Women perform as beautiful, soft-hearted, and emotional. Whereas men are categorized as brave, firm, and strong. Evidently, this sex-role stereotyping are successfully manifested in language.  

In the end, the 50 years of ASEAN can be a momentum to reflect on the issue of gender discrimination that is still remained to this day. There should be efforts to raise the awareness of ASEAN community to diminish sexist language and gender stereotyping which can limit both female and male societal expectation. ASEAN should fight against gender mystification by addressing changes to social beliefs and attitudes rather than merely restructuring language.

 

Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha is a Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN After 50: Reflecting ASEAN as Collective Identity

Rifki Maulana Iqbal Taufik

The 50th anniversary of ASEAN is the right moment to evaluate every achievement and the projections for the future. An evaluation is not limited only to the implementation of program but how ASEAN is being presented in the society. ASEAN’s approach, so far, appears more elitist / state-centric, rather than people-oriented. This resulted in the lack of community understanding on ASEAN, what it does and how it affects their lives. In the context of Indonesia, based on data collected from ASC UGM 2014, about 65% of the people in Yogyakarta have never heard of ASEAN. If that is the case in a city as big as Yogyakarta, what about those living in remote areas? How the ideal of ASEAN Community can be accomplished if the at the ‘real’ community level, an understanding of ASEAN is limited. In other words, it is necessary to start bringing ASEAN to a more community level, involving the whole elements of the country, not just the government, to realize the aspirations of ASEAN Community 2015. At this point, ASEANization is first and foremost.

ASEAN as an Identity?

The Sociological conception of identity is also known as a collective identity. The basic assumption is that collective identity plays as narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors, The macro-theoretical argument says that the more a human society is differentiated, the more it needs a collective identity.

ASEAN has a large and culturally diverse population. In the other side, every country of ASEAN has developed the discourses about itself (national identity). It can be both opportunities and challenges at the same time

In its 50th anniversary, there are still many people who do not understand about ASEAN. Most of them know the existence of ASEAN but do not understand the role and function of this organization. This regard, one can say that ASEAN integration only exists at the state level but not at the community level.

So the most important thing today is how to make ASEAN identity as a normative character that is presented and institutionalized. Identity as an analytical concept covers all these elements: identity emerges by linking the past social relations with those in the present.

To reconstruct the identity of ASEAN, we can refer to history through the identification of structural boundaries and opportunities for historical connectivity. Let us depart from the historical narrative of the past. The kingdom of Southeast Asia has been connected long since the seventh century. The story of this period can be used as a reference in shaping the idea of ASEANization.

Just imagine, various cultures and empires in Southeast Asia interact, connect with each other and create a unity of ASEAN culture and identity. Therefore, it is important to understand that constructing ASEAN’s collective identity is not impossible since it has been historically formed for a long time. Institutionally, ASEAN needs to provide (establish) the institution that focuses on “ASEANization”.

ASEANization: Digital and Youth

With cultural diversity within ASEAN that have co-existed for centuries. The main thing to do is how to make the ASEAN identity is, therefore, understood as a narrative network embedded in social relations among people who live within ASEAN. Digital space can serve as a bridge for the ASEAN community. Increased interest in digitalization changes both social and economic life of human beings. Today, in the digital age, there is no limit to humanity. This phenomenon creates a new pattern of our participation as citizens. Moreover, today, digital space became the foundation of social interaction. Technology has changed social relationships and may have produced forms of identity beyond national boundaries. The existence of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media can be a factor encouraging the public participation to guard oversee ASEAN. This indicates that technology has a significant role in human nature and is regarded as one of the societal importance. In the end, it can be concluded that technology can be used as a tool for ASEANization. Youth are connected very strongly with technology. Hence, the internet as one part thereof is the way for them to accumulate, analyze, disseminate information and knowledge. The most important thing now is to take advantage of this reality, connecting youth through technology and make them the main agents of ASEANization.

 

Rifky Maulana Iqbal Taufik is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN After 50: Climate Justice and Smallholder farmers

Ibnu Budiman

The combination of climate change mitigation and adaptation is essential for millions of smallholder farmers in ASEAN. However, does it consider farmers’ rights and development to achieve a farmer-centered approach? What could ASEAN do to protect the rights of farmers and the environment in general?

ASEAN is one of the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. A Large proportion of these emissions come from the conversion of forests and carbon-rich peatlands into productive agricultural land. This is a prominent issue that needs to be addressed in the 50th anniversary of ASEAN, which has a big impact in the future.

Much of this conversion is driven by the nation’s crop estates (e.g. oil palms, cocoa, and coffee). Although smallholder farmers own only small plots of land, they farm quite a big part of ASEAN’s total land area planted with oil palms. Meanwhile, in Indonesia for instances, under the Nucleus Estates and Smallholders (NES) scheme, a company acquires 70 percent of the land under development. However, as land scarcity drives up the value of unconverted plots, farmers are keen to hold onto a greater share.

ASEAN is one of the most productive agricultural regions in the Asia. In 2012, the region produced 129 million tons of rice, 40 million tons of corn, 171 million tons of sugarcane, 1.44 million tons of soybean, and 70.34 million tons of cassava. However, Southeast Asia is highly vulnerable to climate change as a large proportion of the population and economic activity is concentrated along coastlines; the region is heavily reliant on agriculture for livelihoods; there is a high dependence on natural resources and forestry, and the level of extreme poverty remains high.

A study carried out by Asian Development Bank (ADB) revealed that the mean temperature in the region increased by 0.1 to 0.3 degree Celsius per decade between 1951 and 2000; rainfall trended downward from 1960 to 2000, and sea levels have risen 1 to 3 millimeters per year. Heat waves, droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones have also become more intense and frequent. The same study projects a 4.8 degrees Celsius rise in mean annual temperature and a 70 centimeters rise in mean sea level by 2100 in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.

As matter of fact, the ASEAN farmers has been practicing organic farming and good agriculture practices for quite a while. Most of ASEAN agriculture programs are aiming for sustainable food production. This effort should be combined with the climate-smart agriculture (CSA) to increase the resilience of the region. The concept of CSA was invented by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2010 to sustainably increases productivity, resilience (adaptation), reduces/removes greenhouse gases (mitigation), and enhances achievement of national food security and development goals.

There are several ways to mix these sustainable agriculture practices. Insurance is a good example which protects farmers from crop losses due to bad weather and encourages them to innovate. Weather index-based insurance schemes can help secure farmers’ livelihoods and enable them to invest in climate-smart technologies. It will improve million farmers’ adaptive capacity with the help of climate-smart insurance. Through close collaboration with farmers, civil society, governments and researchers, it will support the concept and practice of climate-smart agriculture in farmers’ fields and in global initiatives.

For many smallholder farmers, modern, chemical-based fertilizers are unaffordable. Traditional slash and burn practices are the alternative method, but they have caused an increase in the soil’s mineral content. As fires become more frequent, however, soils begin to degrade and farmers are left with an area of land with limited fertility.

Farmers’ shifting cultivation practices also cause damage to local river systems through increased sediment discharge and the release of chemical fertilizers, harming fish and other aquatic life. Some environmental groups have claimed that palm oil companies committed to ending deforestation and sustainable production, are, in fact, encouraging slash and burn by smallholder farmers so as to enlarge plantation size.

Deforestation is often the only option available for the livelihoods of smallholder farmers living in forested areas. Compounding this, some governments have made attempts to roll back no-deforestation pledges to allow smallholder farmers to continue using unsustainable agricultural practices.

On top of this, climate change impacts are now emerging as a serious threat to progress in agricultural development. With a strong dependence on climate-sensitive natural resources to support their livelihoods, smallholder farmers in ASEAN are highly vulnerable to climate change. To cope with these challenges, approaches to this issue are becoming even more complex, combining the more established practices of environmental protection and poverty reduction with emerging concepts related to global climate change: mitigation and adaptation.

In Indonesia, from 2002, biologist Willie Smits started to apply an approach to rebuild the rainforests in Borneo. The program has been empowering smallholder farmers to find alternatives to harvesting forests. It was started with a team of 100 local farmers to restore 5,000 hectares of devastated forest. To grow, protect and preserve the forest land itself, the program offers local farmers free land to plant crops in the forest. The government has pledged to make this concept a national project and to be replicated in eight provinces in Indonesia. This approach should also be replicated in other ASEAN countries.

Investing in climate action by smallholders is showing incredible impact in terms of food security, biodiversity improvement, and carbon mitigation.

Last year, the ASEAN farmers discussed opportunities and challenges of family farming with the European Union in order to enable the smallholders to effectively engage in modern business and market practices and to provide more access for them to new and more sustainable farming practices.

However, doubt still remains about sharing the burdens and benefits of the program equitably and fairly with landless farmers, since the rebuilding program focuses more on forest biodiversity, not on a farmer-centered approach to development. What is needed to protect farmers’ rights? It is a question of climate justice.

Climate justice affirms the disproportional impact of climate change on frontline communities—such as farmers—and promotes their solutions to achieve a just transition for people and the planet. One such solution that lies at the nexus of food sovereignty, territory/land, and climate justice is agroecology, a practice that combines local agricultural knowledge and culture with modern scientific insight. Sustainable farming modeled on agroecology can actually return CO2 to where it belongs—the soil (not the atmosphere).

This would offset from 24 to 30 percent of all current global greenhouse gas emissions, through sustainable production, possible, in part, through the decentralized production, collection and use of energy. Through vibrant family farms packed with biodiversity, often on collective territory, agroecology nourishes people and heals broken ecosystems. In this sense, climate justice and food sovereignty are acts of political resistance. They exist outside the corporate control of the food system—thanks in part to their autonomy from external inputs (such as fertilizers and pesticides)!

These solutions enhance the productive potential of the land. ASEAN needs to move forward to this approach, not merely about the connection between agriculture and food, but also climate and environment.

 

Ibnu Budiman, MSc Candidate in Environmental sciences and climate studies in Wageningen University, Netherlands. Earlier version of this article has been published at The Jakarta Post, co-authored with Hannah Barrowman (Australian National University)

ASEAN After 50: Is the ‘ASEAN Way’ still relevant?

Dio Herdiawan Tobing

Unlike other regional or international organizations, ASEAN possesses its own model of diplomatic engagement: the ASEAN Way. For so many years, the ASEAN Way has always been a very heated topic of debate among the academics, government officials, and policy-makers. Now that ASEAN has reached its golden anniversary, the remained question is whether the ASEAN Way is still relevant, or must the organization employ other tools to foster its members’ cooperative behavior in agreed institutional arrangements.

In most academic literature, the ASEAN way is always to blame for any wide-array of cooperation failures, for instance: Indonesia on the haze problem, Myanmar on the Rohingya crisis, and the absence of ASEAN centrality in the South China Sea dispute.

The ASEAN Way is defined a shared of norms, principles, and values governing the interactions of ASEAN member states. It is more of a loosed concept but strictly embedded in the practice of ASEAN diplomacy. The problem is, in many kinds of literature the ASEAN Way has always been incorporated with ASEAN’s strict adherence to the principle of consensus-building, informality, non-interference, and respect to national sovereignty.

Indeed, from a strictly legal perspective, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation serves as the formal foundation of the ASEAN Way, whereby on Art. 2(c) of the agreement, it is emphasized that “In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”. However, the ASEAN Way is not defined as narrow as what enshrined in the treaty.

This is what one keeps on forgetting and neglecting in the kind of literature; as the ASEAN Way is not the goal, but rather a means of achieving collective interests. Hence, the process of norm and values sharing is dynamic and never been stagnant.

On the one side story, criticisms are frequently directed at the gameplay of ASEAN, which often pays too much respect for the above-mentioned principles. Nevertheless, the ASEAN Way is the only possible method that could be employed by the regional institution and its members, as it is shared on daily basis beyond the limits of their consciousness. Intriguingly, the ASEAN Way is neither a failure nor a weakness. As many are not aware of, on the other side of the ‘blame’, lies a powerful instrument: the ASEAN Constructive Engagement.

The ASEAN Constructive Engagement

ASEAN utilized the Constructive Engagement (CE) at Myanmar in the 1990s to foster democratization. It was not introduced as an alternative of the ASEAN Way, yet inseparable for they share the same ‘blood’. The CE prefers a bilateral or multilateral method of engagement by favoring dialogue, opposing the policies of compulsion including sanctions and diplomatic isolation employed by the west.

As matter of fact, the CE is not only utilized by ASEAN in Myanmar’s case. In any other issues, CE informally and unconsciously uses as a method of engagement among ASEAN Countries, whether it is facilitated by ASEAN Secretariat, bilateral or multilateral engagement under the greater umbrella of ASEAN cooperation, or in any diplomatic forums.

Furthermore, CE does not offer a sudden policy shift of any ASEAN member states to adhere towards regional goals, but rather emphasizes on the ‘engagement process’. This is why, in the f by any government in ASEAN.

Some may view this as a disadvantage. However, CE is a promising tool in offering gradual changes in dispute settlement mechanism without harassing any conflicting parties in public spaces.

Two concrete examples of the result of CE can be seen from the policy change of Myanmar towards the Rohingya and Indonesia’s accession to the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement as presented below.

Constructive Engagement: A Tale of Two Case Studies

Even though CE was introduced in early 1991 to induce Myanmar’s cooperative behavior to ASEAN, the effort continued even after Myanmar become one of ASEAN members, especially to persuade Myanmar to become more open to the international community and not treating the Rohingya minority group violently.  

The result was not instant. From 1991 to 2008 there was almost no change in Myanmar policy towards the Rohingya. The country insisted the Rohingya massacre has nothing to do with their country for the Rohingya is not part of the Burmese community. Not until in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, which resulted in the first attempt of regional “humanitarian intervention” to assist Myanmar in recovery. It is imperative to note the regional assistance set up by ASEAN and its members to help Myanmar had broken the problematic stigma of ASEAN’s ‘fixed price’ devotion to the principle of non-interference and traditional concept of sovereignty.

The successful attempt of ASEAN to assist Myanmar recovering from the impact of such humanitarian disaster, served as the pathway to improve the government’s openness to the regional community. In fact, as per 2009, Indonesia played a leading role in opening a bilateral talk with the Burmese government, calling for a greater attention to this Muslim minority. Surprisingly, this occasion functioned as the turning point where the Burmese government finally admitted that the Rohingya problem also belongs to Myanmar. Prime Minister Thein Sein, stated that “in principle, the Myanmar is willing to accept the Rohingyas back if they can prove they are indeed the people of Myanmar”.

Another breathtaking result also occurred in late-2016. At the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of ASEAN on September 30, 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi, finally asked “constructive support” from Myanmar’s regional neighbors to resolve the crisis in the country’s troubled western Rakhine state. The step was then followed by the establishment of a special panel of an investigation, headed by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.

In the Southeast Asian haze catastrophe, ASEAN also utilizes similar approach to persuade Indonesia to pay attention towards the issue. Resulted from thorough bilateral and multilateral discussions, there were at least three events which marked Indonesia’s non-defensive behavior to ASEAN. First, Indonesia had never blocked ASEAN from adopting any resolution, since the Singapore Declaration, where the haze issue was first mentioned, to the making of haze agreement. Second, Indonesia signed the agreement in 2002 and third, in late-2014, Indonesia concluded its accession to the agreement.

It certainly is a long process. In the case of Myanmar, it took more or less 25 years for the Burmese government to acknowledged Rohingya as a problem that needs further attention and finally called for regional arrangements to assist Myanmar in solving this humanitarian catastrophe. For Indonesia, it needs 11 years for the government to finally decide to abide the law.

Conclusion

Through a long norm and values-sharing process, though many kinds of literature discredit how the ASEAN Way’s strict adherence to consensus decision-making, non-interference, and sovereignty hinders the organization to pursue progress in some areas of cooperation, one must understand that it is the ASEAN Way that has led ASEAN to reach its 50th anniversary.

Blaming the failure of cooperation in ASEAN on the ASEAN Way will prevent us from seeing how ASEAN has made progress since the organization was formed. Furthermore, what many kinds of literature have forgotten is that the ASEAN Way embraces CE, which emphasizes on a non-confrontational approach of diplomacy but offering gradual changes, even in some areas of cooperation that seen to be very sensitive by ASEAN.  What needs to be understood is the non-incorporation of the ASEAN Way in assessing ASEAN will never be the right case. Therefore, after the 50th anniversary, the ASEAN Way and CE will always be the nature of ASEAN cooperation because it does not matter if the ‘tool’ is still relevant or not, yet there will be no ASEAN without the ASEAN Way.

 

*) Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He will start his LLM in Public International Law at Leiden University in September.

ASEAN After 50: Rethinking ASEAN-China Cultural Cooperation

Dr. Gabriel Lele

ASEAN-China cooperation has stepped towards a new phase in the recent decade. As ASEAN is celebrating its 50th anniversary, it is important to rethink the cooperation in the future.

The cooperation between China-Indonesia has been developing since as early as the 7th century when Indonesia was part of the Silk Route among traders.  China has its special place in Indonesian history. One of the most historical incidence from Indonesia perspective is the incidence of military aggression to conquer Kingdom of Majapahit of Java in the 13th century for economic and territorial purposes.

The most recent displeasing incident took place during Indonesian economic crisis in 1997-1999. As the crisis went up, the anti-Chinese sentiment escalated due to the accusations that Chinese-Indonesian who are mostly the wealthy businessman is partly responsible for the crisis.

Against this background, up to the very recent days, the cooperation between the two countries, China and Indonesia, has developed even more significant. In cultural sector, there are several key milestones for this instance and the following are some facts.

In the field of tourism, the inbound tourist from China to Indonesia has increased significantly during the last few years. The number of tourists from China recorded as the highest compared to any other country. In fact, the Indonesian government wishes to boost the number in the near future.

In regard to that idea, the Indonesian government has applied a visa-free policy for Chinese visiting Indonesia for cultural purposes.

The latter achievement cannot be separated from several policy initiatives coming from both governments. There have been several policy commitments to extend cultural ties in a more general or specific ways. The involvement of non-government institutions in cultural affairs has also increased by, for example, the extension of education cooperation among universities and inter-media cooperation. This has also strengthened by the cooperation between/among air carriers to support people mobility.

While acknowledging this progress, a qualitative observation reveals that some concerns sustain. Some of the cultural relation framework signed at both bilateral and regional levels require further efforts to make it actual.

Despite its huge potential and opportunity, it is time to take a brief reflection on the ASEAN-China cultural cooperation, what are the challenges and how can we deal with them? How could the cultural bond between two countries be strengthened?

As it has been recognized, strong and genuine cultural cooperation must be based on mutual understanding, mutual respect, and mutual acceptance that may lead to harmonious ties. Because of this very reason, inter-country cultural cooperation cannot be built from the top. Rather, it has to be started from the bottom, where people-to-people cooperation is the key cornerstone.

To this very condition, the current arrangement and implementation of China-Indonesia cultural cooperation have raised criticisms. The first criticism deals with the approach adopted by both governments that are too state/elite centric and close or even secret nature of (cultural) diplomacy. This is a very common way used by the ASEAN member countries or the “ASEAN way” as it commonly known.

Under this scheme, public outreach is only relevant when dealing with the implementation. The secret and elite centric approach are adopted for almost all issues, even for issues that are less/least sensitive where the public participation is important such as cultural cooperation. This is means that cultural policy making only involves limited formal actors. Combined, this has raised the question of legitimacy, acceptability and its ability to be implemented.

The second criticism centers on the issue of implementation or the way cultural cooperation is executed. Because of the nature of cultural policy making, implementation has been very weak, in which delay and deficit are common. Our research shows that even within ASEAN itself, there are many agreements which simply do not work. Opposition to the regional agreements is commonly found.

For example, China and the ASEAN member countries could exchange archives or ancient artistic heritage. But for whose benefit? Putting ancient antiques in both countries’ museums is a very good idea, but then, what is the point if there are no visitors?

Similarly, both countries could agree to exchange basic country information through schools or universities. This would result in no impact if the activity is not supported by a more consolidated curriculum. Unfortunately, this is beyond the reach of both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture.

This kind of problem requires immediate assistance. The first point of departure is by thoroughly considering the nature of governance structure. Chinese governance structure is totally different from the one adopted in Indonesia, with the first being more concerned while the later being more fragmented. This different level of fragmentation affects significantly the prospect of policy success. The lesson is that governance can no longer be ignored or taken for granted; it has to be dealt with more seriously by involving all relevant stakeholders in the policy-making process.

The last criticism deals more with the paradigmatic flaw in how culture and cultural cooperation are defined and operationalized. Different documents concerning cultural cooperation use different definition or dimension.

It is noticeable within the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020), where culture and cultural cooperation are only partially understood as “literature, libraries, archival materials, museums, performing arts, visual arts, art education, other relevant public cultural facilities and cultural/creative industry”. The concept of “culture” is also closely related “historical relics, archaeology and cultural heritage preservation, museums, archives, libraries, and cultural institutes.

Far before this document was developed, ASEAN and China has also signed a MoU on Cultural Relations in Bangkok 2005, through which, culture is broadly defined to cover “tangible and intangible cultural heritage, archaeology, traditional and contemporary arts, cultural enterprise and creative industries, and cultural enterprise” (see Paragraph 2).

ASEAN and China have to solve this issue. We need a better framework for ASEAN-China Cultural Cooperation in the future.

 

*) Dr. Gabriel Lele is Senior Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center and Associate Professor at Department of Management and Public Policy, Universitas Gadjah Mada. A longer version of this article was presented at the Network of ASEAN-China Think Tank (NACT) Meeting in Guiyang, China.

 

ASEAN After 50: Studying the Lands Below the Winds

Dendy Raditya A.

On August 8th this year, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will celebrate its 50th anniversary. This is the right time to reflecting on what had been done from 1967 until now and what need to do in the future, not only by ASEAN as an organization but also by the whole elements within ASEAN.

What could be reflected from the 50 years of ASEAN and the studies associated with this organization? Historically, the embryo of studies about this region –which historian Anthony Reid called as ‘the lands below the winds’ could be traced back to the colonial era. The study of Southeast Asia originally developed at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes founded in Paris around 1795, followed by the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands at 1864, and finally the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London in 1917.

After the end of the colonialism, Modern Southeast Asian Studies, likes the study of other regions, was born from the interests of Western countries (especially the United States) post-World War II to understand the social, cultural, political and economic aspects of countries in Southeast Asia in a postcolonial context.

It is important to first, understand the difference between the ASEAN and Southeast Asian Studies. The most visible difference is the scope of studies: ASEAN Studies focus more on ASEAN as an institution and tends to be more policy-oriented, while Southeast Asian Studies focus more on social, cultural, economic and, to some extent, political aspects of society in the region.  

Likewise, the Southeast Asia Studies faces challenges in its development. There are three interesting issues faced by Southeast Asian Studies (and also ASEAN Studies): The problem of inequality between Western countries and ASEAN countries in the terms of knowledge production; the problems of studying Southeast Asia from within; and the position of contemporary Southeast Asian Studies between state’s and market’s interests.

The disproportion between the Western countries and Southeast Asian countries (as a locus of Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies) is evident in the production of political-economy knowledge of this studies. Achmad Firas and Iqra Anugrah argues that this problem exists since the early days of the formulation of both Southeast Asian studies and ASEAN Studies. Instead by their own people, the knowledge of Southeast Asia was generated by social institutions and scientists from Western countries.

Syed Farid Alatas once wrote that the inequality of knowledge production has resulted in a growing dependence of the scientist and social science institution in Southeast Asia on the Western world. These dependencies include the idea dependence, media dependency to disseminate ideas, the dependence of educational technology, dependence on research and education funding, and dependence of Third World social scientists (including Southeast Asia) on employment in the scientific field of the Western countries.

The other problem is in regard to the possibility of Southeast Asian to study about the Southeast Asia and ASEAN of their own. According to Ariel Heryanto, there at least four issues faced by Southeast Asian researchers who came from this region itself.

First, the status of researchers as an “insider” of the  Southeast Asian societies, creates a dilemma: sometimes they are too qualified in language, living experience and knowledge of their own communities, but less qualified in analytical thinking and academic theorization.

Second, the dominance of English as the language of instruction in the Southeast Asian studies, with the lack of use of the regional languages itself. One fact behind this condition is that the main consumers of the ASEAN and Southeast Asia studies are those who come from the Western countries, not from Southeast Asia itself.

Third, there is a discrepancy between the institution’s objectives, the Southeast Asia Studies Center, on what to look for and the method to use with the social reality in Southeast Asia. It leads to the fourth issue, namely the patronistic relationship in research. Ariel Heryanto illustrates it in a condition when a senior researcher “forced” his junior to quote his work.

There is also the issue of a pitfall among the interests of states and the market. The social disciplines of Southeast Asia post-independence era became a tool of the state to legitimize the policies adopted by rulers. In Indonesia for example, the use of social science for the sake of power was evident in the era known as the “New Order”, when many public intellectuals served as bureaucrats within the regime. The New Order era also put forward the idea of developmentalism and modernization, which in turn eliminating critical paradigms such as class-based analysis and critical theory.

The collapse of many authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia does not necessarily make the study of Southeast Asia more developed. This happens because nowadays, the interests of the market along with the ideology of neoliberalism has penetrated into the realm of scholars around the world. It causes marginalization and limited access to research funding, especially those from scholarships that are deemed to have no “impacts”.

Although the problems faced by the Southeast Asian Studies had made it difficult for them to academically develop in a post-authoritarian scene, there are efforts to bridging the difficulties by various Southeast Asian Studies and Review institutions. The establishment of numbers of institution in Singapore for example, such as the ISEAS (Institute for Southeast Asian Studies), ARI (Asia Research Institute) at NUS (National University of Singapore) and RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies) at the NTU (Nanyang Technological University); Thailand with the ASEAN Studies Center at Chulalongkorn University; and Indonesia with the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies  and the ASEAN Studies Center at Universitas Gadjah Mada can be considered as part of these efforts.

Coinciding with the ASEAN golden anniversary, I suggest that we should rethink about the future of ASEAN Studies besides, of course, Southeast Asian Studies. ASEAN now faces many challenges such as the emergence of many new issues: the digital society, demands for inclusive and sustainable development inside ASEAN Community, global terrorism, identity conflicts, migrant and human trafficking issues, maritime governance, and more. It is necessary to further investigate these issues rather share ASEAN’s relevance in world politics.

Thus, it is important for researchers from the ASEAN and Southeast Asian studies to undertake a critical and theoretical research—and not only the policy-oriented one. It is also important to dismantle the ‘established’ concept and policy reference narrative in the existing studies. ASEAN Studies needs an emancipatory as well as practical dimension.

At the end of the day, the shout goes to all Southeast Asian researchers, especially throughout Indonesia. Call for them to keep on reading, writing and researching to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ASEAN!

 

*) Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito is an Undergraduate Student at the Department of Public Policy and Management, Fisipol, Universitas Gadjah Mada

 

ASEAN After 50: Defending Human Rights in ASEAN

Jakkrit Chuamuangphan

As 2017, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) marks 50 years since first founded in 1967. To date, ASEAN has shown a huge success in realizing the regional economic integration as it became a single market in 2015 and maintaining international relations with other states by placed itself at the center of relations such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and ARF. However, when it comes to the issue of human rights, ASEAN still stumbling upon its inability to ensure the significant improvement of human right environment all across the Southeast Asia. The increase in human rights violations indicates a weakening of ASEAN human rights institutions.

One of the greatest international concern is the case of human rights violations against individual or groups of human right defenders, which according to the UN Declaration referred to as a person or group who concern about human rights have a right to address the concern on behalf of others by peaceful means.

The human rights defenders are in danger because they are often subjected to harassment and lawsuits to stop their activity.

If we trace back to the past ten years, there are many cases of harassment that befell the human rights defenders either by state or non-state actor, due to their activities. For example, Andy Hall, a human rights defender for migrant worker, was intimidated and sued by some of Thailand’s food industries for defamation and Computer Crimes Act charges, as he tried to expose the abuse of Myanmar forced labor. Sombath Somphone, who promoted civil society in Laos and awarded Magsaysay for Community Leadership, was one of the victims of enforced disappearance by uniformed police officers in Vientiane in 2012 but the Lao Government immediately denied the accusations for his disappearance. Naw Chit Pandaing had been a strong advocate against human right violations and the issue regarding land and environmental right. Before she was stabbed to death in November 2016, she has investigated the impacts of mining in Dawei, Myanmar.

The cases above are some of the predicaments of the human rights defenders who tried to expose the misconduct of the government and influential elite that were subjected to criminal lawsuits or injustices. This reality leads to the most fundamental problems in the understanding of human rights, the functioning of human rights institutions and in the end, a great challenge for human rights defenders in ASEAN.

First, the lack of understanding of human right in each ASEAN member states. Most of the states or non-states are deluding with the misconceptions and false beliefs about human rights, that human rights are a threat to national security and their business interests. They tend to see only one side of the mirror, that gives more benefits as desired by states for the sake of security and economic interest.

The misconceptions and false belief of human rights among the ASEAN member states can be overcome by interpreting the values of human rights in line with the values of economic growth and national security.

However, as it happensuman rights defenders can not depend entirely on the government to deal with the protection of human right, as in some cases, states are found to be on the opposite with human rights defenders. In result, the hope of human rights defenders to seek protection go to a broader level, regional for instances. Unfortunately, there are some challenges as well, especially in the case of ASEAN. First, the ASEAN mechanism on human rights heading to only promote, not protect, which makes ASEAN ineffective for the protection of human rights and human rights defenders — even after ASEAN showed a good sign of human right improvement through the establishment of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Right (AIHCR) in 2009.

Let’s take a look at the Terms of Reference of the AICHR. Almost all of the point of reference refer to the provisions and mandate to promote human rights, but not for the protection of human rights.  The only point of mandate that includes the word protection is stated in the article 4(10), “to obtain information from the ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection of human rights.”

Why is this article becoming so important in the protection of human rights? Because of this is the channel that AICHR can obtain the information about human right violation from ASEAN member states. But, in fact, some of ASEAN member states that are part of AICHR consider this point as a form of violation to national sovereignty, therefore refuse to share or recognize any information regarding human right within their territory.

In spite of that fact that this article could be one strong basis to support the AIHCR gaining the information in regard to the human right violation from ASEAN member states.

In addition to that, the fruit of AICHR is also visible on the launching of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. It seems to be an attempt of ASEAN member states to strengthen the human rights foundation in the region. However, it is a non-binding instrument which means it has no power to enforce any states in ASEAN. Moreover, in the eyes of ASEAN civil society, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is still considered as a “Still Window-dressing.” It simply means that it is for display only, it will never be used to protect human right and human right defenders.

The other reason is the lack of coordination with civil society organizations (CSOs) which, in fact, are very enthusiastic to work with ASEAN, yet ASEAN offers a very limited room for CSO activities. The Guidelines on the AICHR’s Relations with CSOs stated two important provisions in regard to that: First, “AICHR shall not have consultative relationships with CSOs that do not respect the principles and purposes of the ASEAN Charter”; Second, “Respect and comply with the national laws and regulations of the concerned ASEAN Member State where their activities take place”.  These provisions imply that CSOs that joined the consultative relationships with AICHR cannot criticize the way ASEAN worked and if it does not comply with the guidelines, the AICHR can suspend consultative relationships with that CSOs.

In the end, there are many challenges faced by human right defenders in carrying out their duties and goals within the scope of ASEAN. This means that ASEAN should take human rights more seriously, consider the value of human dignity to be equal to the value of economic growth and prove that this region is a true society of “sharing and caring” especially for those people who are weak and voiceless, as embedded in ASEAN vision.

 

*) Jakkrit Chuamuangphan is an MA Student in ASEAN Studies, Pridi Banomyong International College, Thammasat University