Entries by aseansc

Call for Essay: ASEAN Community Post 2015

lomba-essay2ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada mengadakan Kompetisi Esai dengan tema “ASEAN Community Post 2015” dengan ketentuan sebagai berikut:

 

Subtema

  • Socio-Cultural Pillar
  • Economic Pillar
  • Political and Security Pillar

 

Ketentuan Umum

  • Biaya Pendaftaran: Rp 30.000,-
  • Peserta merupakan masyarakat umum se-Indonesia
  • Pendaftaran ditutup pada 2 November 2016
  • Seluruh karya esai yang masuk akan menjadi milik ASEAN Studies Center UGM
  • Pemenang lomba diumumkan pada 9 November 2016
  • Keputusan juri tidak dapat diganggu gugat

 

Ketentuan Esai

  • Esai merupakan karya orisinal dari peserta
  • Esai berbahasa Inggris
  • Terdiri atas 2000-2500 kata
  • Penulis boleh individu atau tim (maksimum 3 orang)
  • Ukuran halaman A4
  • Ukuran font 12
  • Font Georgia
  • Footnote and references dengan format Chicago Style
  • Tulisan tidak pernah dipublikasikan di media apapun
  • Non-Plagiarisme
  • Pengumpulan esai melalui email ke aseansc@ugm.ac.id  dengan Subject : Essai Competition_Nama_Institusi

 

Penghargaan

  • Juara 1: Uang pembinaaan sebesar Rp 1.000.000,- dan sertifikat
  • Juara 2: Uang pembinaaan sebesar Rp 750.000,- dan sertifikat
  • Juara 3: Uang pembinaaan sebesar Rp 500.000,- dan sertifikat
  • 10 Esai terbaik akan dipublikasikan pada website ASEAN Studies Center UGM
  • Seluruh peserta mendapatkan sertifikat

 

Pembayaran biaya pendaftaran

Pembayaran biaya pendaftaran sebesar Rp 30.000,- dapat melalui transfer ATM dengan tujuan sebagai berikut:

  • Rekening Bank Mandiri 137-00-1197-149-2 atas nama Dio Herdiawan Tobing
  • Rekening BCA 8610-215-727 atas nama Dio Herdiawan Tobing

Setelah peserta melakukan pembayaran harap melakukan konfirmasi ke  0896 314 958 16 (Andika)

 

Narahubung: Andika Putra (+62) 896 314 958 16

 

 

The Way of ASEAN Non-Confrontation: Backdoor Diplomacy or The Inability to Conduct Diplomacy in Public Spaces

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Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In the past few days, Indonesia’s first Right of Reply in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has attracted nation-wide Indonesia medias. Not because Indonesia’s statement was outstanding, but merely because of its firmness and the beauty of Indonesia’s representative. However, we found out that to some extent Indonesia’s statement focused heavily on sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as, the institutionalization of human rights commitment by the numbers of ratified conventions. This does not show any advantages. It opens a loophole that Indonesia was unable to show evidence of the progress made in Papua related to the human rights violation.

Meanwhile, the second Right of Reply embraced by Solomon Islands, shows intelligence, diplomatic, and well-researched information. Solomon Islands, though, only a very small archipelagic country showed its concern on human rights issue in West Papua by reminding Indonesia that although Indonesia has ratified the Convention against Torture (CAT), progress has not yet been made in Papua. In fact, Indonesia has not yet submitted its Periodic Review since 2008. The Solomon claimed that they received information on the lack of human rights protection of the Melanesian people in West Papua from the Respected UN members and head of civil societies.

Furthermore, it is also regretful to hear that in another right of reply utilized by Indonesia to respond against Solomon Islands, the Republic again justified that Solomon Islands’ concern has breached Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and claiming that Solomon Islands is trapped in trash information of the separatist group in West Papua. Again, without elaborating on what progress has been made and what form for commitment has been implemented by the Indonesian government towards promotion and protection of human rights in West Papua.

In fact, this occasion reminded us of Southeast Asian countries conducting their diplomatic activities. The ASEAN’s method of diplomacy, has been seen upholding the norm of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, and the principle of quiet. ASEAN members in their decision- and policy-making process have always refrained from criticizing others, claiming that criticizing other respective members of ASEAN will fall into the violation of non-interference principle and respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is similar, on what the delegation of Indonesia delivered in her right of reply, that the concern of Solomon Islands’ towards human rights situation in West Papua will only disrespect Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, in other occasion, ASEAN has a method famously known as ‘constructive-engagement’. ASEAN and particularly, Indonesia, have been progressively utilizing this tool to put concern on the human rights situation in Myanmar. In 2009 Indonesia had bilateral talk with Myanmar in regards to the Rohingya massacre. This occasion became a cornerstone because during the talk, it was the first time that Prime Minister Thein Sein finally acknowledged that he paid great attention to this issue. Myanmar finally accepted that Rohingya was also their concern. Wasn’t the talk breach Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity? Actually, it was too, yet the difference is the operation of ASEAN’s constructive engagement remains invisible. Because the diplomatic-negotiation has never been done in public spaces, claiming that it is the feature of ASEAN’s diplomacy, backdoor diplomacy, or for some, how ASEAN conducts its intra- or inter-ASEAN relations have become a model named as “Asian Diplomacy”

Therefore, reflecting on the case of Solomon Islands-Indonesia in the UNGA and Indonesia-Myanmar in ASEAN, the conduct of ASEAN Diplomacy shows only an excuse for ASEAN in particular, Indonesia, upon their inability to demonstrate a proper diplomatic behavior in public spaces.

In the Thick of Fear and Idea: Wither ASEAN Centrality?

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Dedi Dinarto

Long before the discourse on the future of ASEAN centrality, S. Rajaratnam and Thanat Khoman have put their respective ideas on the ontological part of ASEAN, meaning that where ASEAN should depart on its characteristic, thus shape the way its interact at both internal and external level.

Rajaratnam pointed out that the long shadow of Cold War has shaped this region as the “states of fear” where every countries sought to defend themselves from external threat, and provide baseline to construct ‘common threat’. Given the situation of the escalating tension between Soviet Union and the United States, ASEAN chose to setback its activism not to show off their teeth instead of barricading Southeast Asia from the influx of communism influence.

On the other side, Thanat Khoman contrastively derived his idea on how to place the ideal and peaceful cooperation, given the framework to set aside the rising tension of konfrontasi of Indonesia and Malaysia, and other disputes between neighboring countries. He put that the ASEAN should represent a constitutive regime serving promise towards more cohesive, peaceful, and stable condition.

Between those two prominent views, it remains logical that ASEAN has produced 1967 Bangkok Declaration, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) pacts to achieve their objectives. In spite of departing from different views on ASEAN at the first place, these two ideas can be bridged under the framework of winning the security and stability of the region. Neither national interest nor external parties are regarded crucial at that time.

Reflecting from the event of historical sociology between Rajaratnam and Thanat Khoman provides us the outlook of how ASEAN is able to determine its centrality.

However, it should be admitted that the composite interaction between ASEAN member states and its strategic partners nowadays has pushed political scientists and practitioners to look at ASEAN not only as a unproblematic regional body, but as a constructive and flexible pivot amidst tricky surroundings.

This is the matter of how we think about ‘ASEAN Centrality’ as an idea, which implies the source of power of ASEAN as a regional body. The governmentality has proceed to far serving the elites’ interest which surrounded by state-centric approach and calculation.

Not to do away from the dominant discourse, the elites could provide breakthrough creating intensive and fruitful cooperation on more human-centric issues. Negotiating major countries in the region to cooperate in non-traditional security issues that are quite transnational and require high and strict coordination and control mechanisms. Giving the example in how to attract China to aware on the issue of disasters and marine safety, and terrorism in the region would shed light on.

Therefore, this reflective approach underpin the way on how ASEAN member states could define their interests based on human-centric prioritization, and thus put up those issues to the responsibility of strategic partner countries. By doing this way, ASEAN can find its centrality amidst the complexities of international politics in the region. In other words, the centrality must be seen as a phenomenon coherent to change and intersubjective configuration.

Dedi Dinarto is a research assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

ASEAN fights against trans-border crime

Feature - Terrorist

This article was published on 7 September 2016 in Jakarta Post

Dedi Dinarto – Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Given the rising concerns over transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia, the 28th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane this week will face an uphill challenge. This holds true as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported a rise in production of illicit drugs and an expansion of the synthetic drug market in the region after the implementation of the ASEAN Community last year.

It is inevitable that Laos should hold up the discussion to address the issue of transnational crime for several reasons.

Vientiane’s ASEAN chairmanship this year was viewed with pessimism when it came to the issue of the South China Sea. Some of the reasons originated from Laos’ landlocked geographical conditions, which allows it to disregard the security of the sea as crucial and coherent for economic interests, and the lavish influence of China over Laos through the latest cooperation scheme, namely the Mohan-Boten Economic Cooperation Zone.

However, the importance of associating Laos’ leadership with the transnational crime issue is mainly due to the fact that the country is part of the Golden Triangle, which serves as one of the producers of narcotics and a drug transit point for shipments to North America, Europe and other regions in Asia.

Laos directly contributes to the increasing production and expansion of such transnational crime networks. At the same time, the number of arrests related to drugs has tripled in Laos over the last half decade.

On the other hand, Laos has completely ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with the protocol that cancels out the potential benefits it could gain from the narcotics industries.

Moreover, on a broader level, Kuala Lumpur’s leadership last year intensified the fight against transnational organized crime. This development is not supposed to decline under Laos’ chairmanship.

Consequently, the upcoming ASEAN Summit is to manifest the points that have been set forth and agreed within the ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Strengthening Cooperation in the Management of Cross-Border Movement of Criminals and the formulation of a fresh ASEAN plan of action agreed at the previous ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC).

However, in that agenda, the ASEAN member states are supposed to overlook the inter-governmental decision-making process, which is inadequate to combat transnational crime. The failure, according to professor of international affairs Ralf Emmers, was not only caused by domestic circumstances but also by its inbuilt resistance to action and institutional reforms and its inability to criminalize transnational crime.

Besides, they only focused on non-binding and unspecific measures without addressing the question of funding, setting target dates, or establishing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress.

For example, the 10th AMMTC noted the importance of growing of transnational crime as a threat against regional security.

Thus, the response was to broaden their working coverage area by adding the illicit trafficking in wildlife, timber and people smuggling to the provision involving drug trafficking, economic crimes, human trafficking, piracy, money laundering, terrorism, weapon smuggling and cybercrime. Unfortunately, this initiative demonstrated the statist yet similar approach that has been taken by ASEAN member states since 1997.

The effort to securitize transnational organized crime has been successful, but leaves behind the regional practice to combat such an issue.

Rather than having an intensive approach toward the regional threat, ASEAN member states prefer to adopt a regional agreement if it will work significantly at the national level. Therefore, there is a need for shifting the paradigm toward “shared sovereignty”.

If regional security was primarily measured based on the absence of a threat to each nation’s security, then it is now time to see ASEAN as a whole community. The term of “community” adopted at the end of 2015 duly signifies that ASEAN should move from its state-centric security into a human-centric security.

Is it possible to hear a similar voice to that which came out of Thailand’s then foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan in June 1998, who proposed to amend the basic principle of non-intervention?

What may happen in the days following the ASEAN Summit and its “dianoetic” slogan of “Turning vision into reality for a dynamic ASEAN Community” will provide the answers.

Southeast Asia: Refugee Crisis and the Customary Law of Non-Refoulement

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Dio Tobing – Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

If the European Union is still dealing with mass influx of forced migration from the Middle East, Southeast Asian refugee crisis has also been going on for more than years. These refugees are mainly coming from places, which experience worst cases of human tragedy including political instability at their place of origins, conflict-zones, and human rights violations. At this very moment, ASEAN member countries have not yet reached any agreement on how to respond towards this issue, which is why the responsibility then goes back to its members individually.

Due to this lack of agreement within the forum, many people tend to blame the inability and incompetence of ASEAN members in responding this issue due to their majority position as non-parties the 1951 Refugee Convention. Many have also argued that the international community should pressure and urge ASEAN member states to start becoming the parties of the Refugee Convention 1951, as there are only two ASEAN members who have ratified the convention, which are Cambodia and the Philippines.

However, does ratifying such international law reflect states compliance towards its provision? Is international law a manipulable façade for power politics? (Koskenniemi, 2011) Even in the reality of ASEAN region, countries who are highly associated with the issue of refugee have constructively showed progress responding with refugee crisis. In mid-2015, the Ministerial Meeting on Irregular Movement of People in Southeast Asia have successfully adopted a joint statement stressing states responsibilities and obligations to provide humanitarian assistance towards irregular migrants initiated by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The governments of these three countries have committed to deliver humanitarian assistance and temporary shelters to those in need and those who stranded at the sea.

Moreover, these three countries also have their domestic mechanism in dealing with this problem similar to the provision of the 1951 Refugee Convention. For instance, Indonesia government refers to the Letter of the Directorate General of Immigration No. F-IL.01.10-1297. Government of Indonesia emphasizes that those who are seeking asylum in Indonesia would not be deported. The government also stresses that they are working in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) when handling the case of refugee. The provision of this letter is also in accordance with the principle of Non-Refoulement (Justinar, 2011).

Not only Indonesia, Thailand also stands as state not party to the Refugee Convention, however, the country has worked hard in providing temporary shelters along the Thai-Burma border, currently accommodating more than 105.000 refugees (EU, 2016). For Malaysia, there are currently more than 150.000 refugees registered by the UNHCR residing in the country (Lokman, 2016).

These three major ASEAN member countries do not become party to the Refugee Convention yet to some extent, their actions and policies reflected their compliance the fundamental principle codified into the convention, the Customary Principle of Non-Refoulement. Recognizing that the prohibition of refoulement stands on the same level of prohibition of torture as peremptory norm of international law, or jus cogens (UNHCR, 2006). These major countries affected by mass influx in Southeast Asian region have acted accordingly, as bound by the Customary International Law on prohibition of refoulement, although not becoming state parties to 1951 Refugee Convention. Even if there are no regional cooperation or agreement on responding towards the issue and although majority ASEAN members do not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, some states are in cooperation among each other as well as act unilaterally to overcome this issue in accordance to national policy.

2016 Student Working Paper: Call for Paper

Poster

ASEAN Studies Center (ASC) FISIPOL Universitas Gadjah Mada in collaboration with INKA KOMAHI, encourage you IR Students across Indonesia to contribute your paper for Student Working Paper ASC UGM 2016.

We’ll be issuing a call for papers related to Human Security in Southeast Asia. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the following :
– Poverty
– Human Trafficking
– Migrant workers
– Terrorism
– Refugees
– Natural Disasters
– Pollution

Abstract Submission = 1-7 September 2016
Abstract Selection = 8-15 September 2016
Full Paper Submission = 20 October 2016
Paper Revision = 20 October – 2 November 2016

Rules:
  • Deadline for abstract submission is on September 7th, must be in 250-300 words in english.
  • Participants can proceed to write a complete paper after the announcement of abstract selection.
  • Abstracts and papers shall be written in 12-point TNR, 1.5 line space and citation as well as references should be attached.
  • Abstract must be submitted with subject “Student Working Paper” to email: aseansc@ugm.ac.id
  • Selected papers will be compiled and published on ASC Working Paper.
For further information please contact the attached contact person
CP: Kevin (082214886944)

Glimpse of Hope: Student-led Protest in Malaysia

Feature - Myanmar Student

Dedi Dinarto – Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Encouraging students to actively participating in protest movement remains arduous. The busy academic activities and full-time organizational obligation pushes student to stay calm in campus without any centrifugal way of thinking. Living under strict and rigid academic practice and value, most of the students prefer to stay behind the desk and explore the reality through cyberspace as well as preparing their self-capacity for future professional job. On the other hand, there are also small amount of students whose initiative are to oppose against authoritative, corrupt, and repressive government. Given such ‘intellectual power’ to analyze and criticize the social contract, these students come up to organize counterbalance the praxis of statehood. In the last few days, the latter is real reflects on the Malaysian student-led protest that voices out the resonance to arrest ‘Malaysian Official One’ under the yell of ‘Tangkap Malaysian Official One.’

This rally should be seen as a positive signal since students start to participate and speak out of what is happening to their country and how it should be.

Despite the fact that Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (UUCA) hampers the active participation of students within political arena, students have turned into political machine to fight against government. According to Aslam Abd Jalil, a protester who had also been graduated from the Australian National University, TangkapMO1 has showed the significant role of students in political contestation. Students are not only living under the traditional academic cage, but also transcending beyond the limit and fighting for the future of nation. In a broader aspect, he assessed that the rally would cause turbulence towards ruling party, thus affects the ruling party’s popularity. However, this opportunity will not give any significant change to the Malaysian politics since the opposition party is in a mess.

Moreover, TangkapMO1 also signifies the neutrality of student from political party.

Anis Syafiqah Mohd Yusof, spokesperson for the TangkapMO1 and the member of Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Universiti Malaya (PMIUM) mentioned that the students are non-partisan. She loudly voiced out that this student-led rally should not be used by political parties to serve their interest. Although it does not mean that students reject the support from political parties to fight for universal values and justice.

This case reveals what Eep Saefullah (the author of Catatan atas Gagalnya Politik Orde Baru 1998) mentioned about the economic and social transformations that generate the rising of active and passionate students. The higher opportunity to access education will lead to the economic vertical mobilization. The growing of critical and well-informed community is inevitable. In the context of Malaysia, this should be seen as an opportunity since the data reported from World Bank shows that the youth literacy rate in Malaysia up to 2010 is 98.4%.

However, under the authoritative political architecture, it is insufficient for students to only organize and do protest in public space. The need to build and develop discourse within society is utmost. Breaking down the strict relation between government and society should be built under the skeptic view. Therefore, spreading discourse and opinion on what has been going on would be more significant. Otherwise, the movement will be regarded as fragile and extemporaneous.

The 49th ASEAN: Who Does What and How?

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Dedi Dinarto – Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Indonesian scholar Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad through his prominent book titled ‘ASEAN at the Crossroads of History’ criticizes the history of ASEAN which never escape upheaval. As an institution that is designed close to the important historical events in the region, ASEAN has flexibility properties serving both opportunities and downsides.

ASEAN has now entered the age of nearly half a century indicate a lengthy process of institutionalization aspects. The question would be to what extent has ASEAN been running?

To answer these questions, then there are two main layers that can be considered. First, ASEAN as an institution. Second, ASEAN as a community.

Establishment of ASEAN in 1967 is intended to fulfill both internal and external factors.

The former means to rediscover the structure of national economic growth and development, a peaceful atmosphere at that time provides an important precondition for Southeast Asia countries. Driven by the national interest, the five founding countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to immediately establish a functional institution.

On the other hand, the Cold War constellation led by bipolar power structure becomes a threat to the creation of the peaceful and neutral region. Under ASEAN framework, ASEAN member countries could eliminate as well as keep of the threat of communism.

These two main factors then pushed ASEAN member countries to create ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) treaty.

From the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the step undertaken by the ASEAN founding members is an attempt to minimize transaction costs in order to meet national interests. In other words, common interests are first defined off the international context, and then institutions are established by state actors to facilitate the achievement of their joint interests (see Keohane, 1989; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999).

However, current developments indicate ASEAN declination of the institutional aspects. This is partly reflected in the failure of ASEAN in dealing with the South China Sea case. As an institution, ASEAN failed to agree on unified voice in the face of a credible threat to the region yet neglecting the security of sea as a vital element of regional stability.

Even, it is also implicitly indicates that the ASEAN member countries are not willing to commit towards something that is not an issue for a particular country. In the context of South China Sea, the non-disputants such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Singapore, Thailand, and Myanmar would not take a credible stance because it would undermine the logic of the transactional cost efficiency which is expected to come from ASEAN.

In the end, ASEAN will only be used as a ‘stepping stone’ by member states. As long as it can freshly prepared and maximize the potential gains to the member countries, ASEAN would still be relevant.

On the other hand, ASEAN can also be seen from the aspect of community. This has to do with the view that ASEAN is a group of countries that are bound on the role of ideology, rules, and norms. Relations between countries are prepared on social expectations rather than utility maximization calculations.

In other words, institutional routines are followed even when there is no obvious self-interest involved (see March and Olsen, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

The main purpose of connecting people between countries is to construct something as an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist (see Fierke, 2007). This serves as driving factor encouraging the emergence of a community of discourse among member states are organized into three pillars of the ASEAN Community in 2025 include the issue of political-security, economic, and socio-cultural.

Nevertheless, ASEAN is still experiencing a significant issue in encouraging regionalism at the community level. Acharya (2004) was doubting the possibility of ‘participatory regionalism’. Even though several wider NGO-based regional institutions, such as ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum (ACSC/APF) and Asian People’s Advocacy have fought for people’s voice, the case of human rights abuse and trafficking remains appeared on newspaper’s headlines.

Thus, these multi-layer view provides us a reflective insight. To date, ASEAN serves as a political product working simultaneously on both institution and community. It remains a great competition between ‘the logic of consequences’ deemed by States and ‘the logic of appropriateness’ conceived by NGOs as the representative of community. This signifies the multi-interpretive of ASEAN as both an institution and community. Therefore, the development of ASEAN in the future would be depending on who does what and how. It defines the possibility of all agents to shape ASEAN either to remain state-centric or community based.

From a Security Regime into a Security Community: Is it Time?

Feature - Terrorist

Habibah H. Hermanadi – Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

2016 begun with yet another terrorist attack to one of the ASEAN member states, Indonesia, the attempt of suicide bomb in Jakarta backed up by the currently emerging terrorist group Daesh surprisingly resulting in the famous #kamitidaktakut internet sensation which means we are not afraid, a sense of solidarity among Indonesians to resist the terror. Daesh or known as Islamic State (IS) is currently expanding their influence beyond Middle East and North Africa towards Asian regions with strong ideological roots fighting for the return of Islamic Caliphate. Their attacks went continuously in 2016 throughout Europe and Asia, the group is known for spreading terror and grievance by utilizing these attacks and propaganda. One of the most viral propagandas was recently uploaded in youtube—a video based social media depicting dozen of young Indonesian and Malaysian children who were armed and told to ‘liberate’ their homelands.   

Another notorious terrorist group which identifies itself as Abu Sayyaf, located in Philippines, has been causing distress in the Southeast Asia region since 2004, the group spreads regional terror after the very recent case where the group kidnapped 7 Indonesian sailors last month and now 5 more Malaysian fishermen were abducted around Sulu, Philippines. The group had shown extreme gruesome hostility towards the government by sending visual threats through the act of beheading, it was  considered as obscenely brutal way when it is not done in one fell swoop of a sword, but with slashes and hacks from a hunting knife.

On the 36th ASEANPOL Conference, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak stated the importance of unity to fight off terror, in his speech he clearly mentioned “Daesh and its cruel, twisted ideology have no place in our peaceful, diverse, tolerant country and nor in our region,” he also condemned Abu Sayyaf and their recent abduction. The Prime Minister put on emphasis on the role of stronger ASEAN by taking example of Malaysia who had adapted the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act or Sosma; the Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act; the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the National Security Council, by implying these strong counterterrorism measure within Malaysia he had been facing many critics which questioned the government’s intentions yet he was unapologetic for the action that he took when it comes to the safety of the citizens. Similar reaction was shown by the newly elected President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, where he appointed the military to enhance the capability to search and engage the rogue and lawless elements, in his words, “the Armed Forces of the Philippines will be applied to crush these criminals who operate under the guise of religious fervor.”

The strong remark on the conference was dearly welcomed by the Russian federation whereas Moscow offered joint measures to diminish the number of militants arriving from Daesh, The idea was in line with Prime Minister Najib Razak mentioned, Russia will work together with ASEAN through mechanisms of our partnership, namely informal meetings of ASEAN defense ministers and talks of senior officials and sessions of the working group on counteracting terrorism and transnational crime. However on the foreign ministers meeting collaboration between ASEAN-United States was drawn, according to deputy’s spokesperson Mark Toner the detail of collaboration would be focusing on specific actions to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and ASEAN-US pledged their commitment to strengthen cooperation against terrorism and violent extremism.

The two initiations by the two influential countries exactly portray the dynamics of security in Southeast Asia, in one side as terrorist groups had been advancing themselves and connectivity among nations became vital in the context of tracking these groups down, yet in the other side the region has always been known as a strategic region, desirable by many for further security collaborations allowing flow of external parties from United States and Russia questioning the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration which was created to assure that there will be no interference  coming from outside powers. Razak and Duterte had been very vocal in showing their firm actions against these terrorist groups and suggesting others to tighten their military involvement in counterterrorism. Through these strong reactions ASEAN is given an opportunity to think about what Center for Strategic and International Studies, Rizal Sukma, mentioned in 2015 that ASEAN is not a security community, but rather a a security regime; without violating the sacred principle of non-interference. Will the current face of terror reformed the status quo driving ASEAN closer towards its ‘security community’ and ‘common internal enemy’ concept voiced by Professor Amitav Acharya in 1991? Either way the answer lies among the member states and whether or not they will concur.

Sea as Political Space under ASEAN’s Flag

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The obscurity of ASEAN facing the South China Sea issue after the victory of the Philippines against China in the tribunal ruling showed the fragmented ASEAN. Various views criticized potential to rearrange ASEAN regional integration ended nil after the result of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane, Laos. The meeting ended without a joint agreement by ASEAN member countries on the issue of the South China Sea. This situation indicates a declination of political relations between ASEAN countries within the framework of regional cooperation.

After the victory according to the result issued by the arbitral tribunal ruling, the Philippines energies a new approach for ASEAN to encourage the unification of ASEAN on the issue of the South China Sea during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Laos. The initiative was presented by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines as a step getting the international support towards ASEAN unity. The meeting was controversially reported that Cambodia and Laos refuse consensus in facing the South China Sea.

In fact, when referring to the release of a joint communique of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, all countries agreed to establish a network of communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to maritime emergencies in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the strategic measures agreed upon has not shown the existence of a single perspective in dealing with China in the South China Sea. Two of the failure to agree on a joint communiqué in Phnom Penh and Kuala Lumpur should be seen as the culmination of the change of position of ASEAN on South China Sea.

Thus, the question would be how should the ASEAN member countries facing the South China Sea issue?

ASEAN needs to establish a new constructive approach on the sea and its significance for regional integration. Sea is not only to be treated as a material element that can be exploited, but also as a political space in which the action of appropriation can be performed. Reflecting on how the Chinese build a discourse on the importance of the South China Sea is not only to meet the substantive national interest, but also as a traditional element that must be protected.

In the context of Southeast Asia, Jennifer Gaynor argues that the political instrumentalization over sea space had already happened in Southeast Asia. It was firstly brought by the Javanese who are creating the concept of ‘Nusantara’ dividing them with outside party. However, this concept developed to serve ranging purposes from nation-building, national security, and territorial demarcation (Gaynor, 2007). Since the mid-twentieth century, the term Nusantara has become the synonym for tanah air. This period demonstrated how Majapahit empire used this term making appropriation against the Dutch who claimed to restore the glorious of “Indianized” states of Java’s pre-Islamic past (Gaynor, 2007). By giving such ‘spatial ideology’ is to serve the purpose of Javanese making exclusive space against other nations outside of Java Island. In the aftermath, the concept of Nusantara denotes a national space in 1940s. The contemporary Indonesian illustrated Nusantara as a group of islands located between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean or between the Asian mainland and Australia. For the last reason, in 1957, the Indonesia government reinvented the concept of Nusantara in order to prevent the regional rebellions, thus issuing a statement of national unity called the Djuanda Declaration. The additional purpose is that this declaration also includes all of the waters between Indonesia’s islands within a single connected body: manifesting the abstract geographical signifier.

Referring the context above, the ASEAN member countries should begin to consider sea as a political space that is significant to be maintained through the process of appropriation. Instead of just dwelling on the substantive level, ASEAN members need to realize the importance of the ideological claims of the sea as a political space.

Dedi Dinarto is a research assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.