Trump and the Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ Doctrine

November 15, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Bara E. Brahmantika, Guest Contributor

The result of 2016 US election has paved the way for Donald Trump to be the 45th president of United States, and many people are scrambling to figuring out what it means for the world. Two of my colleagues, Dedi Dinarto and Habibah Hermanadi in ASEAN Studies Center had tried to analyze the the implication of ‘Trump’s Triumph’ on the future of ASEAN. But while both of the analysts are sound, I have serious reservation on how both writers overlook the implication of Trump’s foreign on the ASEAN regional politics.

In my view, Dinarto’s argument on the possibility of the remaking of the global triangle politics is an overestimation on the current global power dynamic between major countries, while Hermanadi’s argument that Trump’s Triumph will inspire a strongmen approach among ASEAN countries leaders who are trying to emulate him is an underestimation of the possible impact of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. Both I argue are stem from the authors misconception on the core idea of Trump’s foreign policy. So it is imperative for us to understand what Trump’s Foreign Policy is, a transactional policy, with a combined flavor of isolationism and protectionism

Trump’s Foreign Policy.

It is understandable for many to have misconception about Trump’s policy, because for one, Trump isn’t known as a well articulate candidate. In hindsight, hearing Trump talks on foreign policies gave an impression that Trump foreign policy is just a mishmash of ideas with no core philosophy, thus making it difficult to pin point exactly what is Trump’s outlook on foreign policy. But if we look carefully, underneath all of his incoherent rants, a silver lining could be found

And this is where Hermanadi is right about where Donald Trump might be going. Hermanadi describes Donald Trump as Strongman Leader, which will emphasizes on the strength of greatness based on national unity, and national interest. There is no clearer indication of it, than Trump’s vision on America First.

Trump said, in one of his rallies that, “Under a Trump administration, no American citizen will ever again feel that their needs come second to the citizens of a foreign country.”

According to Trump, America First is an attempt to put American citizen’s priority above citizens of foreign countries. Trump has signaling on reduction of US engagement in international stages, and to put national interest above all else, creating this mixed of political isolationism and economic protectionism. But the more interesting bit is on how Trump define US national interest.

According to Dreazen, Vox’s foreign editor, Trump has this simple and basic view on what is US national interest, which is transactional. In the word of Dreazen; “In Trump’s conception, all of foreign policy is motivated by assessment of what’s better, in a narrow financial sense…. Trump believes the everything comes down to the art of transaction, with countries that spend their money the way he wants them to getting more than countries the don’t”

Just take a look at Trump’s statement during his final presidential debate, explaining about his outlook on US foreign policy:

“As far as Japan and other countries, we are being ripped off by everybody — we’re defending other country. We’re spending a fortune doing it. They have the bargain of the century. All I said is we have to renegotiate these agreements because our country cannot afford to defend Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, South Korea and many other places. We cannot continue to afford.”

So America First foreign policy basically a policy of which United States will disengage from any international involvement unless U.S. has a clear financial benefit from such arrangement. This is pretty clear from Trump’s statements regarding pulling out from NATO, and Japan if they are not willing to pay an equal amount for funding in exchange for their protection. Or Trump willingness to put up trade barriers, and go to trade wars with China until U.S get a better deal from their trade. So how does this play out in South East Asia region?

The Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrine.

During the presidency of Obama, under the rudder of Secretary Clinton, U.S has put forward a ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrines, as U.S new strategies to face the new challenges of China growing presence in Asia region. Pivot to Asia was US decision to shift their priority and presences from Middle East and East Europe to Asia. This drove mainly because not only the growing global influence of China, but also the decline of Russia’s sphere of influence. Pivot to Asia was Obama’s solution to help the Asia region mitigates the international conflict, by providing a counter balance to China.

The South East Asia region is included within Obama’s Pivot to East Asia, and has proven to be resulting in greater engagement of the US in South East Asia region, which is evidently pointed out by Obama thirteen times visits, to nine different ASEAN countries during his two terms in office, this in contrast with his predecessor, President Bush, who only managed to visit South East Asia eight times and only to five different ASEAN countries. US has put considerably more resource in South East Asia, raising investment, greater military presence, and overall better relationship with ASEAN Countries. But this ASEAN re-engagement might come to an end, as President Trump is unlikely to follow the suit.

Take a look at few of his statements when it comes to US foreign policy in Asia, in one his foreign policy speech Trump said;

“We have spent trillions of dollars over time on planes, missiles, ships, equipment, building up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”

And also during one of his TV interview, he mentioned about what he thinks on US presence in Asia:

“Japan is better if it protects itself against this maniac of North Korea, we are better off frankly if South Korea is going to start protecting itself … they have to protect themselves or they have to pay us.”

Given President-elect Trump statement during his campaign, on how Japan and Korea are better off defending themselves with nuclear, instead of burdening United States financially to provide them with military defence, and how likely he would scrap TPP away. That was a clear signal on how President Trump is eager to end the US re-engagement process in East Asia, which in this case will likely include ASEAN.

This is sentiment that shared by many analysts such us Gillen from National University of Singapore, and Sa from S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, as well as Bisley from La Trobe University. Three of them believe that under Trump, there will be significant realignment of US Foreign Policy, to the point of significant diminish of US political and military presence in ASEAN, or even to the point of disappearing all together. With Sa particularly mentioning that Trump might not know that ASEAN existed in the first place.

Within ASEAN member itself, there are growing concern on how the US-ASEAN relations could be deteriorating under Trump, as rightly pointed out by Dinarto in his piece, that many ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia to name few, that are seeing deeper relationship with China as more beneficial relationship.

And if we took what president Trump said during his campaign seriously, we probably will see a more traditional approach on US foreign policy to refocus themselves to Middle East, especially on the issue of ISIS and Israel-Palestinian conflict. While at the same time reducing many of US global involvement when it comes to political, and security issues, and refocusing US foreign policy effort to crafting better economic strategy against China domination.

“If China does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets, I will use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs consistent with Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.” Trump said

So how does it affect ASEAN ?

Dinarto has pointed out that the Trump presidency will likely affect ASEAN in two ways, first it will create Global Triangle dynamic among great powers, or as also pointed out by Hermanadi, that it will force ASEAN to reinvigorate the notion of ASEAN Centrality and unity to attain their own national interest and fending off global powers.

The first scenario of the creation of global triangle politics is very unlikely happen in South East Asia, for few reasons. First, the Trump’s foreign policy doctrine dictates that US will reduce all of their involvement to a minimum, and Trump is more than willing to look away from what happened to Crimea and Syria, just to improve US relations with Russia, and preventing the US government to be dragged away to a conflict that doesn’t financially benefiting US. Japanese brokerage firm Nomura, also predicting that Trump would eventually limit investment in South East Asia in an attempt to bring job backs to the US, and with the TPP is likely to be put to shelf by Trump, and also the possibilities of dismantling US military base in Philippines, the US presences in South East Asia, and globally would be reduced significantly. So US would likely to pull away from intervening in the matter of South China Sea, and would focus their attention on to getting a better trade deal with China, even if it has to comes to trade war.

Second, Russia’s presence in ASEAN is minimal, with Asia- Pacific ranked number four in Russia’s foreign policy priorities, and it is for a reason, because Russia has no significant military objectives in South East Asia, other than selling weaponry and maintaining ties with Vietnam. The share of Russian export in ASEAN is only reach 2.7% in 2014, and Russia’s investment in ASEAN is a meager 0.2% of total Russian investment, or equivalent to 698 million dollars, with almost half of it goes to Vietnam. Currently, when it comes to ASEAN, Russia only hold a status s partnership, in comparison US, China, and Japan all have hold the status of strategic partner. Russia is also in relatively weak position, after the economic embargo and sanction that has been put by US and EU after the Crimea debacles, Russia has been hurt economically, and pretty much dependent on the trade relations with China. Russia and China also hold pretty much the same position on almost every international issues, thus they are more likely to be an ally in South East Asia than adversary. For example, when it comes to South China Sea disputes, despite trying to maintain neutrality for long, the deepening ties between China and Russia, has shift Russian position in favor for China, with Russia clear objection on the use of international court to solve the South China Sea dispute.

Third, all the reasons above left China as the only dominant power in South East Asia region. With TPP likely gone from the picture, the RECP regional bloc and OBOR initiative under the leadership of China are the only major comprehensive economic framework that will affect the ASEAN greatly, thus raised China economic bargaining power greatly within ASEAN. Not to mentioned the ever increasing defence budget and modernization of China’s military that put new emphasize on Navy and Airforce, of which surely increase the ability of Chinese military to project their power in South East Asia. With China as the only major power that actively engaging with ASEAN, the triangle power dynamic between US-China-Russia in ASEAN is very unlikely to happen, at least not in Trump’s first term.

The more likely scenario is that with China as sole major power influencer in ASEAN, ASEAN countries will band together to strengthening their bargaining position to check China’s influence in the region. But with the rise of the populist movement, nativism, and strongman leader in ASEAN countries, as predicted by Hermanadi, ASEAN countries might use and strengthening ASEAN to serves their national ego and protect them from the global power influence such as China.

But one other point that Hermanadi fails to mention is that the absence of US political presence might strengthening the strongman leaders in ASEAN region and slowing down the advance of human rights implementation in ASEAN. Because US has traditionally become the stable actor that has often claim higher moral ground along with EU when it comes to human rights, which can be shown from the topic discussed at US-ASEAN Summit in the past few years. But under Trump presidency, that will colored by unpredictable isolationist foreign policy, and little regard on human rights, ASEAN might find itself reluctant in pursuing the advancement of human right as their priority. And with no global power to put pressure and scrutiny for those strongmen leaders in ASEAN to respect human rights, then we might find ASEAN to be a less friendlier place for human right to flourish.

So in conclusion, while it is difficult to predict where Donald Trump going to take U.S. foreign policy, as he haven’t yet to took the office, it is fair to say that his foreign policy will focus on re-engagement with US traditional pivot to Middle East, improving relationship with Russia, while at the same time reducing US engagement in other regions, including South East Asia. Coupled with Trump reluctant in resuming the implementation of TPP, and his little regards on promoting democracy and human rights as part of U.S foreign policy, would likely resulting not the re-creation of global power politics, but on sole domination of China as the only great power country in South East Asia, therefore would forces many ASEAN country leaders to unite under ASEAN to better fend off China domination in the region.

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

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