Dedi Dinarto, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The triumph of Donald Trump for the presidential election in the United States of America has brought about a shock for world politics. In particular, it also embraced important effects on regional politics in Southeast Asia. Amidst the decline of United States’ role in global politics, “Trump’s Triumph” has raised some doubts on how he might preserve the unipolarity of American “global” leadership and how it might be related with the growing fragmentation of ASEAN member states.

In this case, I argue that Trump’s triumph will bring two most possible impacts for ASEAN centrality. First, ASEAN centrality might be re-established, with the possible remaking of ‘US-China-Russia’ game –or what I shall call “global triangle”— after Trump’s election. Second, we shall witness a more defensive regionalism, which witness the re-engagement of ASEAN member states with major global power 

The Remaking of “Global Triangle” Politics?

I shall begin with the most possible scenario for US Foreign Policy under Trump. I argue that  profound relationship between Trump and Putin would strengthen an infamous thesis on the likelihood of emerging “global conflict”. The previous Trump’s campaign has shown that he rregarded Putin not as an enemy, even though the American intelligence officers have privately briefed Trump on the possible cyber-attacks to the process of US election.

It is also evident that Trump has established some business links in the Russia and, moreover, maintain a relationship with oligarch in Russia.

To some extent, according to Rob Glaser, the deep financial ties and political connection of Trump to Russian oligarchs may increased the bilateral relationship of both countries, and to some extent, hampering the political turbulence in Ukraine as well as giving much possibility for Russia to expand the legacy of Soviet Union. This situation must be cautiously vigilant by the politically distresspost-Brexit European Union.

Regarding its relationship with China, Trump in his victory’s speech underlines that the United States would double its economic growth through the engagement in international economic system. His words provide a clear groundbreaking that there would be a two-side of coins on Sino-US relations, either through mutualeconomic cooperation, or instead economic competition to become a new global hegemony.

As a rising economic power, China has higher bargaining position whether to or not to engage with the United States. However, the nationalist Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream and xenophobic Trump’s Make America Great Again will unlikely bind them into a cooperation. At this point, the ‘global triangle’ consists of China, Russia, and the United States will constitute a new volatility in international politics. I further argue that it will potentially reconfigure the prospect of future regionalism in Southeast Asia.

Effects on ASEAN Centrality

Nevertheless, how does it affects ASEAN centrality? The current situation in ASEAN has shown a fragmented condition. It is evident that Southeast Asia is currently entering the “state of crisis”, characterised by strong leaders, which is followed by the strong national interests. Evelyn Goh, for example has, argued that this ‘statist-turn’ cannot be separated from the political reality in the region, which witnessed the presence of ‘big power’ in the making of ASEAN member states’ foreign policy.

The Philippines under Duterte exemplifies this point. His foreign policy, for example, has clearly pointed out a commitment to strengthen the economic and military engagement towards China. Cambodia, Laos, and the latest Malaysia have engaged through a set of economic cooperation agreement with China. To some extent, Indonesia has much potential to engage with China in the area of maritime infrastructure and investment cooperation.

Even though Singapore remains one of the strong allies of the United States, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long declared that the winning of Trump on US presidential election will increase the reassertion of a sense of identity and somehow to change the status quo. In such circumstance, China acts as a key role in region. If China is likely to cooperate with the United States, it seems that there would be a combination of three great powers in the world in one banner.

If not, it would be likely for China to be in the middle of US-Russia’s polar while playing assertive role to its ASEAN’s strategic partner under its tribute system. For ASEAN member countries, this proves to be a risk that should be confronted by the states.

How should ASEAN Respond?

I argue that ASEAN member countries should be able to take an alternative position towards the tumultuous global politics. One for sure is to strengthen its position as a strategic regional fulcrum. Using the extra-regional diplomatic forum, such as East Asia Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, and so on,ASEAN could voice out their single voice towards the great powers.

Rather than highly engaged under the game of ‘triangle great powers’, they may choose not to involve dependently towards each of great powers. Once again, this alternative option should be established under high political commitment along with risky economic cost.

It is then arguably that “Trump’s triumph” will exacerbate the international politics and rearrange its relationship towards China and Russia. Whether or not the three great powers will work under mutual and cooperative engagement, ASEAN has much to pay for its centrality.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar

In his recent article in The Jakarta Post (18/5), Rizal Sukma (now Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom) embraced an interesting argument: it is time to invoke a post-ASEAN regional order in East Asia. The polarisation in ASEAN, marginalisation of ASEAN’s role of ‘manager of order’, and the growing Sino-US rivalry in recent years, he argued, has demonstrated ASEAN’s inability to deal with emerging geopolitical issues in the region.

Moreover, he argues, any regional order in Southeast Asia will require a stable balance of power among major powers, which is important to be addressed in the future.

However, Even though Sukma convincingly demonstrates ASEAN’s failure in managing order and balance of power in the region, and therefore suggests a post-ASEAN regional order, his argument misses one important point: the internal dynamics of ASEAN that leads to such failures (if we agree with Sukma’s argument).

On the other words, to argue that ASEAN has failed to maintain regional order, we need to also acknowledge that ASEAN’s failure has also been determined by its member states, due to ASEAN’s state-centric nature. In this context, we could recall a famous word from Alexander Wendt, that ASEAN is, in fact, what its member states make of it.

In this article, I propose two inter-related arguments to respond to Sukma’s idea of “Post-ASEAN” regional order in Southeast Asia. First, shifting regional focus to broader East Asian context can only work if Indonesia could maintain its hegemonic position. Second, it is important to revitalise Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN through ASEAN-centered foreign policies

ASEAN and Regional Order

Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has been preserved as a diplomatic forum by its member states. State has been the only acknowledged actor until the 2nd ASEAN Summit in 2003, where its member states have agreed to expand the institutionalisation under one community.

State-centrism in ASEAN has also maintained through its long-standing principles, non-interventionism, which put state’s strong position in the regional institution. ASEAN’s institutional design has also put strong state’s presence in maintaining day-to-day activities, albeit with some space for non-state actors (such as CSOs or Business Actors) to engage in decision-making processes.

Putting the state as inseparable actor in ASEAN is important to understand why ASEAN failed to address major issues in ASEAN, most recently the South China Sea Crisis. The latest ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held recently in Vientiane, Laos, demonstrate this problem: ASEAN’s failure to reach a consensus to deal with South China Sea has been caused by the absence of ‘common ground’ among states to propose a roadmap to overcome the crisis.

Therefore, it can be argued that ASEAN relies on its member states. Sukma’s argument therefore illustrated the absence of a strong institutional rule that bind all its member states in dealing with major geopolitical issues in world politics.  Institutionalists might argue that this failure could be caused by the absence of institutional backdrop in ASEAN, due to state-centric nature of the regional organisation.

However, I found that this is not the case. Even the European Union, which has a stronger institutional power than ASEAN, has to face some internal crisis and democratic drift in its internal member-states, as we most recently witness with ‘Brexit’ and refugee crisis.

The Need for Leadership

I shall argue that what is at stake is ASEAN is not its failure to deal with main geopolitical issues as Sukma has demonstrated. Rather, I argue that it is the absence of a leadership to maintain ‘hegemonic order’ that leads to ASEAN’s ineffective role in East Asia and, more broadly, world politics.

The latest 49th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Laos could be a good point of departure. While ASEAN has produced a remarkable concern over growing crisis in the South China Sea, it has yet to design a common platform to overcome the crisis. Instead, the joint communiqué has recommended establishing the MFA-to-MFA hotline to manage maritime emergencies, which clearly brings the solution to bilateral forum.

What is at stake here, in my humble view, is not that it fails to produce a clear statement to overcome the crisis, which is a difficult thing to do, but that it abandons ASEAN centrality as an approach to peacefully settle the ongoing dispute and instead bring it as a state-to-state business.

It is true that ASEAN does not have a strong institutional binding to deal with such issues, and that ASEAN-based regional order has been limited. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that ASEAN has been less important for Indonesia, since ASEAN constitute an important geopolitical basis for Indonesia’s regional outlook, even with the recent emphasis on ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ that has been endorsed by Jokowi.

Due to ASEAN’s state-centric nature, I argue that this case demonstrate that ASEAN needs a leadership from a particular member state to maintain, to use neorealist argument, hegemonic stability and cooperation in the region. It is the area that Indonesia has declined to play in the region.

As Political Scientist Donald Weatherbee argues (2013), Indonesia has missed important opportunity to be a regional leader during Hassan Wirayudha era, in which Indonesia has committed to ASEAN-centred foreign policy. Despites some achievement in institutionalising Human Rights and Democracy in the regional body, many Indonesia’s proposal has been rejected by ASEAN fellow members.

Sukma might be partly true to say that Indonesia needs to broaden its vision to regional order by encompassing realist, normative, and institution-based order, which implies to an enlargement to East Asian regional order. However, it does not necessarily mean that Indonesia has to shift its focus from ASEAN, which I believe has been ongoing since early Jokowi’s presidency.

Rather, especially with emergent crisis in South China Sea, I suggest that Indonesia needs to re-strengthen its focus to ASEAN by maintaining hegemonic leadership. Indonesia could do so by, for example, utilising ASEAN’s institutional rules and procedures to resolve the emerging regional problems.

A Comeback to ASEAN?

I therefore suggest that rather than abandoning ASEAN-based regional order in Southeast Asia, Indonesia needs to re-strengthen its leadership in ASEAN. It means that Indonesia needs to integrate the so-called ‘national interest’, which is executed through bilateralism, with the use of multilateral foras in order to secure peace and stability in the region.

It implies the use of institutional decision-making process in ASEAN to deal with emerging regional problems, such as South China Sea crisis or several humanitarian issues.

Reviving a collective decision-making process through ASEAN’s institutional norms is therefore important. The recent ASEAN Summit and Ministerial Meeting has evidently shown that ASEAN member states have, to some extent, abandoned ASEAN-centrality to resolve regional problems, in particular the South China Sea crisis.

Indonesia could resolve it by functioning ASEAN institutional foras to facilitate dialogue in such crisis. The spirit of ASEAN centrality, in order to create peace and stability in the region, should be held rather than the old-fashioned ‘non-interventionism. Although it is not an easy task, I believe that Indonesia could maintain ASEAN-centrality as a basis to move to a bigger regional foras, such as East Asian Summit.

To do so, it therefore implies a clear direction on Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN. Indonesia might be, as Sukma suggested, shift its focus to East Asia due to its strategic position in building diplomatic order. However, without Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN, such attempts might not be congruent with Indonesian national interest as envisioned in Foreign Policy Direction.

I believe that in a rapidly changing international order, Indonesia should play a greater role as emerging power in world politics. It is the task that needs to be emboldened in our foreign policy.

*) Ahmad Rizky M. Umar studies Politics with Research Methods at the University of Sheffield, UK and a Research Associate with the ASEAN Studies Centre, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Dedi Dinarto

Long before the discourse on the future of ASEAN centrality, S. Rajaratnam and Thanat Khoman have put their respective ideas on the ontological part of ASEAN, meaning that where ASEAN should depart on its characteristic, thus shape the way its interact at both internal and external level.

Rajaratnam pointed out that the long shadow of Cold War has shaped this region as the “states of fear” where every countries sought to defend themselves from external threat, and provide baseline to construct ‘common threat’. Given the situation of the escalating tension between Soviet Union and the United States, ASEAN chose to setback its activism not to show off their teeth instead of barricading Southeast Asia from the influx of communism influence.

On the other side, Thanat Khoman contrastively derived his idea on how to place the ideal and peaceful cooperation, given the framework to set aside the rising tension of konfrontasi of Indonesia and Malaysia, and other disputes between neighboring countries. He put that the ASEAN should represent a constitutive regime serving promise towards more cohesive, peaceful, and stable condition.

Between those two prominent views, it remains logical that ASEAN has produced 1967 Bangkok Declaration, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) pacts to achieve their objectives. In spite of departing from different views on ASEAN at the first place, these two ideas can be bridged under the framework of winning the security and stability of the region. Neither national interest nor external parties are regarded crucial at that time.

Reflecting from the event of historical sociology between Rajaratnam and Thanat Khoman provides us the outlook of how ASEAN is able to determine its centrality.

However, it should be admitted that the composite interaction between ASEAN member states and its strategic partners nowadays has pushed political scientists and practitioners to look at ASEAN not only as a unproblematic regional body, but as a constructive and flexible pivot amidst tricky surroundings.

This is the matter of how we think about ‘ASEAN Centrality’ as an idea, which implies the source of power of ASEAN as a regional body. The governmentality has proceed to far serving the elites’ interest which surrounded by state-centric approach and calculation.

Not to do away from the dominant discourse, the elites could provide breakthrough creating intensive and fruitful cooperation on more human-centric issues. Negotiating major countries in the region to cooperate in non-traditional security issues that are quite transnational and require high and strict coordination and control mechanisms. Giving the example in how to attract China to aware on the issue of disasters and marine safety, and terrorism in the region would shed light on.

Therefore, this reflective approach underpin the way on how ASEAN member states could define their interests based on human-centric prioritization, and thus put up those issues to the responsibility of strategic partner countries. By doing this way, ASEAN can find its centrality amidst the complexities of international politics in the region. In other words, the centrality must be seen as a phenomenon coherent to change and intersubjective configuration.

Dedi Dinarto is a research assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.