Entries by aseansc

Press Release BINCANG ASEAN “Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand”

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Bincang ASEAN Monday, 14 May 2018

Yogyakarta – Recently, the ASEAN Studies Center UGM held its first Bincang ASEAN in 2018 entitled “The Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand” at Digilib Café FISIPOL, UGM. This particular Bincang ASEAN featured Hestutomo Restu Kuncoro, M.A. (Alumni of Manchester University) with Ezka Amalia (Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM) moderating.

 

On this occasion, Hesutomo raised the topic of democratization in Southeast Asia, using comparative methods of Western democratic model and models adopted in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As the discussion progressed interactively, Hestutomo explained that Southeast Asia did not support the strong Western democratization model in Latin America and Eastern Europe because of differences in the type of regime. As a consequence, Huntington’s ‘universal’ model of democratization is not applicable to Southeast Asia as it could not portray a complete explanation of the process taking shape in the region.

 

Putting the context on Southeast Asia, a region that is relatively immature for its democracy, Hestutomo argued that Thailand and the Philippines subscribe to the opposition-initiated democratization theory, whereas Indonesia adopted the regime-opposition alliance theory. These two types of theory are self-explanatory in nature; both are named after the drive for democratization. The former is characterized with non-violence movements and revolts, to begin with, and started without a power overturn. These people who demanded democracy fought against the same enemy, not because of a shared vision. On the contrary, the latter emphasizes on the function of regime opposition that seeks for change. True oppositions in Indonesia, in this regards, is difficult to define.

 

To further argue, Hestutomo contended that the power of people or civil society is not evidently strong to drive the democratization in Southeast Asia. In Britain, the free flow of ideas during the democratization process was associated with the existence of a strong civil society, something that Southeast Asia did not share in common. The interdependency between business sectors and politics are deemed as the catalyst for democratization. For instance, the unintended consequence of elitist competition in Indonesia gave birth to a greater democracy after the New Order era. In the Philippines, the constituents and those who are loyal to Aquino could not give much to say in the political agenda unless Aquino gave an approval in their action. People in Thailand, however, sought to get the patronage of the country.

 

As to the goals of democratization in Southeast Asia happened primarily due to the expected outcomes of the people within the jurisdiction of the respective state, such as to provide a better opportunity to be heard and to provide a better security from the state. Such conditions depict Indonesia during the fall of well-known corrupt Soeharto’s regime that curbed the voice of the people. In comparison to Portugal and Spain whose, people strove to seek democracy to participate in deciding the budget allocation of the country, the case in Latin America showed a transitional situation from a very closed government into one with the inclusion of the people in economy and decision-making process.

 

The role of the military in government, as Hestutomo explained, dominates in the Philippines and Indonesia. As time passes, they begin to enter the political business network to gain access to national resources. A question remains, why is this clear, the power of the people in the Philippines still unable to remove the authoritarian government that unilaterally supports Marshall’s Law and the War on Drugs in the country despite their views against such practices. Borrowing the physical molecular theory that explains a state of condition with sufficient critical mass and people power and a collective action necessary to transform a particular state or condition to another, democracy is possible to make. However, in fact, is still nowhere near to happen partly because the people in the Philippines still cast their votes to the characteristics of the figure they can relate to.

 

All in all, democratization in Southeast Asia is an unfinished project due to a plethora of variables. The intertwining role of religion and democracy make us questioning the maturity of the democracy in the region. For instance, the democratic practice in Southeast Asia tends to follow a procedural matter of democracy which highly focuses on the national election. The lack of tolerance to differing views in politics has the tendency to be divisive and harmful for the maturity of our democracy. The question that arises is what kind of democracy do young people imagine as the future of Southeast Asia? and how will our civil society be more open to embracing differences? When he concludes, such a scenario will eventually arise when people adhere to the values of democracy and inculcate it in our lives.

 

(Written by Kevin Iskandar, research intern in ASEAN Studies Center UGM)

Indonesia should partner with NGOs to protect unaccompanied child refugees

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Among more than 3,700 child refugees in Indonesia, close to 500 are unaccompanied minors.

Many have no access to formal education and health care. They have to go through the procedures to process their asylum claims without a guardian or legal aid to help them.

Only a few countries, such as Australia and the United States, accept child refugees without guardians. So most unaccompanied child refugees have to wait in transit countries until they are 18 years old before they can be resettled.

Because of these circumstances, these children are considered the most vulnerable among the refugees. The Indonesian government should do more to protect unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia.

In recent years a number of NGOs have provided services for child refugees. The government should consider partnering these organisations to uphold child refugees’ rights to protection.

Unaccompanied minors in Indonesia

Indonesia’s 2016 refugee decree makes explicit the duty to rescue, evacuate, monitor, register and accommodate refugees. For example, if asylum seekers reach Indonesian waters by boat, the government must rescue them.

However, none of the decree’s provisions provides specific rights for refugees post-evacuation nor does it specify the rights of child refugees.

As a result, many asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia live with very little means while waiting to be resettled, as they are prohibited from working and earning an income. Child refugees face the same hardship and, worse, they are prone to being abused.

In Indonesia, the Law on Child Protection Instrument (Law No. 35/2014) protects children. But it does not extend to child refugees because of their immigration status.

While the refugee decree and child protection law in Indonesia do not provide specific rights for child refugees, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRoC) does. Indonesia ratified the convention in 1990 through a presidential decree that provides a specialised obligation on the subject matter.

Article 22(1) of the CRoC stipulates that child refugees are entitled to:

receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments.

The convention applies to both nationals and non-nationals. Further, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child interprets that all of the convention’s provisions shall apply to children irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness and not limited to citizens of a state party.

What is urgently needed for unaccompanied child refugees is prompt appointment of guardians to provide legal advice in claiming the rights of the children in compliance with the principle of the “best interest of the child”.

For example, in the European Union, a legal guardian is appointed to represent the child in legal proceedings, take care of the child’s finances and promote the child’s well-being to the government. The guardian, therefore, should have expertise in childcare and is responsible for helping the children with the administrative and or judicial procedures of asylum claims until they turn 18.

The protection gap

Unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia do not enjoy the rights they are entitled to under CRoC. In January 2017, 91 of 471 unaccompanied minors in total were detained by the immigration authorities.

The child refugee in detention faces worse conditions than children convicted of criminal activities. Convicted children in Indonesia are entitled to exclusive detention treatment at the Children Special Construction Agency (LPKA) or Juvenile Detention Centres (LAPAS) in cases where LPKA is absent. These centres provide them with formal education, skills training and coaching.

Due to their immigration status, child refugees are treated as adult refugees. They are kept in the same detention centres with unrelated adults.

This makes them prone to abusive treatment and sexual assault. Under Indonesian immigration policy they can be detained for up to ten years without any judicial review.

And instead of providing these children with guardianship and legal representation to “promote physical and psychological recovery” in detention, some immigration authorities have been involved in abusing children.

Partnering with NGOs for a rights-based treatment

In recent years, a number of NGOs in Indonesia have started to work on child refugee issues.

Some of them, such as Cisarua Refugee Learning Center and Roshan Learning, pay more attention to educational care and vocational training to provide children with soft skills. The Sunrise Refugee Learning Center of Sandya Institute in Jakarta offers various language, computer, arts, legal, cultural and entrepreneurial classes to refugees. At present, 15 of the total 75 registered students are underage children.

Others, like SUAKA and JRS, provide free legal assistance, but not solely to child refugees.

Church World Service, an NGO that has advocated for an alternative to detention, has been sheltering more than 80 unaccompanied minors in Indonesia.

The increasing attention from civil society organisations on the need for a rights-based treatment of unaccompanied refugee children is an opportunity for the Indonesian government to partner with them in fulfilling its human rights obligations to unaccompanied minors.

The UNHCR, in its Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, recommended that “an independent and formally accredited organisation be identified/established in each country, which will appoint a guardian or adviser as soon as the unaccompanied child is identified”.

Indonesia could delegate its responsibility to ensure protection for unaccompanied child refugees by partnering with NGOs that have been licensed under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Through this partnership, these NGOs could seek experienced legal professionals, provide them with necessary training in childcare and assign them as legal guardians.

In this way, Indonesia can meet some parts of its obligations and at the same time place the principle of the “best interest of the child” at the forefront of its refugee management by ensuring unaccompanied child refugees are treated according to humanitarian principles.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Sumber asli artikel ini dari The Conversation. Baca artikel sumber.

Internship Program

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ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gajah Mada membuka kesempatan magang untuk mahasiswa dari seluruh jurusan di universitas di Yogyakarta yang akan berkesempatan untuk terlibat dalam riset serta program akademik yang diselenggarakan oleh ASEAN Studies Center UGM.

Output dari pekerjaan intern adalah sebagai berikut:
1. Membuat artikel mengenai isu-isu ASEAN sebanyak 1 buah, dalam Bahasa Indonesia atau Bahasa Inggris sepanjang 800 kata per minggu.
2. Berpartisipasi aktif dalam seluruh kegiatan/event yang melibatkan ASEAN Studies Center, UGM
3. Berpartisipasi aktif dalam riset dan program-program akademik ASEAN Studies Center, UGM

Timeline
Pendaftaran : Maret – 13 April 2018
Interview & Pengumuman : Minggu ketiga bulan April 2018
Program Magang : Mei – November 2018

Informasi lebih lanjut (persyaratan-persyaratan) dapat dilihat di foto/hubungi akun-akun ASC UGM (tercantum). #ASC_release

 

Indonesian Foreign Policy under Three Years of Jokowi’s Administration

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Siti Widyastuti Noor

October 2017, marked the third year of administration for Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi’ Widodo. In the beginning of his administration, Jokowi announced the nine prioritized agendas as Nawa Cita, a program that was initiated as an effort to bring Indonesia into a politically sovereign state, economically independent and cultural personality as a state.

In order to realize the spirit of Nawa Cita, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulates three priorities of foreign policy, namely: safeguarding Indonesian sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens and intensifying economic diplomacy.

Meanwhile, Dino Patti Djalal, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, notes that at the beginning of Jokowi’s administration, more attention is paid to the domestic affairs, whose policies tend to be inward-looking, as reflected in his focus on developing national infrastructure. There are 225 projects on a national infrastructure based on President Regulation no. 3 years 2016. The project was later improved to as 248 projects based on the President Regulation no. 58 of 2017. This national infrastructure project is one of the highlighted projects at its disposal in order to improve inter-regional ties and as an effort to reduce the gap between eastern and western parts of Indonesia.

A Retreat from Multilateralism

Observing the dynamics of foreign policy for 3 years administration, Jokowi is more likely to emphasize on consolidation at the national level compared with foreign policy of his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) which emphasized more on a free and active engagement on multilateralism with an outward-looking policy, “a thousand friends, zero enemy”.

Jokowi is more of a domestic reformer when compared to SBY is actively promoting foreign policy as the spotlight of his government. The most noticeable manifestation of differences is Indonesia’s retreat from multilateralism, which is demonstrated by Indonesia’s inactivity to participate in multilateral forums, particularly ASEAN. He missed three opportunities to present as head of state at the United Nations General Assembly and also in the Developing Eight High-Level Meeting in Istanbul.

Although the domestic development agenda progressed significantly, it should be understood that the success of the foreign policy is also capable of affecting the domestic agenda and the Indonesian people. Jokowi’s foreign policy outlook is considered to be a loss to Indonesia’s position as a leading country in ASEAN that might also have an impact on the regional integration agenda.

In addition, many consider that Indonesia’s withdrawal from Multilateral Forum eliminates the opportunity of Indonesia to participate actively in promoting important issues of concern to Indonesia to other countries, as well as undermining Indonesia’s position as a non-permanent member of UNSC candidate.

Jokowi’s Economic Diplomacy

As one of the focus of his policy, Jokowi plays a significant role to enhance the economic diplomacy. Priorities on the economy are defined in the Strategic Plan of Ministry of Foreign Policy 2015-2019 as the utilization of international politics to achieve the national development target.

One of the policies is the diversification of export market. For most of the time, Indonesia is focusing its export activities on traditional export destination countries, such as United States, China, or European market. Under Jokowi, significant changes can be found from a widening and diverse export destination countries, as Indonesia starts to established economic relations with the Middle East, Latin America, and African countries, such as Chile, Turkey, Egypt, Niger and some other countries. This move resulted in a more positive impact on Indonesia’s export and the surplus of trade balance. According to the data from Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Indonesia’s export in the January-September 2017 period reached $123.36 billion.

Indonesia and ASEAN

As a founding member and de facto leader of ASEAN for the great importance of ASEAN GDP and the largest population, Indonesia’s centrality in ASEAN is valuable. Although Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN is not as big and as large as ever, Indonesia still shows great concern and active participation in the Rohingya refugee story. Recently, the latest issue of human rights issues in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Indonesia, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Myanmar for a bilateral meeting to discuss the issue in Rohingya. This method became effective because it later became one of the ways to attract the Government of Myanmar and humanitarian aid humanitarian aid in the form of daily necessities, set up six elementary school buildings, and one hospital.

In recent news, Jokowi is reportedly sending aid to Rohingya refugees through the ASEAN instruments. The Foreign Ministry’s efforts to approach the Myanmar government and encourage ASEAN Member Countries to provide humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Center for Disaster Management (AHA Center) is a sign that Indonesia under Jokowi’s government still values ​​geopolitics and relations among ASEAN countries.

Despite of the hard work of the government to introduce the new approaches and development priorities, it is important for Indonesia to continue paying attention to the regional and international cooperation that has been built since the previous presidency, as a form of active participation and fulfillment of Indonesia’s role in international level.

The ASEAN Enhanced Disputes Settlement Mechanism (EDSM): Functional for Economic Growth or Protecting National Sovereignty?

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Suraj Shah

As the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) seeks to deepen regional economic integration, the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism must avoid politicisation to optimise successful integration and economic development in the region.

Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSM) are fundamental features of economic institutions to ensure optimal outcomes. Governments include DSMs in international institutions to address collaboration problems and enhance the credibility of commitments, through exposing free riding, ascertaining violations and penalizing non-compliance. Economic actors need dispute settlement to be effective, even if not necessarily used, so that they know economic bargains will be honored.

However, in ASEAN, the EDSM suffers from fatal flaws. Fundamentally, a functional DSM that disciplines members who renegade on agreements is incompatible with the ‘ASEAN Way’, particularly given the norms of non-criticism and non-interference. Thus, the institutional outcome of the EDSM is structurally weak in that its instruments reflect the preference for protecting national sovereignty, and is essentially voluntary.

To establish credibility, one can either centralise regulations and institutions, such as the European Union, with a credible threat of referral to the European Court of Justice, or create a legal certainty about the extent of liberalisation with precision from the outset, such as NAFTA, together with the public and private instruments to defends one’s economic rights.

The ASEAN DSM has been active since the 1992 AFTA. Moreover, since the launch of the AEC, ASEAN has sought to enhance the DSM. The Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms was signed in April 2010, providing greater definition to the original DSM, known as the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM).

The ASEAN’s EDSM is modeled on the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), of which all ASEAN members already subscribe to. This includes panels of independents, an appellate body, strict timelines and options for sanctions. However, ASEAN’s EDSM model suffers from practical flaws. The timelines adopted are even more expedited than the WTO DSU, by adopting half the time, which the WTO itself has difficulty following.

Furthermore, the ASEAN Secretariat is tasked to support the EDSM process with administrative and logistical support, yet has inadequate funding and legal expertise allocated to the EDSM process. Additionally, state-induced dispute settlement does not specify the remedy for found violations.

Thus, the EDSM establishes a dispute resolution procedure that cannot practically be followed. This structural weakness means that the EDSM has never been invoked.

Indeed, members favour using the WTO DSU rather than EDSM to resolve disputes, to avoid violating the norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’. For example, in Thailand’s dispute with the Philippines on Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes in July 2016, the WTO DSU was used, as it was seen as strategically less confrontational and would save face among ASEAN members by allowing third parties outside of the region to participate. Additionally, the WTO DSU was seen to give a more favorable outcome, given that the ASEAN EDSM is untested.

Moreover, effective dispute settlement mechanisms must be independent, yet, EDSM suffers from politicisation. The EDSM recognizes a variety of dispute settlement methods, ranging from ‘dialogue, consultation, and negotiation’, reference of ‘unresolved’ disputes to the ASEAN Summit, to the highest political decision-making body. However, it is possible under the current language of the ASEAN Charter, for an ASEAN member to refuse cooperation with the EDSM in the panel process or compliance proceedings, and thereby create an ‘unresolved dispute’.

The EDSM stipulates that ‘unresolved disputes’ have to be adopted by ASEAN political organs such as the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM), where both parties are already represented. In this sense, dispute settlement becomes politicised rather than independent. Moreover, in light of ASEAN norms of the aversion of conflict, adjudication with political, rather than independent, approval means the EDSM will likely be avoided.

Furthermore, the EDSM only envisages participation by ASEAN member states and does not permit private entities or investors to participate in the adjudicatory process. This minimises the involvement of non-state actors by denying access, disallows domestic courts from seeking a preliminary ruling, and deprives adjudicators of the means to compel compliance.

Essentially, the norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’ result in the structural weakness of the ASEAN EDSM. The outcome is a state-controlled EDSM which is voluntary, as there is an opt-out from the institutions of dispute settlement which is functional for protecting national sovereignty. While this non-confrontational approach may be suitable for diplomacy, ASEAN EDSM decisions behind closed doors by bureaucrats or politicians are not suitable for market transactions where private decisions implying private money or private efforts are based on public obligations or rights.

In light of this, the ASEAN EDSM is unlikely to be functional for optimising ASEAN Economic Integration, nor economic development in the region more broadly. ASEAN must seek to depoliticize the Enhanced Disputes Settlement Mechanism and create an independent regulatory body, as it seeks to deepen regional economic integration through the ASEAN Economic Community.

Suraj Shah is a MSc from King’s College London and former visiting fellow of ASEAN Studies Center.

Day 3: UGM-RUG International Working Conference on Regional and National Approaches Toward Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN

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The third day of UGM-RUG International Working Conference on Regional and National Approaches toward Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia held on October 5th 2017. With only three session of draft paper presentation left, the international working conference was opened by Dr. Titus C. Chen’s presentation on his draft paper. The title of his work is blue-washing, green coffe, and the sustainable development agenda in Southeast Asia.

The second draft paper presentation was presented by Dr. Helena Varkkey, an expert on the transboundary haze issues in Southeast Asia. Her works, Transboundary Haze, ASEAN and the SDGs: Normative and Structural Considerations.

Prof. Laksono Trisnantoro from Indonesia became the last but not the least draft paper presenter at the UGM-RUG working conference. He presented his draft paper with the title Health Care System Reform and Governance for Sustainalbe Development in Indonesia. The UGM-RUG international working conference finally closed after every participant presented their draft paper.

Day 2: UGM-RUG International Working Conference on Regional and National Approaches Toward Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN

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The second day of UGM-RUG international working conference on October 4th 2017 was opened by Prof. Dr. Ronald Holzhacker draft paper presentation the relation of multi-level governance and the sustainable development goals. Taking concern on how some persistence issues and also some unfinished agenda from the MDGs, Prof. Dr. Ronald Holzacker then point out at the problem when one issues is tent to be covered by more than one ministry in a country, meanwhile the coordination between the ministries is not good. Prof. Dr. Ronald Holzacker then proposed a solution with multi-level governance approach that would create better coordination between ministries on a specific issues, so the SDGs can be accomplished.

The second presenter is Prof. Ir. Bakti Setiawan MA., PhD from Indonesia. He presented his draft paper, Indonesian Responses toward Goals Number 11: The New Urban Ageda – Habitat 3, which discussed about the gab of the concept of SDGs goal number 11 and the concept of Habitat 3 in order to come up with a better idea in how to design the future urban life.

Protecting Rights of Construction Workers to Safe Working Condition in the Course of Economic Boom: Lesson Learned from Cambodia was the third draft paper that had been presented by Kimsan Soy. Triggered by the fact that the construction worker does not have an employment contact, which mean construction worker does not protected by Cambodia Labor Law, Kimsam Soy explored the possibility in using external resource mobilization to raise the issue so then Cambodia government would acknowledge the issue.

UGM-RUG International Working Conference on Regional and National Approaches Toward Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN Day 1

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ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada and the Groningen Research Centre for Southeast Asia and ASEAN, University of Groningen, organized international working conference on regional and national approaches toward sustainable development goals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. The conference was opened by welcoming message from Dr. Dafri Agussalim, MA, as the Director of ASEAN Studies Center, Dr. Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti as the Vice Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Science, and also Prof. Ronald Holzhacker as the representation from Groningen Research Centre for Southeast Asia and ASEAN, University of Groningen. Some of the keynote from the welcoming message are the strengthening collaboration between two institutions, the importance of the event, and also the significant contribution that can be made when the output of the international working conference could be published.

There were five session of draft paper presentation from five international working conference participants. The first draft paper presenter was Prof. Julio Teehanke from Philippines with the draft paper title is Measures of Accountability: Monitoring Sustainable Development Target 16.6 in the Philippines using Varieties of Democracy Data. Towards Quality Education: Capacity Building for the Academic Community in Cambodia and Laos then presented second by Dr. Azirah Binti Hashim from Malaysia. The next presenter was Dr. Ulrich Karl Rotthoff from Philippines with that discuss Human Rights and Development: The Philippine Case in the International Context. The forth presenter was Dr. Maharani Hapsari from Indonesia with the title of the drat paper is Reinscribing Space for Citizenship: Grassroots Communities, Sustainable Development Goals and Water Governance in Indonesia. Then the last presenter for the first day of the international working conference was Dr. Dafri Agussalim, MA, with the title Localising Sustainable Development Goals: Assessing Indonesian Compliance toward the Global Goals. After each session of draft paper presentation, there was Q&A session that was aimed to evaluate the draft paper that later on would be revised then published as the output of the international working conference.

Following this international working conference, there would be another international working conference as the continuation of today conference and is scheduled to take place in October 2018 in Brussels at the Holland House along with the publication of the book as the final output of research collaboration.

 

Indonesia Drags Its Feet on ASEAN Haze Treaty

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Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Universitas Gadjah Mada

In May, I went with my research team to Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s hotspots of land and forest fires.

We wanted to know how local administrations view an agreement between ASEAN countries on haze pollution that Indonesia ratified two years ago.

We were surprised to hear that the acting head of Central Kalimantan Environmental Agency, Humala Pontas, admitted he didn’t know much about the agreement. He asked:

What is contained in the agreement? Which part of haze does it regulate? Are there any provisions that contain economic or other means?

Here, as well as in other areas in Kalimantan, Sumatra and Papua, slash-and-burn methods are still commonly used to clear land for expansion of oil palm plantations. Palm oil is Indonesia’s top export.

Slash-and-burn is the cheapest and fastest way to prepare land for planting. But it produces haze that harms the health of humans and wildlife. Emissions from forest conversion in Indonesia contribute to global warming.

The smoke from burning doesn’t only affect the area where land is being cleared. It travels with the wind to neighbouring countries.

Response to haze crisis

In 2002, ASEAN members agreed on the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP). This was a response to a haze crisis after huge forest fires in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998 created a thick smog across neighbouring countries.

At the time, fires burned some 45,000 square kilometres of forests in Kalimantan and Sumatra. The wind swept the acrid smoke across the region, polluting Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and even Thailand.

The haze crisis happened in the midst of the devastating Asian Financial Crisis. The timing meant countries in the region struggled to cope with this disaster.

In 1998, Singapore’s minister for environment and health, Yeo Cheow Thong, stated:

A repeat of this disaster will surely aggravate the already bad regional economic situation.

Forest and land fires in Indonesia were leading factors why ASEAN countries formed the haze agreement. During the ministerial meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, in April 1998, ASEAN members blamed Indonesia for its land-clearing activities.

Hence, the 1997-1998 fires prompted ASEAN countries to try to overcome the economic and health impact of haze crisis together.

Slow implementation

It took 11 years after the treaty came into force for Indonesia to ratify the agreement in 2014. But two years in, Indonesia has yet to enact regulations at the national and local level.

Article 11 of the haze agreement obliged state parties, among others, to:

ensure that appropriate legislative, administrative and financial measures are taken to mobilise equipment, materials, human and financial resources required to respond to and mitigate the impact of land and/or forest fires and haze pollution arising from such fires.

During a closed interview with an expert staff of the Legislation Committee at Indonesia’s House of Representative (DPR), she, who requested to remain anonymous, admitted that the House still views additional regulations at the national and local level as unnecessary.

Lawmakers believed that national laws, such as the 2014 Law on Plantations and the 2009 Law on Environmental Protection and Management, were adequate, she said.

These laws do share the spirit of ASEAN’s zero-burning policy. The ASEAN haze treaty has a provision urging parties to prevent land-clearing using fire. The Indonesian laws mentioned above also prohibit land-clearing by burning.

But none of Indonesia’s national laws make special reference to haze or pollution resulting from slash-and-burn activities.

In fact, Indonesia does not categorise the spread of haze from forest burning as a disaster. For Indonesia, haze is merely a result of forest burning, especially when it’s man-made. Not categorising haze as a disaster prevents the country’s national and local disaster agencies from responding accordingly.

To implement the haze treaty, Indonesia could, for instance, legislate to expand the authority of the country’s Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and local disaster management agencies at the provincial level to carry out activities to prevent and mitigate any transboundary haze crisis.

Currently, their mandate is limited to emergency preparedness. The local disaster relief fund can be used only when the haze status reaches “emergency standby” status. As a result, national and local disaster agencies cannot prevent and mitigate haze. They can only start work once there are already fires and haze.

Disjointed action

Within the Indonesian government, problems of commitment and co-ordination among agencies at the central and local level persist.

The Ministry of Environment and Forestry – the government body responsible for tackling threats to the environment – does not seem interested in enforcing the ASEAN haze agreement. It’s more focused on “project-based” action, such as distributing firefighting pump machines to the community.

It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of international agreements, that actively supported Indonesia’s ratification of the haze treaty.

As a consequence of the discord between the two ministries, two years into Indonesia’s ratification of the agreement, local administrations are still not aware of it.

What’s at stake?

If Indonesia maintains its non-compliant behavior, the regional community will continue to blame Indonesia for Southeast Asia’s haze problems. Previously, Indonesia’s non-ratification delayed the establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordination Centre for Haze

ASEAN has set a goal of a haze-free region by 2020. It may not achieve that goal if Indonesia does not not catch up. In a more general and long-term effect, Indonesia will lose its “natural leadership” position in ASEAN, as one of ASEAN’s founders and the largest economy in Southeast Asia.

It’s important to have a united approach between different government agencies for Indonesia to comply with the agreement.

The ConversationLocal administrations throughout Indonesia should be informed about the policy. Only this way can we ensure that policies are synchronised and implemented effectively at national and local level.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

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To protect migrant workers, Indonesia should engage multiple stakeholders

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ASEAN Studies Center UGM held the seventh Bincang ASEAN which discusses some problems that Indonesian migrant workers face in several countries. This discussion is triggered by the recent problems regarding the migrants’ workers. Ezka Amalia, a postgraduate student at Nagoya University, Japan, began the discussion by examining the history of the women migrant workers and the problem they face on a daily basis. She addresses the problems surrouding labor migration in the region, such as the feminization of migration and worker’s rights’ fulfillment, in which the workers mostly became the vulnerable due to their role as a low-skilled labor.

Asia is the region with the largest number of domestic workers, with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka being the largest sender country. According to the ILO 2013 data, migrant domestic workers are vulnerable to long hours (99%), not covered by workers law (61%), and do not have weekly resting rights (97%). Most of the problem originated from the lack of knowledge regarding the right of works in the respective countries.

Ezka noted that most of the governments are still focused on controlling the migrants labor instead of protecting the migrant labor rights. Female migrant workers are not a citizen (in the recipient country). On the other words, they are marginalized citizens, which makes the recipient’s countries feel no need in addressing the problems immediately. There is also a heated debate as to whether Hong Kong government (which is autonomous from the mainland China) and the agency should fulfill the rights of migrant workers, which is yet to reach a conclusion. Women migrant workers have yet to understand their guaranteed rights in employment law.

Ezka also highlighted the nature of the migration of transnational female workers, which is accompanied by advocacy activities by NGOs and trade unions. She said that it needs to be involve all of the international actors working in this issue. Therefore, a transnational perspective is needed in looking at the issue of the protection of female migrant workers

To date, the advancement towards the protection of the migrant’s workers are being made; the advocacy from the NGO namely Migrant CARE and a workers union, in Hongkong, for example, the women migrant workers formed Indonesian Migrant Workers Union (IMWU). She conclude that the protections of migrant workers still needs to be put into the heart of Indonesian government’s program abroad.