Entries by aseansc

Press Release Bincang ASEAN “Transnational Activism for Migrant Workers in Asia: The Case of Indonesia and the Philippines”

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Yogyakarta, October 26th 2018

Yogyakarta – On Friday, October 26, 2018, ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada held the fourth edition of Bincang ASEAN 2018. Approximately 50 students and practitioners across Yogyakarta, Central Java and West Java registered on this Bincang ASEAN #4 held in BA 201 Room FISIPOL UGM on October 26th, 2018. On this edition, Ezka Amalia, MA (ASEAN Studies Center UGM Researcher) disseminatedher dissertation findings about “Transnational Activism for Migrant Workers in Asia: The Case of Indonesia and the Philippines”. This discussion also had Raissa Almira (ASEAN Studies Center UGM Research Intern) moderating.

Firstly, Ezka described the status quo of labor migration in Southeast Asia, specifically Indonesia and Philippines. She also characterized the detail of Indonesia as a migrant worker sending country and the regulations within the country managing the migrant protection. It includes the advocacy maneuvers of Indonesian migrant worker in articulating their peers’ voice. Consecutively, same explanations were also given concerning Philippines as major migrant sending country.

Simultaneously, the dissertation indeed also explains the migrant worker destination country: Hong Kong. She presented the statistics of Hong Kong as receiving country and the advocacy network of both Indonesian and Philippines migrant worker in that country, that is also known to have a prominent regulations protecting the foreigners working there. These explanations were followed by personal stories of migrant workers re-told by Ezka. 

At the end of the presentation, Ezka discloses the reason behind the difference of advocacy model done by Philippines and Indonesia concerning the migrant worker protection. The metric of the comparison was mainly the domestic structure the two countries. Specifically, Indonesia and Philippines has different civil society tradition and characteristic of network.

 

(Written by Rafyoga Jehan Pratama Irsadanar, research intern in ASEAN Studies Center UGM)

Press Release Bincang ASEAN “Delegate Sharing Session: Model ASEAN Meeting Experiences”

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Yogyakarta, Friday, October 12, 2018

ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada held its very first collaborated Bincang ASEAN featuring the Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia. In order to better raise awareness and promote greater ownership of the ASEAN Community among young generation throughout the region, as well as to introduce more closely how the decision-making process at the ASEAN level is carried out, this time Bincang ASEAN inviting Kevin Iskandar (Best Position Paper and Diplomacy Award of AFMAM 2018) and Tri Inov Haripa (Best Delegation of AFMAM 2018) to share their experiences on Model ASEAN Meeting.

The event began with Tri Inov Haripa briefly introducing the ASEAN Model Meeting. She portrayed the Model ASEAN Meeting as an academic simulation from the Model ASEAN Meeting, where participants are invited to play the role of diplomat representing 10 ASEAN member countries in solving urgent regional issues by using perspectives and policies of the assigned countries that are in line with the principles ASEAN. As she emphasizes, the key objective of the Model ASEAN Meeting is for participants to gain an understanding, insight, and appreciation of the decision-making process of ASEAN. The final outcome of the meeting is to have the Heads of Government (HOGs) adopt a concerted document that addresses the issues identified, also known as the Chairman Statement, based on the ASEAN Way. There are 6 steps in the Model ASEAN Meeting Process, which are Opening Ceremony (Remarks by HoG), Simulation of Sectoral Bodies Meeting (SOM), Simulation of ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, Community Council Meeting, Coordinating Council Meeting, and ASEAN Summit (Closing Ceremony & Remarks by HoG).

The next session was continued by Kevin Iskandar, presenting the stages and roles in the ASEAN Meeting Model. First off, ASEAN Secretariat is responsible to prepare the Draft Statement, assist the document formulation during the Negotiation and draft the final report with the assistance of the ASEAN National Secretariat. Second, Senior Officials are responsible to lay out the foundation of discussion and amend the draft statement. Third, the Ministers are responsible to negotiate the unresolved (escalated) points of Draft Statements and propose a substantial point. Lastly, the Head of Government is responsible to coordinate councils and the ASEAN Summit.

Closing the session of Bincang ASEAN, Kevin and Tri outlined more details about the strategy paper & position paper. Position paper lays down the background of the topic, country’s position and proposed solutions, does a deliberate research on the past country’s efforts and regional efforts beforehand and formulated by every delegate with the exception of the HoG and Foreign Minister. As for the strategy paper, it comprises of what one’s country has done in the past in its efforts realizing the vision/mission of each pillar, includes the area of cooperation that your country would be (and would not be) willing to negotiate and covers strategy to approach the issue on the table. All in all, Model ASEAN Meeting is a very good platform for youth to learn more about ASEAN, especially in solving pressing regional issues using the policies and perspectives of their assigned country using the ASEAN Way.

Written by Raissa Almira, research intern in ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Press Release BINCANG ASEAN “Mapping the Source of Indonesia’s Refugee Obligations: Does it Exist?”

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Yogyakarta, 6th September 2018

 

ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada held the second meeting of Bincang ASEAN in Thursday (6/9), with Dio Herdiawan Tobing S.IP, LLM, former researcher at the ASEAN Studies Center UGM, who is currently working as Senior Policy Advisor at the Netherlands Embassy, presenting his dissertation on “Mapping the Source of Indonesia’s Refugee Obligations: Does it Exist?” . Held at BB building room number 208, the discussion was initiated with the issue of mapping Indonesia’s refugee obligation from various international legal instruments.

Indonesia is regarded as one of the main refugee transit countries in Southeast Asia after Thailand and Malaysia with more than 13.000 asylum-seekers and refugees. However, Indonesia is a non-party to 1951 Refugee Convention and its additional protocol but Indonesia ratified several treaties such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention against Torture, and Convention on the Rights of the Child.

“Indonesia’s first action on refugee is when the government provided Galang Island so that refugee can be settled in the late of 1970.  Indonesia also thinks that they’ve done well to do their obligation such as when they provide the Island on the refugee from Vietnam when Vietnam War happened, so the government doesn’t think that it is necessary to ratify the refugee convention.” Dio said.

In this occasion, Dio attempts to explain the decision made by the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia and other government-affiliated institutions’ stance on the refugees-like issue which is solid: no ratification, no refugee obligation. But the fact is Indonesia has existing non-refoulement refugee obligation that derived from other legal instruments such as ICCPR and Convention against Torture. In particular, on Article 3 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 Convention Against Torture.

The findings of his dissertation present that in spite of Indonesia’s non-ratification to the Refugee Conventions, the country remains to have refugee obligation derived from other legal instruments. In fact, the threshold of Indonesia’s refoulement obligation is higher.

Bincang ASEAN: Mapping the Source of Indonesia’s Refugee Obligations: Does it Exist?

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[ASC EVENT] Bincang ASEAN

With more than 13,000 asylum-seekers and refugees currently hosted in Indonesia, the country is regarded as one of the main refugee transit countries in Southeast Asia after Thailand and Malaysia. However, in light of the situation, Indonesia is a non-party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its additional protocol. The Foreign Ministry of Indonesia and other government-affiliated institutions frequently describe that Indonesia’s stance to refugees-like issue is solid: no ratification, no refugee obligation. Is this even entirely true?
Speaking from an international perspective, Dio’s LL.M Dissertation maps out Indonesia’s refugee obligation from various international legal instruments: Convention Against Torture, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Convention on the Rights of the Child. The findings of his dissertation presents that in spite of Indonesia’s non-ratification to the Refugee Conventions, the country remains to have refugee obligation derived from other legal instruments. In fact, the threshold of Indonesia’s non-refoulement obligation is higher.
ASEAN Studies Center UGM presents:
Mapping the Source of Indonesia’s Refugee Obligations: Does It Exists?
With the expert, Dio Herdiawan Tobing, S.IP, LL.M, this edition of Bincang ASEAN will discuss about Indonesia’s existing non-refoulement refugee obligation, the reflection of such obligation in the newly adopted Refugee Decree No. 125/2016 and its flaws, and the incoherence of the existing international non-refoulement obligation in Indonesian practices.

Don’t miss it!
Friday, September 7th, 2018.
15.00 – 17.00 WIB.
In FISIPOL UGM BA 201.

Online registration at http://tiny.cc/BINCANGASEAN2

Pictures source: http://specialeffectscentral.weebly.com/uploads/6/9/7/4/69743383/barbwire001.png https://d25in8q9uizcdd.cloudfront.net/app/uploads/2017/11/crisi-rohingya-birmania.jpg https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/archive/3/3b/20091216111142%21Jakarta-Panorama.jpg

#ASC_event

Panmunjom Agreement: The Role of ASEAN behind the Pacified Peninsula

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Rafyoga Irsadanar

A new stage of peacemaking had progressed in the Korean Peninsula as Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in declared that there will be no more war in the region. This great momentum of peace among the President of Republic of Korea and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea happened during 2018 Inter-Korean Summit in “Peace House” at Panmunjom on April 27th. Under the “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula”, both parties agreed to denuclearize Korean Peninsula and to conduct more talk with the United States in officially bringing Korean War to a permanent end.

A great advancement of perpetual harmony between North and South Korea, indeed, involved many external parties in pacifying the tension. Even though the security issues in the Korean Peninsula mainly spotlighted the credit to East Asian countries (Japan, China and two Koreas) and the United States, the contribution of ASEAN as the neighboring regional power could not be easily overlooked.

ASEAN- Two Koreas Warm Relationship: A Strong Bargain

It is undeniable that ASEAN itself is still struggling in building its firm institutional power in managing their own region, therefore, at some point, one may doubt ASEAN role in putting North and South Korea back into a constructive negotiation.  However, what matters in the negotiation is ASEAN strategic position in convincing both parties to express their cooperative endeavor. It is important to note that ASEAN has a strong political capital to begin with.

By default, ASEAN and the Koreans have a strong bond in various aspects. North Korea, despite its isolative tenet, surprisingly has progressive political and economic relations with ASEAN. Not only North Korea has diplomatic relations with all ASEAN member states, North Korea also actively participated in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster the security stability in Asia-Pacific. Economically, from 2000 to 2006 North Korea’s trade with Southeast Asian nations was able to reach 12 percent of the country whole balance. Simultaneously, South Korea and ASEAN obviously have a firm both political and economic cooperation as well. Besides the fact that South Korea and ASEAN regularly held ministerial and bilateral summits, ASEAN is Korea’s second largest trading partner under the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA).  These warm ties of ASEAN and the conflicting parties are the main ASEAN decisive bargain in persuading the two Koreas to peace.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The prominent relationship of ASEAN and two Koreas has escalated the urgency of ASEAN involvement as South Korea recognized ASEAN as the “fifth power”. The robust economic ties between ASEAN and North Korea also caused Trump Administration demanding ASEAN to cut the trade and financial aids to pressure North Korea, proving ASEAN importance to North Korea. However, in engaging to the issue, ASEAN took a softer approach which is making the best of the existing platform, ASEAN Regional Forum, to be a constructive peaceful talk among conflicting parties in regards to North Korea assertive actions. There are two interconnected reasons why this is exclusive as ASEAN role in pacifying the Peninsula tension:

First, ASEAN Regional Forum is the only multilateral platform where both South and North Korea are encountered to each other in regards to security issues after the failure of Six-Party Talks. This means, ASEAN is the only actor who could bridge the states in Asia-Pacific with North Korea in regards to denuclearization through an official interstate channel. As the aftermath of ARF 2017 Manila, this ASEAN-initiated forum could gather the interest of all its member state to positively and legitimately demand North Korea, as ARF member, to reconsider its nuclear projects since it threatened Asia-Pacific stability. In addition, ARF initial trajectory in welcoming North Korea membership in 2000 was to engage with North Korea softer approach instead of isolating them, as it also appear as the turning point of Inter-Korean Relations at that time,  ASEAN Chairman on that period Surin Pitsuwan stated. Hence, ASEAN contribution in providing the peace talk circuit should be credited to this context.

Second, not only ASEAN could provide the progressive platform, but also has a great potential to sustain it subsequently as a mediating actor. This optimism arises as ASEAN could appear as a friendlier partner toward North Korea. For North Korea, ASEAN is the easier counterpart to talk to compared to the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia.

North Korea trust toward ASEAN could be seen as ASEAN (and a couple of South Asian countries) is the only regional arena where North Korea engaging the most, proven by the number of its envoys sent to ASEAN (added with India and Bangladesh). North Korea admitted that this high level of interaction with ASEAN was caused by its “traditional friendship” established among them. This “traditional friendship” between North Korea and ASEAN was nurtured as North Korea could find its socialist-communist counterparts in ASEAN such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Not to mention its strong connection with Indonesia socialist-friendly regime under President Soekarno also appeared as the additional value of the relationship. Therefore, no wonder that ASEAN is currently seen as a potential actor to maintain the conductivity of the peacemaking as ASEAN is recognized as the one who could communicate with North Korea best.

From these metrics, we can see that trust is the main spearhead that made ASEAN-Koreans friendship possible to sustain. To maintain the maneuvers progressive, this article suggests that ASEAN should maintain its neutrality and strengthen its non-intervention tenet. These two parameters are vital to gain the trust of all parties since it will shape ASEAN as a truthful ally to cooperate with. Also, the non-intervention principle may also show South and North Korea that ASEAN is open to all values, proven by its commitment to not pushing any of its member state against their own identity.

The writer is a Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Seminar on Enhancement of Cooperation between Eastern Part of Indonesia and Southern Part of the Philippines

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Seminar on Enhancement of Cooperation between Eastern Part of Indonesia and Southern Part of the Philippines

23 August 2018 | 8.30 – 16.45 | R. Seminar Timur, Fisipol UGM

REGISTRATION until 21 August 2018
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Subject: August Seminar | Format: name_institution_phone number | send to: aseansc@ugm.ac.id

CP Karina +62 851 1332 3663

*Registration starts at 8.00 AM

Rethinking Strategies and Opportunities for ASEAN in 40 Years of Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations

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Photo by asean.org

Chitito Audithio Syafitri

The year 2017 marks the 40th commemoration of ASEAN – EU Dialogue Relations, which brought together the two countries to adopt a Joint Statement on the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations as well as the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018-2022) to further enhance cooperation towards strategic partnerships in order to maintain peace, stability, security and prosperity in Southeast Asia, Europe and globally.

In today’s world, the multilateralism has indeed taken the crucial role, meanwhile, the emergence of new players in the chessboard of international relations has resulted in various forms of compromise and dynamic cooperation. How should the ASEAN-EU relationship be maintained?

In recent years, not only ASEAN has sought to improve their economic cooperation with the EU, in response to the latest regional trends, ASEAN is also deepening its relations with China, which listed along with the EU having the highest trade cooperation with ASEAN since 2010. Under these circumstances, it is important that ASEAN should be able to direct its cooperation with the two countries, taking into account that tensions can easily spark between China and the EU due to the difference in principles over China’s position in the WTO.

Documented as a developing country, China gains the benefits they should not enjoy, given its current economic conditions and capacity of the country, allowing China to take fewer commitments in the WTO principles. Furthermore, China Belt Road Initiative which comprises of Silk Road Economic Belt for ground access and New Maritime Silk Road for sea access has added new concern for the EU, as they are still struggling with the dilemma of transparency from Silk Road Cooperation with EU member states in the eastern region.

China’s initiative potentially undermines the credibility of the Union such as the 16+1 initiative which able to reduce the political power of the EU that meant to integrate Europe and help China’s goal of economic politicization as has been informed in POLITICO. This type of initiative is the thing that EU is willing to contest.

Indeed, if it is not wisely managed, this situation will put ASEAN’s position as a party between the EU and China in jeopardy. Therefore, the commemoration of the 40th ASEAN-EU relations shall be the moment for ASEAN to evaluate its regional cooperation strategy, where the trend of Asian cooperation should not diminish the focus on other cooperation, such as with EU that has been established so far.

In fact, cooperation with the EU is still very important in ASEAN economic and trade activities. Since the EU market has become a high-quality product standard, this leads to a situation where if a product can be equivalent to EU product standards, it will easily penetrate other markets around the world. Knowing these circumstances, ASEAN should be able to position itself wisely, maintain relations with the EU but on the other hand, maintain good cooperation with China, given China’s importance as one of the largest investors in the ASEAN market and infrastructure.

It is important that ASEAN takes a non-partisan position and absorbs the best of its cooperation with both parties. Apart from the above, there are several important ASEAN-EU cooperation underlined, one of which is the ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU 2013-2016 (ARISE), to support the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) or the great idea of ASEAN Connectivity. For ASEAN, this initiative is vital, knowing that Europeans has previously succeeded in implementing their European Economic Cooperation (AEC), therefore, ASEAN has the opportunity to learn directly from EU through this assistance. In addition, with regard to EU economic standard, the currently progressing cooperation named ASEAN – EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which ASEAN welcomed through the AEM – EU Trade Commissioner Consultations in Manila 2017 is also an opportunity for ASEAN to regionally adapt to the standards EU on imported goods.

ARISE Plus

Following the ARISE 2013-2016, the EU also seeks further cooperation with ASEAN for the successful implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) through ARISE Plus. This involvement is embodied in EU press releases intended to develop ASEAN’s single market, trade facilitation, reduce non-tariff barriers to trade, along with Intellectual Property Rights, civil aviation, and ASEAN statistics. As promised through the establishment of the ARISE program, the EU has truly shown its full support and assistance, evident from the amount of budget distributed to ARISE, which was recorded at EUR 41 million, this initiative is the largest EU-funded ASEAN action.

EU – ASEAN FTA

It is important to understand that EU engagement in Free Trade Agreements either with state entities or regional organizations is part of EU preemptive action to undermine its dependence on the US market, especially after the threat of Trump against key US allies through tariffs on steel and aluminum as US protection compensation to Europe vis-à-vis NATO.

The initiative was not new, in 2009 the ASEAN-EU discussion on FTA has been initiated, but due to some economic and political circumstances, it was never approved. As mentioned by Chotima Lemsawasdikul, director of the ASEAN Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand, by 2015, ASEAN is trying to focus on the work of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.

In addition, it should be noted that individual ASEAN member countries such as Vietnam and Singapore have individually established bilateral trade agreements with the EU. In addition to these defective statements, it is imperative for ASEAN to have started an initiative to keep up with the EU’s regional high standards as part of ASEAN integration. If ASEAN achieves that goal, the fight for global markets is possible.

The writer is a Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada.

ASEAN AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS – International Day of UN Peacekeepers

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Photo by Indonesian Mission UN @indonesiaunny Twitter

Kevin Iskandar Putra

May 29th 2018 remarks the 70th Years of Service and Sacrifice of the UN Peacekeepers. Through the General Assembly Resolution 57/129 on the report of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) adopted in its fifty-seventh session held 24 February 2003, the international community decided to dedicate one day to commemorate and honor the dedication and contribution of the UN blue helmet as a front line to ensure international peace and stability. These blue helmets were first deployed by the UN Security Council to ensure the monitoring process of the Israeli-Arab Countries Armistice Agreement on 29 May 1948.

As recorded by the United Nations, 3,700 UN peacekeepers have lost their lives in the battlefield since 1948. This number includes 134 in the year 2017. The UN Charter Chapter VIII governs the Regional Arrangements, asserting that “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”. However, the utilization of such regional arrangements could also be taken with the authorization of the UNSC, according to the Article 53 (1) of the chapter.

Since its establishment in 1957, ASEAN, as a regional inter-governmental organization has been contributed greatly to the making of regional stability. The ASEAN Charter Article 1 (1), “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability in the region” reflects a commitment made to contribute to the making of the UN Charter Art. 1 (1) to maintain international peace and security. Political-security cooperation ensuring peace and security, embedded in the Plan of Action of ASEAN and the UN (2016 – 2020) 1.1.4., emphasizes the intention to further cooperate with the UN to provide continued training assistance in peacekeeping to ASEAN, including training in humanitarian affairs and civil-military coordination, gender issues such as the role of women peacekeepers, health, safety and security arrangements, and support ASEAN’s efforts in strengthening the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network, including through the sharing of lessons learned, best practices and capacity building.

Table 1: Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post
Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troop (31/03/2018)

Country Police UNMEM Troops Staff Officers Total
Brunei Darussalam 0 0 30 0 30
Cambodia 0 6 769 14 789
Indonesia 175 30 2,445 45 2,695
Laos – – – – –
Malaysia 20 10 818 17 865
Myanmar 0 0 0 2 2
Philippines 0 10 0 0 10
Singapore – – – – –
Thailand 8 9 0 5 22
Viet Nam 0 3 0 5 8
Grand Total ASEAN 203 68 4062 88 4421
Grand Total World 10,679 1,316 77,145 1,918 91,058
Proportion 1.2 % 5 % 5 % 4.5 % 4.8 %

To date, ASEAN countries have contributed to peacekeeping missions that include police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troops. Per March 2018, the number of personnel deployed by ASEAN accounts up to 4,419 personnel to the UN PKO with 4,239 male and 180 female personnel. In this regard, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia are the largest contributing countries measured by the number of mission and post. Such number shows the huge gap between men and women peacekeepers. The total number of the male peacekeepers are also significantly higher than that of female peacekeepers, comprising 86,723 men and 4,335 women.

Gender disparity in UNPKO is problematic because the role of women, in this regards, has not yet been considered seriously in peacekeeping process. As matter of fact, women in peacekeeping operations contribute positively to improve intelligence-gathering, deconstructing cultural and social biases in some conflicting areas, as well as breaking down the gender-based violence and exploitation. The milestones for women in PKO could be seen from the story where Major General Kristin Lund of Norway was deployed to Cyprus as the first female to serve as Force Commander in UN PKO; Gladys Ngwepekeum Nkeh in the Central African Republic, as well as Major Bettina Stelzer’s in South Sudan.

Increasing the deployment of women is an important agenda for the United Nations. It is believed that by incorporating women in peacekeeping operations the key to reduce the root causes of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN forces will be found. Based on Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers: Addressing the Gender Imbalance (as of 30 March 2018) countries in ASEAN that have contributed to 14% or more women peacekeepers are only Philippines and Thailand.  Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Indonesia belong to the countries with 0.1% or more contribution of women peacekeeping. Whereas, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are countries in ASEAN that do not contribute to women peacekeeping.

Initially, the agenda to reduce the gender gap in women peacekeepers was mentioned in the reports by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan Bulletin 2003 and the Zeid Report, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Despite the contributions of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, ASEAN is nowhere near to be a model for a regional organization that is significant in its contribution to the peacekeeping mission. In order to go to that direction, countries such as Singapore and Laos should be encouraged to submit their report on their contribution in Peacekeeping Operation to evaluate their supports in terms of human resources and funding.

Indonesia, through its Foreign Minister Retno L. P. Marsudi has pledged to send four thousand peacekeeping troops to overseas UN missions by 2019. This reflects that another effort to improve the role of one ASEAN country is in the making. However, this would not constitute as a large contribution if other  ASEAN countries has no willingness to follow Indonesia’s effort to increase its contribution to the peacekeeping mission.

In line with the expected role of PKO such as to monitor the peace process in two disputing parties, ceasefires and the withdrawal of troops to reduce the tensions and prevent the recurrence of hostilities, ASEAN should also give its paramount focus in the maintenance of international peace and security. Should the international community aim to realize its vision towards stability, a greater commitment should be put in the conflict prevention, cooperation with regional body like ASEAN, as well as allocating more money to fund and deploy peace mission. These collective efforts combined will reflect the efforts to materialize the three pillars of the UN systems, namely peace and security, development, and human rights. The road towards stability will be a long and winding, but the gap towards its end-goal could be narrowed by shedding more lights in improving the effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations.

The writer is a Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Press Release BINCANG ASEAN “Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand”

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Bincang ASEAN Monday, 14 May 2018

Yogyakarta – Recently, the ASEAN Studies Center UGM held its first Bincang ASEAN in 2018 entitled “The Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand” at Digilib Café FISIPOL, UGM. This particular Bincang ASEAN featured Hestutomo Restu Kuncoro, M.A. (Alumni of Manchester University) with Ezka Amalia (Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM) moderating.

 

On this occasion, Hesutomo raised the topic of democratization in Southeast Asia, using comparative methods of Western democratic model and models adopted in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As the discussion progressed interactively, Hestutomo explained that Southeast Asia did not support the strong Western democratization model in Latin America and Eastern Europe because of differences in the type of regime. As a consequence, Huntington’s ‘universal’ model of democratization is not applicable to Southeast Asia as it could not portray a complete explanation of the process taking shape in the region.

 

Putting the context on Southeast Asia, a region that is relatively immature for its democracy, Hestutomo argued that Thailand and the Philippines subscribe to the opposition-initiated democratization theory, whereas Indonesia adopted the regime-opposition alliance theory. These two types of theory are self-explanatory in nature; both are named after the drive for democratization. The former is characterized with non-violence movements and revolts, to begin with, and started without a power overturn. These people who demanded democracy fought against the same enemy, not because of a shared vision. On the contrary, the latter emphasizes on the function of regime opposition that seeks for change. True oppositions in Indonesia, in this regards, is difficult to define.

 

To further argue, Hestutomo contended that the power of people or civil society is not evidently strong to drive the democratization in Southeast Asia. In Britain, the free flow of ideas during the democratization process was associated with the existence of a strong civil society, something that Southeast Asia did not share in common. The interdependency between business sectors and politics are deemed as the catalyst for democratization. For instance, the unintended consequence of elitist competition in Indonesia gave birth to a greater democracy after the New Order era. In the Philippines, the constituents and those who are loyal to Aquino could not give much to say in the political agenda unless Aquino gave an approval in their action. People in Thailand, however, sought to get the patronage of the country.

 

As to the goals of democratization in Southeast Asia happened primarily due to the expected outcomes of the people within the jurisdiction of the respective state, such as to provide a better opportunity to be heard and to provide a better security from the state. Such conditions depict Indonesia during the fall of well-known corrupt Soeharto’s regime that curbed the voice of the people. In comparison to Portugal and Spain whose, people strove to seek democracy to participate in deciding the budget allocation of the country, the case in Latin America showed a transitional situation from a very closed government into one with the inclusion of the people in economy and decision-making process.

 

The role of the military in government, as Hestutomo explained, dominates in the Philippines and Indonesia. As time passes, they begin to enter the political business network to gain access to national resources. A question remains, why is this clear, the power of the people in the Philippines still unable to remove the authoritarian government that unilaterally supports Marshall’s Law and the War on Drugs in the country despite their views against such practices. Borrowing the physical molecular theory that explains a state of condition with sufficient critical mass and people power and a collective action necessary to transform a particular state or condition to another, democracy is possible to make. However, in fact, is still nowhere near to happen partly because the people in the Philippines still cast their votes to the characteristics of the figure they can relate to.

 

All in all, democratization in Southeast Asia is an unfinished project due to a plethora of variables. The intertwining role of religion and democracy make us questioning the maturity of the democracy in the region. For instance, the democratic practice in Southeast Asia tends to follow a procedural matter of democracy which highly focuses on the national election. The lack of tolerance to differing views in politics has the tendency to be divisive and harmful for the maturity of our democracy. The question that arises is what kind of democracy do young people imagine as the future of Southeast Asia? and how will our civil society be more open to embracing differences? When he concludes, such a scenario will eventually arise when people adhere to the values of democracy and inculcate it in our lives.

 

(Written by Kevin Iskandar, research intern in ASEAN Studies Center UGM)

Indonesia should partner with NGOs to protect unaccompanied child refugees

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Among more than 3,700 child refugees in Indonesia, close to 500 are unaccompanied minors.

Many have no access to formal education and health care. They have to go through the procedures to process their asylum claims without a guardian or legal aid to help them.

Only a few countries, such as Australia and the United States, accept child refugees without guardians. So most unaccompanied child refugees have to wait in transit countries until they are 18 years old before they can be resettled.

Because of these circumstances, these children are considered the most vulnerable among the refugees. The Indonesian government should do more to protect unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia.

In recent years a number of NGOs have provided services for child refugees. The government should consider partnering these organisations to uphold child refugees’ rights to protection.

Unaccompanied minors in Indonesia

Indonesia’s 2016 refugee decree makes explicit the duty to rescue, evacuate, monitor, register and accommodate refugees. For example, if asylum seekers reach Indonesian waters by boat, the government must rescue them.

However, none of the decree’s provisions provides specific rights for refugees post-evacuation nor does it specify the rights of child refugees.

As a result, many asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia live with very little means while waiting to be resettled, as they are prohibited from working and earning an income. Child refugees face the same hardship and, worse, they are prone to being abused.

In Indonesia, the Law on Child Protection Instrument (Law No. 35/2014) protects children. But it does not extend to child refugees because of their immigration status.

While the refugee decree and child protection law in Indonesia do not provide specific rights for child refugees, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRoC) does. Indonesia ratified the convention in 1990 through a presidential decree that provides a specialised obligation on the subject matter.

Article 22(1) of the CRoC stipulates that child refugees are entitled to:

receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments.

The convention applies to both nationals and non-nationals. Further, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child interprets that all of the convention’s provisions shall apply to children irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness and not limited to citizens of a state party.

What is urgently needed for unaccompanied child refugees is prompt appointment of guardians to provide legal advice in claiming the rights of the children in compliance with the principle of the “best interest of the child”.

For example, in the European Union, a legal guardian is appointed to represent the child in legal proceedings, take care of the child’s finances and promote the child’s well-being to the government. The guardian, therefore, should have expertise in childcare and is responsible for helping the children with the administrative and or judicial procedures of asylum claims until they turn 18.

The protection gap

Unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia do not enjoy the rights they are entitled to under CRoC. In January 2017, 91 of 471 unaccompanied minors in total were detained by the immigration authorities.

The child refugee in detention faces worse conditions than children convicted of criminal activities. Convicted children in Indonesia are entitled to exclusive detention treatment at the Children Special Construction Agency (LPKA) or Juvenile Detention Centres (LAPAS) in cases where LPKA is absent. These centres provide them with formal education, skills training and coaching.

Due to their immigration status, child refugees are treated as adult refugees. They are kept in the same detention centres with unrelated adults.

This makes them prone to abusive treatment and sexual assault. Under Indonesian immigration policy they can be detained for up to ten years without any judicial review.

And instead of providing these children with guardianship and legal representation to “promote physical and psychological recovery” in detention, some immigration authorities have been involved in abusing children.

Partnering with NGOs for a rights-based treatment

In recent years, a number of NGOs in Indonesia have started to work on child refugee issues.

Some of them, such as Cisarua Refugee Learning Center and Roshan Learning, pay more attention to educational care and vocational training to provide children with soft skills. The Sunrise Refugee Learning Center of Sandya Institute in Jakarta offers various language, computer, arts, legal, cultural and entrepreneurial classes to refugees. At present, 15 of the total 75 registered students are underage children.

Others, like SUAKA and JRS, provide free legal assistance, but not solely to child refugees.

Church World Service, an NGO that has advocated for an alternative to detention, has been sheltering more than 80 unaccompanied minors in Indonesia.

The increasing attention from civil society organisations on the need for a rights-based treatment of unaccompanied refugee children is an opportunity for the Indonesian government to partner with them in fulfilling its human rights obligations to unaccompanied minors.

The UNHCR, in its Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, recommended that “an independent and formally accredited organisation be identified/established in each country, which will appoint a guardian or adviser as soon as the unaccompanied child is identified”.

Indonesia could delegate its responsibility to ensure protection for unaccompanied child refugees by partnering with NGOs that have been licensed under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Through this partnership, these NGOs could seek experienced legal professionals, provide them with necessary training in childcare and assign them as legal guardians.

In this way, Indonesia can meet some parts of its obligations and at the same time place the principle of the “best interest of the child” at the forefront of its refugee management by ensuring unaccompanied child refugees are treated according to humanitarian principles.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

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