Entries by aseansc

Where is ASEAN in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy? Jokowi after Two Years

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Ahmad Rizky M. Umar

Research Associate at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia appears less oriented toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Earlier in 2014, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi embraced several new ideas on how Indonesia’s foreign policy will be directed under her leadership, which is now popular as “Pro-People” Foreign policy. Recent developments showed some moves in Indonesia’s foreign policy to promote bilateral diplomacy rather than multilateralism, strengthening ties with China, and reluctance to take lead in the emerging South China Sea.

Is this a signal that Jokowi is now on his way to abandon “ASEAN-Centrality” and move to a “Post-ASEAN” regional policy?  What do these developments imply to regional politics in Southeast Asia?

ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada organised a forum to discuss these questions with two distinguished speakers: Dr Avery Poole (Lecturer at University of Melbourne) and Mr Zain Maulana (PhD Candidate at University of Leeds) in Friday, 11 November 2016, 1.30-3.00 p.m. This forum was moderated by Mr Ahmad Rizky M Umar (Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center UGM). From two different perspectives,  this discussion attempts to unpack why Indonesia tend to move from ASEAN to a broader perspective of regional order in Southeast Asia (see Sukma, 2016).

The Changing Regional Order

Dr Avery Poole began her presentation by raising a question: is Indonesia a ‘natural leader’ in ASEAN, as reflected through ‘ASEAN-centrality’ doctrine during Yudhoyono’s presidency? Or, in contrast, should Indonesia put forward a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy, as noted by several analysts?

Indonesia is, until present, still considered as one of the main force in ASEAN, given a huge population and geopolitical position. This strategic position has unambiguously put Indonesia at centre of regional politics. Indonesia has played a significant role, for example, in mainstreaming and institutionalising Human Rights in the region, during Hassan Wirajuda’s tenure as Foreign Minister. Moreover, Indonesia has also been at the centre of the establishment of ASEAN Community, which was declared in Bali at 2003.

However, we should also take into account recent growing tension in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. Several headlines have noted that Indonesia has not played any prominent rule in mediating the conflict, while several other points to Indonesia’s lack of leadership in ASEAN, particularly during the conflict. Indonesia’s reluctance could be understood as an attempt to manage regional order, which is vulnerable to tension not only with external forces (such as China, India, or the US), but also between its member states.

Indonesia has therefore faced a dilemma, whether to take role in mediating any conflict in a changing regional order, or instead retreat to defend the ‘national interest’. Jokowi seems to opt for the second choice. But we should also consider that ASEAN Summit, whatever result it has produced, should not be considered as the only measurement to understand foreign policy outcomes and multilateral arrangements. As Evan Laksmana has aptly noted, it is how to transform and leverage those meetings into concrete strategic outcomes that matters in understanding regional order.

Thus, it is important to continuously re-assess Indonesia’s foreign policy not only by rhetorics, but also by any concrete effort to transform statement into policies. It is clear that Indonesia has not retreat from ASEAN, but instead adapting to the changing regional order. The way Indonesia project their interest in ASEAN, therefore, should be understood in the complex relationship between national interest, changing geopolitical order, and institutional arrangement within ASEAN itself, particularly in relations to the recently-established ASEAN Community.

Explaining Shifts

If Indonesia does not ‘retreat’ from ASEAN, then what role does Indonesia currently play in ASEAN? According to Zain Maulana, Indonesia is now shifting from being a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in ASEAN, as arguably exercised by previous Yudhoyono’s administration, to a more ‘investment-friendly’ foreign policy. The result is ‘frank diplomacy’, in which Jokowi tend to use a more informal meeting to exercise foreign policy rather than formal multilateral arrangement.

The shift was occurred due to three main reasons. First, Jokowi faced different social and political context with Yudhoyono, which witnessed the changing regional and world order in international level. In domestic level, Jokowi also needs to maintain legitimacy from various political forces around his power. Second, both Jokowi and Yudhoyono have different experiences, backgropund, and characteristics, which makes their approaches to international politics differs each other. Third, Jokowi and Yudhoyono have different policy orientations in addressing international politics, which distinguish their approaches to ASEAN.

However, several opinions that put Jokowi’s foreign policy as ‘backward-looking’, and contrasting it with Yudhoyono’s foreign policy, is misleading. In fact, international politics is highly interconnected and is currently multipolar. Consequently, one should understand Indonesia’s foreign policy by placing it under particular structural setting in international politics.

Indonesia is not turning his back from ASEAN. Rather, Indonesia is not necessarily interested to take lead as “norm entrepreneur”and instead seeking a broader form of cooperation. As Rizal Sukma has recently argued, Indonesia place ASEAN as one of several order’ in Southeast Asia, while actively seeking and constructively engaging in broader initiatives in regional politics. It therefore seeks to cooperate with other actors in the dynamic regional politics.

Indonesia, however, could not avoid ASEAN in their foreign policy, since ASEAN is geopolitically strategic and important for the articulation of Indonesia’s national interest. What Indonesia needs to do is seeking recognition and legitimacy among ASEAN member states. Indonesia therefore needs to consider ASEAN as a venue to negotiate their interest and, at the same time, contribute to maintain order through institutional mechanism. It therefore requires a more concrete foreign policy orientation towards ASEAN.

The Role of International Organization in Managing Global Refugee Crisis

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Thursday, 24 September 2016

Gedung BD Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Gadjah Mada

 

This public lecture aims to discuss the problem of refugee issues, which has been increasing compared to the event of World War II. Southeast Asia as the busiest route in the world also serves as the place where refugee crisis is happening the most. Despite the situation, there are international organizations in Southeast Asia who are working to manage the high influx of refugee into this region. Recently, there is a recent development on Rohingya issues in Myanmar, who have always been marginalized and neglected on their rights to live. This serves as a serious global issue that is not far away from our door. The query then, is it relevant for IR? In the context of International Relations, refugee issues works as the most triggering part to question further whether nation-states system has provided the protection of refugee as subaltern. What really matter is that the refugees are there because of the crack and failure of nation-state system. This issue will bring us up to criticize the interconnection of at least four concepts, namely state, citizen, sovereignty, and territory.

This event invites special guests from the Indonesian Representative of United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR), Ms. Dinna Puspita Hapsari. On the other side, we also have Mr. Lars Stenger who has been working in Indonesia through Jesuit Refugee Service. Each of speaker will talk about their organization perspective on refugees, and the way they treat each of them under respective mechanism.

Ms. Dinna began with providing three main reasons why people move from one place to another place. Economic reasons has become the prominent factor why people move to another place for the sake of higher wage, cheaper living cost, and enjoyable place to live in. The second is social reasons. In the case of someone who is marrying someone from another place, he or she has to move to his or her spouse origin place. This has become common in our society. However, the last reason where people are sometimes neglecting this fact is the security (protection) reason. Some people have to move because of war, conflict, and human rights violation. Living dangerously in their origin place, they decide to migrate to another place for the sake of seeking national protection from states. Although some of them are irregular, this poses a serious problem where the receiving states do not allow them passing through states border. Even some countries do not regard the non-refoulement principle. At this point, border must be seen as a manmade imagination, which is fictionally created by the elites.

Asia Pacific provides the safe place for refugee, particularly Indonesia, which serves as the strategic place for migration. A lot of ports and coastlines give advantage for refugees to berth their boats. However, since Australia declared its new policy to block refugee coming into the country, this situation poses a serious problem for Indonesia whom will has high responsibility accommodating the influx of refugee into the region.

Ms. Dinna explained further about how UNHCR plays its vital role providing the refugee protection under the instruction of the Government of Indonesia. In the case of managing and providing settlement, UNHCR serves as the only international organization who is fully responsible on this issue. UNHCR works under mandates, namely to provide international protection (based on international human rights laws), to seek durable solution for refugee (restore dignity and life), to promote International Refugee Law, and to protect stateless people and Internally Displaced Persons. It also works under Global Sharing Burden where the responsibility to accept refugees should be shared out to each different countries. UNHCR also manages the pull-factor, where refugees who have been living in long-term duration, thus decide to move to another well-living place for settlement.

Notwithstanding, the UNHCR is under-staffed. The high amount of refugees sets problem for UNHCR Indonesia since they have have to spend 24 months for giving the resettlement and status of refugees to 1,200 stateless people. If they decide to maintain the system, we will neglect the fact that we cannot provide protection to all of the refugees. At this point, UNHCR Indonesia claims that they are not in fact managing those refugees instead overwhelmed by this fact.

UNHCR is not only facing the problem of mechanism, but also the administrative problem where they have to proceed the resettlement service of people who are without any proof of identity. For example, Rohingya are born without any birth certificate, passport, and many more, where Indonesia needs all of those administrative stuffs for registration.

Amidst the problem of UNHCR as main organization in settling the problem of refugee, Ms. Dinna also highlights other challenges that are still happening, as follows:

  1. Indonesia has yet to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
  2. The absence of comprehensive and operational legislation and regulations for addressing asylum and refugee issues in Indonesia
  3. The use of detention as a refugee and asylum management
  4. Increasing number of asylum applications in Indonesia

 

In the next session, Mr. Lars Stenger discusses about the role of Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) who is already working globally in wide-ranging regions, such as Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East, and South Asia. The unique mechanism they use is involving refugees to work as teachers, health officers, and many more according to their skills. JRS works under three main principles, namely accompany, serve, and advocate. On the daily basis, JRS staffs try to listen to the story of refugees. This practice provides them relief, particularly in understanding of what they are really need. In fact, living under crises and sorority has changed their mindset on the luxury standard. What matters for them is not only eat and live, but to also apply their skills reviving the dignity of life.

JRS comes up with broad definition of refugee. According to JRS, refugee includes the people who are persecuted due to racial, religious, and the membership of social or political group issues; and the victims of armed conflicts, erroneous economic policy, or natural disasters. On the other hand, according to Lars, the refugees are not the crisis. It is the bombing, the torture, the destruction. That is what has been mainly fueling this unprecedented movement of people. To date, JRS has reached 724,500 individual under several services mechanism, such as education, emergency assistance, healthcare, livelihood activities, and social services.

In Africa, JRS has played important role to alleviate the serious threat to people who are being abused due to the endemic sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers in Eastern Congo. JRS comes up with campaign to stop people using sexual abuse. Moreover, JRS also puts concern in Asia Pacific through many offices spreading in Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. The main activity in this region is assisting refugees in detention.

Before he closed his session, Mr. Stenger underlines the rising concern of xenophobia where western civilizations are afraid of refugees since they look over them as illegal immigrants and even the cells bent from terrorism trying to destroy Western civilization instead of seeing them as naturally as refugees. This is the fact that hampering civil society and humanitarian organization to combat such abnormal thought over refugees.

Q&A Session

Question:

  1. I am curious about UNHCR mandate is to protect stateless people. Whether to talk about the Rohingya massacre the refugees are in fact looking for the international protection and fleeing outside the country looking for Muslim-based country. How UNHCR address the issue of legal administration? How Indonesia government can be involved in cooperation with UNHCR?
  2. Is there any kind of particular mechanism to protect refugees while waiting for the status grant?
  3. How can we ensure this refugee to be accepted in society?

Overall Answers:

  1. UNHCR Mandate is not only to protect, but also to prevent statelessness. Indonesia as natural leader should be pushed to negotiate Myanmar in term of Rohingya persecution. However, frankly speaking, the situation is more complex that what we think. The hate is so deep and Aung San Suu Kyi as the Nobel Awardee is disappointing.
  2. UNHCR protection mechanism is there, but failing. We have Regular Detention Center Monitoring in 13 detention centers. It is simply too expensive to travel to Papua. UNHCR lacks of sources.
  3. We should intervene public opinion on refugees making them to think that refugees can be very beneficial for society.
  4. Indonesians are quiet humble. In Aceh, one refugee tells a story that he has been nicely accepted. Listening and understanding their fear can help us to regard refugee as positive subject. Providing communication and creating safe space.

A Single Monetary Regime in ASEAN: Panacea or False Hope

Poster-Woman-Development

Muhammad Rasyid Ridho[1] & Wening Setyanti[2]

3rd Winner of Call for Essay: ASEAN Community Post 2015

Basically, there are four pillars under ASEAN economic integration: (1) a single market and production base, (2) a highly competitive economic region, (3) a region of equitable economic development, and (4) a region fully integrated into the global economy. From the four pillars that were realized through the AEC, we see the similarity between it, conducted by ASEAN today with the European single market. The European single market refers to the European Union (EU) as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services and the European single market then make a more progressive agenda of their economic integration, called Economic dan Monetary Union (EMU) with euro as their single currency. The single currency presents undeniable advantages: it lowers the costs of financial transactions, makes travel easier, strengthens the role of Europe at international level, etc.[3] From this explanation, will ASEAN economic integration be more progressive by laying down something like EMU? Does it matter to create a model of monetary union as a form of more progressive economic integration in this region?

a

Questioning Southeast Asia Monetary Union: Economic Inequality among States

Arguably, ASEAN is not yet ready for economically integrated. Why? Because inequality still exist between ASEAN member countries, especially under the economic sector as a key factor of advancement indicator and stability. For example, we have a model to compare and classify the ASEAN member countries, called its ‘level of wealth’ which are wealthiest, middle, and least wealthy countries. Wealthiest are Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia; Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia can be categorized as middle; the ‘CLMV’ are middle to least wealthy countries per 1993-2010—we can see the gap on figure 1.[4] Although those gaps started to decrease per year, but the economic problems always emerge annually.

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From the chart above, we can see that the gap is still going on and the position between actors still not much changed (nearly same as the first order). So far, there is no significant changes in the nearly three decades (per 2016) and it could be our fundamental evidence to prove our scepticism of ASEAN economic advancement based on its inequality and disparity of economic circumstances. The more progressive economic integration such as monetary union and/or single currency seems impossible to be apply in ASEAN.

Preventing the Possibility of Crisis Reoccurrence

The reason why monetary union cannot be applied in Southeast Asian countries is to avoid any possibilities of crises that caused by converging policy in single currency. Just imagine how destructive the subsequent effects if those countries do that kind of manoeuvre to support several domestic programs. The prominent example is European crisis 2008, when most countries face slowdown and credit freeze. If we put ASEAN in this scenario, then because of the striking differences in economic performance by each member, then crisis will engulf all countries in the region.

To prevent the crisis, then there must be a unified fiscal policy. Unfortunately, to unify it means the respective country ability to control its spending has to be restricted and conferred to a higher authority. By this instance, ASEAN become into a new super-state agency. New problem arise, does every country want to bestow their sovereignty to this new agency for unitary monetary stability sake? Most of ASEAN will resort to a specific norm in ASEAN Way, the non-intervention. Thus, the implementation of monetary union is not going to happen in any extent.

Status Quo in Southeast Asian Monetary Regime

The status quo shows us there is no singular monetary regime in this region. By de facto category, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are utilizing managed floating system; meanwhile Vietnam pegs her currency to US dollar; Philippines uses flexible exchange rate system with independent characteristic; and Myanmar pegs to special drawing rights.[5]

However, there are many attempts to do cooperation in monetary sector and we deem this situation is sufficient enough to support monetary stability regionally. There are four instruments; first, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) is agreement on currency swap between ASEAN+3 central banks. Second, Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), to promote local currency bond market and supported by a specific forum to harmonize regulatory basis.  Third, Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF), for helping supplying bonds in local currency. Fourth, ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) for monitoring macroeconomic trends, evaluating financial sector, and giving policy recommendation for ASEAN+3.[6]

By looking at these points, ASEAN shall reconsider their decision if they are going to establish a single monetary regime, especially by reflecting to EU case. Another aspect that shall take into account is the probability of ASEAN-sceptics’ appearance inside ASEAN, whether they are putting their focus particularly in disagreement over monetary union issue or campaigning ASEAN demise.

Reference

Bock, Matthew J. ‘Income Inequality in ASEAN: Perceptions on Regional Stability from Indonesia and the Philippines’ (ASEAN-Canada Working Paper Series no. 1. Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. 2014).

Ciorciari, John D. “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International Politics and Institution-Building in Asia.” Asian Survey 21, no. 5 (2011): 926-952.

Rajan, Ramkishen S. Management of Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Asia. ADBI Working Paper. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 2011.

Verbeken, Dirk. “History of economic and monetary union,” European Parliament. October, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_4.1.1.html (accessed November 1, 2016).

[1] Student of International Relations Department of Social and Political Sciences Faculty, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

[2] Student of International Relations Department of Social and Political Sciences Faculty, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

[3] Dirk Verbeken, “History of economic and monetary union,” European Parliament, October, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_4.1.1.html (accessed November 1, 2016)

[4] Matthew J. Bock, ‘Income Inequality in ASEAN: Perceptions on Regional Stability from Indonesia and the Philippines’ (ASEAN-Canada Working Paper Series no. 1, Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 2014).

[5] Ramkishen S Rajan, Management of Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Asia, ADBI Working Paper, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2011.

[6] John Ciorciari D., “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International Politics and Institution-Building in Asia,” Asian Survey 21, no. 5 (2011): 936.

Drawing ASEAN Limits and Strengths in Tackling Terrorism: Study Case of Abu Sayyaf Group

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Novita Putri Rudiany-Kholifatus Saadah

1st Winner of Call for Essay: “ASEAN Community post 2015”

 

ASEAN actually had discussed terrorism issue before 9/11 happened, since the summit in 1997 and continued until the signing of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism in Cebu Philippines on January 13, 2007 (Soesilowati 2011). On average in Southeast Asia, the terrorism issues come from the separatist movement or motion-based Islam. One of the terrorist movement, is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which based in the Philippines. They have the principle for attacking other religious groups and believe that violence is the only way in the fight against others (Tan 2001). ASG has close connection with the world terrorist groups, and particularly Janjalani is well-known as Afghanistan war veterans. Recently, the ASG captivity was proven to hijacking action to the vessels crew from Indonesia and Malaysia. As quoted by the BBC (2016) ASG will not release the hostages if no ransom crate desired. Indonesia’s Chief Security Minister, Luhut Pandjaitan, said conditions were carried out by ASG is an act of “New Somalia”. They also proved involved in the number of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion activities alleged to them either by the Government of the Philippines, ASEAN and the international community (Banlaoi 2006). This is a challenge for ASEAN, especially what had been done by the ASG is no longer bound by the state but transnational crime.

Regional Security Complex Theory: How ASEAN See the Terrorism as Threat

Regional Security Complex is describing how a regional look at the concept of security in the region, that revealed the concept of security will be shaped by the dynamics which occurred in a certain region. There are at least two main concepts that establish Regional Security Theory Complex (RSCT), first is power relations and second is pattern of amity and enmity. Power relations are concepts that are formed when the dynamics of a particular area then influenced by forces that are owned by its members (Buzan & Waever 2003). This conception will show how a country responds to the actions of other countries in their region, which is based on the relationship of forces between them. In the case of terrorism, as the Philippines could no longer tackle the actions of ASG, this country emphasized terrorism issue as emergency condition that should be responded immidiately. Therefore, there was effort from other ASEAN member countries to establish a framework in order to provision the common understanding in combating terrorism. Moreover, ASG was not only about terrorism but also connected with the human rights violence transnationally.

The second concept is the pattern of amity and enmity. This concept illustrates the pattern of relations between countries will establish, by construction, the dynamics in the region. ASEAN countries began to see the terrorist as a common threat, visible from ACCT formation in 2007. The dynamics that occur in ASEAN has been encouraging members to no longer see that terrorism is a threat to the security of single country, but the Southeast Asia region as a whole. In addition, the constellation internationally outside the Southeast Asian region also formed the view that the ASG is a threat to both members of ASEAN and the international community because the target they were after not only the local population but also involve foreign residents, especially the American (Sailing Totem 2014).

ASEAN Limits in Combating Terrorism

We argue that the limitations lie both in the elite side and the civil society side. First, ASEAN is good in creating framework, but weak in implementing it. Regarding the issue of terrorism, ASEAN works not only among its member states, but also with dialogue partners. Starting from 2001, member countries stipulated “ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism” (asean.org 2016). Five years later, ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism established. Then in 2015, there was special ministerial meeting to respond the rise of radicalization and violent extremism. Recently in 2016, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ announced the statement regarding terrorist attack in Jakarta (asean.org 2016). From this timeline, ASEAN is still having problem in conducting common policy. They took long time to ratification the convention and apply the real action, while the terrorist could have planned the following insurgences.

From the civil society side, first is the Islam majority, but they feel like minority. Radical to extremist Islamic militant spread the issue that the need to uphold the Islamic norms to fight the injustice treatments by the state government. Paying attention to the case of ASG, it is obvious that they demands of the recognition of their existence and aims to build a distant caliphate as it pledged allegiance to the ISIS (Almuttaqi 2016). Second, they usually recruit people from the low economic and education level and organize the training inside the unreachable zone near the states border which is out of government control. These target citizens has no enough information about the propaganda of terrorist. Therefore, they are easily provoked to the promises of the radical and extremist Islamic groups.

Strengthening ASEAN Power to Fight Terrorism

Addressing those two backgrounds of limitations, there are two approaches to strengthen the ASEAN power. On one side is, what the elite should do in creating applicable strategies regionally. On the other side is, how to empower the society and raise the awareness to the terrorist propaganda. At the government level, ASEAN framework in combating terrorism is an enough base to set up real actions. Moreover, the cooperation among some countries has been establish such as sharing intelligence from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in 2002 (David 2002). The following should be commitment to push the law enforcement to avoid the reluctant behavior of member countries, and establishing concrete instruments as well. The urgency of reinterpreting ASEAN common understanding does matter. Thus, ASEAN could conduct specific tactics to fight terrorism. Also, transparency in judicial process should be underpin so that anti-terror laws are not used for political purposes but specifically as security tools.

Later, as radical to extremist Islamic militants are targeting the mind of the people, therefore civil society should also play active role to educate each other. Southeast Asia consist of heterogenic ethnics and cultures, thus it is important to put force in respecting human beings. Besides, ASEAN needs to develop local, data-driven restorative approaches to prevent and rehabilitate radicalization (Greer and Watson 2016). In short, ASEAN needs militarily force also increase economic development, social stability, and political participation also need to work for more structural change (Swanstrom dan Bjornehed 2004).

Trump and the Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ Doctrine

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Bara E. Brahmantika, Guest Contributor 

The result of 2016 US election has paved the way for Donald Trump to be the 45th president of United States,  and many people are scrambling to figuring out what it means for the world. Two of my colleagues, Dedi Dinarto and Habibah Hermanadi in ASEAN Studies Center had tried to analyze the the implication of ‘Trump’s Triumph’ on the future of ASEAN. But while both of the analysts are sound, I have serious reservation on how both writers overlook the implication of Trump’s foreign on the ASEAN regional politics.

In my view, Dinarto’s argument on the possibility of the remaking of the global triangle politics is an overestimation on the current global power dynamic between major countries, while Hermanadi’s argument that Trump’s Triumph will inspire a strongmen approach among ASEAN countries leaders who are trying to emulate him is an underestimation of the possible impact of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. Both I argue are stem from the authors misconception on the core idea of Trump’s foreign policy. So it is imperative for us to understand what Trump’s Foreign Policy is, a transactional policy, with a combined flavor of isolationism and protectionism

Trump’s Foreign Policy.

It is understandable for many to have misconception about Trump’s policy, because for one, Trump isn’t known as a well articulate candidate. In hindsight, hearing Trump talks on foreign policies gave an impression that Trump foreign policy is just a mishmash of ideas with no core philosophy, thus making it difficult to pin point exactly what is Trump’s outlook on foreign policy. But if we look carefully, underneath all of his incoherent rants, a silver lining could be found

And this is where Hermanadi is right about where Donald Trump might be going. Hermanadi describes Donald Trump as Strongman Leader, which will emphasizes on the strength of greatness based on national unity, and national interest. There is no clearer indication of it, than Trump’s vision on America First.

Trump said, in one of his rallies that, “Under a Trump administration, no American citizen will ever again feel that their needs come second to the citizens of a foreign country.”

According to Trump, America First is an attempt to put American citizen’s priority above citizens of foreign countries. Trump has signaling on reduction of US engagement in international stages, and to put national interest above all else, creating this mixed of political isolationism and economic protectionism. But the more interesting bit is on how Trump define US national interest.

According to Dreazen, Vox’s foreign editor, Trump has this simple and basic view on what is US national interest, which is transactional. In the word of Dreazen; “In Trump’s conception, all of foreign policy is motivated by assessment of what’s better, in a narrow financial sense…. Trump believes the everything comes down to the art of transaction, with countries that spend their money the way he wants them to getting more than countries the don’t”

Just take a look at Trump’s statement during his final presidential debate, explaining about his outlook on US foreign policy:

“As far as Japan and other countries, we are being ripped off by everybody — we’re defending other country. We’re spending a fortune doing it. They have the bargain of the century. All I said is we have to renegotiate these agreements because our country cannot afford to defend Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, South Korea and many other places. We cannot continue to afford.”

So America First foreign policy basically a policy of which United States will disengage from any international involvement unless U.S. has a clear financial benefit from such arrangement. This is pretty clear from Trump’s statements regarding pulling out from NATO, and Japan if they are not willing to pay an equal amount for funding in exchange for their protection. Or Trump willingness to put up trade barriers, and go to trade wars with China until U.S get a better deal from their trade.  So how does this play out in South East Asia region?

The Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrine. 

During the presidency of Obama, under the rudder of Secretary Clinton, U.S has put forward a ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrines, as U.S new strategies to face the new challenges of China growing presence in Asia region. Pivot to Asia was US decision to shift their priority and presences from Middle East and East Europe to Asia. This drove mainly because not only the growing global influence of China, but also the decline of Russia’s sphere of influence. Pivot to Asia was Obama’s solution to help the Asia region mitigates the international conflict, by providing a counter balance to China.

The South East Asia region is included within Obama’s Pivot to East Asia, and has proven to be resulting in greater engagement of the US in South East Asia region, which is evidently pointed out by Obama thirteen times visits, to nine different ASEAN countries during his two terms in office, this in contrast with his predecessor, President Bush, who only managed to visit South East Asia eight times and only to five different ASEAN countries. US has put considerably more resource in South East Asia, raising investment, greater military presence, and overall better relationship with ASEAN Countries. But this ASEAN re-engagement might come to an end, as President Trump is unlikely to follow the suit.

Take a look at few of his statements when it comes to US foreign policy in Asia, in one his foreign policy speech Trump said;

“We have spent trillions of dollars over time on planes, missiles, ships, equipment, building up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”

And also during one of his TV interview, he mentioned about what he thinks on US presence in Asia:

“Japan is better if it protects itself against this maniac of North Korea, we are better off frankly if South Korea is going to start protecting itself … they have to protect themselves or they have to pay us.”

Given President-elect Trump statement during his campaign, on how Japan and Korea are better off defending themselves with nuclear, instead of burdening United States financially to provide them with military defence, and how likely he would scrap TPP away. That was a clear signal on how President Trump is eager to end the US re-engagement process in East Asia, which in this case will likely include ASEAN.

This is sentiment that shared by many analysts such us Gillen from National University of Singapore, and Sa from S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, as well as Bisley from La Trobe University. Three of them believe that under Trump, there will be significant realignment of US Foreign Policy, to the point of significant diminish of US political and military presence in ASEAN, or even to the point of disappearing all together. With Sa particularly mentioning that Trump might not know that ASEAN existed in the first place.

Within ASEAN member itself, there are growing concern on how the US-ASEAN relations could be deteriorating under Trump, as rightly pointed out by Dinarto in his piece, that many ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia to name few, that are seeing deeper relationship with China as more beneficial relationship.

And if we took what president Trump said during his campaign seriously, we probably will see a more traditional approach on US foreign policy to refocus themselves to Middle East, especially on the issue of ISIS and Israel-Palestinian conflict. While at the same time reducing many of US global involvement when it comes to political, and security issues, and refocusing US foreign policy effort to crafting better economic strategy against China domination.

“If China does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets, I will use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs consistent with Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.” Trump said

So how does it affect ASEAN ?

Dinarto has pointed out that the Trump presidency will likely affect ASEAN in two ways, first it will create Global Triangle dynamic among great powers, or as also pointed out by Hermanadi, that it will force ASEAN to reinvigorate the notion of ASEAN Centrality and unity to attain their own national interest and fending off global powers.

The first scenario of the creation of global triangle politics is very unlikely happen in South East Asia, for few reasons. First, the Trump’s foreign policy doctrine dictates that US will reduce all of their involvement to a minimum, and Trump is more than willing to look away from what happened to Crimea and Syria, just to improve US relations with Russia, and preventing the US government to be dragged away to a conflict that doesn’t financially benefiting US. Japanese brokerage firm Nomura, also predicting that Trump would eventually limit investment in South East Asia in an attempt to bring job backs to the US, and with the TPP is likely to be put to shelf by Trump, and also the possibilities of dismantling US military base in Philippines, the US presences in South East Asia, and globally would be reduced significantly.  So US would likely to pull away from intervening in the matter of South China Sea, and would focus their attention on to getting a better trade deal with China, even if it has to comes to trade war.

Second, Russia’s presence in ASEAN is minimal, with Asia- Pacific ranked number four in Russia’s foreign policy priorities, and it is for a reason, because Russia has no significant military objectives in South East Asia, other than selling weaponry and maintaining ties with Vietnam. The share of Russian export in ASEAN is only reach 2.7% in 2014, and Russia’s investment in ASEAN is a meager 0.2% of total Russian investment, or equivalent to 698 million dollars, with almost half of it goes to Vietnam. Currently, when it comes to ASEAN, Russia only hold a status s partnership, in comparison US, China, and Japan all have hold the status of strategic partner. Russia is also in relatively weak position, after the economic embargo and sanction that has been put by US and EU after the Crimea debacles, Russia has been hurt economically, and pretty much dependent on the trade relations with China. Russia and China also hold pretty much the same position on almost every international issues, thus they are more likely to be an ally in South East Asia than adversary. For example, when it comes to South China Sea disputes, despite trying to maintain neutrality for long, the deepening ties between China and Russia, has shift Russian position in favor for China, with Russia clear objection on the use of international court to solve the South China Sea dispute.

Third, all the reasons above left China as the only dominant power in South East Asia region. With TPP likely gone from the picture, the RECP regional bloc and OBOR initiative under the leadership of China are the only major comprehensive economic framework that will affect the ASEAN greatly, thus raised China economic bargaining power greatly within ASEAN. Not to mentioned the ever increasing defence budget and modernization of China’s military that put new emphasize on Navy and Airforce, of which surely increase the ability of Chinese military to project their power in South East Asia.  With China as the only major power that actively engaging with ASEAN, the triangle power dynamic between US-China-Russia in ASEAN is very unlikely to happen, at least not in Trump’s first term.

The more likely scenario is that with China as sole major power influencer in ASEAN, ASEAN countries will band together to strengthening their bargaining position to check China’s influence in the region. But with the rise of the populist movement, nativism, and strongman leader in ASEAN countries, as predicted by Hermanadi, ASEAN countries might use and strengthening ASEAN to serves their national ego and protect them from the global power influence such as China.

But one other point that Hermanadi fails to mention is that the absence of US political presence might strengthening the strongman leaders in ASEAN region and slowing down the advance of human rights implementation in ASEAN. Because US has traditionally become the stable actor that has often claim higher moral ground along with EU when it comes to human rights, which can be shown from the topic discussed at US-ASEAN Summit in the past few years. But under Trump presidency, that will colored by unpredictable isolationist foreign policy, and little regard on human rights, ASEAN might find itself reluctant in pursuing the advancement of human right as their priority. And with no global power to put pressure and scrutiny for those strongmen leaders in ASEAN to respect human rights, then we might find ASEAN to be a less friendlier place for human right to flourish.

So in conclusion, while it is difficult to predict where Donald Trump going to take U.S. foreign policy, as he haven’t yet to took the office, it is fair to say that his foreign policy will focus on re-engagement with US traditional pivot to Middle East, improving relationship with Russia, while at the same time reducing US engagement in other regions, including South East Asia. Coupled with Trump reluctant in resuming the implementation of TPP, and his little regards on promoting democracy and human rights as part of U.S foreign policy, would likely resulting not the re-creation of global power politics, but on sole domination of China as the only great power country in South East Asia, therefore would forces many ASEAN country leaders to unite under ASEAN to better fend off China domination in the region.

What Comes after ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015: A Threat from China’s Economic Downfall

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Niki Wahyu Sayekti,  2nd Winner of Call for Essay: “ASEAN Community Post 2015”

ASEAN governments have spent decades crafting their reliance on the Chinese economy, with a strategic relationship shaped by geography and exports[1], thus the recent economic breakdown from China would certainly affect the economy of the region as well. A stock market crash, a depreciating currency and a sharp economic slowdown have driven Chinese consumer sentiment to record lows in the past few months,[2] and which means bad news for ASEAN.

The slowdown in China’s economy will continue to affect growth prospects on the rest of the region as export demand drops and investment flow decline.[3] Merchandise exports to China as a share of GDP vary considerably among the ASEAN countries, ranging from about 12% for Malaysia and 6-8% for Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam to as little as 3% for Indonesia and the Philippines.[4] Another sector being affected by China’s economic slowdown is investment because FDI inflows from China into some of ASEAN countries have become an important overall source of foreign investment, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand.[5] The financial repercussions of China’s slowdown may also impact domestic financial markets in ASEAN countries and could complicate their macroeconomic management.[6] A report from International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that countries with closer trade linkages with China (Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) and net commodity exporters (Indonesia and Malaysia) would suffer the largest impact, with growth falling between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points in response to a decline in China’s growth by 1 percentage point depending on the model used and the nature of the shock.[7]

This condition of economic insecurity experienced mostly by the ASEAN-5 (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines), who are basically the dominant economy in the region) more or less would impinge on the AEC as well. As dominant economic powers in the region, the ASEAN-5 are morally supposed to support the economy and take bigger responsibility to help other ASEAN nations who are still less-developed in the region. However, with an economic knockdown from China, it’d be hard for the ASEAN-5 even to keep up with their own domestic economic affairs.

China’s economic crash might cause disaster for ASEAN economy and threaten the AEC, yet there are still opportunities for ASEAN behind this catastrophe. Due to the sluggish performance of China’s economy, investors would most likely seek for relocation from China. The migration of China’s inbound foreign investment from labor-intensive sectors to services and high-end manufacturing has seen a seismic shift in 2015 which will potentially create a knock-on effect for investment into Southeast Asia.[8] This investment will be a welcome relief particularly to countries affected by falling commodity exports, even as the region positions itself as an attractive alternative to soak up such inflows.[9] By the emergence of ASEAN Economic Community itself, the opportunity to attract more FDI is larger since ASEAN would be integrated as an economic entity with a single market and production based orientation. All ASEAN countries are important for foreign investors if they are considered as one node in a larger regional market of nearly 600 million people – a single market.[10]

ASEAN can maximize full-potentials of AEC to cover its wounds from China. The establishment of AEC which provides an access for free flow of goods and capitals could be utilized to increase trade and cross-border investment intra-region so that it should boost-up the region’s economy and reduce the trade-dependence on China.

[1] Luke Hunt, “Beware ASEAN’s coming economic bloom.” The Diplomat, Feb 12, 2016, accessed October 31, 2016,  http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/beware-aseans-coming-economic-gloom/.

[2] David Wilder, “Chinese crisis bites Asean and Latin America consumer sentiment.” Financial Times, March 16, 2016, accessed October 31, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/8b474f76-e3ab-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6.

[3] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  (OECD). Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2016 Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia: Enhancing Regional Tie (2015), 1.  http://www.oecd.org/dev/asia-pacific/SAEO2016_Overview%20with%20cover%20light.pdf.

[4] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  (OECD), ibid, 4.

[5] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  (OECD), ibid, 5.

[6] Ibid.

[7] International Monetary Fund (IMF). Spillovers from China’s Growth Slowdown and Rebalancing to the ASEAN-5 Economies (2016), 6. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16170.pdf.

[8] Steven Cranwell, “Southeast Asia Set to Benefit from China’s Economic Rebalancing.” HSBS, Oct 12, 2016, accessed Oct 31, 2016. http://www.about.hsbc.com.sg/news-and-media/southeast-asia-set-to-benefit-from-chinas-economic-rebalancing

[9] Steven Cranwell, ibid.

[10] “Asia Opportunities: Asean Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.” Business in Asia, accessed Nov 1, 2016, http://www.business-in-asia.com/asia/asean_economic_community.html

Donald Trump and the Global Politics of “Strongman Leaders”

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Habibah Hermanadi,

Research assistant of ASEAN Studies Center UGM

 

Donald Trump has been elected as the 45th President of the United States. As predicted, the result triggered massive reaction from all over the world including Southeast Asia. Previously, the scenarion of “Trump’s Triumph” has been unimaginable among academics and political commentators, for he was seen merely as an anecdotal figure with bleak chance of winning. Even media has forecasted the failure of his campaign, which is now proven to be wrong.

This is clearly a global situation. However, it is not unpredictable. I argue that “Trump’s Triumph” reflects the rising trend of ‘strongman leader’ in world politics, which is reflected upon the current leadership trends in many parts of the world, including in Southeast Asia.

Strongman Leaders

Financial Times described the condition as the rise of “Strongman Leaders”. Their argument is simple: the world is witnessing the rise of tough leaders, paired with assertive approach, strong rhetoric, and, most importantly,put great emphasis on the strength of greatness based on national unity. A classic study from Anthony Birch nationalism has been the most successful political doctrine to promote a political agenda, particularly in electoral campaign. The concept of national unity itself is contrasted from Rousseau’s vision of nationalism, which highlights how a community living based on shared customs and a single way of life, could be expected to feel affection from their own societies. Moreover, national unity also poses constant exposure to conflicts and internal fragmentation that could drive society to elect a ‘strongman leaders’.

It is against this backdrop we could understand how Trump won in the recent US General Election.

This is also the case in Southeast Asia. Rodrigo Duterte, the current president of Philippines, shows how a “strongman leader” arouses from the practice of democratic politics. Even though he was democratically elected, he also confront international society by embracing a tough war on drug dealers, which became an international human rights concern.

On the regional level, the recent 36th ASEANPOL Conference last July was marked by powerful remarks from leaders, such as from Malaysian current Prime Minister Najib Razak, who deemed that national security is a paramount issue in which he will not be apologetic. The trend also includes Thailand, whose currently undergoing the military government has been showing potentials of shifting its constitutions.

In the recent referendum, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the Prime Minister of Thailand, even has legitimacy to exercise some sorts of ‘martial law’, for he is given a permanent super-crisis powers and  maximum power to the army to resolve political crises in the countiry.

Indonesia, on the other hand showed a different demands in terms of what the society demands in a leader. During the 2014 election, he beat , Prabowo Subianto a former charismatic general who promised a turn for ‘developmentalist politics’ characterised by strong leadership. Known for his straightforward, down-to-earth, and populist politics his popularity declined in 2015 as he was seen as an indecisive leader unable to take decisive actions. Even though he could survive Indonesian politics (with his unexpected maneouvre in some political occassions), there has been some criticisms from Indonesian for his inability to challenge strongmen and oligarch in the .

A Cold War Legacy

“Strongman leaders” is in fact a Cold War legacy. It is a trend where transparency endless and democratic politics are not a common practice in world politics. At the end of the War, endless political revolutions and internal reformations has been resulted by this trend. It was a time where popular demands rise and challenge the politics of oligarchy in many states, including Indonesia.

Strongman leaders relies upon popular demand from their followers/voters. They tend to neglect a more technocratic view in doing diplomacy and foreign policy.

Take Phillippines as an example. The Cold War has brought Phillippines under the shadow of US Foreign Policy, placing the nation as the pivot of the power politics against the Communists. But it also witnessed the popular protest, when, for example, President Marcos has been toppled down by people’s protests in 1986. It since then witnessed the emergence of strong leaders from different political factions.

More interestingly, when Duterte strongly call for the end of the country’s special relationship with the United States, he insisted that Phillippines do not fear foredooming wars. The Diplomat observed this condition as ‘Duterte effect’, in which other ASEAN member states could replicate Duterte’s tones in doing diplomacy in the region.

Implication for Regional Politics

What does this “strongman leaders” imply for Southeast Asian politics? I suggest that this trend could lead to a US-China re-balance in Southeast Asia. Even though we shall also need to wait for upcoming events, particularly following Trump’s administration, we could assume that this trend could lead to the re-emergence of ‘national interest’ in Southeast Asian politics, followed by the rhetorics of strong leaders in each ASEAN member states.

Therefore, ‘strongman leaders’ could start a new trend of putting ASEAN aside and putting national interest first, for it constitutes the way e strongman leaders deliver their messages to be acknowledged in world politics.

If it is true, then the rise of strongman leaders could revoke the strong state’s vision in ASEAN. It could probably strengthen ASEAN, but not in the ‘people-oriented’ way. It could, to some extent, revive ASEAN’s ideal of planned unity, backed by strong national ego. It could also means a revival for ‘non-interference’ doctrine in the region.

We could nonethelessly learn from Donald Trump’s strategy that takes him to the White House. Trump’s triumph is not a surprising event. In the current tumultous world, it is likely that society demands the type of leaders who could speak louder than the others. Strongman leaders, therefore, is a very product of the world that we currently live in.

What does “Trump’s Triumph” Mean for ASEAN?

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Dedi Dinarto, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The triumph of Donald Trump for the presidential election in the United States of America has brought about a shock for world politics. In particular, it also embraced important effects on regional politics in Southeast Asia. Amidst the decline of United States’ role in global politics, “Trump’s Triumph” has raised some doubts on how he might preserve the unipolarity of American “global” leadership and how it might be related with the growing fragmentation of ASEAN member states.

In this case, I argue that Trump’s triumph will bring two most possible impacts for ASEAN centrality. First, ASEAN centrality might be re-established, with the possible remaking of ‘US-China-Russia’ game –or what I shall call “global triangle”— after Trump’s election. Second, we shall witness a more defensive regionalism, which witness the re-engagement of ASEAN member states with major global power 

The Remaking of “Global Triangle” Politics?

I shall begin with the most possible scenario for US Foreign Policy under Trump. I argue that  profound relationship between Trump and Putin would strengthen an infamous thesis on the likelihood of emerging “global conflict”. The previous Trump’s campaign has shown that he rregarded Putin not as an enemy, even though the American intelligence officers have privately briefed Trump on the possible cyber-attacks to the process of US election.

It is also evident that Trump has established some business links in the Russia and, moreover, maintain a relationship with oligarch in Russia.

To some extent, according to Rob Glaser, the deep financial ties and political connection of Trump to Russian oligarchs may increased the bilateral relationship of both countries, and to some extent, hampering the political turbulence in Ukraine as well as giving much possibility for Russia to expand the legacy of Soviet Union. This situation must be cautiously vigilant by the politically distresspost-Brexit European Union.

Regarding its relationship with China, Trump in his victory’s speech underlines that the United States would double its economic growth through the engagement in international economic system. His words provide a clear groundbreaking that there would be a two-side of coins on Sino-US relations, either through mutualeconomic cooperation, or instead economic competition to become a new global hegemony.

As a rising economic power, China has higher bargaining position whether to or not to engage with the United States. However, the nationalist Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream and xenophobic Trump’s Make America Great Again will unlikely bind them into a cooperation. At this point, the ‘global triangle’ consists of China, Russia, and the United States will constitute a new volatility in international politics. I further argue that it will potentially reconfigure the prospect of future regionalism in Southeast Asia.

Effects on ASEAN Centrality

Nevertheless, how does it affects ASEAN centrality? The current situation in ASEAN has shown a fragmented condition. It is evident that Southeast Asia is currently entering the “state of crisis”, characterised by strong leaders, which is followed by the strong national interests. Evelyn Goh, for example has, argued that this ‘statist-turn’ cannot be separated from the political reality in the region, which witnessed the presence of ‘big power’ in the making of ASEAN member states’ foreign policy.

The Philippines under Duterte exemplifies this point. His foreign policy, for example, has clearly pointed out a commitment to strengthen the economic and military engagement towards China. Cambodia, Laos, and the latest Malaysia have engaged through a set of economic cooperation agreement with China. To some extent, Indonesia has much potential to engage with China in the area of maritime infrastructure and investment cooperation.

Even though Singapore remains one of the strong allies of the United States, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long declared that the winning of Trump on US presidential election will increase the reassertion of a sense of identity and somehow to change the status quo. In such circumstance, China acts as a key role in region. If China is likely to cooperate with the United States, it seems that there would be a combination of three great powers in the world in one banner.

If not, it would be likely for China to be in the middle of US-Russia’s polar while playing assertive role to its ASEAN’s strategic partner under its tribute system. For ASEAN member countries, this proves to be a risk that should be confronted by the states.

How should ASEAN Respond?

I argue that ASEAN member countries should be able to take an alternative position towards the tumultuous global politics. One for sure is to strengthen its position as a strategic regional fulcrum. Using the extra-regional diplomatic forum, such as East Asia Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, and so on,ASEAN could voice out their single voice towards the great powers.

Rather than highly engaged under the game of ‘triangle great powers’, they may choose not to involve dependently towards each of great powers. Once again, this alternative option should be established under high political commitment along with risky economic cost.

It is then arguably that “Trump’s triumph” will exacerbate the international politics and rearrange its relationship towards China and Russia. Whether or not the three great powers will work under mutual and cooperative engagement, ASEAN has much to pay for its centrality.

Winners of “Call for Essay: ASEAN Community Post 2015”

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It’s been three weeks since we, ASEAN Studies Center team, announcing a competition on Call of Essay: “ASEAN Community Post 2015”. We are glad to have so many participant which comes from a wide range of age and academic background. Hereby we announce the winners!

1st Winner: “Drawing ASEAN Limits and Strengths in Tackling Terrorism: Study Case of Abu Sayyaf Group” by Novita Putri Rudiany & Kholifatus Saadah

2nd Winner: “What Comes after ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015: A Threat from China’s Economic Downfall” by Niki Wahyu Sayekti

3rd Winner: “A Single Monetary Regime in ASEAN: Panacea or False Hope” by Muhammad Rasyid Ridho & Wening Setyanti

 

The Other Best 10:

  1. “ASEAN Political-Security Community: The Prospect of South China Sea” by Muhammad Ammar Hidayahtulloh
  2. “Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in Southeast Asia: Why the International Regime to Regulate Commercial Fishing has Failed” by Muhammad Adrian Gifari Adi & Liya Rizqiya Armina
  3. “The Implementation of Security Pillar in Combating Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia” by Elida Rahajeng Puspitasari
  4. “A Blurry Potrait of Indonesia’s Agriculture Strategy in Asean Economic Community” by Muhammad Ibnu Mundzir
  5. “Narrowing the Education Disparities of ASEAN Higher Education in Post-2015 (Study case: ASEAN University Network as ASEAN Organization of Higher Education)” by Galuh Octania Permatasari & Siti Widyastuti Noor
  6. “ASEAN Financial Integration Post 2015: Key Objectives, Progress, Evaluation and Suggestion” by Calvin
  7. ASEAN Toward Global Market Integration : Enhanced Connectivity & External Relationship” by Arrizka Permata Faida

Congratulations for all the best 10! For those the winners and the best 10 authors please immediately contact Dika (0896-3149-5816) via whatsapp for further information of publication into ASEAN Studies Center website.