Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar – Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s non-intervention is aggravating the plight of ethnic Rohingya Muslims suffering widespread abuse by the Burmese military in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Rohingya are one the of the world’s most persecuted ethnic minorities.

Human Rights Watch reported the Burmese military launched a campaign of killings, rape and arson against ethnic Rohingya following attacks by militants against government border guards in Rakhine State on October 9, 2016. HRW reported in December that, since the day of the attack, at least 1,500 homes have been burned in retaliation, displacing thousands of Rohingya people.

The United Nations has expressed concern about the military operations against the Rohingya. One UNHCR official reportedly called the attacks “ethnic cleansing”. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights, Yanghee Lee, is visiting Rakhine State. But the Myanmar government is denying her access to some areas and reportedly only allows her to speak with individuals it has pre-approved.

In a closed-door meeting in Yangoon in December, ASEAN’s foreign ministers discussed the violence following the October attack. But they avoided talking about the issue in human rights terms.

Among leaders of ASEAN member states, only Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, has condemned the violence in Myanmar. He described the military operations as “genocide”.

In Indonesia, despite pressure from rights groups and Muslim groups in the country, President Joko Widodo stopped short of condemning Myanmar, but offered humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees.

Regional problem

The persecution of ethnic Rohingya is a regional and global problem. Thousands of stateless Rohingya fleeing persecution end up in refugee camps in Bangladesh or become victims of human trafficking. They have been held ransom in death camps in Thailand and Malaysia, and sold to work in plantations or on fishing boats.

In 2015, a crackdown against human traffickers in Thailand prompted traffickers to abandon their boats. Thousands of Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants were left stranded in the Andaman Sea. The plight of the Rohingya people hence become a regional problem, sparking debate among Southeast Asian leaders.

Where do Rohingya belong?

Historically, the Rohingya people have inhabited Burmese lands for hundreds of years. This dates back to before the British colonial age in Myanmar, which began in 1824. But the Burmese mostly still view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

When Myanmar gained independence from the British in 1948, it enacted a citizenship law that excluded the Rohingya people as one of the country’s many ethnicities. Almost 140,000 Rohingya people have been displaced and between 800,000 and 1.3 million Rohingyas are without citizenship.

Bangladesh, which borders Myanmar, also does not accept them, although thousands have escaped and sought refuge in Cox Bazaar, a border town within the country.

ASEAN’s non-intervention approach

Myanmar has insisted that the problems in the Rakhine State are a domestic matter. Within ASEAN, countries commonly refrain from intervening in domestic issues.

But ASEAN’s state-centric nature has prevented the regional organisation from protecting the rights of all people in the region.

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the main human rights institution in the region, could not even form an investigation committee to look into the problem. This is because, according to AICHR’s Terms of Reference, the commission does not have any mandate to carry out such an investigation. Any decision made by the commission should be accepted by all state representatives.

ASEAN members’ non-intervention approach has effectively blocked ASEAN’s own institutions – AICHR and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre – from protecting human rights.

Forging a caring and sharing ASEAN community

Talks among ASEAN leaders are often limited to political and economic issues, pushing problems with deep social and cultural roots like the persecution of ethnic Rohingya to the margins.

This should not be the case. Since 2015, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, with the aim of forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society in the region. ASEAN states adopted the ASEAN Vision 2025, which put forward the idea of a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN in the upcoming decade.

Forging a common platform for socio-cultural regionalism should not leave out state protection of human rights. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that the state bears responsibility to protect basic individual rights. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN that’s people-oriented must go hand-in-hand with the protection of human rights.

Yet, to date, ASEAN member states have not discussed a “people-oriented” mechanism to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

ASEAN member states should discuss the crisis in the upcoming ASEAN summit in the Philippines. ASEAN should combine these diplomatic talks with non-state initiatives, such as advocacy networks and humanitarian organisations.

We could learn from community initiatives in dealing with the Andaman Sea crisis in 2015. When governments were slow to rescue Rohingya and Bangladeshi people languishing on boats off the coast of Indonesia’s Aceh province, the local fishing community saved them from drowning. NGOs gave the refugees shelter. The strong role of non-governmental organisations and community-based initiatives to deal with humanitarian issues prompted the governments to sit down and find a solution.

ASEAN has equipped itself with various institutional mechanisms that encompass political security, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This means that ASEAN should not only deal with matters relating to economic growth and a free ASEAN market. It should also tackle issues relating to multiculturalism, be that religion, national identity, or ethnicity. Otherwise, we will only be waiting for Godot to end the persecution of ethnic Rohingya.

This article has been previously published by The Conversation

Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

2016 was a significant year for Australian ASEAN relations. The First ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit was held on 7 September 2016 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. At the Summit Australian Prime minister Malcolm Turnbull highlighted the importance of the Strategic Partnership between his country and the regional body, focussing on opportunities for economic partnerships and the common security challenge, “that demands a united response, terrorism.”

Beyond this, Australia also promoted its role as a peace broker as a non-claimant in the South China Sea. The Summit can be seen as a major success for Australian ASEAN diplomatic relations and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong offered a significant compliment, when he said Australia “understands” ASEAN and its developmental needs. The Summit closed with Turnbull proposing a special ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ Summit in 2018. This invitation was quickly followed by Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s offer to host the ASEAN leaders summit in 2018, which, if accepted, would be the first summit held outside of a current ASEAN member state.

These diplomatic developments reflect increasing inter-linkages between Australia and ASEAN on economic, cultural, academic and security fronts. These include the signing of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2009 and the development of Australia’s New Colombo Plan initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges by supporting Australian students to study and undertake work-based placements in ASEAN Member States. Participants of the ASEAN-Australia Summit also agreed to update the 2004 Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 2014 also saw the celebration of Australia’s 40th year as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN.

These developments raise the question, what is Australia’s place in the region?

Australia in ‘Asia’

Historically ‘Australian’ identity has been defined in opposition to the idea of ‘Asia’. As part of the British Empire, Australia was understood as an outpost ‘confronting’ Asia. Following the decline of the British Empire this outpost mentality persisted and was reflected in former Prime Minister John Howard’s identification of Australia as a deputy sheriff to the US in Southeast Asia.

This identity stressed differences between Australia and ‘Asia’, conceived of as a coherent mass to the countries north, and was represented through racial identifiers, such as the ‘White Australia policy’, and ideological or cultural identifiers such as Howard’s championing of the shared values and common interests’ that bind the US and Australia together.

Culturally and politically, Australia has been tied to the Anglo sphere, while the country’s security policy has remained one of dependence, first on the UK and then on the USA.

Despite this, however, Australia finds itself drawn into its surrounding geo-graphical and geo-political region.  Not only have Australian economic interests become increasingly embedded within the region, the country’s significant strategic and security objectives are also tied to its relationship with South East Asian partners.

ASEAN and Australia: Competing visions of Regionalism?

ASEAN has positioned itself as the driver of East Asia regionalism. The Organization’s convening power and centrality to regional processes is reflected in forums, such as ASEAN + three, East Asia Forum and the ASEAN Forum, which brings together a number of states well beyond the core 10 members, to shape the evolving political, strategic and economic architecture of the region.  

ASEAN has also shown a propensity for expansion. The initial five members has expanded to the present 10, while observer status is held by Papua New Guinea (since 1976) and Timor Leste (2002). Fiji’s request for observer status also received support from former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Bangladesh has received support from Laos.

Australia’s reorientation towards Asia-Pacific was, perhaps, first evidenced, when Australia became ASEANs first dialogue partner 1974. Since then Australia has been invited to attend and participate at the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

As Australia engages with the region, however, it does so from a liminal position between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia.’ Australia has displayed an ambivalent position toward South East Asian Regionalism and ‘Asian’ regional identity and ASEAN states have reciprocated this ambivalence regarding Australia place within the region.

Former Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi expressed Australia’s outsider status at the first East Asia Summit when he remarked that Australia and New Zealand would be second-class participants in Asia’s vision, with “ASEAN+3” to be the “driver” of integration. Badawi commented that Australia’s participation at the Summit represented a convergence of “common interests’ rather than “being members of the community.”

Regarding a potential Australia application for ASEAN membership, Rodolfo Severino, a Philippines diplomat and Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002, remarked that ASEAN’s likely response would be “You’re not Southeast Asian.”

Australia’s ambivalent, or marginal position toward and in ‘Asian’ regionalism has led to the development of different, perhaps competing, visions of regional architecture. Australia’s involvement in establishing APEC, which would come to include the US, can be seen as an attempt to dilute growth of East Asia regionalism. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also made a proposal for the creation of Asia Pacific Community by 2020, which would include US, New Zealand, China and India focused on security and trade. The proposal was met with little enthusiasm, particularly from ASEAN members, and was criticized as unnecessarily multiplying regional institutions.

Ongoing debates in Australia have also seen a shift from defining the countries region as the ‘Asia Pacific’, to the ‘Indo Pacific,’ which may or may not include China, and even Africa, depending on ones viewpoint. In 2014, during a speech about Australia’s “new aid paradigm” Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, stated that Australia’s principal focus for aid allocations, would be in Australia’s region – ‘the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific.’ The Indo-Pacific has also become the defining geographic expression for Australia’s defence strategy, first articulated in the Labour Party’s 2013 Defence White paper and later embraced by the Coalition government.

The Future of Australian-ASEAN Relations

How can the recent developments in Australia-ASEAN relations be interpreted against this backdrop? Is it evidence of deepening integration, or the development of a shared community? Or are ASEAN Australia relations still mediated, purely, by a paradigm of shared interests. Is it a sign of convergence between how Australia and ASEAN understand their region, or will they continue to have different, perhaps competing, visions of regionalism?

Severino, points to Australia’s continuing ambivalence as its biggest hurdle to the integration into ASEAN. Regarding elevation to observer status he argues,

‘The problem with Australia is its ambivalence. At some point when Australia feels confident enough to say, “We are in Southeast Asia and we deserve to be in ASEAN,” then that will be the time. But this has to be worked out internally, domestically.’

However, by defining its region as the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ it can be argued that Australia is not attempting to integrate itself within the ASEAN community. The expansive definition is an acknowledgment, not only of Australia’s many geographical and strategic connections, or its maritime outlook, but also of the persistence of its ambivalent character as an island nation with no firm attachments, or connections with the countries that surround it. Australia’s region is defined by partnerships, even friendships, strengthened through social and cultural outreach. It is not, however, defined by a community. Within Australia’s new, and expansive understanding of its region, ASEAN is part of a broader picture, one partner among many.

Dedi Dinarto – Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Indonesia’s maritime sector gained a boost when on December 21, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Panjaitan agreed to cooperate with Japan, establishing the strategic bilateral Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum (IJMF). The two countries agreed to collaborate in the field of maritime security, maritime economy, maritime infrastructure, as well as maritime education and training, as The Jakarta Post has put it.

Seeking strategic cooperation in the maritime and industrial sectors, Luhut invited Japan to contribute to the development of fish markets in Natuna Besar and the energy sector in East Natuna. Furthermore, he hopes that Japan would be interested in constructing a strategic port in Sabang, as well as urging the Maritime Security Board to work with the Japanese on smuggling issues and cleaning up the ocean.

Though the agreement signifies strategic bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in term of smuggling prevention, it appears to neglect a growing transnational maritime threat in Southeast Asia: maritime piracy, incidents of which have mostly occurred in Indonesian waters (see Figure 1).

In Southeast Asia, according to a report from a private intelligence agency Dryad, piracy has increased by 22 percent compared to 2014. From 1995 to 2013, Southeast Asia was responsible for 40 percent of the total piracy in the world due to many strategic areas to be opportunistically plundered, particularly in the shipping lanes from the Strait of Malacca to the Singapore Straits and off to the South China Sea.

In the case of Indonesia, according to the report from the ICC-IMB that I have compiled in my chapter of a book entitled Reformasi Tata Kelola Keamanan Maritim di Era Presiden Joko Widodo, published by Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, a substantial number of piracy and armed robbery attacks took place in most major Indonesian ports (see Figure 2).

Another missing concern of Indonesia’s bilateral diplomatic engagement is the lack of success to carry out maritime diplomacy as one of the essential elements of the global maritime fulcrum doctrine. The unwillingness of the head of the Indonesian Maritime Security Board, Vice Admiral Arie Soedewo, to recognize maritime piracy as a plausible threat in Indonesian waters (or even more broadly in Southeast Asia) was reflected in the recent deal with Japan. At this point, it poses a serious question as to the Maritime Security Board’s functional role within Indonesia’s maritime security domain.

Indonesia must strengthen maritime security cooperation through active diplomacy. According to its capacity as a middle-power country, Indonesia should maximize its bargaining position at least in particular fields of interest. Indonesia should actively strengthen maritime security cooperation through bilateral and multilateral channels as a preventative measure, not only reacting when significant threats arise (as, for example, in the case of the establishment of trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines after Abu Sayyaf’s kidnappings). Although, as the Japan deal shows, Indonesia is likely to focus more on developing the potential of maritime industries and services without any strategic measures on maritime security, both elements are prominent, and indeed inter-related.

Maritime security, as a vital part of becoming a global maritime fulcrum, should not be neglected for two crucial reasons. First, if piracy and armed attacks against ships cannot be forestalled by Indonesia’s coast guard and navy, it would potentially cause harm to the development of the maritime industry and service sectors. A lack of maritime security along the shipping lanes and ports in Indonesia would be a determinant factor for shipping companies weighing whether to involve Indonesia as a transit point.

Second, vulnerability to piracy may threaten the image of Indonesia as a maritime nation. If Indonesia is able to open up to receiving others’ contributions in the maritime industry sector, Indonesia will also need to respond to and prevent current and future maritime security challenges.

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and independently concerning on Indonesia’s maritime security issues.

The original article has been published in The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesia-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-against-maritime-piracy/>