Entries by aseansc

Pengumuman Hasil Seleksi Wawancara ASEAN Studies Center 2017

 

Yth. Kepada seluruh peserta internship ASC 2017,

Setelah melalui proses seleksi yang panjang dan dengan kompetisi yang tinggi, kami mengumumkan hasil lolos seleksi wawancara Program Internship ASEAN Studies Center 2017, sebagai berikut:

No. Nama
1 Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha
2 Siti Widyastuti
3 Diaz Kurniawan
4 Ruth Tarullyna Simanjuntak
5 Imas Lu’ul Jannah
6 Pinto Buana Putra
7 Tiarra Dya Arma Lucita.
8 Annisa Maulia Fahmi

Bagi nama yang telah disebutkan diatas, kami telah mengirimkan pengumuman kepada e-mail masing-masing.  Bagi yang tidak mendapatkan email, kami dengan berat hati menginformasikan bahwa anda belum diterima pada periode internship kali ini. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya.
Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseansc@ugm.ac.id

Pengumuman Wawancara Internship Program 2017

Berikut adalah peserta yang lolos seleksi berkas beserta jadwal wawancara yang ditentukan. Wawancara akan diadakan di kantor ASEAN Studies Center Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Gedung BC ruang 209.

NO. NAMA TANGGAL WAKTU
1 Flory Rahmah Abiwawanti 6 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
2 Nina Arina 6 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
3 Khairunnisa Simbolon 6 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
4 Zahlul Pasha 6 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
5 Erwin Mansyur U. Saraka 6 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
6 Wahyunanda Kusuma Pertiwi 6 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
7 Andi Muhammad Ibnu Aqil 6 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
8 Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha 6 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
9  Muhammad Ridwansyah 6 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
10 Hafidhotun Nabawiyah 6 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
11 Syifa R. Wibowo 6 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
12 Fitriyani 6 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30
13 Siti Widyastuti 7 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
14 Sahid Maani 7 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
15 Diaz Kurniawan 7 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
16 Kadhung Prayoga 7 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
17 Ahmad Iffan 7 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
18 Andreas Nugroho Rahardyanto 7 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
19 Evan Sapentri 7 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
20 Muhammad Hafiz Noer 7 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
21 Aura Fadzila 7 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
22 Dendy Raditya 7 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
23 Annisa Maulia Fahmi 7 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
24 Siti Komariah 7 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30
25 Khoir el Umar 8 FEBRUARI 2017 10:00
26 Mochammad Fajar Akbar 8 FEBRUARI 2017 10:30
27 Anggun Dina Putri Utami, 8 FEBRUARI 2017 11:00
28 Shofiyanto 8 FEBRUARI 2017 11:30
29 Halimah Garnasih 8 FEBRUARI 2017 13:00
30 Ruth Tarullyna Simanjuntak 8 FEBRUARI 2017 13:30
31 Jasmine Nadhira Lathifazaputri 8 FEBRUARI 2017 14:00
32 Randi Kurniawan 8 FEBRUARI 2017 14:30
33 Imas Lu’ul Jannah 8 FEBRUARI 2017 15:00
34 Pinto Buana Putra 8 FEBRUARI 2017 15:30
35 Tiarra Dya Arma Lucita. 8 FEBRUARI 2017 16:00
36 Gusti Agung Bagaskara 8 FEBRUARI 2017 16:30

Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseansc@ugm.ac.id

ASEAN Countries Should Find a Solution to End the Persecution of Rohingya

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar – Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s non-intervention is aggravating the plight of ethnic Rohingya Muslims suffering widespread abuse by the Burmese military in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Rohingya are one the of the world’s most persecuted ethnic minorities.

Human Rights Watch reported the Burmese military launched a campaign of killings, rape and arson against ethnic Rohingya following attacks by militants against government border guards in Rakhine State on October 9, 2016. HRW reported in December that, since the day of the attack, at least 1,500 homes have been burned in retaliation, displacing thousands of Rohingya people.

The United Nations has expressed concern about the military operations against the Rohingya. One UNHCR official reportedly called the attacks “ethnic cleansing”. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights, Yanghee Lee, is visiting Rakhine State. But the Myanmar government is denying her access to some areas and reportedly only allows her to speak with individuals it has pre-approved.

In a closed-door meeting in Yangoon in December, ASEAN’s foreign ministers discussed the violence following the October attack. But they avoided talking about the issue in human rights terms.

Among leaders of ASEAN member states, only Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, has condemned the violence in Myanmar. He described the military operations as “genocide”.

In Indonesia, despite pressure from rights groups and Muslim groups in the country, President Joko Widodo stopped short of condemning Myanmar, but offered humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees.

Regional problem

The persecution of ethnic Rohingya is a regional and global problem. Thousands of stateless Rohingya fleeing persecution end up in refugee camps in Bangladesh or become victims of human trafficking. They have been held ransom in death camps in Thailand and Malaysia, and sold to work in plantations or on fishing boats.

In 2015, a crackdown against human traffickers in Thailand prompted traffickers to abandon their boats. Thousands of Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants were left stranded in the Andaman Sea. The plight of the Rohingya people hence become a regional problem, sparking debate among Southeast Asian leaders.

At least 1,500 homes of ethnic Rohingya have been burned since October 2016. Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters

Where do Rohingya belong?

Historically, the Rohingya people have inhabited Burmese lands for hundreds of years. This dates back to before the British colonial age in Myanmar, which began in 1824. But the Burmese mostly still view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

When Myanmar gained independence from the British in 1948, it enacted a citizenship law that excluded the Rohingya people as one of the country’s many ethnicities. Almost 140,000 Rohingya people have been displaced and between 800,000 and 1.3 million Rohingyas are without citizenship.

Bangladesh, which borders Myanmar, also does not accept them, although thousands have escaped and sought refuge in Cox Bazaar, a border town within the country.

ASEAN’s non-intervention approach

Myanmar has insisted that the problems in the Rakhine State are a domestic matter. Within ASEAN, countries commonly refrain from intervening in domestic issues.

But ASEAN’s state-centric nature has prevented the regional organisation from protecting the rights of all people in the region.

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the main human rights institution in the region, could not even form an investigation committee to look into the problem. This is because, according to AICHR’s Terms of Reference, the commission does not have any mandate to carry out such an investigation. Any decision made by the commission should be accepted by all state representatives.

ASEAN members’ non-intervention approach has effectively blocked ASEAN’s own institutions – AICHR and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre – from protecting human rights.

Despite the change of political regime in Myanmar – with the appointment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi as de-facto prime minister – the persecution of the Rohingya continues. Soe Zeya Tun

Forging a caring and sharing ASEAN community

Talks among ASEAN leaders are often limited to political and economic issues, pushing problems with deep social and cultural roots like the persecution of ethnic Rohingya to the margins.

This should not be the case. Since 2015, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, with the aim of forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society in the region. ASEAN states adopted the ASEAN Vision 2025, which put forward the idea of a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN in the upcoming decade.

Forging a common platform for socio-cultural regionalism should not leave out state protection of human rights. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that the state bears responsibility to protect basic individual rights. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN that’s people-oriented must go hand-in-hand with the protection of human rights.

Yet, to date, ASEAN member states have not discussed a “people-oriented” mechanism to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

ASEAN member states should discuss the crisis in the upcoming ASEAN summit in the Philippines. ASEAN should combine these diplomatic talks with non-state initiatives, such as advocacy networks and humanitarian organisations.

We could learn from community initiatives in dealing with the Andaman Sea crisis in 2015. When governments were slow to rescue Rohingya and Bangladeshi people languishing on boats off the coast of Indonesia’s Aceh province, the local fishing community saved them from drowning. NGOs gave the refugees shelter. The strong role of non-governmental organisations and community-based initiatives to deal with humanitarian issues prompted the governments to sit down and find a solution.

ASEAN has equipped itself with various institutional mechanisms that encompass political security, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This means that ASEAN should not only deal with matters relating to economic growth and a free ASEAN market. It should also tackle issues relating to multiculturalism, be that religion, national identity, or ethnicity. Otherwise, we will only be waiting for Godot to end the persecution of ethnic Rohingya.

This article has been previously published by The Conversation

The Future of ASEAN-Russian Relations

Content - Porto - Research Advo

Shane Preuss, Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s strength is demonstrated by its ‘convening power’ and its ability to attract the courtship of the world’s great powers. However, these strengths also present challenges, as ASEAN must not only navigate its relations of these powers, but also the various relationships of its individual members with respective powers. In light of this, significant commentary has been dedicated to the threat of rising US-China tensions for ASEAN’s unity and coherence. These tensions, often centered on the South China Sea dispute, are set to amplify as President-Elect Trump establishes a firm, even aggressive position toward China.

There is, however, another great power in the region, whose increasingly eager courtship of ASEAN, combined with its complex and evolving relations with both China and the USA, is set to play a significant role in the region’s geopolitics; Russia.  

The Origins of ASEAN-Russian Cooperation

Russia became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996 and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. It has since gained membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. The First ASEAN-Russia summit was held in 2005, and the second in 2010. The third Russia-ASEAN summit to commemorate the 20th anniversary of their dialogue relations was held in Sochi, in 2016.

Despite these developments, Russia-ASEAN relations have remained relatively unfruitful and Putin has shown a lack of interest in the region. This has been evidenced by his lack of presence at the East Asia Summit, the modest level of achievement yielded by first ten years of the Russia-ASEAN action plan, and the relatively low level of trade with ASEAN, especially when compared to other major powers, China and the USA.

In 2016, however, there were clear indications that this trend is beginning to shift. Russia is now eagerly engaging with the regional body and its member states. Over the two days of the Third ASEAN-Russia Summit, from May 19-20, Russia held bi-lateral members with every ASEAN member. The summit culminated in the announcement of a ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action’ to promote a cooperation between ASEAN and Russia in the areas of political-security, economic, socio-cultural and development cooperation. This increase in diplomatic activity was followed on December 23, when the UN General Assembly approved, by consensus, a Russian co-authored resolution, for Cooperation between the UN and ASEAN.

At the 2016 Russian-ASEAN ministerial conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined Russia’s approach to security, while recognizing, and supporting ASEAN’s centrality in the region. Russia, he said is building ‘a modern security architecture in Asia-Pacific,’ while ‘staunchly and consistently’ defending the role of ASEAN in regional affairs.

In the first week of 2017, two Russian warships Russia also made a visit to the Philippines. Eduard Mikhailov, deputy commander of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, signaled Russia’s desire to cooperate on military exercises in the South China Sea, with the Philippines, other ASEAN states, such as Malaysia, as well as China.  The expression of interest was well received and it was announced on Monday, 9th of January 2017, the Philippines and Russia and are in the process of finalizing a security deal, which allows the countries leaders to exchange of visits and observe military drills.

Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said the MOU between the countries opens the prospect for joint exercises. However, he also assured Washington the military agreements will not permit the rotational deployment of Russia troops and is not comparable to the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Philippines and the USA. Nevertheless. the development is significant on the back of President Duterte angry outbursts against President Obama and his decision to scale back military ties with his countries traditional ally while deepening engagement with China and Russia.

Russia has also begun developing regional economic agreements throughout Asia. The Russian-led, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), compromised of several former Soviet states, was established in 2015 and has already signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam and memoranda of cooperation with Cambodia and Singapore. ASEAN and Russia also agreed to launch a joint feasibility study of a comprehensive free trade area between ASEAN and EAEU.

Great Power Relations and the Future of ASEAN

Russia approaches to ASEAN and ASEAN states are part of a broader pivot to Asia, which, while effectively announced several years ago, began to take shape in 2016.  In addition to the strengthening ties with ASEAN, Russia has also sought to deepen its partnership with China. In June 2016 the EAEU and China signed a joint declaration on the negotiation of a trade and economic cooperation agreement and reach an agreement to integrate activities of the EAEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.

Russia’s decision to look East for new economic and security partnerships must be understood within the context of the Kremlin’s increasing estrangement from Western powers. While not necessarily, or causally, connected, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the West has marked a major rift in their international relations. This will considerably reshape Russia’s strategic posture and leanings for the coming years.

It remains to be seen what lasting effects recent will tensions between the US and Russia have on the relations between the two powers. These include allegations of Russian interference in 2016 US elections and Obama’s decision to retaliate by expelling 35 Russia diplomats. Putin received plaudits for his strategic nous for deciding not to retaliate, and, instead, express his intention to wait for the Trump Presidency to begin before making any decisions on the future of US-Russia relations.

However, while Trump and Putin appear to have shared warm relations over the election period, it is uncertain whether Trump will maintain this tone during his time in office. In light of these uncertainties, Russia’s increasing engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN members, coupled with its evolving and shifting relationships with other major powers, will be a major point of interest in the study of ASEAN geopolitics.

The Future of ASEAN-Australian Relations

Feature - AustraliaASEAN

Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

2016 was a significant year for Australian ASEAN relations. The First ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit was held on 7 September 2016 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. At the Summit Australian Prime minister Malcolm Turnbull highlighted the importance of the Strategic Partnership between his country and the regional body, focussing on opportunities for economic partnerships and the common security challenge, “that demands a united response, terrorism.”

Beyond this, Australia also promoted its role as a peace broker as a non-claimant in the South China Sea. The Summit can be seen as a major success for Australian ASEAN diplomatic relations and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong offered a significant compliment, when he said Australia “understands” ASEAN and its developmental needs. The Summit closed with Turnbull proposing a special ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ Summit in 2018. This invitation was quickly followed by Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s offer to host the ASEAN leaders summit in 2018, which, if accepted, would be the first summit held outside of a current ASEAN member state.

These diplomatic developments reflect increasing inter-linkages between Australia and ASEAN on economic, cultural, academic and security fronts. These include the signing of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2009 and the development of Australia’s New Colombo Plan initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges by supporting Australian students to study and undertake work-based placements in ASEAN Member States. Participants of the ASEAN-Australia Summit also agreed to update the 2004 Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 2014 also saw the celebration of Australia’s 40th year as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN.

These developments raise the question, what is Australia’s place in the region?

Australia in ‘Asia’

Historically ‘Australian’ identity has been defined in opposition to the idea of ‘Asia’. As part of the British Empire, Australia was understood as an outpost ‘confronting’ Asia. Following the decline of the British Empire this outpost mentality persisted and was reflected in former Prime Minister John Howard’s identification of Australia as a deputy sheriff to the US in Southeast Asia.

This identity stressed differences between Australia and ‘Asia’, conceived of as a coherent mass to the countries north, and was represented through racial identifiers, such as the ‘White Australia policy’, and ideological or cultural identifiers such as Howard’s championing of the shared values and common interests’ that bind the US and Australia together.

Culturally and politically, Australia has been tied to the Anglo sphere, while the country’s security policy has remained one of dependence, first on the UK and then on the USA.

Despite this, however, Australia finds itself drawn into its surrounding geo-graphical and geo-political region.  Not only have Australian economic interests become increasingly embedded within the region, the country’s significant strategic and security objectives are also tied to its relationship with South East Asian partners.

ASEAN and Australia: Competing visions of Regionalism?

ASEAN has positioned itself as the driver of East Asia regionalism. The Organization’s convening power and centrality to regional processes is reflected in forums, such as ASEAN + three, East Asia Forum and the ASEAN Forum, which brings together a number of states well beyond the core 10 members, to shape the evolving political, strategic and economic architecture of the region.  

ASEAN has also shown a propensity for expansion. The initial five members has expanded to the present 10, while observer status is held by Papua New Guinea (since 1976) and Timor Leste (2002). Fiji’s request for observer status also received support from former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Bangladesh has received support from Laos.

Australia’s reorientation towards Asia-Pacific was, perhaps, first evidenced, when Australia became ASEANs first dialogue partner 1974. Since then Australia has been invited to attend and participate at the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

As Australia engages with the region, however, it does so from a liminal position between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia.’ Australia has displayed an ambivalent position toward South East Asian Regionalism and ‘Asian’ regional identity and ASEAN states have reciprocated this ambivalence regarding Australia place within the region.

Former Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi expressed Australia’s outsider status at the first East Asia Summit when he remarked that Australia and New Zealand would be second-class participants in Asia’s vision, with “ASEAN+3” to be the “driver” of integration. Badawi commented that Australia’s participation at the Summit represented a convergence of “common interests’ rather than “being members of the community.”

Regarding a potential Australia application for ASEAN membership, Rodolfo Severino, a Philippines diplomat and Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002, remarked that ASEAN’s likely response would be “You’re not Southeast Asian.

Australia’s ambivalent, or marginal position toward and in ‘Asian’ regionalism has led to the development of different, perhaps competing, visions of regional architecture. Australia’s involvement in establishing APEC, which would come to include the US, can be seen as an attempt to dilute growth of East Asia regionalism. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also made a proposal for the creation of Asia Pacific Community by 2020, which would include US, New Zealand, China and India focused on security and trade. The proposal was met with little enthusiasm, particularly from ASEAN members, and was criticized as unnecessarily multiplying regional institutions.

Ongoing debates in Australia have also seen a shift from defining the countries region as the ‘Asia Pacific’, to the ‘Indo Pacific,’ which may or may not include China, and even Africa, depending on ones viewpoint. In 2014, during a speech about Australia’s “new aid paradigm” Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, stated that Australia’s principal focus for aid allocations, would be in Australia’s region – ‘the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific.’ The Indo-Pacific has also become the defining geographic expression for Australia’s defence strategy, first articulated in the Labour Party’s 2013 Defence White paper and later embraced by the Coalition government.

The Future of Australian-ASEAN Relations

How can the recent developments in Australia-ASEAN relations be interpreted against this backdrop? Is it evidence of deepening integration, or the development of a shared community? Or are ASEAN Australia relations still mediated, purely, by a paradigm of shared interests. Is it a sign of convergence between how Australia and ASEAN understand their region, or will they continue to have different, perhaps competing, visions of regionalism?

Severino, points to Australia’s continuing ambivalence as its biggest hurdle to the integration into ASEAN. Regarding elevation to observer status he argues,

‘The problem with Australia is its ambivalence. At some point when Australia feels confident enough to say, “We are in Southeast Asia and we deserve to be in ASEAN,” then that will be the time. But this has to be worked out internally, domestically.’

However, by defining its region as the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ it can be argued that Australia is not attempting to integrate itself within the ASEAN community. The expansive definition is an acknowledgment, not only of Australia’s many geographical and strategic connections, or its maritime outlook, but also of the persistence of its ambivalent character as an island nation with no firm attachments, or connections with the countries that surround it. Australia’s region is defined by partnerships, even friendships, strengthened through social and cultural outreach. It is not, however, defined by a community. Within Australia’s new, and expansive understanding of its region, ASEAN is part of a broader picture, one partner among many.

ASEAN Toward Global Market Integration: Enhanced Connectivity & External Relationship

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Arrizka Permata Faida

Best 10 Author of Call for Essay: ASEAN Community Post 2015

The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 is a major milestone in the regional economic integration agenda in ASEAN.  With population over 622 million people and a nominal combined GDP of US$2.6 trillion in 20142 is fast becoming a major economic force in Asia and a driver of global growth. ASEAN has become the third largest economy in Asia and the seventh in the world. ASEAN become more influential, with widening markets regionally and globally. This essay focus on AEC fourth pillar3 refers to integration with the global economy to become strength as a region in economy and sustainable in needs to respond to global trends and be proactive in seizing new opportunities toward global market integration.

Introduction

Following the successful implementation of the AFTA, the ASEAN Leaders adopted the ASEAN Economic Blueprint as a master plan guiding the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community 2015. The stated goal is a regional economic integration – a single market and production base and the free movement of goods, services and labor. ASEAN economic integration effort contributed fundamentally to the regional economic foundation, ensuring the continuing strong performance of our national and regional economies.

External Economic Relationship

In globalization era, the forms of external relations have become more important. ASEAN possesses immense growth potential and is a notable global hub of manufacturing and trade, as well as one of the fastest-growing consumer markets in the world.

AKFTA is focusing to strengthen economic, trade and investment cooperation by progressively liberalizing and promoting trade in goods and services as well as create a transparent, liberal and facilitative investment regime. 4

In  trade of goods and service, imports  from  ASEAN to Korea make  up  about  10%  of  Korea’s  total  inbound  shipments, the top items imported from ASEAN have a much higher share compared to world  imports  in  terms  of  amount.  It is possible to assess that ASEAN is an important trade partner. Korea stood at the 7th largest trading country, and ASEAN represents an important trading partner (for Primary Products as table above) for Korea. Korea’s total trade volume with ASEAN in 2014 amounted to $138 billion USD, making ASEAN Korea’s second largest trading partner, after China at $235.4 billion USD. Out of Korea’s total 2014 trade volume of $1,098.2 billion USD, ASEAN’s share was 12.6%, only after China at 21.4%.

Figure 1. Korea’s Import Item from ASEAN by Industry (1990~2009)

tabel1

The EU was ASEAN’s second largest trading partner after China in 2013. With the portion for around 13% of ASEAN trade. ASEAN is the EU’s 3rd largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China) with more than €246 billion of trade in goods and services in 2014.5 The EU is by far the largest investor in ASEAN countries accounting for 22% of total FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) inflows in the region. EU companies have invested an average €19 billion annually in the region (2012-2014). The main imports from ASEAN to the EU are machinery and transport equipment, agricultural products as well as textiles and clothing.

Figure 2. EU-ASEAN Negotiations History

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The EU makes a negotiations with individual ASEAN Member States in different year, but also cooperates with the ASEAN region as a whole.6 EU and ASEAN as two leading regional integration initiatives partnering in integration and connectivity.7

The US is the 3rd largest trading partner for ASEAN. ASEAN investment in the US has grown over 1,400% and US investment in ASEAN has increased 169% since 2001. US investment in ASEAN is almost $190 billion exceeding all other destinations in Asia, while ASEAN investment into the US exceeds $27 billion. The importance of America’s current and future relationship with ASEAN mutually beneficial growth will require greater investments in America’s political, economic, and diplomatic engagement with ASEAN. Recognizing its geostrategic importance, the US cooperates with ASEAN and its member states on a multitude of initiatives ensuring security and stability in the region. ASEAN investment in the US is growing much faster than the investment coming from other regions.

Figure 3. US-Asia Direct Investment,through 2012

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Participation in global supply networks

 ASEAN requires an integrated approach to connectivity. To enhance participation in global supply networks by:

  • Adoption of international standards and regulation in production and distribution
  • Developing a comprehensive package of technical [efficient logistics and distribution services] to upgrade industrial capabilities and productivity. 8
  • Optimize their production process (from raw materials to finished products) through outsourcing and offshoring of activities at competitive cost and quality.

Conclusion

A competitive economic region is a connected region. ASEAN is one of the largest economic zones in the world; a growing hub of consumer demand. Process toward global market integration has shown. Global market integration could potentially combine to produce opportunities and generate challenges,that is higher costs, or complicated regulations to ASEAN countries. That will help to improve the living standards of the ASEAN population through economic development. ASEAN also intends to improve global supply networks, as well as expand trade, and improve transportation and infrastructure.

REFERENCES

Burnson, Patrick. ASEAN is Refining Supply Chain Networks. Accessed on October 29. http://www.scmr.com/article/asean_is_refining_supply_chain_networks

Cheong, Jaewan. Korea’s Intermediate Goods Trade with ASEAN. Accessed on October 28. http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/05_chapter4.pdf

European Commission. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Accessed on October 28. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/

European External Action Service. The EU-ASEAN relationship in twenty facts and figures. Accessed on October 29. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/asean/docs/key_facts_figures_eu_asean_en.pdf

Supply Chain Asia. Building Resilient ASEAN Supply Chains. Retrieved on October 29. http://supplychainasia.org/building-resilient-asean-supply-chains/

The East-West Center. ASEAN MATTERS FOR AMERICA/ AMERICA MATTERS FOR ASEAN. Retrieved on October 28. www.AsiaMattersforAmerica.org/ASEAN

Vinayak HV, Fraser Thompson, and Oliver Tonby. Understanding ASEAN: Seven things you need to know. Retrieved on October 28. http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/understanding-asean-seven-things-you-need-to-know

AEC                           ASEAN Economic Community

AFTA                         ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

AKFTA                     ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area

ASEAN                     Association of Southeast Asian Nations

EU                              European Union

1  : Student at Department of Management, School of Business and Management, Bandung Institute of Technology

2 : ASEAN. ASEAN Economic Community. Accessed October 26,2016. http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/

3 : The 4 pillars are a single market and production base; a competitive economic region; equitable economic development; and integration with the global economy.

4 It also aims to explore new areas and develop appropriate measures for closer economic cooperation and integration; facilitate more effective economic integration of the new ASEAN Member States and bridge the development gaps; and, establish a cooperative framework to further strengthen economic relations among the countries. Retrieved from : http://akfta.asean.org/index.php?page=background-of-akfta

5Data retrieved from: European Commission Website. http://ec.europa.eu

6 Framed by a biannual ASEAN-EU Trade and Investment Work Program

7 In February 2014, the ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee visited the EU.

8 To achieve this requires support for physical infrastructure as well as improving cross-border agreements and institutional connectivity.

Indonesia Needs to Step up Its Fight Against Maritime Piracy

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Dedi Dinarto – Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Indonesia’s maritime sector gained a boost when on December 21, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Panjaitan agreed to cooperate with Japan, establishing the strategic bilateral Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum (IJMF). The two countries agreed to collaborate in the field of maritime security, maritime economy, maritime infrastructure, as well as maritime education and training, as The Jakarta Post has put it.

Seeking strategic cooperation in the maritime and industrial sectors, Luhut invited Japan to contribute to the development of fish markets in Natuna Besar and the energy sector in East Natuna. Furthermore, he hopes that Japan would be interested in constructing a strategic port in Sabang, as well as urging the Maritime Security Board to work with the Japanese on smuggling issues and cleaning up the ocean.

Though the agreement signifies strategic bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in term of smuggling prevention, it appears to neglect a growing transnational maritime threat in Southeast Asia: maritime piracy, incidents of which have mostly occurred in Indonesian waters (see Figure 1).

Piracy in SEA

In Southeast Asia, according to a report from a private intelligence agency Dryad, piracy has increased by 22 percent compared to 2014. From 1995 to 2013, Southeast Asia was responsible for 40 percent of the total piracy in the world due to many strategic areas to be opportunistically plundered, particularly in the shipping lanes from the Strait of Malacca to the Singapore Straits and off to the South China Sea.

In the case of Indonesia, according to the report from the ICC-IMB that I have compiled in my chapter of a book entitled Reformasi Tata Kelola Keamanan Maritim di Era Presiden Joko Widodo, published by Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, a substantial number of piracy and armed robbery attacks took place in most major Indonesian ports (see Figure 2).

Piracy in Indonesia

Another missing concern of Indonesia’s bilateral diplomatic engagement is the lack of success to carry out maritime diplomacy as one of the essential elements of the global maritime fulcrum doctrine. The unwillingness of the head of the Indonesian Maritime Security Board, Vice Admiral Arie Soedewo, to recognize maritime piracy as a plausible threat in Indonesian waters (or even more broadly in Southeast Asia) was reflected in the recent deal with Japan. At this point, it poses a serious question as to the Maritime Security Board’s functional role within Indonesia’s maritime security domain.

Indonesia must strengthen maritime security cooperation through active diplomacy. According to its capacity as a middle-power country, Indonesia should maximize its bargaining position at least in particular fields of interest. Indonesia should actively strengthen maritime security cooperation through bilateral and multilateral channels as a preventative measure, not only reacting when significant threats arise (as, for example, in the case of the establishment of trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines after Abu Sayyaf’s kidnappings). Although, as the Japan deal shows, Indonesia is likely to focus more on developing the potential of maritime industries and services without any strategic measures on maritime security, both elements are prominent, and indeed inter-related.

Maritime security, as a vital part of becoming a global maritime fulcrum, should not be neglected for two crucial reasons. First, if piracy and armed attacks against ships cannot be forestalled by Indonesia’s coast guard and navy, it would potentially cause harm to the development of the maritime industry and service sectors. A lack of maritime security along the shipping lanes and ports in Indonesia would be a determinant factor for shipping companies weighing whether to involve Indonesia as a transit point.

Second, vulnerability to piracy may threaten the image of Indonesia as a maritime nation. If Indonesia is able to open up to receiving others’ contributions in the maritime industry sector, Indonesia will also need to respond to and prevent current and future maritime security challenges.

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and independently concerning on Indonesia’s maritime security issues.

The original article has been published in The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesia-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-against-maritime-piracy/>

What ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trump’s Triumph’ Warn Us About ASEAN Community

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Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Gadjah Mada University

One year after the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community, it is important to ask what relevance the political events, which have occurred in Europe and the USA this year, hold for ASEAN integration. These events have seen reassertions of national identity and the exaltations of the nation-state as a defense against supra-nationalism and globalization.  

How can we reflect on ASEAN’s slogan of regional integration, “One vision, One identity, One community” in light of Brexit, rising Euroskepticism and the election of Trump in USA?

The ‘Nation’ State vs ‘Globalists’ – A Reflection from Recent Surveys

Against this backdrop it is important to acknowledge the significance of rising nativism in Europe and the USA and the associated backlash against political establishments and institutions believed to represent globalization and supranationalism.

The EU is suffering from a crisis, wherein its political legitimacy has been tarnished by a perceived disconnect between its citizens and the institutions, which govern and represent them. Euroskepticm continues to rise throughout Europe. A Pew Centre poll of 10 EU countries, published on June 7th this year, found that 49% of Europeans viewed the EU unfavorably. Negative opinions are most pronounced in France, where 61% of the population hold this view and in Greece where the opinion is shared by 71% of the population.

The migrant and refugee crisis has brought anti-EU sentiment to a head, especially amongst rising  right-wing and nationalist movements. However, euroskeptism can be found both on both the left and right of the ideological spectrum, albeit predicated on many different issues. These issues range from negative economic expectations and rising inequality to cultural, migration and security concerns.

Defenders of the EU, extol the political project’s virtues as a champion of peace, prosperity, human rights, justice and democracy, however it is failing to maintain legitimacy amongst the citizens of its members states. Increasing numbers of Europeans hold the perception that the EU does not serve their interests.

This perception is spurring a defense of the nation-state. 42% of respondents in the Pew poll agree they want more powers returned to national governments, while only 19% wish to see a closer Europe and EU expansion through the transference of more power to the regional body.  

Lessons from ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trump’s Triumph’

Brexit was driven by rhetoric focused on reclaiming of national sovereignty. This rhetoric, and the campaigns victory, is all the more significant given the result caught the majority of elected representatives in both major parties unawares.

The same rhetoric appeared in Trump’s presidential campaign. Trump’s vision to ‘Make America Great Again’ was predicated on the notion of putting ‘America First’. With these slogans Trump promoted the role of the ‘Nation’ State as an institution designed to serve its citizens first, appealing to a wide range of Americans, disenfranchised with the political establishment.

Trump’s further appeals to the ‘forgotten man and women’ was also, arguably, a key to his victories in the rust belt states, the region of the country worst affected by globalization and free trade.  It is also important to note the rhetoric of many of Trumps supporters, and the media voices sympathetic to him, who use the term ‘globalist’ to describe their ideological opponents.

Lessons for ASEAN?

What lessons can be learnt from these recent developments in the Europe and the USA? Firstly, it is important to acknowledge the significance of ASEAN’s slogan for a region like South East Asia. ASEAN began as a pragmatic, rather than idealistic, political agreement amongst governing elites concerned with preserving regional peace and the stability of their rule.

It is significant, therefore, that an organization, created by, predominantly, post-colonial states, to aid projects of state-building and national identity formation, is now extending itself to become an engine to foster a second level of identification, the ASEAN identity. Creating such an identity is ambitious political project. Collective identity is often understood as key part of creating resilient communities, and the facilitation of such a shared identity will play an important role in managing the multitude of ethnic, religious and identity differences in one of the most diverse regions in the world.

However, Gita Murti, an Indonesian foreign-service officer who has worked in the Directorate for ASEAN Political Cooperation, argues, it is “easier to agree upon a vision than to form a true collective identity.” The Vision of ASEAN integration remains an elite driven agenda, but one which rests on support and engagement of the public, the constituents of the ‘one’ identity and community, in order to achieve political legitimacy.

The events in Europe illustrate the difficulties of creating regional institutions, which, represent, and benefit a wide range of, often divergent, interests and concerns, while Trump’s victory and Brexit testify to the continuing belief that the nation-state remains the best-placed political institution to address the interests and concerns of its citizens.  

The creation of the ASEAN community, like the EU, is of course an elite driven process, but it requires engagement from the public for its legitimacy. It represents a shift from the pragmatic and political, State-Centred ASEAN to the ideational and social project of creating a ‘people-centred ASEAN.’ This people-centred, or people-orientated ASEAN, is premised, not only a promoting ASEAN, and ASEAN identity amongst the regions citizens, but also on delivering concrete benefits for these people.

However, in 2012, ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan, warned that the birth of the ASEAN Community will create “winners and losers” with some communities ready to take full advantage of the new economic advantages available, while others may be left behind. He cautioned that growth of inequalities and disparities between communities may jeopardize the sense of belonging to the process of regional integration.

In light of these warnings, it is important to reflect on how the recent, and unfolding, attacks on supranationalism and globalisation in Europe and the USA hold relevance for ASEAN and its slogan of regional integration, “one vision, one community and one identity.”

ASEAN Political-Security Community: The Prospect of South China Sea

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Muhammad Ammar Hidayahtulloh

Best 10 Author of Call for Essay: ASEAN Community Post 2015

ASEAN is located strategically at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and its history has been shaped as much by the influence by great civilizations as the impact of great powers. Nevertheless, even the ASEAN has the strategic geographic position; the conflict or dispute within the region is unavoidable that will threat the peace and stability in the region. It’s related to the geographic position of ASEAN which close to the disputable South China Sea as one of the most important waterways in the world ever since its discovery of the source of oil and gasses.

The South China Sea (SCS) becomes the scene of occurring territorial dispute between China and several ASEAN member states; the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Vietnam, moreover the involvement of United States of America within the dispute has been increasing the tension in the region. Every claimant states have their own claim and strategy to assert their claim toward their sovereignty in the South China Sea. China marked South China Sea claims in 1947 which simplifying the border to nine-dashes that become the historical basis for its territorial claims up to this day. The rest claimant states are ASEAN member states are also taking different claims. Vietnam claims all of both the Spratly and Paracel island chains in the South China Sea. Malaysia claims over the islands and features in the Southern Spratly, and has occupied five of them since 2009. Philippines claims over 50 features in the Spratly and occupies nine of them, where its military presence is second only to that of Vietnam. Brunei claims only two features in the Spratly islands, submerged formations called Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, and extends its EEZ around the feature and well into the southern section of the South China Sea. The United States also involving its military power in South China Sea in order to protect the rights freedoms, and lawful uses of sea and airspace guaranteed to all.

ASEAN has outlined its position toward the SCS dispute, it has firstly signed by the agreement between ASEAN and China agreed upon ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 which approve ASEAN and China commitment to hand in hand maintain the SCS, furthermore DOC strongly support the adoption of Code of Conduct in SCS. Unfortunately, attributable to the overlapping claim on SCS at the moment the ASEAN’s position toward the South China Sea dispute is blurry. The difference stances among ASEAN countries on SCS dispute engender the disunity among ASEAN which leads the rough road in maintaining a unified position on a Code of Conduct. In 2012, ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting failed to issue joint statement for the first time, because the Cambodia didn’t agree and it was not reach the consensus. Lately in 2016, Cambodia refused to include the verdict of Permanent Court of Arbitration toward the SCS dispute. Cambodia position is hardly affected by its close relation with China. Heretofore, it such a big dilemma when Cambodia and other ASEAN countries takes uncooperative position which supporting China and diminishing the ASEAN unity.

By 2015, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) has established as the community to ensure the peace and stability in the region by deepening and expanding the cooperation in political and security sectors in responding the regional and international challenges, so does in SCS dispute. APSC has three key characteristics, a rules-based community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. The well implementation of these three characteristics by all ASEAN countries, the inter-state trust, solidarity and integrity can be reached which will make ASEAN become a strong regional unity. Aftermath, ASEAN countries will prefer in the side with fellow ASEAN countries rather than outside powers for pragmatic reasons.

After APSC has well-achieved to create strong regional unity; under the framework of APSC, the South China Sea is the sea of peace, prosperity and cooperation which encourage the dialogue, consultation, and negotiation regarding the SCS dispute bilaterally between ASEAN and China intensively to meet the agreement among the claimant states by adopting the Code of Conduct. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), ADMM-Plus, and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will much contributive to support to meet the agreement among all claimant states of SCS. Furthermore, the statement of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the East Summit in 2015 to cooperate collectively maintains the South China Sea can be used as the weapon to force China to commit for maintaining the dispute.

Thus, ASEAN must be stand together with unified common position on the SCS dispute and ensure the multilateral and regional solution are in accordance with the main characteristics and principle of APSC which is rules-based, beneficial for all concerned, preserve regional peace, stability and development. Eventually, as the expected prospect, SCS dispute can be settled without any further tensions in the region and the joint cooperation of South China Sea can be attained by all claimant states under the adoption of Code of Conduct on parties in South China Sea.

 

References:

ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016

ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009

Bhatia, Rajiv K., and Vijay Sakhuja. Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospect. New Delhi: Vij Book and Indian Council of World Affairs, 2014

Council on Foreign Relations. “China’s Maritime Disputes.” Accessed October 26, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/

Pertiwi, Sukmawani Bela. “Is ASEAN Unity in Danger Form the South China Sea?.” The Diplomat. August 3, 2016 Accessed October 29, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/is-asean-unity-in-danger-from-the-south-china-sea

Roach, J. Ashley. Foreword to Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of Their Claims in the South China Sea. Unites States: CNA Analysis and Solution Paper, 2014

Behind EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreements: Do Norms Matter?

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Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

The EU is currently attempting to pursue both normative political interests and economic interests in the ASEAN. I argue that the EU’s capacity to pursue its normative political interests through trade negotiations is dependent on its economic leverage and that ASEAN states, aware of the attractiveness of their markets, are willing to use their leverage to resist the EU’s attempts to export its political norms through binding legal mechanisms.

The EU has long promoted itself as the ‘model’ of regional integration and an ‘inspiration’ for ASEANs development. It has also provided significant assistance and financial support to the bourgeoning ASEAN secretariat. The EU’s normative political interests regard the attempt to export its norms of political cooperation, domestic and regional law, political institutions and values to other countries and regional bodies. The EU has, often, attempted to achieve this through conditionalities tied to FTA’s.

The resistance of ASEAN members to EU norms in trade negotiations does not, however, amount to a rejection of these norms, but a rejection of the process through which the EU attempts to pursue its normative political interests. ASEAN states have shown a willingness to adopt certain norms promoted by the EU, but only within the existing normative context of political cooperation common in the ASEAN region.

The Norms/Economic nexus in EU trade policy

The EU’s normative political interests are laid out in the Lisbon Treaty (2007), which articulates that EU foreign policy should be guided by its core principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The EU has often used markets access and financial aid as leverage to incentivize policy reform in accordance with ‘European’ values. The EU’s FTA’s are commonly accompanied by Political Cooperation Agreements (PCA’s) and ‘essential clause ’has been used to link preferential trade status to conditions of upholding‘ European values outlined in the PCA. Failure to meet conditionalities can trigger a suspension of trade preferences. The ‘essential’ clause has been a central feature of the EU’s agreements since the early 1990’s.

There are, however, tensions between the EU’s economic interests and its normative political interests. The EU is not a unified actor and there is a distinction between the economic interests of member states and the EU’s normative position, which gives identity to the EU as a whole. This places limits on the EU’s ability to pursue it normative political interests alongside economic interests. The EU has faced criticism for not activating conditionality enough, or for doing so selectively on ‘harmless’ partners, while being reluctant to do so against powerful countries.

As a fragmented power, the EU tends to compromise its normative ambitions and consistency in the face of commercial interests as member states are more likely to converge on economic rather than ideational interests.

Behind EU-ASEAN’s Free Trade Agreements: Examining the relationship between Norms and Economic Leverage

The tension between the EU’s commercial interests and normative ambitions is evident in the EU’s FTA negotiations with ASEAN states. The attractiveness of South East Asia markets has given ASEAN members greater leverage in negotiations, contributing to a relatively symmetrical relationship between the EU and ASEAN states. This blunts the EU’s capacity to insist on legally binding, coercive clauses and conditionalities with prospective partners, who also object to the inclusion of explicit language on social issues in FTA agreements.  

To date, the EU has signed FTA agreements with Singapore and Vietnam and has initiated negotiations with Malaysia and the Philippines.

In FTA negotiations with ASEAN members thus far, the ‘essential clause’ has been replaced with sustainability chapters, which cover labor and environmental practices. The chapters include a dispute resolution mechanism, which is less coercive and more collaborative than the ‘essential clause’ and prevents the unilateral suspension of trade preferences. A complaint can be brought to a panel of experts appointed by a Joint Council of the Agreement who, on the basis of evidence, may propose a non-binding plan of action.

“Normative Adaptation”: Explaining EU-ASEAN Relations

The EU’s inability to insist on strong clauses and conditionality does not, however, equate to a rejection of these norms in ASEAN. It represents that ASEAN states are not passive receivers of EU norms and rejection the process through which the EU attempts to pursue its normative interests. ASEAN has it own norms of political co-operation and the reception of EU norms must be adapted to this pre-existing normative context. While the EU favors institutionalization and the incorporation international principles into domestic law, ASEAN states exhibit a strong focus on protecting sovereignty and a preference for cooperation and discussion on such issues, thus rejecting their attachment to trade negotiations.

Furthermore, while ASEAN has continued to institutionalize, as evidenced by the signing and the ASEAN charter, these developments stop short of emulation of the EU and instead demonstrate the adoption of certain norms and institutions within the EU, where appropriate and where adaptable to ASEAN norms. The inclusion of statements on human rights in the charter, as well as the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human rights are significant examples, which must be understood within the political context of ASEAN’s regional norms.

ASEAN, at this stage, is concerned with promoting, rather than protecting human rights, meaning ASEAN has adopted these norms in a way which does not replace nor undermine the norm of non-interference. The EU’s turn to ‘soft’ mechanisms, such as sustainability chapters, therefore represents a compromise of normative interests and processes of adoption, brought on by the EU’s lack of economic leverage and the embeddedness of ASEAN’s own norms.