Robbery and Piracy in SEA (South-East Asia): Protecting the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)

September 24, 2021/0 Comments/in ASEAN Notes/by syukron.subkhi

The maritime element widely connected our world. Two-third of the Earth’s surface is covered by sea and ocean. Sea is not only providing huge natural resources which can be explored and exploited but also has a big geopolitical potential to support the distribution and trade between countries and continents. In the current globalized economy, where sea transportation has been so far modernized, the international trading system still uses 90% of the exchanges by using sea transportation (Sciascia: 2016).

Herve Coutau-Begarie (2007) mentioned that the maritime domain has to be considered toward the frame called the “Maritime Triad”. The term was introduced to better understand the classification of the maritime domain, which is classified into three kinds of maritime space. (1) Maritime domain as a space of communication, there could be seen the international trade exchange that still uses the sea transportation, and according to TeleGeography, there is a fact that by more than 99% of international communications by the internet are carried and connected over fiber optic cables under the sea; (2) Maritime domain as a space of resources, the oceans have enormous reserves of energy and natural resources. Not only gas and oil, but the oceans are also a potential energy and renewable resource with a large number of minerals, fisheries, and many unexplored resources; (3) Maritime domain as a space for projection of power, the history shows that the sea has been the field of many wars in the past between countries, this proves how important the sea is for a country as one aspect that can be determined as a power.

The maritime domain can be defined as the surface of Earth covered by sea and littoral areas, and geographically speaking, a “space”. In this specific “multidimensional space” that has been considered a frontier for centuries, human interactions occur, which makes the protection and securitization of the maritime domain a necessity (Parrain: 2012). By it means, the maritime domain is subjected to several violence and threats in its development which could be determined, including but not limited to piracy and armed robbery in the sea. According to the Wikidiff, piracy is the hyponym of the (nautical) robbery at sea, an act of a violation against international law and taking a ship away from the control of those legally entitled to it. But the different meanings of piracy and robbery could be determined based on UNCLOS III Article 101, in which piracy is defined as any illegal acts of violence which occur on high seas and beyond the jurisdiction of any state. Meanwhile, according to Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Article 1, armed robbery against ships is defined as any illegal acts of violence in a place within the contracting party’s jurisdiction over such offenses. By the risks and threats against the maritime domain, maritime security evolved where the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) is the most important or vital object to be protected.

Protecting the SEA’s Sea

According to Barry Buzan (1991), security in the maritime domain is a major stake for humanity. Moreover, in a world where the concept of security has deeply evolved since the end of the cold war. The threats and risks could also be determined on two conceptions: (1) Traditional threats, traditional maritime security threats in South-East Asia, are preeminent regarding the long history of territorial disputes in the area. Issues related to sovereignty, sovereign rights, and border governance are widely spread. They might threaten the stable situation in the region if not addressed in a good manner by the involved parties, in this case, the concerned states (Sciascia: 2016). Besides, other states excluded in the South-East Asia Region may interfere with the situation and escalated the conflict, such as China with their interest in the South China Sea, where most of the area is located in the South-East Asia Region. (2) Non-traditional threats, different from traditional threats, non-traditional threats cover many aspects of threats and risks. This threat covers more issues to be concerned not limited to a conflict between states, but also non-state actors involved in terrorism, piracy, robbery, illegal fishing, slavery, environmental issues, etc. This article will mainly discuss the conception of non-traditional threats in piracy and armed robbery in South-East Asia, especially amid the world-spread Covid-19 pandemic.

Picture: www.semanticscholar.org

South-East Asia is strategically located at the crossing of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and between two continents Australia and Asia. South-East Asia, as we know, have two countries, Indonesia and The Philippines that are archipelagic, Myanmar that adjacent directly to the Indian Ocean, Singapore, and Malaysia is located at the crossroads between the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, then Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam are adjacent to the South China Sea. The region is home of importance oceans, seas, and straits that formed one of the busiest international Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). Those facts above make the international trade between countries by the sea transportation revolving frequently in this region.

Since the 1990s, South-East Asia has been considered the target area where piracy and armed robbery conduct against international law. Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia have initiated the joint patrol program in Malacca Straits, namely Malacca Straits Patrol, to tackle piracy in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, according to safety4sea.com, new types of crimes may have occurred. High-value tankers can be targets if cybercriminals receive information from company servers or ship officials are complicit and give up information to pirates about the ship’s position or the cargo on board. On a side note, insurance fraud is common, with vessels submitting fake reports of attacks to get insurance pay-outs.

According to the European Institute of Asian Studies, a number of the piracy and robbery activity in Southeast Asia has traditionally been concentrated around the vitally important Strait of Malacca shipping artery. The impact of the 2004 tsunami (which destroyed many pirate hideouts and small vessels in the area), along with effective counter-piracy measures undertaken in the Strait since 2005, has shifted the focus of these activities towards the coasts of Singapore and Malaysia, and in particular to other sections of the traditionally risky Indonesian waters.

Until now, piracy and robbery activities in the Southeast Asia Region have not been properly resolved by countries involved in the protection of the sea lanes of communication. In 2020, following the Covid-19 pandemic that affects the development of further economic in South-East Asia into desperation, the number of piracy and armed robbery at sea cases in the Singapore Strait hit its highest mark in half a decade, with its 34 incidents forming the bulk of cases in Asia’s waters in the year. Based on the article in the Critical Maritime Routes Programme, as a matter of facts, highlighted by ReCAAP ISC Executive Director Masafumi Kuroki at the 12th Nautical Forum on 15 January 2021, there was a significant increase in ‘actual incidents’ of piracy last year (+17% compared to 2019) in South-East Asia. The most worrisome aspect of this development is that incidents have increased in various locations, such as Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Viet Nam, the South China Sea, and the Singapore Strait. The broad range of these locations is emblematic of the regional scope of the problem.

In a pandemic situation that spreads worldwide, communication and distribution of humanitarian and logistical assistance from one country to another for handling the virus outbreaks also enliven international sea trade routes. Moreover, following the economic crises caused by the pandemic raises social symptoms, increasing the criminality rate. The SLOCs are inseparable from this situation, the crime rate caused by the high unemployment rate, forcing coastal communities to turn to crime as a means to fund themselves and their families. Some of the funds to conduct patrols in marine areas prone to piracy and robbery are being cut to overcome the pandemic. This is a dilemma that must be wisely decided and determined by the government.

The situation on protecting and securing the SLOCs in South-East Asia concerned the states in the region and states that conduct the international trade exchanges by sea transportation through South-East Asia. For instance, the European Union eek more active involvement in activities ensuring smooth trade and securitization of the SLOCs. According to the Critical Maritime Routes Programme, the current EU-ASEAN Plan of Action reaffirms the importance of strengthened cooperation on maritime security issues, such as in combatting sea piracy, armed robbery against ships, as well as encouraging cooperation to address the maritime-related problems comprehensively. In 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was proposed and sponsored by the United States to help the securitization of the SLOCs in South-East Asia, was rejected by Indonesia. The initiative was argued that it might interfere with the state’s sovereignty and potentially threaten Indonesian security (Sciascia: 2016).

So, what is the best way to overcome this issue and wisely protect the SLOCs, while the pandemic situation must end? Combating piracy is consequently a difficult herculean task. Beyond the joint patrol system to the prone sea areas of piracy and robbery, it requires the implication of wise and strong policy by the government. The cooperation and coordination include but are not limited to the states in the region, the external actors (states outside the region), even if it is possible to involve the international organization to promote communication and information exchanges to guarantee security and freedom of shipping overseas. The international coordination mechanism should be conducted properly and avoid the intervention to areas that could increase the tension and escalate the conflict between actors. The cooperation between the actors and stakeholders does not mean and need the same role and responsibilities in the securitization of the maritime domain, or specifically the SLOCs. Every actor and stakeholder have their respective portions and roles in achieving the goal of the securitizations.

Bibliography

Sciascia, Alban, “Securing Ports and Se Lanes of Communication: A Herculian Task”, Penerbit Aswaja Pressindo, Yogyakarta, 2016
Coutau-Begarrie, Herve, “The Globalized Ocean: Geopolitic of Seas in the 21st Century), Economica, 2007.
Parrain, Camille, “High Sea: A Space at the Frontier of Geographic Research), EchoGeo, 2012, no. 19
Buzan, Barry, “People State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era”, ECPR, 2007(first edition 1991)
Hribernik, Miha, “Countering Maritime Piracy and Robbery in Southeast Asia: The Role of the ReCAAP Agreement” European Institute of Asian Studies, Briefing Paper 2013/2
“Piracy and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia: the long-lasting legacy of COVID-19”, 2 February 2021, https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/2021/02/02/piracy-and-armed-robbery-at-sea-in-southeast-asia-the-long-lasting-legacy-of-covid-19/

About Writer

Syukron Subkhi is a Media Publication Officer at ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada. He holds the bachelor’s degree of Social Sciences majors in International Relations with particular focuses on International Organizations, Socio-Cultural, Security and Development Studies.

0 replies

Want to join the discussion?
Feel free to contribute!

Latest Articles

ASEAN Spice: The Connecting Culture of Southeast AsiansJune 1, 2024 - 3:49 am
RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
Redefining Commodities in International Trade: ASEAN Blue Carbon Initiative and Its Role in Navigating Climate Crisis in the Southeast Asia RegionDecember 18, 2023 - 12:05 am
Korea-Indonesia Cooperation Forum in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of Diplomatic RelationsDecember 6, 2023 - 3:53 am

Facebook

RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Robbery and Piracy in SEA (South-East Asia): Protecting the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)

Leave a Reply

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

ASEAN STUDIES CENTER UGM

CONTACT US