Kevin Iskandar Putra

May 29^th 2018 remarks the 70^th Years of Service and Sacrifice of the UN Peacekeepers. Through the General Assembly Resolution 57/129 on the report of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) adopted in its fifty-seventh session held 24 February 2003, the international community decided to dedicate one day to commemorate and honor the dedication and contribution of the UN blue helmet as a front line to ensure international peace and stability. These blue helmets were first deployed by the UN Security Council to ensure the monitoring process of the Israeli-Arab Countries Armistice Agreement on 29 May 1948.

As recorded by the United Nations, 3,700 UN peacekeepers have lost their lives in the battlefield since 1948. This number includes 134 in the year 2017. The UN Charter Chapter VIII governs the Regional Arrangements, asserting that “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”. However, the utilization of such regional arrangements could also be taken with the authorization of the UNSC, according to the Article 53 (1) of the chapter.

Since its establishment in 1957, ASEAN, as a regional inter-governmental organization has been contributed greatly to the making of regional stability. The ASEAN Charter Article 1 (1), “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability in the region” reflects a commitment made to contribute to the making of the UN Charter Art. 1 (1) to maintain international peace and security. Political-security cooperation ensuring peace and security, embedded in the Plan of Action of ASEAN and the UN (2016 – 2020) 1.1.4., emphasizes the intention to further cooperate with the UN to provide continued training assistance in peacekeeping to ASEAN, including training in humanitarian affairs and civil-military coordination, gender issues such as the role of women peacekeepers, health, safety and security arrangements, and support ASEAN’s efforts in strengthening the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network, including through the sharing of lessons learned, best practices and capacity building.

Table 1: Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post
Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troop (31/03/2018)

Country	Police	UNMEM	Troops	Staff Officers	Total
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	30	0	30
Cambodia	0	6	769	14	789
Indonesia	175	30	2,445	45	2,695
Laos	–	–	–	–	–
Malaysia	20	10	818	17	865
Myanmar	0	0	0	2	2
Philippines	0	10	0	0	10
Singapore	–	–	–	–	–
Thailand	8	9	0	5	22
Viet Nam	0	3	0	5	8
Grand Total ASEAN	203	68	4062	88	4421
Grand Total World	10,679	1,316	77,145	1,918	91,058
Proportion	1.2 %	5 %	5 %	4.5 %	4.8 %

To date, ASEAN countries have contributed to peacekeeping missions that include police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troops. Per March 2018, the number of personnel deployed by ASEAN accounts up to 4,419 personnel to the UN PKO with 4,239 male and 180 female personnel. In this regard, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia are the largest contributing countries measured by the number of mission and post. Such number shows the huge gap between men and women peacekeepers. The total number of the male peacekeepers are also significantly higher than that of female peacekeepers, comprising 86,723 men and 4,335 women.

Gender disparity in UNPKO is problematic because the role of women, in this regards, has not yet been considered seriously in peacekeeping process. As matter of fact, women in peacekeeping operations contribute positively to improve intelligence-gathering, deconstructing cultural and social biases in some conflicting areas, as well as breaking down the gender-based violence and exploitation. The milestones for women in PKO could be seen from the story where Major General Kristin Lund of Norway was deployed to Cyprus as the first female to serve as Force Commander in UN PKO; Gladys Ngwepekeum Nkeh in the Central African Republic, as well as Major Bettina Stelzer’s in South Sudan.

Increasing the deployment of women is an important agenda for the United Nations. It is believed that by incorporating women in peacekeeping operations the key to reduce the root causes of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN forces will be found. Based on Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers: Addressing the Gender Imbalance (as of 30 March 2018) countries in ASEAN that have contributed to 14% or more women peacekeepers are only Philippines and Thailand.  Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Indonesia belong to the countries with 0.1% or more contribution of women peacekeeping. Whereas, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are countries in ASEAN that do not contribute to women peacekeeping.

Initially, the agenda to reduce the gender gap in women peacekeepers was mentioned in the reports by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan Bulletin 2003 and the Zeid Report, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Despite the contributions of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, ASEAN is nowhere near to be a model for a regional organization that is significant in its contribution to the peacekeeping mission. In order to go to that direction, countries such as Singapore and Laos should be encouraged to submit their report on their contribution in Peacekeeping Operation to evaluate their supports in terms of human resources and funding.

Indonesia, through its Foreign Minister Retno L. P. Marsudi has pledged to send four thousand peacekeeping troops to overseas UN missions by 2019. This reflects that another effort to improve the role of one ASEAN country is in the making. However, this would not constitute as a large contribution if other  ASEAN countries has no willingness to follow Indonesia’s effort to increase its contribution to the peacekeeping mission.

In line with the expected role of PKO such as to monitor the peace process in two disputing parties, ceasefires and the withdrawal of troops to reduce the tensions and prevent the recurrence of hostilities, ASEAN should also give its paramount focus in the maintenance of international peace and security. Should the international community aim to realize its vision towards stability, a greater commitment should be put in the conflict prevention, cooperation with regional body like ASEAN, as well as allocating more money to fund and deploy peace mission. These collective efforts combined will reflect the efforts to materialize the three pillars of the UN systems, namely peace and security, development, and human rights. The road towards stability will be a long and winding, but the gap towards its end-goal could be narrowed by shedding more lights in improving the effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations.

The writer is a Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Siti Widyastuti Noor

October 2017, marked the third year of administration for Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi’ Widodo. In the beginning of his administration, Jokowi announced the nine prioritized agendas as Nawa Cita, a program that was initiated as an effort to bring Indonesia into a politically sovereign state, economically independent and cultural personality as a state.

In order to realize the spirit of Nawa Cita, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulates three priorities of foreign policy, namely: safeguarding Indonesian sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens and intensifying economic diplomacy.

Meanwhile, Dino Patti Djalal, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, notes that at the beginning of Jokowi’s administration, more attention is paid to the domestic affairs, whose policies tend to be inward-looking, as reflected in his focus on developing national infrastructure. There are 225 projects on a national infrastructure based on President Regulation no. 3 years 2016. The project was later improved to as 248 projects based on the President Regulation no. 58 of 2017. This national infrastructure project is one of the highlighted projects at its disposal in order to improve inter-regional ties and as an effort to reduce the gap between eastern and western parts of Indonesia.

A Retreat from Multilateralism

Observing the dynamics of foreign policy for 3 years administration, Jokowi is more likely to emphasize on consolidation at the national level compared with foreign policy of his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) which emphasized more on a free and active engagement on multilateralism with an outward-looking policy, “a thousand friends, zero enemy”.

Jokowi is more of a domestic reformer when compared to SBY is actively promoting foreign policy as the spotlight of his government. The most noticeable manifestation of differences is Indonesia’s retreat from multilateralism, which is demonstrated by Indonesia’s inactivity to participate in multilateral forums, particularly ASEAN. He missed three opportunities to present as head of state at the United Nations General Assembly and also in the Developing Eight High-Level Meeting in Istanbul.

Although the domestic development agenda progressed significantly, it should be understood that the success of the foreign policy is also capable of affecting the domestic agenda and the Indonesian people. Jokowi’s foreign policy outlook is considered to be a loss to Indonesia’s position as a leading country in ASEAN that might also have an impact on the regional integration agenda.

In addition, many consider that Indonesia’s withdrawal from Multilateral Forum eliminates the opportunity of Indonesia to participate actively in promoting important issues of concern to Indonesia to other countries, as well as undermining Indonesia’s position as a non-permanent member of UNSC candidate.

Jokowi’s Economic Diplomacy

As one of the focus of his policy, Jokowi plays a significant role to enhance the economic diplomacy. Priorities on the economy are defined in the Strategic Plan of Ministry of Foreign Policy 2015-2019 as the utilization of international politics to achieve the national development target.

One of the policies is the diversification of export market. For most of the time, Indonesia is focusing its export activities on traditional export destination countries, such as United States, China, or European market. Under Jokowi, significant changes can be found from a widening and diverse export destination countries, as Indonesia starts to established economic relations with the Middle East, Latin America, and African countries, such as Chile, Turkey, Egypt, Niger and some other countries. This move resulted in a more positive impact on Indonesia’s export and the surplus of trade balance. According to the data from Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Indonesia’s export in the January-September 2017 period reached $123.36 billion.

Indonesia and ASEAN

As a founding member and de facto leader of ASEAN for the great importance of ASEAN GDP and the largest population, Indonesia’s centrality in ASEAN is valuable. Although Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN is not as big and as large as ever, Indonesia still shows great concern and active participation in the Rohingya refugee story. Recently, the latest issue of human rights issues in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Indonesia, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Myanmar for a bilateral meeting to discuss the issue in Rohingya. This method became effective because it later became one of the ways to attract the Government of Myanmar and humanitarian aid humanitarian aid in the form of daily necessities, set up six elementary school buildings, and one hospital.

In recent news, Jokowi is reportedly sending aid to Rohingya refugees through the ASEAN instruments. The Foreign Ministry’s efforts to approach the Myanmar government and encourage ASEAN Member Countries to provide humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Center for Disaster Management (AHA Center) is a sign that Indonesia under Jokowi’s government still values ​​geopolitics and relations among ASEAN countries.

Despite of the hard work of the government to introduce the new approaches and development priorities, it is important for Indonesia to continue paying attention to the regional and international cooperation that has been built since the previous presidency, as a form of active participation and fulfillment of Indonesia’s role in international level.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Universitas Gadjah Mada

In May, I went with my research team to Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan, one of Indonesia’s hotspots of land and forest fires.

We wanted to know how local administrations view an agreement between ASEAN countries on haze pollution that Indonesia ratified two years ago.

We were surprised to hear that the acting head of Central Kalimantan Environmental Agency, Humala Pontas, admitted he didn’t know much about the agreement. He asked:

What is contained in the agreement? Which part of haze does it regulate? Are there any provisions that contain economic or other means?

Here, as well as in other areas in Kalimantan, Sumatra and Papua, slash-and-burn methods are still commonly used to clear land for expansion of oil palm plantations. Palm oil is Indonesia’s top export.

Slash-and-burn is the cheapest and fastest way to prepare land for planting. But it produces haze that harms the health of humans and wildlife. Emissions from forest conversion in Indonesia contribute to global warming.

The smoke from burning doesn’t only affect the area where land is being cleared. It travels with the wind to neighbouring countries.

Response to haze crisis

In 2002, ASEAN members agreed on the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP). This was a response to a haze crisis after huge forest fires in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998 created a thick smog across neighbouring countries.

At the time, fires burned some 45,000 square kilometres of forests in Kalimantan and Sumatra. The wind swept the acrid smoke across the region, polluting Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and even Thailand.

The haze crisis happened in the midst of the devastating Asian Financial Crisis. The timing meant countries in the region struggled to cope with this disaster.

In 1998, Singapore’s minister for environment and health, Yeo Cheow Thong, stated:

A repeat of this disaster will surely aggravate the already bad regional economic situation.

Forest and land fires in Indonesia were leading factors why ASEAN countries formed the haze agreement. During the ministerial meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, in April 1998, ASEAN members blamed Indonesia for its land-clearing activities.

Hence, the 1997-1998 fires prompted ASEAN countries to try to overcome the economic and health impact of haze crisis together.

Slow implementation

It took 11 years after the treaty came into force for Indonesia to ratify the agreement in 2014. But two years in, Indonesia has yet to enact regulations at the national and local level.

Article 11 of the haze agreement obliged state parties, among others, to:

ensure that appropriate legislative, administrative and financial measures are taken to mobilise equipment, materials, human and financial resources required to respond to and mitigate the impact of land and/or forest fires and haze pollution arising from such fires.

During a closed interview with an expert staff of the Legislation Committee at Indonesia’s House of Representative (DPR), she, who requested to remain anonymous, admitted that the House still views additional regulations at the national and local level as unnecessary.

Lawmakers believed that national laws, such as the 2014 Law on Plantations and the 2009 Law on Environmental Protection and Management, were adequate, she said.

These laws do share the spirit of ASEAN’s zero-burning policy. The ASEAN haze treaty has a provision urging parties to prevent land-clearing using fire. The Indonesian laws mentioned above also prohibit land-clearing by burning.

But none of Indonesia’s national laws make special reference to haze or pollution resulting from slash-and-burn activities.

In fact, Indonesia does not categorise the spread of haze from forest burning as a disaster. For Indonesia, haze is merely a result of forest burning, especially when it’s man-made. Not categorising haze as a disaster prevents the country’s national and local disaster agencies from responding accordingly.

To implement the haze treaty, Indonesia could, for instance, legislate to expand the authority of the country’s Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and local disaster management agencies at the provincial level to carry out activities to prevent and mitigate any transboundary haze crisis.

Currently, their mandate is limited to emergency preparedness. The local disaster relief fund can be used only when the haze status reaches “emergency standby” status. As a result, national and local disaster agencies cannot prevent and mitigate haze. They can only start work once there are already fires and haze.

Disjointed action

Within the Indonesian government, problems of commitment and co-ordination among agencies at the central and local level persist.

The Ministry of Environment and Forestry – the government body responsible for tackling threats to the environment – does not seem interested in enforcing the ASEAN haze agreement. It’s more focused on “project-based” action, such as distributing firefighting pump machines to the community.

It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of international agreements, that actively supported Indonesia’s ratification of the haze treaty.

As a consequence of the discord between the two ministries, two years into Indonesia’s ratification of the agreement, local administrations are still not aware of it.

What’s at stake?

If Indonesia maintains its non-compliant behavior, the regional community will continue to blame Indonesia for Southeast Asia’s haze problems. Previously, Indonesia’s non-ratification delayed the establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordination Centre for Haze

ASEAN has set a goal of a haze-free region by 2020. It may not achieve that goal if Indonesia does not not catch up. In a more general and long-term effect, Indonesia will lose its “natural leadership” position in ASEAN, as one of ASEAN’s founders and the largest economy in Southeast Asia.

It’s important to have a united approach between different government agencies for Indonesia to comply with the agreement.

Local administrations throughout Indonesia should be informed about the policy. Only this way can we ensure that policies are synchronised and implemented effectively at national and local level.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Sumber asli artikel ini dari The Conversation. Baca artikel sumber.

 

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar and Karina Larasati B. Riyanto

What should ASEAN do in the next 50 years? For ASEAN, its survival for the last 50 years is a great achievement. Although some people said that ASEAN has undergone slow and steady development, its survival during the last 50 year has proved ASEAN’s resilience to political changes in global.

But could ASEAN survive for another 50 years? ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada has presented a series of article on “ASEAN after 50”, which comprises reflections on what has ASEAN achieved in latest 50 years and what should be done in the future. Many authors shared optimism –alongside critical viewpoint—on the future of ASEAN.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar kicked-off by arguing that the future ASEAN integration needs to move beyond political and economic integration. He suggests that ASEAN needs to take into account broader issues other than traditional free trade, security, or political integration issues. ASEAN needs to deal with oft-neglected issues such as Middle Income Trap, Sustainability, Human Rights, or Gender.

Suraj Shah, for example, argues that ASEAN needs to rethink its approach to development and industrial strategy in order to escape the Middle Income Trap. Economic integration attempt to pave the way for such initiative, but the perceived ASEAN way among the member states constrained the implementation.

Taking a more critical stance, Jakkrit Chuamuangphan calls ASEAN to pay more attention to Human Rights defender. The case of forced disappearances in many Southeast Asian states (most notably, the Sombhat case in Laos) should be tackled by ASEAN by functioning its Human Rights Commission, which has been established since 2009. Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha highlights the many languages of gender discrimination in the region, which ASEAN is still unable to respond with proper policy frameworks.

From a sustainability perspective, Ibnu Budiman reflects the need for ASEAN to rethink its approach to agricultural sector due to the danger of climate change. Moreover, he suggests that ASEAN should start to protect the rights of smallholder farmers through investing in climate action. A more participatory approach with farmers in each ASEAN member states is therefore necessary.

Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito raises more questions as to how we should reconsider ASEAN studies in the future, given the existing social and political challenges in the last 50 years. For example, as Dio H. Tobing has critically asked, is such notion like ASEAN Way –a perceived diplomatic culture among ASEAN member states based on non-intervention principle—still relevant in the future? The answer yes, given the historical importance of such norm in the past.

Nevertheless, according to Rifky Maulana Iqbal Taufik, ASEAN should also consider establishing a more complex form of collective identity to bring the idea of ASEAN Community ‘down to ordinary people’. This is where paradiplomacy is increasingly important for ASEAN. Ario Bimo Utomo explains that which the practice of diplomacy is not only dominated by the central government, but also the local government. This new framework should also be considered by ASEAN in the future. This necessitates further capacity development and inclusion of ‘good governance’ in ASEAN’s institutional design, according to Pinto Buana Putra.

In the end, the trend of Asian international politics in the 21st century shows geopolitical challenges that ASEAN cannot deny. The geopolitical context in Asia is changing. The rise of China after nearly forty years of reforms evokes the signs of uncertainty, security instability and also, expectation, within the region.
On the one hand, China’s presence as the new global economic force altered the direction of bilateral relations in Asia by reducing the dominance power and influence of the United States within the region. China rise to power succeeded in providing new nuances in regional cooperation including export activities of Southeast Asia countries. On the other hand, as suggested by many analysts, rising power usually emerges as revisionist rather than status quo powers or simply maintaining the balance of power. With China outgrowing as a regional power and on its way through the global stage, its opening up the possibility of creating a new order in the international system.

China’s economic ascent and therefore, military strengthening raises concerns about the possibility of war outbreak between the two great powers and the deteriorated conflict in the South China Sea, involving China and most of the ASEAN member states. As a matter of fact, what is seen to date, instead of peace and stability as promised, there is an increase of tension and China’s arrogance in securing its state’s interests.

Another challenge for ASEAN in this geopolitical shift is to maintain the neutrality and unity of ASEAN member states. It is worth noting, China’s growing economic relations with ASEAN member states is remarkable but the US is an irreplaceable element of regional balance because it is the US that has brought prosperity to the region. The competition of two or more great forces within the region has, indirectly, divided regions over different frontiers. With the faded unity among ASEAN member states, ASEAN has increasingly lost its relevance and power to act as a stabilizer between the competition of the two great powers.

The geopolitical shift and the rise of China are inevitable. To deal with this challenges, ASEAN needs to wisely benefit on the opportunities and fight against any possibilities that might deteriorate regional peace and stability. The generous goal of China in establishing Asia as an independent region should be put to good use.

This is where ASEAN needs to strengthen its cooperation with China as well as the other countries to counterweight China’s power in the region, as argued by Gabriel Lele,  ASEAN should not become a ‘passive actor’ in crafting cooperation with China. Rather, ASEAN should negotiate in many relevant aspects, one of which is the cooperation based on history past and similarity on culture.

 

*) Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center UGM and
Karina Larasati is a Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Ario Bimo Utomo

During the last few decades, sub-state entities have been rising to prominence due to the increasing level of globalization. Anthony Giddens argues that this phenomenon is caused by two colliding forces of globalization, namely the upward force and the downward force. The upward force, as Giddens describes, is a force which diminishes the traditional state boundaries by creating an increasing interconnectedness among states.

On the other hand, the downward force of globalization is a force which encourages local entities to realize their own positions in this increasingly connected world—forcing states to provide them with channels to express their own interests. The involvement of sub-state entities in the foreign affairs is known as paradiplomacy.

Paradiplomacy, an abbreviation of “parallel diplomacy”, is a concept which depicts the ability of sub-state entities (cities, provinces, autonomous regions) to engage in international affairs with their foreign counterparts. Andre Lecours states that paradiplomacy can be conducted within three different scopes: (1) economic, (2) cultural, and (3) political. Intuitively, paradiplomacy is possible to enhance the quality of democracy as it makes policies less elitist by putting the decision-making authority closer to the people.

Paradiplomacy constitutes one prominent issue in this 50 years anniversary of ASEAN. However, we can examine that paradiplomacy is relatively unknown in most scholarships about the organization. We may notice that states are still positioned as the most prominent actors. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been popular for having its own unique principles which essentially champions state-centric norms such as non-interference and respect for sovereignty—a set of principles which is dearly called as the ASEAN Way. This stance has sparked debates regarding its relevance in this increasingly-interconnected world.

It is difficult to envisage a diplomatic mechanism which positions sub-state entities as other actors in alternative discourses about ASEAN. Therefore, it leads us to our main question: can ASEAN—with its ASEAN Way—embrace paradiplomacy?

ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities

The organization, however, does not stipulate explicitly how sub-state engagement can be conducted. In the ASEAN Charter, yet, the organization has already outlined a vision that ASEAN shall be a “people-oriented” society which everyone can benefit from its integration (Point 13 of the Article 1). Through the Blueprint of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, ASEAN has also indicated its commitment to building a more “inclusive, sustainable, resilient, and dynamic” community.

Those factors indicate that sub-state engagements are not impossible to be done within the current ASEAN framework.

As a matter of fact, it is incorrect to say that the paradiplomatic activity is completely unknown to this organization. Despite its essential focus in state-to-state relations, the organization has already got a platform which paved a road for sub-state entities to be positioned as actors. In this case, we can pick an example from a program called the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities.

During 2009-2015, the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities was intended to be a part of the wider ASEAN Socio-cultural Community Blueprint. According to the ASEAN official website, the program is a manifestation of ASEAN’s mission to promote a quality living standard in urban areas. Thereby, this program aimed to ensure that “cities/urban areas in ASEAN are environmentally sustainable while meeting the social and economic needs of the people”. The program involved 25 cities from the different 10 ASEAN member states. The cities picked are described as “smaller and rapidly-growing” urban areas.

Within this program, there are some activities such as the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on the Environmentally Sustainable Cities, ASEAN Model Cities Program, and the ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities Award. The two latter examples were utilized as an incentive as well as benchmarking measures for the respective cities to develop.

As Southeast Asia is a home to the increasingly-urbanizing 580 million people, it is understandable that ASEAN puts a bigger emphasis on cities. The increasing role of urban areas as the bridge between the regional aspirations and the grassroots level, consequently, cannot be ignored.

In a bigger picture, cities have a significant role in localizing international goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) stipulated by the United Nations. Such efforts are harder to attain when the states cannot accurately translate the needs of their smaller constituent units.

Sub-state engagements can be done without necessarily breaching the core ASEAN principle which upholds sovereignty. With the lack of ASEAN awareness remains a haunting problem in realizing a Southeast Asian socio-cultural community, paradiplomacy offers a channel which connects people with the organization. In this case, the ASEAN Way should not be perceived as a stumbling block.

In contrast, the core ASEAN principles can be a common identity which brings a special colour toward the ASEAN paradiplomacy, enabling the parties to realize their shared identity and to achieve their collective interests in a peaceful manner.

Fifty years since its establishment, ASEAN has shown its progress as a dynamic and forward-looking regional organization. However, it also signifies that ASEAN still has more to offer in responding to the modern diplomatic trends. In this case, paradiplomacy can be a solution. Mainstreaming paradiplomacy can be a future investment for the organization to stay relevant with the needs of its heterogeneous constituents.

This can be done by creating new programs which give more portions to the local entities to participate. Member states, on the other hand, should also be committed to encouraging its sub-state units to stay on track with the regional vision in creating an inclusive community through an extensive public diplomacy.

 

*) Ario Bimo Utomo is a former research assistant at the ASEAN Studies Center UGM. He earned his master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Sydney, Australia.