Entries by aseansc

Press Release Public Lecture: “The Politics of Leadership Succession: A Comparative Perspective across Democratic and Non-democratic Regimes”

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Yogyakarta, 20 August 2019

On Tuesday 20th August 2019, ASEAN Studies Center UGM welcomed the new semester with a public lecture by Professor Ludger Helms from the University if Innsbruck, Austria. In this lecture, Professor Helms talked about his research on leadership succession, and compared leadership transitions between democratic and non-democratic governments. The public lecture was held in Universitas Gadjah Mada’s Faculty of Social and Political Sciences and was moderated by Robbaita Zahra, an intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM.

The public lecture commenced by questioning the definition of leadership, what exactly constitutes as leadership, and what is specifically required from an individual or a group in order to be recognized as a leader. Professor Helms believed that leaders do not necessarily refer to the incumbent – anyone who is able to inspire and mobilize a group of people to perform actions could also be definitively considered as a leader, regardless of whether their intentions were ‘good’ or ‘bad.’[1] 

Furthermore, Professor Helms also explained the difference between ‘successions’ and ‘transitions’ as these two terms are often used synonymously.  In democratic studies, ‘successions’ entail change in political leaders and/or parties, whereas ‘transitions’ mean something else. The difference between the two is best described as such: when a government experiences change in its dominant political party, it is considered a ‘succession’, but when the government only experiences mere reform, it is considered a ‘transition’.

Helms believed that successions are mainly found in non-democratic regimes. Evident authoritarian governments such as dictatorships mainly appoint its successor from close spheres of influence. With the case of monarchies, the king or queen may appoint its successor on familial merits. However, this is not exclusively exercised by non-democratic regimes. In democratic governments, a leader could also find its successor within dynastic families that often play a large role in the government’s authority – occupying parliamentary seats without public notice and driving the country’s policies from the shadows.  However, it is important to note that this is a rare occurrence.

The lecture also highlighted five differences between democratic and non-democratic leadership successions: institutionalization and openness of succession, the existence or absence of term limits, incumbency advantage and longevity, the ability of leaders to pick their own successors, and political dynasties.

One significant finding that Helm’s research brought was that non-democratic governments, that are usually ruled by such autocratic regimes, tend to have much longer ruling periods in comparison to more democratic regimes. The centralization in autocratic regimes also contributes to the adoption and maintenance of a single policy without opposition, which provides an incumbency advantage for the leader. Meanwhile, in democracies, such policies would more likely be safeguarded by the opposition coalition to ensure its execution, limiting the power of the incumbent to single-handedly choose their next successor.

Professor Helms ended the lecture by emphasizing the need to develop a more substantive academic understanding of leadership succession, especially how the study has not been developed as much as its other political science counterparts. He specifically refers to the need for better conceptualization and better data compilation so that the study of leadership succession could further contribute to the study of democracy implementation of various countries.

[1]Professor Helms expressed his dissatisfaction to his colleagues that argue that ‘bad’ leaders such as Hitler or Stalin, simply referring to them as ‘power-wielder.’ In his point of view, no matter how ‘bad’ they are, they can still be considered as a leader as they fulfill the prerequisites, requirements, and what it takes to be a leader.

Written by Daffa Syauqi, Robbaita Zahra, Fara Sheila. Edited by Nisrina H Khotimah. Research interns at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN, EU collaboration needed to resolve palm oil dispute

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Image: Palm oil mill in Sabah, Malaysia © CEphoto, Uwe Aranas

The failure  to upgrade ties between the EU and ASEAN to a new strategic dialogue partnership at the 22nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting was another blemish on relations between the most institutionalized regional groupings of the developed and developing world.

The outcome of the talks, however, do not come as a surprise and reflect that the EU is more concerned with upgrading relations than ASEAN. ASEAN member states, meanwhile, are using the interregional negotiations to leverage national agendas.

While the EU and the majority of ASEAN member states were ready to conclude an agreement, Malaysia and Indonesia insisted the EU drop its plan to phase out the use of palm oil in biodiesels as stipulated under its Renewable Energy Directive.

The EU purports that its palm oil policy is a global policy. Nearly 90 percent of the world’s palm oil, however, comes from Southeast Asia, mostly from Indonesia and Malaysia. The commodity is one of Indonesia’s most important sources of export revenue, worth US$19 billion annually, and the EU is its second biggest export destination after India. Around half of the EU’s palm oil imports are used for biodiesel.  The EU now claims the palm oil industry is responsible for deforestation, hence it is phasing out its use in biodiesels.

Given the importance of palm oil to the Indonesian and Malaysian economies, they have pushed a combative counter-narrative against the EU’s palm oil policy.

They have accused the EU of protectionism and discrimination, as the phasing out of palm oil will create demand for alternative vegetable oils more readily found in Europe, such as soybean or rapeseed oils.

Concurrently, they have appealed to the EU as a normative power that supposedly acts as a force for good by promoting the narrative that the palm oil industry supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

“Refusing to use palm oil is the same as rejecting the SDGs,” Deputy Trade Minister AM Fachir said as reported by The Jakarta Post  . Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, meanwhile, told Bloomberg that Malaysia was preparing retaliatory measures. Saifuddin confirmed that palm oil was behind the impasse between the EU and ASEAN.

Significantly, upgrading interregional relations is more important for the EU, even if only in name.

The EU is looking to reinforce the importance of regionalism and interregional cooperation, given that Brexit and rising nationalism in EU member-states has dented its self-perception as a model for regional integration.

Upgrading relations would further anchor the EU in a geostrategic and economically important region. US President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy, as well as the trade war with China, has prompted the EU to promote the international rules-based system, a view that ASEAN shares.

ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization, however, takes a consensus-based approach. ASEAN member states thus appear to be using negotiations to leverage and amplify the national concerns of palm oil producers. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the issue of palm oil has derailed talks.

Foreign ministers still agree in principle on upgrading relations to a new strategic dialogue partnership but have said in a joint statement that it is “subject to details and timing to be worked out”.

Moving forward, the EU will rely on its recent experience in which threatening to close its market can lead to a change of behavior with external partners. This was evident with Thailand, the world’s third-largest exporter of seafood, which pushed through reforms to tackle illegal fishing after the EU stated that it would ban imports from the country.

Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia are strengthening their sustainable palm oil certification systems. The Malaysian government has moved to ensure all palm estates are certified as sustainable by the end of this year, with special assistance extended for smallholders. On March 1, Malaysian Primary Industries Minister Teresa Kok said the country would halt the expansion of oil palm plantations to 6 million hectares in response to the negative campaign against palm oil and EU pressure.

Such high-pressure tactics, however, will only increase ASEAN member state’s perception that the EU is belittling toward them.   The EU must communicate its palm oil policy more clearly, as it is evident that there are conflicting accounts of what the policy entails and what measures are required of palm oil producers to alleviate EU pressure.

Moreover, the palm oil issue between the EU and ASEAN member states has largely been played out at the top levels of government. To make further headway, there needs to be greater incorporation of lower levels of government, regulatory bodies, as well as smallholders and large estate representatives to ensure the impasse is dealt with holistically and collaboratively.

Achieving this will ensure that upgrading relations to a new strategic dialogue partnership will be more than just a public relations exercise, and a boost for regionalism and interregional cooperation at a time when it is sorely needed.

 

The writer is an emerging markets analyst and editor. Find him on Twitter @ShahSurajBharat.

Research on ASEAN Aviation Industry

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RESEARCH ON ASEAN AVIATION INDUSTRY

Indonesia Refugee Policy is on Right Track

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Refugees from Afghanistan stage a rally in front of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) office in Medan, North Sumatra, on Monday, Nov. 19, 2018. (JP/Apriadi Gunawan)

 

January 2019 marks two years of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s 2016 presidential decree on handling foreign refugees. The Presidential Decree no. 125/2016 on the Treatment of Refugees from Overseas, signed on Dec. 31, 2016, provides legal certainty and standard procedures on coordination and effective collaboration among the mandated government agencies.

Before this decree, the Directorate General of Immigration under the Law and Human Rights Ministry was the highest authority to exercise policy response towards asylum-seekers and refugees in Indonesia – mainly with security measures. Human rights of refugees were largely neglected, especially as they were considered largely illegal immigrants.

The 2016 decree states special treatment is provided for refugees with special needs such as those who are ill, pregnant, disabled, children and the elderly.

On the right to housing, article 26 of the decree instructs that facilitation of refugee shelters support can be sought from international organizations regarding basic necessities such as clean water, food, clothing, healthcare and hygiene, and religious facilities. The decree does not specify any international organization.

Australia’s decision in March 2018 to cut off its funding, previously channeled through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that provides incentives for refugees whilst waiting for their resettlement process, has also raised Indonesia’s refugee burden amid uncertain political commitment on refugee issues.

The refugee issue was never a priority agenda in Indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies, with humanitarian emergency being the only exception.

Nevertheless, since the 2016 decree the situation of refugees in Indonesia has improved gradually despite absence of explicit right-based provisions.

On the fundamental right to freedom of movement, for example, Indonesia has been quietly progressing. As of December 2018, only 1 percent of the total refugees in transit in Indonesia remain living at the immigration detention centers, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). This only amounts to around 120 from the total of 14,016 refugee population registered with the UNHCR.

Meanwhile before the decree, there were over 4,200 individuals, including women and children, who were detained at the Indonesian detention centers in 2016. It had given Indonesia a bad reputation on hosting refugees in overcrowded immigration lockups, such as the one at Kalideres, West Jakarta which may amount to torture under international law.

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, Nils Melzer, stated in his report that, “grossly inadequate detention conditions can even amount to torture if they are intentionally imposed, encouraged or tolerated by States for reasons based on discrimination of any kind, including based on immigration status, or for the purpose of deterring, intimidating, or punishing migrants or  their  families,  coercing them into withdrawing  their requests  for asylum,  subsidiary  protection  or  other  stay,  agreeing  to  ‘voluntary’  return,  providing information or fingerprints, or with a view to extorting money or sexual acts from them.”

Another milestone achieved over the past two years is access to education for refugee children.

While the right to education is not mentioned in Jokowi’s refugee decree, the IOM noted some Indonesian cities have admitted child refugees to public schools such as in Jakarta, Medan, and Makassar.

Through a memorandum of understanding between the IOM and the Education Agency in Medan, North Sumatra, over 290 child refugees are integrated into the city’s local public school system.

Hasan Basri, the head of the agency expressed concern for the refugees as cited in a press release from IOM, “especially for these school-aged children […] [therefore] my department will give its full support towards ensuring that they are able to pursue their education.”

The children cannot get certificates of graduation as they are not registered in residential family cards. However the UNHCR noted that around 320 child refugees are now enrolled in accredited national schools, from which 2,835 children are in school age.

The remaining homework is making the right to employment available by integrating refugees to the local labor market in their transit period. It is still a long way to go, as authorities face concerns that refugees might steal local jobs. The government should progress to consider allowing ways for refugees to gain income, given stress levels of long-term refugees — which have led to suicides among them. At least now the national and local governments are on the right track towards providing universal access to human rights for refugees.

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Dio Herdiawan Tobing, S.I.P., LLM. Research fellow at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The article was published on Jakarta Post

 

 

Quo Vadis: Thailand’s Taking the Chair of ASEAN, Sailing in the Troubled Waters

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After one year, Singapore has led the Association to progress in ASEAN’s three pillars, the next torch of the Association is now in Thailand’s grip. Faced with relentless fights against new threats of transnational crime, terrorism, trade wars, climate change, the new chairmanship seems to give some hopes to reach out a greater partnership, reaffirming some key agendas of deepening the infrastructure and people-to-people connectivity, maintaining the rules-based order and sustainability.

“Advancing Partnership for Sustainability” has been chosen as Thailand’s new tagline for its chairmanship of ASEAN 2019. It encompasses two points: sustainability and connectivity. Along with this tagline, many observers may ponder upon what will the next chairmanship bring to the region? And how will it pull the ASEAN member states together in the midst of facing other countries’ spur of development assistance? And more importantly, how would it push the agenda to strengthen ASEAN Centrality in any regional initiatives that seem to tear apart?

One greatest challenge facing the new chairman would be on finding the regional alternative to face the geopolitical battle in Indo-Pacific region; one depicted by the divisive characteristics of Pax-Americana and Pax-Sino initiatives on their own geopolitical strategy in the region.

ASEAN does not hold view a common ground on whether they should go take sides on either one of them, nor to just omni balance. The fact that there has yet been any unified approach to face Belt and Road Initiative, or US Pivot to Asia, tells us that the Association is tested for its unity. This, in turn, would be even more interesting to examine, as we also observe that countries like South Korea with its New Southern Policy, India and its Act East Policy and Japan with its long-standing International Cooperation Agency also try their best to get some shares of influences over ASEAN countries.

 

This above-mentioned argument would then also bring our attention to the dilemma of aid over independence. Noting that many of these initiatives by bigger economies usually showcase some features of being (infrastructure) development assistance, the question whether these assistances would be effective -for the receiver, thus, not likely to turn as a weapon against them – is largely determined by the ASEAN country itself. Thailand, could perhaps, encourage its fellow member states to be very careful in taking any risks of accepting aids so that they could benefit from the opportunities provided by the global economy.

 

Being a chairman determines your country’s privilege to set the agenda of the meetings. Perhaps, Thailand could seize the moment by introducing a new aid assessment tool or framework that ASEAN could agree upon, to better evaluate the effectiveness of aid – if they could not have an agreement upon the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) – sheds lights on values of net aid value, donor’s commitment to the Declaration, value for money, time to access aid, etc. –for what always being claimed as having too many indicators. Together, ASEAN could foster its institutional power to make the best of it in using the donor’s assistance while providing transparency and such.

 

In a similar vein, the new Chairmanship would also give up a new opportunity for the Association to explore existing partnerships. Keeping the old ones and trying to dig deeper into the core of the cooperation sounds delicate rather than having to reach out to new partners. Perhaps, Thailand could also lead the Association to work with South Korea in narrowing the development gap between Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam under ROK’s New Southern Policy. This could be made possible by requesting South Korea to help spillover its digital transformation into Southeast Asia, in two strategic possible cooperation areas of technology and creative industry.

 

Korea, as a middle power, looks as if it poses no threats to the region – moreover when compared with great players such as China and the US. With its miraculous economic transformation in the last 50 years, internet penetration rate and broadband speeds, as well as its leading technology companies Samsung, LG and Hyundai, such cooperation are possible. These show that South Korea has leverage on spreading its influence through its soft power approach- military power-centric afar. Looking at this trend, ASEAN needs more investor in developing its Research and Development in Industry 4.0 Sectors, transfer of idea and technology, as well as bridging its skills and capacities gap in digital technology. In addition, in the field of creative industry, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are emerging inexorably. With emerging powerhouses in Southeast Asia and greater public-private partnerships, the way to achieve a rapid digital economic growth in ASEAN would come handy.

 

Amidst the geopolitical battle in the region between China and the US, Thailand, which has long been known for its unique foreign policy principle and a dedicated member to focus on ASEAN, comes as a promising actor to leverage the regional association’s position vis-à-vis great powers. Thai’s “Bamboo Bending with the Wind” foreign policy principle tells us about the policies that are rooted solidly in their own, but flexible enough to bend with the wind to survive. Together, the member states can swirl in the wind while balancing the US and China, through ASEAN-led foreign policy focus. Perhaps, it could also then facilitated by considering again the intra-regional initiative of having its “ASEAN-style Indo-Pacific Vision’ hoped to accommodate all interests regardless of some small frictions between countries.

 

With the laid foundations and ongoing projects under Singapore’s chairmanship that tend to shed lights on issues such as cybersecurity and digitalization, as well as maintaining the rules-based order in the region, Thailand should also continue the legacy of its predecessor. In this, we hope to keep the existing initiatives and make some improvements on ASEAN’s resilience and innovation, as we are living on the era of disruption whose challenges are inevitable but could be learned and mitigated. And this would continue to put the test on every member state of ASEAN, with no exceptions to Thailand.

 

Written by Kevin Iskandar Putra, research intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

The Challenges of Indonesia’s Palm Oil Industry: An Overview

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The global debate on the sustainability and legitimacy of palm oil production is one that continues to evolve and define the industry. As Indonesia and Malaysia are the two major palm oil producing nations, there is much discussion around the issues that palm oil plantations pose in the face of environmental sustainability, the local economy, and human rights. The Indonesian debate on palm oil is an international issue that continues to affect local, national and international frameworks through negative consequences to the flora and fauna and land disputes, while also providing benefits for local economies and the development of rural Indonesia.

Palm oil is a global commodity that is extracted from the oil palm tree, Elaeis guineensis. These plantations can be found throughout Southeast Asia, however largely concentrated in Indonesia’s Kalimantan and Sumatra. The oil palm is an attractive source of livelihood for farmers, due to the high yielding compared to soy and canola.

In 2010, Indonesia’s land-use for oil palm plantations was at 8.4 million hectares, this is juxtaposed with the 18 million hectares that the Indonesian Government has deemed suitable for plantations for current or future stakeholders in the industry. Through this booming industry, Indonesia has accumulated international attention through their rapidly increasing economy, and the mass deforestation of native rainforests as a result. Together, Indonesia and Malaysia provide 80.5% of the world’s palm oil. This is a major market for the two nation-states, with Indonesia alone producing 32.5 million tons of palm oil in 2014, with 80% exported to global consumer. The global community plays a major role in consumer products, as approximately half of the packaged supermarket products contain palm oil, with the industry expected to grow rapidly. Indonesia hopes to increase its production and exportation of the palm oil to 40 million tonnes annually by 2020.

Today, Indonesia is one of the largest palm oil producer in the world, with a rapidly increasing economic and trading market. The production of Palm oil and exportation contributes heavily towards to nation’s Gross National Product (GNP), thus provides  an obligation and responsibility for the nation, and stakeholders, to continue to provide this commodity for the global community to import and consume, in addition for the state to balance their national economy. However, in 2015 San Afri Awang, Indonesia’s Environment and Forestry Minister, stressed that the government’s “authority is being taken over by the private sector”, demonstrating the heavy influence and power these big corporations have over the governmental policy and economy, through lobbying and networks.

The environmental impacts of mass palm oil plantations are extensive within Indonesia. Deforestation is the major issue that continues to negatively impact the industry. Between 2008 and 2008, 3.1 million hectares of rainforests were lost due to new oil palm plantation, with approximately half a million hectares lost every subsequent year. In addition, the imbalances in the environment are found in the forms of disturbances in the soil, the loss of carbon from biomass, as well as the accumulation of organic matter due to peat swamps for oil palm establishment. The use of agrochemicals such as fertilizers, rodenticides, and pesticides also threaten the terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems within the region. Humans also become the subjects and experience the environmental damage of wildfires, as many have to suffer from respiratory, cardiovascular disease and death. Furthermore, 20% of wildfires across Indonesia are attributed directly to palm oil plantation practices between 1989-2008.

The majority of Indonesia’s rainforests grow on carbon-rich peatland, which causes major environmental and economic risks. The palm oil plantations create two issues when dealing with carbon mitigation, first is the emissions from deforestation, and second is the emissions created from the production of palm oil.  Through these two processes, carbon is released from the soil, and methane is released from the mill effluent. These elements are major influences in Indonesia’s rainforest loss and contribute heavily to its national pollution and emissions.

Major palm oil companies in Indonesia often resort to illegally expanding their plantations to neighboring forests, which in many cases results to deforestation of rainforests. This creates an unbalanced ecosystem through the disruption of biodiversity and food chains. Two critically endangered species, Orangutans and Sumatran tigers, which are only found in the region, are facing extinction, along with much other native flora and fauna. Orangutans are decreasing at alarming rates, there are approximately 50,000 orangutans left in the wild, compared to approximately 315,000 in 1990. Although the palm oil industry is not wholly responsible, they largely contribute to the destruction of their habitat, which is the leading cause of extinction.

Challenges are also created through local conflicts between local community and palm oil companies. In 2015 alone saw 776 conflicts between palm oil companies and local indigenous communities. Abram et al. (2017) state that these problems arise due to “boundary disputes, illegal operations by companies, perceived lack of consultation, compensation and broken promises by companies”. In addition, many small local or indigenous communities have not had the privilege of obtaining legal documents that certify ownership of land, thus creates major issues in proving land ownership. Many communities suffer livelihood damages and access to community resources, once they are in conflict with large palm oil companies. As a source of income, local members often are left with no options but working for the companies, and many experience inadequate labor standards and abuse.

The mushrooming local to national corruption in the sector of palm oil is an increasing concern for many national and international bodies. The lack of law enforcement and land allocation creates a messy and ambiguous working environment on a local level. Local government in regencies across the country are the most susceptible to bribery and corruption, due to the lobbying, or personal interests in the sector. In 2012, 13 regents were under investigation for providing illegal allocation and permits, while a third of all regents in Indonesia are under investigation for corruption. This led to the imprisonment of two governors for illegally providing permits to palm oil investors or companies in 2012 alone. In addition, some local governments have invested interests in the palm oil sector, and according to the EIA International, crimes in the palm oil industries happen largely due to the issuance of the Plantation Business Permit (IUP) prior to approval of Environmental Permit, or the Forest Clearance prior to Timber Utilisation Permit (IPK). Therefore, a major aspect of corruption occurs through the allowance of companies to skip or bypass certain laws which are in place to ensure the legality, sustainability, and validity of the plantation.

Despite the issues and challenges that the palm oil industry faces, one could also argue that it is indeed very difficult to find the alternative to this commodity. For Indonesia, the industry itself creates 17 million jobs for communities and smallholder farmers. Approximately, 4 million people in Indonesia are dependent on this industry to sustain their livelihoods and community. (These local economic benefits for communities have provided mechanisms to reduce poverty and increase social development through a rural economy and job opportunities. In addition, it provides major advantages in Indonesia’s national economy and exports, as in 2016 alone, Indonesia generates 13.9 billion USD for its exports on palm oil, with the biggest export destinations of India, China, and Pakistan.

Juxtaposed with this, is the 31 million tons of palm oil that were exported in 2017, bringing about 75 percent of Indonesia’s total output and 22.9 billion USD foreign exchange revenue. Overall, these are significant benefits for cultivating and producing sustainable palm oil. These benefits can be seen in a local community level, to a national economic level.

To better portray the issue on hand, two frameworks surrounding palm oil production in Indonesia, namely the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and Moratorium on the Issuance of New Permits for Palm Oil Plantations would be examined. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) comes as an international effort to establish and implement global standards with the focus to advance the production, procurement, finance and use of sustainable palm oil products. Actors involved in the RSPO include oil palm growers, retailers, banks and investors, environmental or nature conservation NGOs, social or development NGOs, as well as palm oil consumers. Indonesia’s certified area per 30 June 2018 holds 1,555,847 hectares share, including the smallholders certified under group certification. Noted in 2018, Indonesia holds the highest number of complaint submissions, whose number accounts up to 69% of the total case since 2009. In many countries in the Asian region, RSPO faces challenges as many stakeholders and consumers are reluctant to pay more on sustainable products (https://www.rspo.org/key-documents/impact-reports). If the trend continues, the RSPO would lose its significance in the global community, which would create negative effects in advocating against the clearance of primary forest, fires, disputed land ownership.

Nevertheless, the RSPO creates important pathways to combat this growing industry, such as through its newly adopted consensus-driven P&C 2018 scheme where deforestation is not encouraged, along with the implementation of the High Carbon Stock Approach. The RSPO’s role in creating a space for stakeholders to come together to implement strategies for sustainable palm oil production has created significant changes within the industry and continues to do so, however, there are still major challenges that they face in creating a fully sustainable industry.

The moratorium on the issuance of new permits for palm oil plantations instructed by President Joko Widodo in September 2018 to his ministers and regional administrations, is arguably deemed as a significant mechanism to mitigate the environmental and social consequences of the sector. Besides its objective to boost the productivity of palm oil plantations, this moratorium also aims to reduce conflict between smallholders and corporations inside natural forests. Nevertheless, Indonesia is still being scrutinized as to whether it could make some betterments to the law enforcement and practices on the palm oil industry. The complexity of the issue in Indonesia seems to be put together with the discussion of its Palm Oil Bill in the Parliament. This Bill, which is seen as part of the National Legislation Program in 2016 and 2017 by the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) seems to align only with the interests of the investors. If this Bill is passed, the battle of finding the best solutions to unsustainable palm oil production may become increasingly difficult.

The multidimensional aspects of solving sustainable practices within the palm oil industry indicate that there is a need to exert greater eagerness in discussing upon the matter with multiple respective actors. In order to bring about new impetus on resolving the issue, all stakeholders need to collaborate hand-in-hand in making dialogues as accommodative and constructive as possible. The Government’s role as a determining factor on the mitigation and production becomes more important than ever. Thus, they need to prompt themselves to always consider their responsibility towards their people in every action. Perhaps, by investing more on the Research and Development on finding the substitute of palm oil, collaborating with epistemic communities and partners in the advanced countries for its environmentalist agenda would be leverage in enhancing the sustainability aspect of the palm oil business.

To further argue, the efforts to nurture the environment would also be accentuated by raising the awareness and implementing a better coping mechanism of introducing smart plantation. The role of Civil Society Actors should also be encouraged, by giving them more opportunities to grow their resistance power against the palm oil industry.

There are major challenges and issues concerning the implementation, processes, and characteristics of the palm oil industry in Indonesia. The global push for change within the sector is a major driving force behind the move to a more sustainable industry. The palm oil industry continues to rapidly change and grow with the attention and support of the global community, affecting societies on a local, national and international level.

Written by Kevin Iskandar Putra & Mia Dunphy. Kevin is a research intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

ASEAN on Disaster Management: Earthquake and Tsunami in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia

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7,7 SR Earthquake and 1.5-meter-high tsunami hit Central Sulawesi, Indonesia on September 28th, 2018. The natural disaster caused various physical destructions, and fatalities; the death toll reached 1,948, and thousands may still be buried under the debris, not yet found. In response to the unfortunate disaster, The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) has coordinated with relevant agencies and stakeholders to organize search and rescue teams as well as humanitarian support to Indonesia. This, of course, relieves some of the burdens Indonesia now carries.

ASEAN’s strong commitment to reduce disaster losses in the region and to jointly respond to disaster emergencies is manifested through The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The agreement was signed in Vientiane, Lao in July 2005, it outlines the directions that may be taken into consideration by ASEAN in the following years.

The agreement classifies the key strategies to implement the AADMER to become more people-centered, people-oriented, financially sustainable, and network approachable by 2025. Most importantly, the focus is to further strengthen the role of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) as the main coordinating body for disaster management, and to realize the vision of ‘One ASEAN Response’.

Established by the 10 ASEAN Member States, AHA Centre is an inter-governmental organization, which aims to assist cooperation and management among the ASEAN Member States and with the United Nations and international organizations for disaster management and emergency response within ASEAN region. AHA Center frequently reports its progress and activities to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). The ACDM members consist of leaders of National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) of the 10 ASEAN Member States who operate as the Governing Board of the AHA Centre. The following statements are the core values that AHA Centre has:

  • Always maintain the trust and confidence of the ASEAN Member States
  • Open working environment where everyone is part of a first class professional team that is stronger together and helping one other
  • An efficient and non-bureaucratic organization that constantly delivers results and gets things done
  • Zero tolerance towards corruption with high accountability and financial integrity
  • Passion for excellence in everything we do through continuous improvement and innovation to make ASEAN great in disaster management.

Furthermore, there are 3 main mandates carried out by the AHA Center: disaster monitoring and analysis; preparedness and response; and capacity building. In addition, one of the main strategies of the AHA Center is concrete action in every disaster monitoring and analysis Through these activities, the AHA Centre targets to decrease the loss of life and impairment to property from natural disasters by identifying hazards and risks before impact and by increasing warning times.

The AHA Center operates closely with the National Disaster Management Organization (NDMOs) of all ten ASEAN Member Countries in monitoring and distributing information about disasters in the region. As regards to preparedness and response, AHA Centre advances several tools and regulation to hasten the mobilization of resources between the ASEAN Member States and its partners in times of catastrophes – one of the available resources includes standard operating procedures.

Concerning the third operation, capacity-building aims to build a disaster-resilient region. It has two courses, which are ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) and the AHA Center Executive Programme (ACE). The ASEAN-ERAT is a response team to support the affected ASEAN Member States during disasters.  Every time a disaster occurs in the Southeast Asia region, ASEAN-ERAT members are ready to be deployed within eight hours after an emergency warning is activated or based on the request of the affected country. As for the ACE Program, it is intended to train future leaders of disaster management in ASEAN. The ACE program by far is the most concentrated disaster management training program in the region.

For disasters that occurred in Central Sulawesi, most ASEAN member countries provided assistance, aid, and relief to Indonesia through AHA Centre. The Malaysian government has contributed RM1 million and set up the Sulawesi Earthquake/Tsunami Disaster Fund (TBGBTS) on October 4, 2018, to help the victims of the disaster.

Singapore Government has also offered to send humanitarian provisions and workforces to help with ongoing relief; two Republic of Singapore Air Force C-130 aircraft are set to deliver humanitarian supplies and equipment, including tents, meal rations, and medical supplies. The aircraft then will continue to help Indonesia with disaster relief works including the evacuation of citizens from the areas affected.

Meanwhile, the Singapore Civil Defense Force (SCDF) has employed two officers to participate in a 10-day mission to central Sulawesi as part of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team; this is under the coordination of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management.

The Vietnamese Government decided to offer US$100,000 in aid relief. Prime Minister of Thailand, presented a contribution of 5 million baht (approximately US$155,000) to H.E. Mr. Ahmad Rusdi, Ambassador of Indonesia to Thailand. While Lao PDR donated 200,000 USD and Brunei Darussalam deployed members to explore types of assistance needed. The Philippines donated 300,000 USD and sent relief items, and Cambodia gave 200,000 USD.

As a manifestation of the ‘One ASEAN One Response,’ the AHA Center is expected to always be alert and prepared to assist countries affected by the disaster. Since the ASEAN member countries are vulnerable to natural disaster, the AHA Center has a very imperative role in ASEAN. AHA Center should also do more research about the possibility of future disasters and how to effectively manage them – since nature has always been a mystery when it comes to disastrous events. It is important that the AHA Center should always be prepared for whatever is to come.

Written by Raissa Almira, a research intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Press Release Bincang ASEAN “What Can ASEAN Do For Rohingya?”

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Yogyakarta, Friday, November 24th, 2018

The series of Bincang ASEAN was concluded with a very problematic discussion over the humanitarian crisis situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. This Bincang ASEAN was commenced on 24 November 2018 with Diah Triceseria as the speaker. The alleged ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya Muslim minority still continues after today. These people who are predominantly lived in Arakan now known as Rakhine State or Western Burma are forced out of the area. Citizenship Act 1982 does not include Rohingya as one of its eight recognized ethnicities. Due to its implementation, they are denied citizenship status by the government. Under this act, they are excluded from eight recognized ethnicities, which include Bamar, Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (2017), there are 146,500 internally displaced people in Rakhine state[1]. The allegedly ethnic cleansing done by the Burmese security forces resulted in other mass atrocities and humanitarian violence such as raping, torture, killing, as well as more than 480,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh in the search of a more secured living. Human Rights Watch reports that there has been a massive destruction of more than 210 villages in Rakhine State. This issue has attracted international attention, oftentimes generating people’s sympathy calling to help their distant strangers. Human Rights Watch called for an urgent response to address the crisis in the Human Rights Council last September 19, 2017. This issue also appeals U.S. Senators to ask U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, and Administrator Green to give a diplomatic influence against Myanmar’s government for not resolving the crisis. There has also been a call for the United Nations Security Council to come up with a resolution by imposing sanctions and an arms embargo on the Burmese military and remain seized in the matter. However, no resolution has been made and no states has been seen willing to intervene directly in Myanmar to address this humanitarian issue.

Recent the Development of the Issue

The International Criminal Court’s pre-trial chamber’s statement made recently this month, says that the leaders of Myanmar could still be investigated for the alleged crimes against humanity- in this case, a forcible transfer of a population. Nonetheless, it is never easy to bring this case before the ICC. Although it seems to us that the ICC could help solve the crisis, the way to get there is still afar from

nearly possible. Myanmar is not a signatory to the court, meaning that the ICC does not have its jurisdiction in the country. The only way to get there is to wait until the refugees enter Bangladesh, a state party to the Rome statute governing the court. Until then, the investigation would be completed.

Diah Triceseria contends that Indonesia has never been a place for the Rohingya refugees to seek shelters. Nonetheless, most of the refugees that transit in Indonesia come from Afganistan and Pakistan; usually they are refugees who want to go to Australia, but stranded in the Indonesian waters because of the ‘turn back the boat’ policy of the Australian government. As a regional intergovernmental organization, ASEAN does not seem to offer much in solving this issue. Through the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance, ASEAN delivered some assistances to the Rohingya.

 

The ‘non-interference’ principle of ASEAN does not allow the organization to talk about the issue if it relates to the domestic politics of its member state, as what is exactly going on in Myanmar. Thus, the Rohingya are also helpless per se because they could live up their expectation to ASEAN. Many of them decide to go to India as the country has a big Islamic community, aside from the fact that they could also work there. The working permit is also possible to be granted in Malaysia, hence why some go to Malaysia. ASEAN is expected to play larger contribution to this issue regardless.

 

The situation in Myanmar politics is so muddy to the point that we could not blame Aung San Suu Kyi for not taking action. The situation in which she is put with no choice also worsens the scenario. As the people in Myanmar do not want to acknowledge the Rohingya as part of their people, Aung San Suu Kyi decided to remain silent as she knows that by saying something wrong would risk the country to be controlled again, in a greater scale, by the military who is now still dominating the vital ministries in Myanmar. What is worse is that they have the seats as much as one third of the parliament. Changing the constitution would not be likely too, as it requires simple majority- not possible until the military loses grips on the parliament.

Efforts to repatriate the Rohingya people since mid 2018 has been made by ASEAN, and was discussed (briefly) on ASEAN Summit with the conclusion of “sending a regional task force to assist in the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar”. It is scheduled that the transfer of the first batch of 2,260 Rohingya from camps in Bangladesh to temporary detention facilities across the border in

Myanmar’s Rakhine State would be done before the end of 2018 nobody is willing to return. This shows that hopes are still small for the Rohingya to feel secure again to go back there. In this case, the solidarity among ASEAN Member States would not be sufficient to change the course of politics in Myanmar, I would argue, but still hold firm that it would alleviate the human sufferings for the Rohingya minority by giving them aids and assistance in our best capacity.

[1] Council, Internal. 2017. “IDMC » Myanmar IDP Figure Analysis”. Internal-Displacement.Org. http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/myanmar/figures-analysis.

Written by Kevin Iskandar Putra, research intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Press Release Bincang ASEAN “Gender in ASEAN”

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Yogyakarta, Friday, November 9th, 2018

The ASEAN Studies Center UGM and ASEAN Studies Center UMY held its first collaborated Bincang ASEAN entitled “Gender in ASEAN” at Amphitheater E6 K.H Ibrahim Building, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

 

This event featured Dr. Nur Azizah, M.Si. (Head of International Relations Department Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta & Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UMY and Karina Larasati, S.IP. (Junior Researcher, ASEAN Studies Center, UGM) as the moderator.  250 undergraduate and postgraduate student across Yogyakarta and Central Java participated in this event.

 

On this occasion, Dr. Nur Azizah, M.Si. addressed the misconception about gender in society and how important it is to understand gender and further differentiate it with the term” sex”. She explained that today, the issue of gender is being politicized and associated with the power division in the government. As consequences, the attention to gender issues is often ruled out where in the end women do not get maximum political space as desired by the relevant legislation and defenders of women’s rights.

 

Furthermore, she emphasizes that in ASEAN, the issue of gender is still under-explored. If compared to European countries, awareness of gender equality can be said to be quite lagging behind. Yet, this does not mean that gender issue is truly dead in the region. In 1975, ASEAN established the ASEAN Sub-committee on Women (ASW), followed by a meeting in Makati, Philippines to determine ASEAN’s strategy in responding to the United Nations International Decade for Women (1975-1985). In 1981 the ASW was changed to AWP (the ASEAN Women’s Program) until it ended with the name of the ASEAN Committee on Women the year after.

 

It is good news for gender equality defenders that in recent times, various gender mainstreaming initiatives have emerged in the region. All in all, ASEAN has done a great job in increasing gender equality within its region. However, she further emphasizes that there are constraints and challenges need to be considered, such as lack of data availability, resources, and funding. There will be lots of improvements to be done, and the actions need to be taken to do a grander job. This Bincang the ASEAN exchange center between ASEAN Studies Center UGM and the ASEAN Studies Center UMY.

 

Written by Karina Larasati and Raissa Almira, ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Modern Slavery: A Fight, Not Yet Won

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Photo by Lisa Kristine (https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/2110986/modern-slavery-and-american-photographer-who)

The term slavery may sound a little bit old, but in fact, slavery still exists in this era with a new term: modern slavery. The term modern slavery is an umbrella concept, capturing various form of exploitation that affects the vulnerable workers worldwide. According to World Slavery Index, modern slavery can be defined as the condition in which a person treats others as their property, so that the person’s (slave) freedom is seized and exploited for the benefit of the person who practices slavery; people can be hired and thrown away like goods.

Today, migrant workers have become an important factor Southeast Asia’s economy as countries increasingly relies on the availability of cheap labor. This condition has made an ideal environment for the practice of human trafficking in the region, which currently affects many industries such as fisheries, agriculture, construction and domestic work. Some major cases of modern slavery occurred in Thailand and Indonesia.

 

Thailand

An investigation by the Guardian back in 2014 exposed severe cases of modern slavery on Thai fishing boats. The seafood business goes into the supply sold by supermarkets in the US, UK and Europe. In 2015, the European Union enacted a “yellow card” on Thailand under its illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing framework, threatening to ban Thai fisheries imports if the government flopped to clean up its fishing industry, especially labor rights violations. The Thai government responded the threat with broad programs of reforms including new laws to regulate and improve working conditions for migrant fishermen.

 

However, unfortunately, it remains capitalized with human rights abuses. Report shows that migrant fishermen from all over ASEAN continue to be trafficked on to fishing boats, received physical abuse, experienced lack of food and are often unpaid for their work or paid less than the minimum wage.

 

Legal strengthening is one solution to counter the practices of modern slavery. In addition, resistance can be taken through ensuring that seafood vendors are responsible for ensuring the supply chain is free from rights abuse. Buyers and retailers have to comprehensively play their part to be smart customers and eventually break the chain; the lesser the demand, the lesser the supply. Supermarkets, buyers and retailers sourcing seafood from Thailand, have yet to bring transparency and accountability to their supply chains.

 

Indonesia

According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and BNP2TKI, about 5 million Indonesian working abroad as migrant domestic workers, where the majority of them are women. The lack of employment in Indonesia has contributed as the driving factor on why many Indonesian choose to work abroad. In addition, the big amount of salary earned abroad rather than in Indonesia is also the reason for supporting this decision. This situation has then encouraged a number of Indonesians to become migrants, which later supported the occurrence of modern slavery practices.

 

One of the reasons why modern slavery is so high in migrant workers is the lack of safety assurance and standard work experience procedures that should be provided to them. This absence can ultimately expose Indonesian migrant workers to exploitation, both for working hours and salaries. In addition, this absence also paves way for sexual harassment and abuse toward female workers.

 

The presence of law that regulates the protection of migrant workers is vital to ensure the safety of migrant workers in the future. However, even though the law exists, it has not been implemented optimally. The recent case of torture of Indonesian migrant workers from NTT, Adelia Faso, is an evidence of weak legal functions regarding the protection of migrant workers in Indonesia and Malaysia.

 

In addition, this incident also illustrates the weakness of PJTKI in providing comprehensive pre-departure training to prospective migrant workers. For example, migrant workers who will go to Arabia only get limited knowledge about their work, not about the rights as workers, and aspects of the culture and character of the destination country. Whereas, the lack of understanding regarding the rights and obligations as workers may lead to poor performances and, often, the violation of rights and the occurrence of torture against them.

 

One of the ways to protect these “foreign exchange héroes” (pahlawan devisa) is to closely monitor and supervise the supply process of migrant workers on a regular basis. The government should ensure that prior to deployment, the migrant workers have to pass the proper training that includes  all-around work and cultural education of recipient country, which is held by sending agencies. This precautionary measure also includes rigorous screening that will hold workers without complete and legal documents to go abroad.

 

This initial prevention effort also includes maximizing the role of relevant sending agents, where the government ensures that these agents have notified migrant workers of their rights and obligations. Therefore, pre-departure, government and relevant sending agents could  ensure the mental and physical conditions of prospective workers must be 100% ready before departure.

 

Conclusion

The efforts to counter modern slavery practices in ASEAN is illustrated in The ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP). The Convention serves as a legal document that integrates the overall regulation for ASEAN’s efforts in opposing modern slavery, especially human trafficking  have yet to obliterate modern slavery as a whole.  Adopted at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015, the Convention is considered as an imperative commitment for ASEAN to deliver more effective counter-trafficking efforts. The Convention supports the UN Protocol to Suppress, Prevent and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol, 2000) and implemented its definition on trafficking – it  became apparent that modern slavery is a fight not yet won. The roots of modern slavery can be traced to the limited knowledge and awareness of workers. Because those who are most vulnerable to the practice of human trafficking are people in rural areas in ASEAN. Indeed, more needs to be done to solve this problem; commitment has to be strengthen, and this issue needs to be socialized to the public more.

 

Raissa Almira is an intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada