Entries by aseansc

What Southeast Asian Studies Could Learn from Japan

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By Truston Yu (Picture: CSEAS Kyoto University)

The Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) at Kyoto University could be seen as the pinnacle of Southeast Asian Studies in Japanese scholarship. During my exchange semester in Japan, I had the opportunity of visiting the Center on three different occasions, speaking to the Director, and attending an academic conference. From multidisciplinary to interdisciplinary and now transdisciplinary, the CSEAS ethos completely transformed my understanding of the discipline. This article looks into the work of one of the most renowned institutions in this field, drawing lessons from Japanese academia for Southeast Asian Studies.

The Kyoto University Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) has its origins in a 1950s seminar series on research in Southeast Asia and was officially established in 1963. CSEAS prides itself on three principles: emphasis on long-term fieldwork conducted in local languages, interdisciplinarity, and “research agendas defined by local contemporary issues.”

Academia in Japan as a whole has been renowned for its excellence in Area Studies. Western institutions, such as Berkeley, required students of Chinese studies to learn the Japanese language in order to tap into the rich literature in this field. In the Western tradition, area studies tend to focus on the political and economic side of the region. CSEAS has a much more holistic perspective, which includes natural science and even medical science.

In a working paper published by CSEAS titled Bridging the Disciplinary Divide: 50 years of Research at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, it is said that Japan’s study of Southeast Asia is not free from a Japanese “ancestral sin” known as the Southern Expansion Doctrine (Nanshin-ron) in the early years following the Meiji restoration. In this sense, Japanese scholarship could be seen as being motivated by Japan’s expansionist ambitions at that time. Agricultural research projects were conducted in newly acquired territories for the purposes of higher yields with cash crops. It is this experience that shaped Japanese area studies to be more diverse than its Western counterparts. Since the 1960s in the early years of CSEAS, they have already featured a host of diverse disciplines broadly grouped under humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences.

Despite the connection with imperialism in its early origins, Japanese literature on Southeast Asia has been and continues to be a great contributor towards our understanding of this region in different dimensions. Interdisciplinarity is an increasingly popular paradigm for understanding the world, and this is reflected in the way research is conducted at Kyoto University. Students would have at least two supervisors whose expertise is in different disciplines, and such an arrangement would allow for more nuances in research outputs.

In 2017, CSEAS launched a new initiative called the Japan-ASEAN Platform for Transdisciplinary Studies. Transdisciplinarity, as explained by CSEAS, is the idea of breaking the barriers separating academic and non-academic stakeholders. Compared to more theoretical disciplines, area studies have a more practical application as its fundamental purpose is to inform people about a particular region such that they could devise better policies. This is especially true for the various studies on Southeast Asia conducted by external parties, such as Europe in the colonial period, the United States during the Cold War, and now many more institutions around the world, given the rise of ASEAN. Much of their research output was intended to enable policymakers to engage Southeast Asia more effectively. In addition to involving the governmental, private, and civil sectors, CSEAS also works closely with local Southeast Asian researchers. In a way, CSEAS is playing a role in the notion of “bringing Southeast Asian Studies back to Southeast Asia”.

CSEAS Kyoto has become a household name for those with decent exposure to Southeast Asian Studies. In this case, why is Japanese scholarship in this region often overshadowed by its Western counterparts? The working paper suggested that it is not for lack of writings published in English, but rather “a persistent hierarchy in knowledge production that privileges both writing and publication in an Anglo-American continuum”.

To create synergy for the Asian perspective in Southeast Asian Studies, CSEAS led the establishment of the Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA) in 2013. The charter was signed by various regional universities, including the National University of Singapore, University of the Philippines, and Universiti Brunei Darussalam. The Consortium seeks to connect scholars and stakeholders from the region, fostering exchanges on a wide variety of topics. In some sense, this is an antidote to criticisms of Southeast Asian Studies as being affected by Orientalist perspectives.

Southeast Asian Studies in Southeast Asia is much closer to the ground, and local scholars research institutions are thus even more well-placed than those based in Japan and the West. While external parties like China or the United States only require research insights insofar as they are relevant to specific engagements such as trade or security, Southeast Asia needs to have a comprehensive understanding of itself in relation to the goals of greater regional integration. Area studies must transcend the boundaries of social sciences or humanities; Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and transdisciplinarity should be the aspiration for researchers of Southeast Asian Studies in the region.

Truston Yu is a research assistant at the University of Hong Kong. Their research interests include Southeast Asian Studies and its manifestations. They could be reached at their e-mail: trustonyuofficial@gmail.com

Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies: What’s the Difference?

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By Truston Yu (Picture: Businesswest)

Ever since I began my research on Southeast Asia, there has been a lingering question that intrigued me: what is the difference between Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies? Having worked with various institutions on numerous projects relating to the Southeast Asian region, I believe I now have a more well-informed answer to this question. Though, in practice, there are large overlaps between them, the two have slightly different focuses, which will be examined in this article.

Southeast Asian Studies has a longer history than ASEAN Studies. Research on Southeast Asia, such as ethnographies and ecological surveys, can at least be dated back to the colonial period. Russel Wallace’s book The Malay Archipelago is one of the most famous pieces of literature of this nature; It chronicles a British naturalist’s scientific exploration over the other side of the Earth. The first institutionalized academic program, as Benedict Anderson recalls in his book The Spectre of Comparisons, would later be offered at Yale University in 1947. It was also around that time that the world established the current conception of what “Southeast Asia” consisted of. Before there could be an ASEAN Studies, however, there must have been an “ASEAN” to begin with. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations only came into existence following the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. Hence any notion of ASEAN Studies would only come into existence afterwards. Naturally, ASEAN Studies also looks at more contemporary topics rather than historical ones.

ASEAN Studies often carry official prerogatives. ASC UGM, for example, was established by the Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, in collaboration with the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Universitas Gadjah Mada. With a mission of “Bringing ASEAN Closer to you”, the Center organizes a wide array of events seeking to inform the wider public of regional issues. At any rate, the notion that ASEAN’s existence is desirable is taken as a given.

Most institutions that bear the name “ASEAN Studies” are found within the ASEAN region, such as the ASEAN Studies Centers at Chulalongkorn University and at Prince of Songkla University. Apart from that, institutions that carry the name “ASEAN” remain to be a minority compared to those of “Southeast Asia”.

The term “ASEAN Studies” itself implies a focus on this regional organization. ASEAN is composed of its member states, which also hints that this discipline would have a state-centric approach more or less. In certain aspects, the ASEAN Studies discipline can be described as rather rigid and narrow. Timor-Leste, for example, is a Southeast Asian country without ASEAN membership, and would often be left out of ASEAN Studies. On the contrary, Southeast Asia, has a wider and more fluid interpretation: it may include the study of religion, society, and even ecology.

In practice, however, there would be much overlap between the two fields. It ultimately depends on the institution in question. If their work covers Southeast Asian Studies in the context of contemporary politics and economy, it is more likely to overlap with ASEAN Studies. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) Kyoto University, on the other hand, is renowned for its interdisciplinary study of the region, which features scientific and even medical research.

In some cases, ASEAN Studies may be seen as a branch of Southeast Asian Studies. At the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (originally named the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), for example, there is an ASEAN Studies Center, which is a unit set up alongside country studies programs such as Myanmar Studies and Indonesia Studies. Comparing it with other disciplines, a similar parallel would be the subtle distinction between European Studies and EU Studies; Perhaps we could even consider the two fields of Sinology and China Studies as a homologous pair.

Perhaps a criticism of Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies is that both fields may have a tendency of delving too much into the country-by-country distinction. Southeast Asia was divided into these boxes following the demarcation of colonial boundaries, which still restricts our thinking today. With an awareness of this potential problem, we may think out of the box to see the threads that transcend national borders.

Admittedly, the above characterizations are from a personal perspective, and the interpretation of what discipline entails is ultimately up to those who do research in it. It is up to each of us to decide what Southeast Asian Studies or ASEAN Studies mean, and what good scholarship in either field entails. That being said, hopefully, the above frameworks could serve as a paradigm for students of Southeast Asia to think about their academic goals.

Truston Yu is a research assistant at the University of Hong Kong. Their research interests include Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies. They could be reached at their e-mail: trustonyuofficial@gmail.com

A Provincial Level Approach to Studying China-Southeast Asia Relations

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By Truston Yu (Picture: Wikimedia)

With the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road umbrella, China is becoming increasingly relevant to Southeast Asia. While China’s relative influence might be diluted by Taiwan and South Korea, which provided supplies and expertise under the pandemic, but China-Southeast Asia interactions would continue to increase on an absolute level. Thus, learning about China remains to be imperative for those in the field of Southeast Asian studies. This article seeks to shed light on the significance of a provincial framework of understanding in the study of China, explaining their roles in engaging Southeast Asia.

Contrary to what many people have assumed, China is not one single monolithic being – there are competing ideas within the ruling Chinese Communist Party; there are different ethnic groups, languages, and dialects across the country. Sinologist Lucian Pye famously described China as a “civilization pretending to be a nation-state”. To look into the black box, one possible way would be to examine China on a provincial level.

The People’s Republic of China claims 34 provincial-level administrative divisions, including five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. This article investigates seven provincial-level divisions in the southern part of China, discussing their relevance to Southeast Asia with regard to China’s ASEAN engagement, overseas Chinese populations, and historical connections.

The Chinese province with the most overlaps with Southeast Asia is Yunnan, bordering Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. This province is home to the Dai ethnic group, one of the many ethnic minorities in China. They are closely related to the Thai, and like their counterparts to the south, Dai celebrate the water-splashing festival and speak a related language. Certain scholars would regard the current distinction between China and Southeast Asia as arbitrary; indeed, borders have changed over the centuries, and Southeast Asia’s northern frontier remains closely related to the southern tip part of China. Dai is a testament to how southern China is an extension of Southeast Asia.

Yunnan was one of the less advanced areas in China, but trade with ASEAN made it one of the fastest-growing provinces with an 8.8% growth rate, top of the national figures. Naturally, the local population has a high awareness of ASEAN and plays a role in China-ASEAN interactions. China is now working on an ambitious project to build a railway from Yunnan’s capital Kunming all the way to Singapore, passing through the Laotian capital Vientiane. The Kunming-Vientiane section was completed earlier this year.

Next to Yunnan is the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Bordering Vietnam, Guangxi’s capital city Nanning is known to be China’s “strategic gateway” to ASEAN. It is the origin of the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, later incorporated into the Belt and Road framework. Naning now hosts the annual China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO), co-sponsored by the Chinese commerce ministry and that of the ASEAN member states as well as the ASEAN Secretariat. The Expo Center’ architecture is said to resemble the ASEAN emblem. One of Nanning’s latest projects is the China-ASEAN Financial Town, which aims to provide services and supporting infrastructure for China-ASEAN businesses.

Also closely related to ASEAN is the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, most renowned for its role as China’s gateway to the world and vice-versa. ASEAN is Hong Kong’s second-largest trading partner, and this city also serves as an entrepot for goods flowing between China and Southeast Asia. Most recently, the ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade Agreement was concluded and entered into force 2019.

Hong Kong is a former British colony and has long been a cosmopolitan destination, and many prominent Southeast Asian figures have spent a substantial amount of time in the city where the East meets West: Jose Rizal, National hero of the Philippines, spent some time as a doctor in Hong Kong; This is also where Malaysian business magnate Robert Kuok built his Kowloon Shangri-La Hotel, the second of his chain of highly successful luxury hotels.

In the years following WWII, Hong Kong continues to be highly connected with the British colonies in Southeast Asia. The University of Hong Kong (HKU), for example, has nurtured generations of doctors from Malaya. Revered chemist Rayson Huang and historian Wang Gungwu have both served as Vice-Chancellor at HKU, and spent a substantial portion of their academic career in Singapore and Malaysia before that.

Today, Hong Kong is home to hundreds of thousands of domestic workers, of which roughly half are from the Philippines, and another half comes from Indonesia, a tiny minority is composed of Thais, Nepalis, and other nationalities. Up to ten percent of the Philippine GDP comes from remittances of overseas workers.

A short ferry ride away from Hong Kong is the Macau Special Administrative Region, a former Portuguese colony and now a casino hub known as the “Las Vegas of the East”. While the Portuguese were one of the very first seafarers to set foot in Malacca and Nagasaki, Macau and Timor-Leste remained to be the only Portuguese colonies in East Asia towards the end of the 20th century.

Naturally, Macau became a platform for China to engage the Lusophone community, which Timor-Leste is a member of. In 2002, Macau became one of Timorese capital Dili’s very first sister cities. In 2003, China set up the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macao), also known as Forum Macao.

Both Hong Kong and Macau are under the sphere of influence of Guangdong, formerly known to the West as Canton. Southeast Asia is home to one of the biggest overseas Chinese populations, and many of them originated from this province. Cantonese popular culture, such as music and cinema, has become the collective memory of many ethnic Chinese adults in Southeast Asia.

Another significant group of Southeast Asian Chinese migrated from the Hokkien area known as Fujian province today. In Medan, for example, the spoken variety of the Chinese language is not Mandarin but Hokkien. More specifically, many overseas Hokkien descendants trace their ancestry back to the city of Xiamen, also known as Amoy. Partly due to this ancestral connection, Xiamen hosts hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian tourists each year, and CCTV calls it a “pivot city” connecting China to Southeast Asia.

Xiamen University (XMU) is one of the top universities in China and hosts a Center for Southeast Asian Studies dating as far back to 1956. The XMU main campus itself was founded by a Malayan Chinese, and in 2015 a Malaysia campus was established – marking the very first time a Chinese University has established a campus abroad. This was a result of coordination between the governments of both countries, after a 2011 meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.

In addition to Guangdong and Fujian, the southernmost province of Hainan is also the origin of Chinese descendants in Southeast Asia, though a smaller proportion. It is an island which is also the namesake of Singapore’s famous chicken rice. The next “big thing” to look out for is the Hainan free-trade port. Said to be one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own initiatives, the port plans to “allow duty-free imports and lower taxes to attract investors.” This is also a rather ambitious plan as the goal is for the free port to be set up by 2025. In the future, Hainan may serve as an important avenue for Southeast Asian businesses making inroads into Mainland China.

The reality is that there is more than just “one” China – just like how Bali is different from Sunda, which is different from Padang, different parts of China have their history, ethnic groups, and culture. The heterogeneity of China requires a provincial framework of understanding, which lets us see China in a more nuanced manner, distinguishing between the different roles played by numerous regions – particularly with respect to the various Belt and Road projects In examining China’s engagements with Southeast Asia, it may be worth asking “how” and “from where?”. Guangxi and Yunnan’s proximity to Mainland Southeast Asia made them perfect hubs for connectivity projects; Hong Kong and Macau’s international status as well as their colonial heritage served as a bridge for China-Southeast Asia interactions; Guangdong and Fujian leveraged their connection to the Chinese diaspora abroad; finally, the southern tip Hainan is expected to play a bigger role with its free port project. This paradigm may give rise to more precise analyses of China’s engagement with Southeast Asia.

Truston Yu is a research assistant at the University of Hong Kong. Their research interests include Southeast Asian Studies and Southeast Asia’s external relations. They could be reached at their e-mail: trustonyuofficial@gmail.com

How Taiwan Could Capitalize on its New Southbound Policy

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By Truston Yu (Picture: Wikimedia)

20 May 2020 marked the inauguration ceremony of Taiwan’s reelected President Tsai Ing-wen, signaling a continuation of her New Southbound Policy (NSP), which engages eighteen countries, including the ten ASEAN member states. This article looks into the Southeast Asia section of the NSP, exploring the narratives and actions Tsai may take if her administration is determined to deepen ties with this region.

Tsai was first elected in 2016, succeeding Ma Ying-jeou, who served two terms as president. Within months after her election, she rolled out the New Southern Policy to deepen ties with South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. Spanning across eighteen countries from India all the way to New Zealand, the NSP coincides with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. It is however, a comprehensive policy directive – ranging from trade and technology to cultural exchanges and talent development. Notably, there are four strategic links: Soft power links, Supply chain links, Linking regional markets, People-to-people links.

Certain challenges are facing Taiwan today. To begin with, Taiwan is rather late in the game compared to its Northeast Asian neighbors. Japan has long played a significant role in modernizing Southeast Asia; China has been stepping up its Belt and Road Initiative which started in 2013; even South Korea has firmly established its presence in mainland Southeast Asia long before President Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy in 2017.

Even more fundamentally, Taiwan is not a widely recognized country, and Beijing has been rather aggressive in depriving Taipei of diplomatic recognition. Cambodia and Laos, which have been China’s closest partners in Southeast Asia, would likely pose an obstacle towards ASEAN engagement with Taiwan. Therefore, unlike Hong Kong, a unified policy within ASEAN for engaging Taiwan would be immensely difficult.

An often overlooked issue would be Taiwan’s stake in the South China Sea conflict. As a party to the dispute without official diplomatic relations with the others, Taiwan’s involvement adds to the complexity of the issue. The U-shaped line drawn on the South China Sea, otherwise known as the nine-dash line, actually began as the eleven-dash line proposed by Nationalist China before Chiang Kai-shek’s government moved to Taipei. Communist China simply inherited these claims, making slight modifications with regard to the Gulf of Tonkin.

Beijing naturally overshadows Taipei in the South China Sea dispute. Still, if the Nationalist faction were to prevail and retain control over China up till this day, they would be the one at odds with the ASEAN member states.

If Taipei is to demonstrate amity towards the ASEAN member states and willingness to participate in a rules-based international order, it would be wise for them to renounce the claims of its predecessor regime: it was already ruled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration to be inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Philippines v. China).

Despite the above obstacles, there are certain advantages that are unique to Taiwan. In the context of the South China Sea, Taiwan has set an example for the world with its conservation efforts on Dongsha Island. While the militarization of the South China Sea has often been associated with environmental destruction, the Dongsha Atoll houses a well-equipped scientific center that welcomes researchers and provides them with amenities for fieldwork. This has been dubbed by regional analysts as “coral diplomacy”.

Taiwan is one of the Four Asian Tigers, and many developing countries see their growth as a model to emulate; The cutting-edge semiconductor industry is one of Taiwan’s most unique advantages. This year, Taiwan has come under attention for their incredible performance in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic. “Taiwan can help, Taiwan is helping” is the narrative they are currently presenting. In the second wave of mask diplomacy, over a million masks were donated to NSP countries.

Perhaps the unique advantage for Taiwan in engaging Southeast Asia would be the intricate links between the two places. They share a lot of historical connections, leading to two potential narratives in the present day: the Austronesian connection and the Chinese connection.

For Southeast Asian archaeologists, the biggest significance of Taiwan would probably be the “Out of Taiwan” model. A group of scholars believes that the Austronesian populations migrated South from Taiwan. Indeed, in terms of geographical distance, the Island of Taiwan is only some 700 kilometers from Luzon of the Philippines, even shorter than that between Jakarta and Indonesia’s new capital city.

Taiwan is home to sixteen officially recognized indigenous groups, which are ethnically akin to the populations in the Malay Archipelago. On one hand, archaeologists studying Southeast Asia would be amazed by the similarities between these populations; On the other hand, Bruneians, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Filipinos may be intrigued by the culture of the Taiwanese indigenous.

Southeast Asia is home to one of the most significant foreign Chinese populations, many of which are of Hokkien descent, closely related to the Taiwanese Chinese community in terms of language and culture. Some of the older generations of Chinese Southeast Asians still have ties with the Kuomintang or affiliated entities in Taiwan. Because of these connections, Taiwan is an incredibly familiar destination for the “Nanyang Chinese”. This connection extends to the present through popular culture: The 2001 Taiwanese TV series Meteor Garden gained massive popularity in Southeast Asia, while several famous Southeast Asian artists such as Namewee from Malaysia and JJ Lin from Singapore have been based in Taiwan. On this note, it is worth considering how pop culture from Taiwan constitutes a facet of soft power, albeit not as powerful as the Korean Wave – again, this is an aspect which Taiwan could capitalize on in the context of the NSP. The above examples show how the Chinese connection serves as a bridge between Taiwan and its neighbors to the south.

Indeed, the modern definition of “Southeast Asia”, primarily determined by ASEAN membership, is a somewhat arbitrary construct. The interpretation of “Southeast Asia as connectivity” looks at this region not only from a geographical aspect but the spheres of influence and trade with Taiwan, South India, and Southern China as well. Philip Bowring’s “Nusantaria” is an embodiment of this paradigm, stretching from Ceylon (Sri Lanka today) all the way to Formosa (Taiwan today). Under this framework, Taiwan can be seen as a part of Southeast Asia.

To further build up soft power in Southeast Asia, it is in Taiwan’s interest to show their willingness to abide by a rules-based international order. Regardless of the specific steps taken by Tsai, Taiwan is already headed towards greater interactions with Southeast Asia. However, they may even take it a step further to advance new narratives of Austronesian and Chinese connections. Not only would they bring Taiwan closer to Southeast Asia, but this also puts Taiwan within Southeast Asia itself. For Taiwan, the positive impacts are manifold – in addition to economic gains and greater security through building relations with multiple countries, it also consolidates their contribution towards the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Truston Yu is a research assistant at the University of Hong Kong. Their research interests include Southeast Asian Studies and Southeast Asia’s external relations. They could be reached at their e-mail: trustonyuofficial@gmail.com

Press Release – “Diplomatic Briefing on the ACWC 10th Year Commemoration – Solidifying the Role of Think Tanks and CSOs in the Advocacy to Strengthen the ASEAN Commission of Women and Children (ACWC)”

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In continuation of the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), the ASEAN Studies Center UGM conducted a Diplomatic Briefing discussing the Commission’s work in the past decade and future outlook of its work. This event was held virtually on Friday, 9 October 2020, also with the support of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and FORUM-ASIA.

Carrying the same theme, namely “Solidifying the Role of Think Tanks and CSO in the Advocacy to Strengthen the ASEAN Commission of Women and Children (ACWC)”, the forum invited the insights, experiences and thoughts from the audience on ways to further the cause of promoting the rights and protection of women and children in the region.

The meeting commenced with opening remarks delivered by Dr. Dafri Agussalim, Executive Director of ASEAN Studies Center UGM, followed by speech by Prof. Roel van der Veen, Head of Political Affairs of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and also Shamini Darshni Kaliemuthu, Executive Director of FORUM-ASIA to launch the Report of FORUM-ASIA titled Assessing the Commission’s Impact on Protecting Women and Children’s Rights in ASEAN. Dr. Dafri emphasized the importance of promoting, ensuring the rights of women and children as they are an integral part of a thriving community. The success of ASEAN in empowering  and protecting the rights of women and children will likely lead us to become a successful region in the future. In line with this, Prof. van der Veen also stated the commitment of the Netherlands to always support ASEAN in reinforcing its regionalism, where it can be achieved by having strong regional institution that can ensure and protect the rights of its citizens, including women and children.

The discussion session of the Diplomatic Briefing was moderated by Andy Yentriyani Commissioner of the Committee for the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan). To start the discussion, Rachel Arinii Judhiastri, FORUM-ASIA, highlighted several key findings on FORUM-ASIA Report on the ACWC+10 including the fact that only 25% of the 2016-2020 Workplan had been implemented. This was due to several challenges in the region such as the Rohingya crisis, other human rights abuse towards marginalized groups, and lack of engagement in CEDAW and CRC reporting which clearly affected the responsiveness of ACWC in addressing issues relating to human rights of women and children. However, ACWC had also achieved notable milestones such as the Declaration on the Protection of Children from all Forms of Online Exploitation and Abuse in ASEAN, the campaign on Trafficking in Persons and also the nexus to Violation Against Women. Therefore, as she also emphasized, there is a need to have strong regional mechanism which can accelerate the efforts in achieving gender equality, particularly within the Southeast Asia region.

Agustina Kustulasari, Senior Fellow, ASEAN Studies Center UGM, highlighted how ASEAN principles have hindered the decision making process and implementation of regulations and conventions related to the human rights issues, such as the rights of women and children. Therefore, to address this situation carefully, several recommendations included to involve more policy actors and media as the fourth pillar of democracy which can bring public opinions into the agenda setting and accelerate policymaking processes in the region. Engagement with the media in campaigning sensitive journalism will help amplify the use of appropriate terms when advocating issues to the government. She also mentioned the importance of involving the academia in conducting research related to the concerns of ACWC . This will help nudge ASEAN governments to place the issue of women and children, higher in the regional agenda.

H.E. Dr. Ratchada Jayagupta, ACWC Thailand, as respondent, focused her presentation on the implementation of ACWC TOR in Thailand. The ACWC Thailand had endorsed the ACWC gender sensitive guidelines on handling women victim of human trafficking in 2016, and translated the guidelines into Thai. A pilot project for capacity building was also conducted where it involved officials and CSOs working together on advocating particularly on anti-human trafficking. ACWC Thailand also attempted to increase the visibility of ACWC through various social media and channels to provide information and regular activities of the commission, as well as making the channels as a direct communication platform with all ACWC Representatives. The dialogue was then followed with a Q&A session where it discussed the hindrances of substantive engagement between ACWC and other ASEAN bodies, CSOs, think tanks, and also donors within the region. In general, during the ten years of the ACWC journey in advocating rights for women and children, the engagement with ASEAN mechanisms and other CSOs in the region had faces various challenges including limited resources, staffing in implementing its activities and overall support from ASEAN member countries. The limited visibility of the information about ACWC also may be one of the factors that affected the quality of the substantive engagement with the bodies, compared to other ASEAN human rights mechanisms.

Press Release Public Lecture: “The Politics of Leadership Succession: A Comparative Perspective across Democratic and Non-democratic Regimes”

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Yogyakarta, 20 August 2019

On Tuesday 20th August 2019, ASEAN Studies Center UGM welcomed the new semester with a public lecture by Professor Ludger Helms from the University if Innsbruck, Austria. In this lecture, Professor Helms talked about his research on leadership succession, and compared leadership transitions between democratic and non-democratic governments. The public lecture was held in Universitas Gadjah Mada’s Faculty of Social and Political Sciences and was moderated by Robbaita Zahra, an intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM.

The public lecture commenced by questioning the definition of leadership, what exactly constitutes as leadership, and what is specifically required from an individual or a group in order to be recognized as a leader. Professor Helms believed that leaders do not necessarily refer to the incumbent – anyone who is able to inspire and mobilize a group of people to perform actions could also be definitively considered as a leader, regardless of whether their intentions were ‘good’ or ‘bad.’[1] 

Furthermore, Professor Helms also explained the difference between ‘successions’ and ‘transitions’ as these two terms are often used synonymously.  In democratic studies, ‘successions’ entail change in political leaders and/or parties, whereas ‘transitions’ mean something else. The difference between the two is best described as such: when a government experiences change in its dominant political party, it is considered a ‘succession’, but when the government only experiences mere reform, it is considered a ‘transition’.

Helms believed that successions are mainly found in non-democratic regimes. Evident authoritarian governments such as dictatorships mainly appoint its successor from close spheres of influence. With the case of monarchies, the king or queen may appoint its successor on familial merits. However, this is not exclusively exercised by non-democratic regimes. In democratic governments, a leader could also find its successor within dynastic families that often play a large role in the government’s authority – occupying parliamentary seats without public notice and driving the country’s policies from the shadows.  However, it is important to note that this is a rare occurrence.

The lecture also highlighted five differences between democratic and non-democratic leadership successions: institutionalization and openness of succession, the existence or absence of term limits, incumbency advantage and longevity, the ability of leaders to pick their own successors, and political dynasties.

One significant finding that Helm’s research brought was that non-democratic governments, that are usually ruled by such autocratic regimes, tend to have much longer ruling periods in comparison to more democratic regimes. The centralization in autocratic regimes also contributes to the adoption and maintenance of a single policy without opposition, which provides an incumbency advantage for the leader. Meanwhile, in democracies, such policies would more likely be safeguarded by the opposition coalition to ensure its execution, limiting the power of the incumbent to single-handedly choose their next successor.

Professor Helms ended the lecture by emphasizing the need to develop a more substantive academic understanding of leadership succession, especially how the study has not been developed as much as its other political science counterparts. He specifically refers to the need for better conceptualization and better data compilation so that the study of leadership succession could further contribute to the study of democracy implementation of various countries.

[1]Professor Helms expressed his dissatisfaction to his colleagues that argue that ‘bad’ leaders such as Hitler or Stalin, simply referring to them as ‘power-wielder.’ In his point of view, no matter how ‘bad’ they are, they can still be considered as a leader as they fulfill the prerequisites, requirements, and what it takes to be a leader.

Written by Daffa Syauqi, Robbaita Zahra, Fara Sheila. Edited by Nisrina H Khotimah. Research interns at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN, EU collaboration needed to resolve palm oil dispute

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Image: Palm oil mill in Sabah, Malaysia © CEphoto, Uwe Aranas

The failure  to upgrade ties between the EU and ASEAN to a new strategic dialogue partnership at the 22nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting was another blemish on relations between the most institutionalized regional groupings of the developed and developing world.

The outcome of the talks, however, do not come as a surprise and reflect that the EU is more concerned with upgrading relations than ASEAN. ASEAN member states, meanwhile, are using the interregional negotiations to leverage national agendas.

While the EU and the majority of ASEAN member states were ready to conclude an agreement, Malaysia and Indonesia insisted the EU drop its plan to phase out the use of palm oil in biodiesels as stipulated under its Renewable Energy Directive.

The EU purports that its palm oil policy is a global policy. Nearly 90 percent of the world’s palm oil, however, comes from Southeast Asia, mostly from Indonesia and Malaysia. The commodity is one of Indonesia’s most important sources of export revenue, worth US$19 billion annually, and the EU is its second biggest export destination after India. Around half of the EU’s palm oil imports are used for biodiesel.  The EU now claims the palm oil industry is responsible for deforestation, hence it is phasing out its use in biodiesels.

Given the importance of palm oil to the Indonesian and Malaysian economies, they have pushed a combative counter-narrative against the EU’s palm oil policy.

They have accused the EU of protectionism and discrimination, as the phasing out of palm oil will create demand for alternative vegetable oils more readily found in Europe, such as soybean or rapeseed oils.

Concurrently, they have appealed to the EU as a normative power that supposedly acts as a force for good by promoting the narrative that the palm oil industry supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

“Refusing to use palm oil is the same as rejecting the SDGs,” Deputy Trade Minister AM Fachir said as reported by The Jakarta Post  . Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, meanwhile, told Bloomberg that Malaysia was preparing retaliatory measures. Saifuddin confirmed that palm oil was behind the impasse between the EU and ASEAN.

Significantly, upgrading interregional relations is more important for the EU, even if only in name.

The EU is looking to reinforce the importance of regionalism and interregional cooperation, given that Brexit and rising nationalism in EU member-states has dented its self-perception as a model for regional integration.

Upgrading relations would further anchor the EU in a geostrategic and economically important region. US President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy, as well as the trade war with China, has prompted the EU to promote the international rules-based system, a view that ASEAN shares.

ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization, however, takes a consensus-based approach. ASEAN member states thus appear to be using negotiations to leverage and amplify the national concerns of palm oil producers. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the issue of palm oil has derailed talks.

Foreign ministers still agree in principle on upgrading relations to a new strategic dialogue partnership but have said in a joint statement that it is “subject to details and timing to be worked out”.

Moving forward, the EU will rely on its recent experience in which threatening to close its market can lead to a change of behavior with external partners. This was evident with Thailand, the world’s third-largest exporter of seafood, which pushed through reforms to tackle illegal fishing after the EU stated that it would ban imports from the country.

Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia are strengthening their sustainable palm oil certification systems. The Malaysian government has moved to ensure all palm estates are certified as sustainable by the end of this year, with special assistance extended for smallholders. On March 1, Malaysian Primary Industries Minister Teresa Kok said the country would halt the expansion of oil palm plantations to 6 million hectares in response to the negative campaign against palm oil and EU pressure.

Such high-pressure tactics, however, will only increase ASEAN member state’s perception that the EU is belittling toward them.   The EU must communicate its palm oil policy more clearly, as it is evident that there are conflicting accounts of what the policy entails and what measures are required of palm oil producers to alleviate EU pressure.

Moreover, the palm oil issue between the EU and ASEAN member states has largely been played out at the top levels of government. To make further headway, there needs to be greater incorporation of lower levels of government, regulatory bodies, as well as smallholders and large estate representatives to ensure the impasse is dealt with holistically and collaboratively.

Achieving this will ensure that upgrading relations to a new strategic dialogue partnership will be more than just a public relations exercise, and a boost for regionalism and interregional cooperation at a time when it is sorely needed.

 

The writer is an emerging markets analyst and editor. Find him on Twitter @ShahSurajBharat.

Research on ASEAN Aviation Industry

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RESEARCH ON ASEAN AVIATION INDUSTRY

Indonesia Refugee Policy is on Right Track

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Refugees from Afghanistan stage a rally in front of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) office in Medan, North Sumatra, on Monday, Nov. 19, 2018. (JP/Apriadi Gunawan)

 

January 2019 marks two years of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s 2016 presidential decree on handling foreign refugees. The Presidential Decree no. 125/2016 on the Treatment of Refugees from Overseas, signed on Dec. 31, 2016, provides legal certainty and standard procedures on coordination and effective collaboration among the mandated government agencies.

Before this decree, the Directorate General of Immigration under the Law and Human Rights Ministry was the highest authority to exercise policy response towards asylum-seekers and refugees in Indonesia – mainly with security measures. Human rights of refugees were largely neglected, especially as they were considered largely illegal immigrants.

The 2016 decree states special treatment is provided for refugees with special needs such as those who are ill, pregnant, disabled, children and the elderly.

On the right to housing, article 26 of the decree instructs that facilitation of refugee shelters support can be sought from international organizations regarding basic necessities such as clean water, food, clothing, healthcare and hygiene, and religious facilities. The decree does not specify any international organization.

Australia’s decision in March 2018 to cut off its funding, previously channeled through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that provides incentives for refugees whilst waiting for their resettlement process, has also raised Indonesia’s refugee burden amid uncertain political commitment on refugee issues.

The refugee issue was never a priority agenda in Indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies, with humanitarian emergency being the only exception.

Nevertheless, since the 2016 decree the situation of refugees in Indonesia has improved gradually despite absence of explicit right-based provisions.

On the fundamental right to freedom of movement, for example, Indonesia has been quietly progressing. As of December 2018, only 1 percent of the total refugees in transit in Indonesia remain living at the immigration detention centers, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). This only amounts to around 120 from the total of 14,016 refugee population registered with the UNHCR.

Meanwhile before the decree, there were over 4,200 individuals, including women and children, who were detained at the Indonesian detention centers in 2016. It had given Indonesia a bad reputation on hosting refugees in overcrowded immigration lockups, such as the one at Kalideres, West Jakarta which may amount to torture under international law.

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, Nils Melzer, stated in his report that, “grossly inadequate detention conditions can even amount to torture if they are intentionally imposed, encouraged or tolerated by States for reasons based on discrimination of any kind, including based on immigration status, or for the purpose of deterring, intimidating, or punishing migrants or  their  families,  coercing them into withdrawing  their requests  for asylum,  subsidiary  protection  or  other  stay,  agreeing  to  ‘voluntary’  return,  providing information or fingerprints, or with a view to extorting money or sexual acts from them.”

Another milestone achieved over the past two years is access to education for refugee children.

While the right to education is not mentioned in Jokowi’s refugee decree, the IOM noted some Indonesian cities have admitted child refugees to public schools such as in Jakarta, Medan, and Makassar.

Through a memorandum of understanding between the IOM and the Education Agency in Medan, North Sumatra, over 290 child refugees are integrated into the city’s local public school system.

Hasan Basri, the head of the agency expressed concern for the refugees as cited in a press release from IOM, “especially for these school-aged children […] [therefore] my department will give its full support towards ensuring that they are able to pursue their education.”

The children cannot get certificates of graduation as they are not registered in residential family cards. However the UNHCR noted that around 320 child refugees are now enrolled in accredited national schools, from which 2,835 children are in school age.

The remaining homework is making the right to employment available by integrating refugees to the local labor market in their transit period. It is still a long way to go, as authorities face concerns that refugees might steal local jobs. The government should progress to consider allowing ways for refugees to gain income, given stress levels of long-term refugees — which have led to suicides among them. At least now the national and local governments are on the right track towards providing universal access to human rights for refugees.

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Dio Herdiawan Tobing, S.I.P., LLM. Research fellow at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The article was published on Jakarta Post

 

 

Quo Vadis: Thailand’s Taking the Chair of ASEAN, Sailing in the Troubled Waters

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After one year, Singapore has led the Association to progress in ASEAN’s three pillars, the next torch of the Association is now in Thailand’s grip. Faced with relentless fights against new threats of transnational crime, terrorism, trade wars, climate change, the new chairmanship seems to give some hopes to reach out a greater partnership, reaffirming some key agendas of deepening the infrastructure and people-to-people connectivity, maintaining the rules-based order and sustainability.

“Advancing Partnership for Sustainability” has been chosen as Thailand’s new tagline for its chairmanship of ASEAN 2019. It encompasses two points: sustainability and connectivity. Along with this tagline, many observers may ponder upon what will the next chairmanship bring to the region? And how will it pull the ASEAN member states together in the midst of facing other countries’ spur of development assistance? And more importantly, how would it push the agenda to strengthen ASEAN Centrality in any regional initiatives that seem to tear apart?

One greatest challenge facing the new chairman would be on finding the regional alternative to face the geopolitical battle in Indo-Pacific region; one depicted by the divisive characteristics of Pax-Americana and Pax-Sino initiatives on their own geopolitical strategy in the region.

ASEAN does not hold view a common ground on whether they should go take sides on either one of them, nor to just omni balance. The fact that there has yet been any unified approach to face Belt and Road Initiative, or US Pivot to Asia, tells us that the Association is tested for its unity. This, in turn, would be even more interesting to examine, as we also observe that countries like South Korea with its New Southern Policy, India and its Act East Policy and Japan with its long-standing International Cooperation Agency also try their best to get some shares of influences over ASEAN countries.

 

This above-mentioned argument would then also bring our attention to the dilemma of aid over independence. Noting that many of these initiatives by bigger economies usually showcase some features of being (infrastructure) development assistance, the question whether these assistances would be effective -for the receiver, thus, not likely to turn as a weapon against them – is largely determined by the ASEAN country itself. Thailand, could perhaps, encourage its fellow member states to be very careful in taking any risks of accepting aids so that they could benefit from the opportunities provided by the global economy.

 

Being a chairman determines your country’s privilege to set the agenda of the meetings. Perhaps, Thailand could seize the moment by introducing a new aid assessment tool or framework that ASEAN could agree upon, to better evaluate the effectiveness of aid – if they could not have an agreement upon the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) – sheds lights on values of net aid value, donor’s commitment to the Declaration, value for money, time to access aid, etc. –for what always being claimed as having too many indicators. Together, ASEAN could foster its institutional power to make the best of it in using the donor’s assistance while providing transparency and such.

 

In a similar vein, the new Chairmanship would also give up a new opportunity for the Association to explore existing partnerships. Keeping the old ones and trying to dig deeper into the core of the cooperation sounds delicate rather than having to reach out to new partners. Perhaps, Thailand could also lead the Association to work with South Korea in narrowing the development gap between Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam under ROK’s New Southern Policy. This could be made possible by requesting South Korea to help spillover its digital transformation into Southeast Asia, in two strategic possible cooperation areas of technology and creative industry.

 

Korea, as a middle power, looks as if it poses no threats to the region – moreover when compared with great players such as China and the US. With its miraculous economic transformation in the last 50 years, internet penetration rate and broadband speeds, as well as its leading technology companies Samsung, LG and Hyundai, such cooperation are possible. These show that South Korea has leverage on spreading its influence through its soft power approach- military power-centric afar. Looking at this trend, ASEAN needs more investor in developing its Research and Development in Industry 4.0 Sectors, transfer of idea and technology, as well as bridging its skills and capacities gap in digital technology. In addition, in the field of creative industry, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are emerging inexorably. With emerging powerhouses in Southeast Asia and greater public-private partnerships, the way to achieve a rapid digital economic growth in ASEAN would come handy.

 

Amidst the geopolitical battle in the region between China and the US, Thailand, which has long been known for its unique foreign policy principle and a dedicated member to focus on ASEAN, comes as a promising actor to leverage the regional association’s position vis-à-vis great powers. Thai’s “Bamboo Bending with the Wind” foreign policy principle tells us about the policies that are rooted solidly in their own, but flexible enough to bend with the wind to survive. Together, the member states can swirl in the wind while balancing the US and China, through ASEAN-led foreign policy focus. Perhaps, it could also then facilitated by considering again the intra-regional initiative of having its “ASEAN-style Indo-Pacific Vision’ hoped to accommodate all interests regardless of some small frictions between countries.

 

With the laid foundations and ongoing projects under Singapore’s chairmanship that tend to shed lights on issues such as cybersecurity and digitalization, as well as maintaining the rules-based order in the region, Thailand should also continue the legacy of its predecessor. In this, we hope to keep the existing initiatives and make some improvements on ASEAN’s resilience and innovation, as we are living on the era of disruption whose challenges are inevitable but could be learned and mitigated. And this would continue to put the test on every member state of ASEAN, with no exceptions to Thailand.

 

Written by Kevin Iskandar Putra, research intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada