Entries by aseansc

New ASC Book: “ASEAN In 2017: Regional Integration in an Age Of Uncertainty”

/in /by

ASEAN Studies Center UGM is pleased to launch a new book that covers a regional outlook in 2017. Co-authored by four ASEAN Studies Center’s researchers, this book highlights three key issues in ASEAN regional integration and the policy prospects for integration beyond 2017.

In political and security issue, Dedi Dinarto argues that Duterte’s presidency in Phillippines, who will hold ASEAN Chairmanship, is pivotal in managing US-Sino rivalry in the region. This is particularly in case with growing tension in the South China Sea.

In economic issue, Shane Preuss suggests that low-skilled labour migration is likely to deepen uneven economic development in the region, in which ASEAN needs to respond.

In social and cultural issue, Dio H. Tobing highlights the unresolved conflict in Rohingya, which has been a regional issue since 2015. Without strong regional solution from ASEAN and engagement with Myanmar’s new administration, the issue will bring further problems for regional social and cultural environment.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar finally underscores the need for ASEAN to promote social integration instead of merely focusing on political and economic integration, given the state of ASEAN in 2017.

All authors strongly recommends Indonesia’s foreign policy to hold strong leadership in ASEAN.
ASEAN in 2017: Regional Integration in an Age of Uncertainty can be downloaded here

Pengumuman Seleksi Wawancara AYIEP 2017

/in /by

Yth. Kepada seluruh peserta seleksi Panitia AYIEP 2017,

Setelah melalui proses seleksi yang panjang dan dengan kompetisi yang tinggi, kami mengumumkan hasil seleksi wawancara panitia ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Program 2017, sebagai berikut:

 

1 V. Y. Seto Damar
2 Hasya Nindita
3 Galuh Octania Permatasari
4 Fadilah Rahma NR
5 Rostya Septiana Putri
6 Heidy Melia Nefertiti
7 Anang Wahid Efendi
8 Alifiandi Rahman Yusuf
9 Patricia Martina Tobing
10 Dzikrullah Umam

 

Bagi nama yang telah disebutkan diatas, kami akan mengirimkan pengumuman kepada e-mail masing-masing.  Bagi yang tidak mendapatkan email, kami dengan berat hati menginformasikan bahwa anda belum diterima pada kepanitian kali ini. Terima kasih atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya.
Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseanyiep@gmail.com

Modelling International Lawmaking in ASEAN

/in /by

 

ASEAN and its model of international law has always being questioned by many international lawyers for its informal nature of law-making processes in concluding agreements among member states. For them, this phenomenon is unusual because normally international law is being concluded in a formal manner to show its commitment in tackling global problems.

In 2012, The University of Oxford released a book entitled, “Informal International Lawmaking”. This book is written after the realization on the increasing number of Informal International Law (IN-LAW), which being made within the international community. In this book, Joost Pauwelyn identifies the characteristics of IN-LAW which consists of output informality, process informality, and actor informality.

All of these characteristics are reflecting the way of ASEAN in concluding its agreements. However, interestingly, only a limited amount of reference to ASEAN is being included in this book to understand the nature of IN-LAW.

The emergence of IN-LAW is not a new phenomenon. Since ASEAN’s inception in 1967, the characteristic of this organization is underpinned by ‘informality’. Therefore, the blame towards ASEAN’s inability to conclude legally-binding agreements should be argued further. It is common that many legal scholars arrive at mistakes in assessing international law in ASEAN because the tendency of assessing and framing ASEAN law through the ‘western-based’ conception of international law.

I argue that many of ASEAN agreements are IN-LAW based on the following evidences. First, IN-LAW is entrenched strongly in ASEAN’s vessels that by the time of ASEAN founding fathers had a meeting to conclude ASEAN’s establishment, the foundational treaty was simply a declaration. Only when ASEAN member states realized that the organization is missing of a constituent treaty, the ASEAN charter was created.

This unique characteristic of ASEAN in law-making process is driven by the ASEAN Way, especially on ASEAN’s procedural norm that endorses the principle of seeking agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic (Soesastro, 1995). In short, all of these principles lead to the informal aspect of ASEAN.

In fact, if to be traced back any further, ASEAN’s predecessors, both Associations of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (Maliphindo), have already practiced similar norms on managing intra-regionalism affairs (Goh, 2003). Thanat Khoman, the key architect of ASA who was then Thailand’s Foreign Minister declared that ASA’s norms were deeply rooted in “Asian Culture and Traditions”. Similar view is shared towards Maliphindo, where consultation or musyawarah serves as the basis of settling differences among ASEAN members.

Second, non-legally binding instruments are the nature of ASEAN agreements. Due to the informal nature of cooperation among ASEAN member states, the output of decision-making is often to be informal as well. Even for ASEAN external agreements, 104 out of 175 are non-legally binding (Cremona et al, 2015). If more than a half of agreements concluded with external actors are non-legally binding, what is to be expected in ASEAN’s inter-state cooperation. The number of ASEAN’s legally binding agreements is far fewer than those formed in legally-binding instruments. It is clearly that non-legally binding nature of cooperation is the foundation and custom of ASEAN inter-state cooperation.

Third, actors engaged in ASEAN diplomacy are not exclusively the head of state or foreign minister. ASEAN hosts various annual meeting, ranging from state representatives to non-state actors. All this type of ASEAN meetings concludes the making of ASEAN agreements. Different than the United Nations (UN) or any other international organizations that facilitate committee of experts which focus on the technicalities of that particular chamber, ASEAN does not offer similar facilitation, yet some of ASEAN’s meeting are filled with non-state actors. The involvement of non-state actors in ASEAN diplomacy shows the characteristic of ASEAN informality.

These three aspects conclude the nature of IN-LAW in ASEAN law-making process. Therefore, in assessing international law in ASEAN, legal scholars must refrain from using the conventional approach of assessment to international law due to the nature of ASEAN cooperation. Furthermore, in developing a study related to IN-LAW, such discipline must not neglect the fact that such international law has been well developed in Southeast Asian region, thus reference to ASEAN should be made.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Pengumuman Jadwal Wawancara AYIEP 2017

/in /by

Berikut adalah peserta yang lolos seleksi berkas beserta jadwal wawancara yang ditentukan. Wawancara akan diadakan di kantor ASEAN Studies Center Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Gedung BC ruang 209.

No Nama Tanggal Waktu
1 Gidion Ivan Arly 23 Maret 2017 10:00
2 Alfian B. Satrio 23 Maret 2017 10:20
3 Valentinus Yudanto Seto Damarjati 23 Maret 2017 10:40
4 Sri Winarni Ardi Sutrisni 23 Maret 2017 11:00
5 Ubaidillah Amir 23 Maret 2017 11:20
6 Nikita Cendhani P 23 Maret 2017 11:40
7 Muzakir Haitami 23 Maret 2017 12:00
8 Alifiandi Rahman Yusuf 23 Maret 2017 13:00
9 Patricia Martina Tobing 23 Maret 2017 13:20
10 Gurindra Budi Prasetyo 23 Maret 2017 13:40
11 Hasna Nurain Muksin 23 Maret 2017 14:00
12 Dzikrullah Umam 23 Maret 2017 14:20
13 Rostya Septiana Putri 23 Maret 2017 14:40
14 Imra’atul Jamilah 23 Maret 2017 15:00
15 Nur Fajrhi 23 Maret 2017 15:20
16 Hasya Nindita 23 Maret 2017 15:40
17 Wahyu Ramadhan Yusuf 23 Maret 2017 16:00
18 Anang Wahid Efendi 24 Maret 2017 10:00
19 Rahil Helmi 24 Maret 2017 10:20
20 Rizky Fitri Lestari 24 Maret 2017 10:40
21 Galuh Octania Permatasari 24 Maret 2017 11:00
22 Heidy Melia Nefertiti 24 Maret 2017 11:20
23 Muhammad Alfian Kusuma Wardhana 24 Maret 2017 13:00
24 Amanda Mutiara Ayu Rahmawati 24 Maret 2017 13:20
25 Fadilah Rahma Nur R 24 Maret 2017 13:40

 

Informasi lebih lanjut silahkan hubungi: aseanyiep@gmail.com

Bincang ASEAN Discusses “Politics in the Boardroom”

/in /by

ASEAN Studies Center UGM held the second meeting of Bincang ASEAN in Friday (17/3), which invited Indri Dwi Apriliyanti (Lecturer at Department of Public Policy and Management, FISIPOL UGM and PhD Candidate from University of Agder, Norway). The meeting discussed Indri’s dissertation paper about the Politics in the Boardroom, which draws upon her on-going research about state-owned enterprises in Indonesia.

In her paper, Indri develops a theoretical framework to examine the relationships between decision making process and dynamics between Board in emerging market’s state-owned enterprise. She explained some issues related to diverse power distribution of Board members, decision making style, and attentional selection that was resulted from dynamics in the boardroom. She argues that effective decision can be obtained when there is balance of power, the majority of Board uses rational approach, and good corporate governance is operated within the company.

She concluded that Boards is inseparable part in national politcal economy, and more researches is needed to understand state-owned enterprises in emerging market countries, including Indonesia.

Next meeting of Bincang ASEAN will be held in Friday (31/3) to discuss IORA and Possible Shifts in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy.

Why Indonesia Needs to Reform Maritime Security Governance

/in /by

 

President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) seems not to show any significant progress in the aspect of maritime security governance. The reason lies under the ignorance towards the existence and role of maritime security governance as a guarantor of Indonesia’s maritime economy development. As if we invite and let people invest in our company, President Jokowi did not realize that there has been a high rate of crimes occurring inside the company, which will be taken into consideration by investors. To that end, President Jokowi needs to gaze slightly the issues of maritime security governance in Indonesia before figuring the way to reform it.

Indonesia as a maritime country holds two roles: First, Indonesia plays key role  as a bridge of the global shipping and trade through Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia. Second, Indonesia could also become a hotbed of pirates in Southeast Asia. According to the report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Indonesia was ranked 8th from a total of 80 developing countries with unloading capacity to 9,638,607 TEUs of containers in 2012, 11.27345 million TEUs in 2013, and 11,900,763 TEUs in 2014. Through this potential contribution of 200 trillion rupiah per year for Indonesia’s GDP (Jompa, 2014), Indonesia has the opportunity to be a stopover point for global shipping and trade.

However, Indonesia arrived as the first-rank country for piracy and armed robbery against ships incidents. Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is highly vulnerable to the pirate attacks. Moreover, ports have served as a conquerable spot for most of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Indonesia. The percentage incident happening at ports has respectively reached 65% of total cases in 2012, 79% in 2013, 77% in 2014 and 82% in 2015. These findings assure that port is the vulnerable areas targeted by pirates.

Thus, the question lies in whether the Jokowi’s government has seen the importance of maritime security governance. If so, how has the maritime security governance been progressing?

Maritime security governance, as a policy system, consists of three main aspects, namely the legal framework, institutions, and resources. In the context of Indonesia, there has been no adequate legal framework. Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime and Law No. 17/2008 on Shipping do not regulatethe function and role of maritime security institutions in combating piracy. Even so, it cannot be ruled out that Indonesia has shown an early commitment in terms of maritime transportation security by authorizing the Draft Law on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 into a law to ensure the safety of the crew.

In term of institution, Indonesia experienced a fairly problematicalissue in managing the existing maritime security institutions. After the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, there is a mixed response from the stateswhich have intensively utilized their maritime domain. One is preparing its civil maritimelaw enforcement agency, such as marinepolice and coast guard, where some are involving naval armyfor maritime patrol and law enforcement. However, in the case of Indonesia, it remains equivocal.

Law No. 32/2004 on Marine has clearly dictated the role of Badan Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) as a civil maritime law enforcement agency and the TNI-AL as an institution whose role is to manage, maintain, and protect national sovereignty. However, in practice, TNI-AL perceives that the function of law enforcement at sea remains the duty of TNI-AL through the successful apprehension of pirates who hijacked KM Hai Soon 12 in Tanjung Puting, South Kalimantan, where the Head of the Information Office of the Indonesian Navy First Admiral Edi Sucipto explained that the TNI-AL as a law enforcement agency at sea must prevent all forms of violence within the jurisdiction, and always exercising patrols to maintain security in the territory of Indonesia.Although according to the former Chief of Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Army Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo, the function of law enforcement in national waters must be carried out by civilian law enforcement agencies. This situation indicates the problem of coordination among Indonesian maritime security institution,in which requires a significant political role of President Jokowi to dictate agencies in accordance to the authorized role.

The last is the resources issue including fleets’ capabilities and system, as well as personnel with ample experience and training. Bakamla obtained financial support from the government with a budget of 520 billion rupiah per year plus three patrol boats, which is then be added with the approval of the Parliament of 726.3 billion rupiah per year with an additional 30 units patrol boats. However, Bakamla is experiencing a shortage in human resources aspects. According to the Head of Operations Management of Bakamla Colonel Andi Achdar, human resources persists as main problem.

The small number of human resources encroaches the performance Bakamla covering many aspects, such as the formulation of national policies in the field of security and safety, the implementation of early warning systems, custody and supervision, monitor execution, and so on. With these limitations, carrying out all the functions in a wide range of work areas by Bakamla is unlikely for a country with huge maritime size like Indonesia.

At this point, it is necessary for Indonesia to consider the maritime security governance reform by performing two-level efforts.

At the national level, the Indonesian government needs to consider the availability of a legal framework that specifically regulates the issue of maritime security with the aim of establishing a strong legal basis and to facilitate the creation of laws derivation into specific instruments, such as the making of action plan and blueprints. Indonesia should also strengthen the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency despite the high stake of TNI-AL whose deterrence effect may exacerbate the border disputes in Southeast Asia’s waters. Moreover, lifting the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency will be much more effective and efficient using affordable commercial-standardized fleets to subdue pirates.

At the regional level, Indonesia needs to intensify the existing maritime security cooperation, such as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and newly-established Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative (SSPI), overcoming resource limitations in the maritime security governance through joint training and exchange of knowledge and manpower.

Given such condition in which Indonesia possesses limited resources, Indonesia needs to consider an involvement in a particular area or sector in international relations. President Jokowi along with the ranks of government can build a prototype of a policy initiative where the issue of the maritime economy can be associated and overlaid with maritime security issues, thus promoted in the region as a mechanism of cooperation to face common non-traditional maritime security threat.

Finally, this complexity signifies the importance of Indonesia to regard maritime security governance. Otherwise, Indonesia may experience the loss of its potential strategic ports as a transit point, and the breakdown of its image as a maritime nation.

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Is Indonesia Choosing the Indian Ocean Rim Association Over ASEAN?

/in /by

Indonesia’s substantial involvement in IORA signifies a stage of crisis for ASEAN.

From March 5 to 7, Jakarta played host to the leader’s summit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which was also commemorating its 20th anniversary. Given the chance to lead the summit, Indonesia has pursued significant initiatives, including the enactment of the IORA Concord, or so-called Jakarta Concord. This document, which will be used to govern the Indian Ocean and IORA members, highlights several important agendas, including maritime safety and security, the blue economy, and gender empowerment.

Indonesia’s substantial work to play a leadership role in the vast Indian Ocean, however, also indicates the failure of Indonesia’s natural leadership in ASEAN.

Why did IORA become important for Indonesia? IORA can be seen a new forum that is strategically aligned to the Nawa Cita, President Jokowi’s nine-point leadership agenda. IORA not only is a platform to attract investment for accelerating Indonesia’s infrastructure development policies, it also provides an opportunity for Indonesia to show its teeth as a “global maritime fulcrum.” As Ibrahim Almutaqqi has pointed out, through a series of economic cooperation policies contained within the IORA document, Indonesia has become actively and strategically involved in IORA to explore the potential of new economic markets and investments.

However, in evaluating Jakarta’s contributions to IORA, it is necessary to look back on the argument that Indonesia has turned away from ASEAN as a multilateral forum, instead focusing more on strategic bilateral cooperation (see: Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?). In this context, Indonesia might see IORA as an alternative means of regional cooperation. Desra Percaya, the Asia Pacific and Africa directorate general at the Foreign Ministry, has expressed his concern that IORA not let any conflict similar to the South China Sea disputes happen in the Indian Ocean. This apple-to-apple way of thinking signifies that Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry sees a new opportunity in the Indian Ocean, an opportunity that a divided ASEAN can no longer present. At this point, Indonesia’s foreign policy maneuver hints that ASEAN has entered a state of crisis.

Indonesia has appeared to lose interest in its position as the natural leader in the region. During the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos, Indonesia presented no serious initiatives to find an alternative solution to the lack of agreement on a joint communique. This stands in contrast to 2012, when then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa conducted shuttle diplomacy to the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore in order to craft a unified statement on the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. In 2015, Natalegawa emphasized that Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN cannot be seen as an event but rather as a process.

ASEAN’s current leadership seems to be ready to accept the stalemate, rather than actively pursuing a breakthrough. The current ASEAN chair, the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, has not provided any certainty for the region, only calling for the code of conduct (CoC) to settle down the South China Sea disputes. Manila is unlikely to use its legal victory in a Permanent Court of Arbitration case from last year to solve the conflict and instead is likely to repair its economic relationship with China. The Philippines perceives that they it engage in war, but remains hostile if China’s activity seems to affect the Philippines’ interests. It is difficult to see Manila playing an important role under the ASEAN framework due to the Duterte’s nationalist approach, which includes a foreign policy accommodating China’s economic interests.

If Indonesia continues to set aside the importance of ASEAN as a multilateral body, while looking more toward the IORA, it will jeopardize its history of deft diplomacy in the region. Since ASEAN has entered a stalemate, Indonesia must consider taking up its “natural” role in promoting dynamic and fluid negotiations in ASEAN. Instead of celebrating its successful bid to establish the IORA’s governance, Indonesia should look to the political future of its neighborhood, which, if neglected, may disrupt its economic-oriented foreign policy.

 

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

This article has been published in The Diplomat.

ASEAN Economic Community Today: From Neo-liberalism to New Structuralism?

/in /by

In 2010, the World Bank published a book that shed light on a new framework for world development: New Structural Economics. Authored by the Bank’s Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin, this book aims to combine old neoclassical economics with the tradition of structuralism in political economy.

This attempt was resulted in what Lin called as “new structural economics” (NSE).

Basically, this idea is not necessarily new. During 2000s, some idea of ‘neostructuralism’ has also been developed by Latin American economists to refer to the economic strategies undertaken by extractive-rich countries, which did not follow neoliberal prescription. The idea was soon dissolved after the low commodity price in 2010s, which leads the regional economy in crisis.

There are, of course, critiques and debates over NSE particularly among economists. From China itself, there is Weiying Zhang, who challenges Lin’s Keynesian prescription with his libertarian thinking. In the West, some leading political economists, such as Dani Rodrik or Ben Fine put forward some critical comments against this idea.

However, the most interesting point within international political economy (IPE) framework is not about the economic ideas that NSE offers. Rather, it was because NSE comes amid the concurrent global crisis, which makes global leaders to rethink the current political and economic framework that governs world politics.

I argue that NSE is important for two distinctive reasons. First, NSE offers a new theoretical framework to resolve the concurrent crisis in global political economy, which was marked by global financial crisis and low commodity price in stock market.

Second, NSE has recalled the ‘old’ debate in IPE whether the state should be given prominent rules in managing economy. NSE strongly called for strong state intervention in maintaining industrial policy, which goes side-by-side within its role providing good infrastructures for industrial purposes.

It is precisely the topic, in which Weiying Zhang, a prominent Chinese economist from Peking University, disagreed with Lin’s argument. A Hayek-inspired economist, Zhang demands for a bigger role for Chinese entrepreneurs in economy with minimal state intervention.

Whatever the result of the debate is, NSE seems to slightly put an alternative against the old-style neoliberal regimes in world politics, including ASEAN Economic Community.

For instance, Yifu Lin recently wrote for Project Syndicate over ‘African Industrial revolution’, in which he argues that Africa desperataly needs a significant industrial policy to catch-up with global economic development. He suggests that government needs to revitalise its role in spurring industrialisation based on state’s comparative advantages. Through this scheme, state-led industrialisation could lead African states to catch other regions in more developed countries.

On the other hand, the question over industrial policy should start with one key variable: how could the state finance the industries? The question is thus straight-forward: international cooperation. It is through cooperation with Multinational Companies (MNCs) and other governments, as Yifu Lin argues, that the ‘industrial revolution’ could be financed.

Yifu Lin’s illustration over Africa has raised another question on ASEAN: does ASEAN also pave its way for renewing industrial policy, which therefore abandons the ‘free-trade’ regime that was established through ASEAN Economic Community since 2003?

In 2015, ASEAN member states has agreed to renew their commitments over ‘ASEAN Economic Community’, which is centred over four key points: (1) a highly integrated and cohesive economy, (2) a competitive, dynamic, and innovative region, (3) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation, and (4) a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centred ASEAN.

These points shown that the idea of ASEAN Economic Community is still a continuation of integration commitment that was agreed in 2003 (Bali Concord II) and 2009 (the first blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community).

However, since 2011, ASEAN has also stepped forward a commitment for ‘industrial cooperation’, which was among others marked by the establishment of ASEAN Infrastructure Fund through partnership with Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is coincided with growing ‘infrastructure-related’ initiatives among ASEAN member states, including Indonesia.

Since the reign of Jokowi, for example, Indonesia has put forward some commitments to improve infrastructures and build national industries in many areas, particularly in Java Island.

It is of course not without cost. Several international cooperation schemes, as well as maximising tax revenues, have been set out by the Government to finance infrastructures and industries. It is in this context the intellectual leadership of Sri Mulyani, Jokowi’s Finance Minister and former World Bank’s Managing Director, plays significant role.

This new trends are also initiated by some other Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Indochinese states. In four Indochinese states (Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam), some cooperation schemes to boost infrastructures have resulted in the fast growth and modernisation in those countries.

So, will ASEAN undergo some shifts from neo-liberalism to the new trend of ‘new structuralism’ in the future? Even though some integration agenda in ASEAN Economic Community still maintains some classic ‘neoliberal’ agenda, such as free trade or competitive economic region, the ‘new structural’ wave is also move slowly within the region. It takes place bilaterally, under Chinese leadership in providing infrastructures and supports for industrialisation, rather than through regional economic integration.

This wave needs to be taken seriously by everyone who concerns with ASEAN development. Will these new waves of ‘new structuralism’ provide a better chance to narr0w development gap in the region? Or, in contrast, is it only ‘the same old wine in a new bottle’?

Whilst the idea of ‘industrial cooperation’ is not new for ASEAN (similar initiatives have ever been initiated in the 1980s) we still need to rethink the future of economic integration. It is because what happen in the region will affect the future of our country—as the 1997 financial crisis taught us.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Migration-Development Nexus: The Launching of Bincang ASEAN in UGM

/in /by

ASEAN Studies Center UGM has launched Bincang ASEAN,  a regular event that provides critical discussions over recent development in ASEAN. The first discussion was held in Friday (3/3) in BC 207, FISIPOL UGM, and discussed Migration-Development Nexus: Migrant Labours and the ASEAN Economic Community. At the meeting, Dana Hasibuan (Lecturer at Department of Sociology, FISIPOL UGM) presented his recent research on Indonesian migrant labours in Wonosobo and East Lombok.

Dana’s research, which was funded by FISIPOL UGM Research Grant in 2016, uncovered the relationship between local development and the constitution of political subjectivity of migrant workers in these Districts. Drawn upon an extensive fieldwork during 2016, he found that economic motivation matters among Indonesian migrant labours from this areas, which was overwhelmingly led the Migration of people abroad as TKI after the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community in 2003. “The case clearly shown that capital penetration has already been embedded even in a small village”, he added.

Through a poststructuralist lens, he argues that the constitution of labour migration is inextricably linked with the process of local development and the transformation of statehood in Southeast Asia under neoliberal regime. It was strengthened by the fact that there are thin boundaries between legal and illegal migration, as well as narrow political exposure during the process of migration. “The government, therefore, needs to consider this issue as a political problem, not only about economic or local development issues”, Dana concluded.

The next meeting, which will discuss ‘Politics in the Boardrooms’ with Indri Dwi Apriliyanti (PhD Candidate at the University of Oslo), will be held on Friday (17/3) at BC 207.  (Rr/Armu)

ASEAN Studies Center UGM Leads Review of ASEAN Charter

/in /by

ASEAN Studies Center UGM, in collaboration with the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security arranges a Focused Group Discussion to the discuss the review of ASEAN charter, which will be brought into discussion at the upcoming ASEAN Summit.

Dr Dafri Agussalim, the Head of ASEAN Studies Center UGM, spoke on some issues related to Human Rights in ASEAN.

Dr Dafri spoke alongside Dr Edy Prasetyono (University of Indonesia), Dr Riefqi Muna (Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Mr Sanga Pangaribuan (staff of Indonesian Permanent Representative in ASEAN) and several staffs from Directorate of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation. This forum was also attended by several staffs from various Ministries and Directorates, as well as researchers from ASEAN Studies Center.

The Focused Group Discussion is conducted on Friday, February 24 th 2017, which takes place in Dean’s meeting Room FISIPOL UGM. In this meeting, the speakers debate the possibilities of revision in ASEAN Charter, particularly with recentupdates in ASEAN institutional development.