By Nisrina Husnul Khotimah and Kevin Iskandar Putra (Picture: Aris Daeng)

 People in Palu and its surrounds are still struggling to survive a month after the 7.5 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami had struck. As of Friday 26^th October 2018, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) has recorded a total of 2,081 fatalities – a large and dense number for the affected area. Locals and international news agencies were quick to realise that human resources and humanitarian aid did not come quickly enough and hastily turned their attention towards ASEAN as they questioned their role in rescue operations. The high number of deaths is a red flag that signalled that ASEAN is still not resilient towards natural disasters and much assessment is needed on the regional organisation’s response to these events.

This article intends to examine the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) – the body that was mostly involved in efforts to recover Palu and past post-natural disaster operations –under the intention to understand why ASEAN’s response was not evident until almost a week after the tsunami struck. This article also intends to critique the placement of natural disasters in ASEAN’s communities’ blueprints, emphasising how natural disasters should be seen as a security issue rather than a socio-cultural one. Finally, this article would like to propose the rudiments of what could possibly be an addition to the AHA that could improve their agility in terms of action.

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management serves as a platform for intergovernmental efforts in cooperating and coordinating the ASEAN Member States, with the United Nations for disaster management and emergency response in the region. There are some frameworks used as the basis to run the organization, which entail Disaster Monitoring, Preparedness and Response, and Capacity Building; all playing their respective important role. As another focus, AHA also developed its Emergency Operations Centre (OEC), shedding an integral part of the importance of collective response. Through the Web Emergency Operations Center (WebEOC), an online-based platform that AHA provides, the organisation intends to provide a mechanism to monitor and share the information related to regional disasters.

ASEAN’s inadequate response towards, and involvement in, the aftermath of the tsunami in Palu is a clear illustration of the organisation’s lack of political willingness to clamp regional cooperation. Not only does this allow us to question why there is a lack of urgency, but it also allows us to identify issues in its institutional structure as well. Areas of concern include the fact that disaster management is under the socio-cultural community blueprint in which we believe would be most suitable if it were under the political-security community blueprint instead.

 

Placing disaster management under the socio-cultural community blueprint has many relatively troubling implications. Primarily, it indicates that ASEAN sees disaster management as an opportunity to “lift the quality of life of its peoples through [people-orientated] activities”, as stated in their ASCC Blueprint 2025, rather than a means to prevent conflict and instability – which could easily arise after a natural disaster hit. Disaster management in the socio-cultural community blueprint, thus far, has only attempted to enhance the capacity of communities to adapt to vulnerabilities through people-centred initiatives such as the provision of resources and management support, as exemplified by what was reported in AHA’s situation updates on the Palu tsunami and also other post-natural disaster situations such as Typhoon-Mangkhut.

As one could deduce, there is still a need for a troop-based response from this regional organisation. It is important to realise that natural disasters represent a very major threat to security of human life. Allowing the wounds of a natural disaster to linger for an extended period of time without recovery would allow a plethora of other security issues to penetrate the affected area. Security issues such as the displacement of people, increasing population density elsewhere and cross-border migration are easily in the foresight of post-natural disaster consequences and all possess “the potential for instability and conflict…conflict due to scarcity”. With this in mind, it is imperative for ASEAN to see natural disasters as, not only an urgency, but a threat to its well-guarded peace.

In addition, another reason why disaster management should be a part of the political-security community blueprint lies on the fact that ASEAN’s harmonious environment is easily at risk when natural disaster strikes. This was especially evident during the haze crisis in 1997 where winds swept acrid smoke across Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, causing these countries to confront Indonesia after they were unable to cope with the disaster due to the Asian Financial Crisis happening at the same time. From here, one could identify the lack of regional cooperation as they turned to denouncement rather than incentives to undertake the haze crisis together as member states of the same organisation. A regional effort is therefore critical so that every member state has a stake in relief operations and preventive measures.

Relating back to the aftermath of the tsunami in Palu, such regional effort was evidently absent in relief operations. Based on situation updates provided by the AHA, most actions taken and resources mobilised were done by the Indonesian government. It was not until situation update no. 9, out of fifteen, where one could read about responses from other ASEAN member states (which, in situation update no. 9, was humanitarian assistance from the Philippines and Singapore, and a THB 5 million contribution from Thailand). Moreover, what could also be revealed from the situation updates was the fact that most operational management was done by the Indonesia’s National Board of Disaster (BNBP), indicating that a great deal was being handled by Indonesia alone and ASEAN only served as a subsidiary force of aid.

ASEAN’s, as a regional organisation, involvement in the Palu tsunami aftermath was primarily done through the AHA. Although it did coordinate resources and activities done by incoming NGOs through the ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT), it is still better described as a management body comprised of experts from different organisations. This further emphasises the fact that ASEAN’s disaster management is still socially oriented as its motions are dependent on other actors’ proposal of actions.

This calls for an enhancement in ASEAN’s framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management, in which we propose an ASEAN-Emergency Operation Team (ASEAN-EOT) that is able to conduct rescue operations and provide human resources in order to ease access for medical personnel to disaster-stricken areas in the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN-EOT would be established by ASEAN itself, giving the AHA the power to oversee and coordinate collective action. ASEAN-EOT would be composed of experienced and trained military personnel from all 10 countries of ASEAN, training together specifically for disaster rescue missions.

Military personnel will remain members of their respective national forces as the ASEAN-EOT does not intend to act as an independent “ASEAN force”, but rather a collective-action unit for disaster operations. With the existence of this unit, we should expect ASEAN to be one of the first actors to respond to a natural disaster, increasing humanitarian aid and consequently reducing the amount of possible deaths. With the information collected and coordinated by AHA, the ASEAN-EOT should effectively know how much military personnel and air transportation is needed within a realistic time-frame of 48 hours.

From our analysis, it could be concluded that ASEAN’s agility and involvement in natural disaster rescue and relief operations remain inadequate. This article theorised that placing disaster management under the socio-cultural community has many worrying implications as it implied that ASEAN treated post-natural disaster situations as an opportunity to improve quality of life rather than a threat to their security and peace.

Therefore, we suggest to put natural disasters under the political-security community, allowing us to also propose what could be a potential ASEAN-Emergency Operation Team. This team serves as a collective-action unit under the oversight of AHA, ensuring that ASEAN would be one of the first actors to respond when natural disaster strikes in the Southeast Asian region. Such unit would not only enhance the ASEAN’s agility in terms of response, but it would also reduce the number of subsequent fatalities due to quick responsiveness. Failure to improve their natural disaster management framework would inevitably deteriorate the international stature of ASEAN states.

 

References:

AHA Centre Situation Update No. 15 – FINAL: M 7.4 Earthquake and Tsunami, Sulawesi, Indonesia – Friday, 26 October 2018, 12:00 hrs (UTC+7), AHA, https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/aha-centre-situation-update-no-15-final-m-74-earthquake-and-tsunami-sulawesi

“About the AHA Centre”, The AHA Centre, https://ahacentre.org

“What we do”, The AHA Centre, https://ahacentre.org/what-we-do/

A Strategic Framework for ASEAN-UN Cooperation, UNESCAP, https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Session%201.%20Cooperation%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf

“Introduction.” in ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, March 2016.https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/8.-March-2016-ASCC-Blueprint-2025.pdf

The UK UN delegation in a debate on impact of climate change on peace. Hough, Peter. “Environmental Security.” in International Security Studies, ed. Peter Hough et al. 211 – 224. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Nguitragool, Paruedee. “Negotiating the Haze Treaty: Rationality and Institutions in the Negotiations for the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002).” Asian Survey 51, no. 2 (2011): 356-78. doi:10.1525/as.2011.51.2.356.

AHA Centre Situation Update No. 9: M 7.4 Earthquake and Tsunami, Sulawesi, Indonesia – Monday, 8 October 2018, 17:00 hrs (UTC+7), AHA, https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/aha-centre-situation-update-no-9-m-74-earthquake-and-tsunami-sulawesi-indonesia

Written by Cavin Dennis Tito Siregar

Science and Technology have never stopped advancing since the very first time humans invented fire. The fact that we are experiencing The Fourth Industrial Revolution has opened a wide gate of opportunities to everyone. Those who can make use of such opportunities will prevail. ASEAN, being one of the most diverse regions, shall unite and utilize this opportunity.

“For the first time in the history of living standards ordinary people have experienced sustainable growth. This kind of economic behavior has never happened before. ”

(Robert E. Lucas, 2017)

1. The Fourth Industrial Revolution

Curiosity is in our DNA. This is what underlies the rapid development of Science and Technology that enables humans to classify epochs in each transition of their lives according to the standard of living which applies at that time. Beginning in the 18th century, the first Industrial Revolution was marked by the mechanization of production through steam power which gave rise to the proletarian. In the 19th century, the industrial revolution was marked by the automation of mass production.

At this time, countries worldwide competed to bring innovation in the automobile industry and build large scale electrical networks. The third industrial revolution in the 1950s was

marked by the development of digital systems and information technology. Industries become increasingly rapid with the development of computer-based automation. Industrial machineries work automatically through computer. Humans at this time have become the supervisor of these machines.

Artificial intelligence, robot technology, big data and Internet of Things connect human lives so easily with one another. Some even argue about humans being replaced with their own technology. The Industrial Revolution 4.0 could have a negative impact on the government that stutters and cannot utilize rapid technological developments (Schwab, 2017). While the Fourth Industrial Revolution comes with massive improvement in productivity, with it comes the replacement of human labor.

Automation has come a long way since the 19^th century. Wealthy markets, such as The Gulf States, have the resources to invest in new technologies, and those with better established manufacturing sectors, such as the countries in Southeast Asia, appear best placed to reap the benefits of the revolution. The global economy is entering the 4^th Industrial Revolution based on the application of advanced automation all the way from production to service delivery. The transformative impact of this revolution will require countries to think deeply about their policies and priorities on a national scale.

Many ASEAN governments are well aware of this need and have launched national responses, such as Thailand 4.0, Singapore’s Smart Nation initiative, Making Indonesia 4.0, The Philippines’ inclusive Innovation Industrial Strategy (I3S), etc. However, some of the greatest impacts of the 4^th Industrial Revolution will play not on a national scale but at a regional scale. The nature of cross-border relations and economic interaction will be revolutionized. It will not be enough to think only about a national response. In the years ahead, regional organizations like ASEAN will be called upon ever more heavily to help steer and shape these historic transformations.

And yet, given the accelerating speed of technological advancement, shaping regional policies is growing increasingly harder. It means that ASEAN and organizations like it will need to redesign the way they manage regional governance.

1. Trade, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Sustainability of ASEAN

Today, entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of economies all over the world. Even in a command economy like China, entrepreneurs are valued for their contributions to the economy and encouraged to innovate to compete with companies worldwide. The global economy, combined with modern infrastructure and communications, has introduced a new age of

competition to the world of entrepreneurship. There will no longer be competition within ASEAN’s own tribe, town, village, or city, instead competition will be held among entrepreneurs worldwide.

Many of these entrepreneurs can access cheaper means of production than before. They may have better access to raw resources of cheap labor, for example. This has made modern entrepreneurship more challenging and arguably more rewarding than ever before.

As a region, ASEAN has dramatically outpaced the rest of the world in growth of GDP per capita since the late 1970s. Income growth has remained strong since 2000, with the average annual real gains of more than 5 percent. In comparison, ASEAN has real GDP growth of 66% in the Asia-Pacific from 2006 to 2015. According to a study by McKinsey, in the year 2000, 14 percent of the region’s population is living below the international poverty line of $1.25 a day (calculated in purchasing-power-parity terms), but by 2013, that share had fallen to just 3 percent. Already several million households in the ASEAN countries have incomes that allow them to make significant discretionary purchases.

That number could reach 125 million households by 2025, making ASEAN an important consumer market. ASEAN has long heeded the connectivity imperative, and the benefits of regional cooperation and economic integration, through initiatives such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), are paying dividends. ASEAN commands a combined GDP of about $2.4 trillion, and GDP per capita has increased by 63.2% from 2007 to 2015. If it were a single country, it would be among the top 10 economic powers in the world.

To further drive growth, ASEAN and its six strategic partners will come together in November for the anticipated signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This will create the world’s largest free-trade area, representing nearly 30% of global GDP, and will demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to removing barriers to trade and expanding market access both within the region and with its partners.

There is a substantial list of opportunities associated with AEC integration. For instance, economic integration provides opportunities to boost economic stability in the region. Another benefit is that integration would turn ASEAN into a more competitive region within the world economy. A stronger regional economy will help to improve the living standards of the ASEAN population by reducing poverty through economic development.

ASEAN member countries expect to achieve greater economic cooperation in the areas of financial policies, trade, and human capital. AEC integration will also serve to promote goods and services, investment, labor mobilization, and mobilization of capital. The ASEAN region could potentially become a highly competitive economic union operating as a single market. ASEAN also intends to improve regional agricultural and industrial utilization, as well as expand trade, and improve transportation and infrastructure.

As an example, Six Southeast Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, are the most suitable countries for entrepreneurial goals. The population in these six countries reaches 9% of the world’s population. While the Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) reaches 3.17% of world GDP. This makes these six countries considered capable of being a land for establishing trade, business and economic partnerships. Thus, the results of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the world’s foremost study of entrepreneurship, establish the conduct of entrepreneurial research comprehensively in six Southeast Asian countries.

1. The Future of ASEAN’s Technopreneurship

The process of organizational creativity is a process of mainstreaming innovation or continually finding important corporate problems, solving those problems, and implementing the solutions to satisfy the global market and is referred to as Technopreneurship (S.O.O., 2014). Technopreneurship emerges when entrepreneurship is combined with the development of Science and Technology. The equation between entrepreneurship and Technopreneurship is caring for profit. But Technopreneurship, aside from caring for profit, also cares about the development of Science and Technology.

A Technopreneur is an entrepreneur who understands technology, who is creative, innovative, dynamic, and dares to be different. They take paths that have not been explored, and are very excited about their work. ASEAN is home to an abundant of natural resources and is one of the world’s largest producers of agricultural commodities. Many ASEAN Member States (AMS) used this endowment as a springboard for industrialization, and today the region is a thriving hub for global manufacturing and trade. These developments have been supported by a number of common trends: most AMS have achieved sound macroeconomic fundamentals and a high savings rate, and they demonstrate relatively open trading systems with a young, rapidly growing population.

The creation of the AEC promises to open up sizeable new market opportunities for ASEAN firms, including SMEs, yet it also threatens to open up new challenges. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of ASEAN economies. Between 89% and 99% of enterprises within ASEAN are SMEs, providing between 52% and 97% of employment in member states. They’re also an important source of innovation. But many SMEs are limited in their ability to grow because of lack of access to finance, business services and information, and constrained access to markets beyond their immediate neighborhoods.

However, the rise of digital marketplaces and online services can empower and support SMEs to trade in ways that was unimaginable even a few years ago, connecting them to giant, regional

markets rather than just local customers. There are 6 unicorn Technopreneurship or e-commerce that are widely-known, which are Gojek (Indonesia), Grab (Malaysia), Lazada (Chinna), Sea (Singapore), Tokopedia (Indonesia), Traveloka (Indonesia), etc.

1. ASEAN Youth’s Role on Technopreneurship

The youth are an important section of the population in any country in the world and are in need of attention as they are both our current and future leaders and the catalyst for economic, social, and cultural development. Over the years, the ASEAN youth have become more aware and more involved in building and promoting the ASEAN Community. There are currently 213 million youth (15-34 years) in ASEAN countries, constituting the largest ever cohort of ASEAN youth. The peak population of just over 220 million is expected in 2038.

Technopreneurship in its development is always associated with technological developments that end in internet use. With a total population of 644.1 million, ASEAN holds 8.4% of the world’s total population. 53% of the population are internet users. This gives benefits to technopreneurs to develop Technopreneurship in Southeast Asia. Adding to 35% of the ASEAN population is the younger generation.

Technopreneurship is sometimes connected to the youth’s role in all countries in the world. Youth is best understood as a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence. That’s why, as a category, youth is more fluid than other fixed age-groups. Yet, age is the easiest way to define this group, particularly in relation to education and

employment, because ‘youth’ is often referred to a person between the ages of leaving compulsory education, and finding their first job.

Adopting a standardised definition of youth is complex as there is no definition which is universally recognised (Global YDI Report, 2016). The complexity comes from the different aspects and issues involved in the transition stages of young people’s development from adolescence to adulthood. The UN definition of youth is 15-24 years and the Commonwealth Global Youth Development Index definition is 15-29 years. In the context of ASEAN Member States (AMS), the age ranges of youth are defined in the law and regulations which exist in each country.

It should be noted, however, that the age ranges available for the indicators do not align with this definition. Should further disaggregation by age become available in the future, this may improve the accuracy of the picture provided of the youth in the region by the YDI, which stands for Youth Development Index, in ASEAN.

The emergence of Technopreneurship provides great support to the government, related institutions, and also ASEAN youth. ASEAN youth, with their enthusiasm and abilities, are able to adapt to the development of science and technology, specifically the internet. This can be seen from the Technopreneurship unicorn leaders in Southeast Asia, mostly young people. For example, e-commerce is a subsidiary of SEA Group originating from Singapore. Christin Djuarto, 29, right on February 2018 served as Director of Shopee Indonesia.

Not only that, the founder of Gojek and CEO of Gojek, Nadiem Anwar Makarim, founded Gojek in 2015 when he was 31 years old and still adrift as a youth in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the youth have roles in the development of Technopreneurship which is very promising not only in ASEAN but also in the world. However, most young people feel optimistic and pessimistic about the development of technology or the internet for their work later. But again, it takes good cooperation and contribution between all parties so that this can work well and the younger generation can be encouraged to be more enthusiastic.

The ASEAN Youth Forum (AYF) has committed itself to upholding meaningful youth participation in the following:

1. Realising action-based activities on youth issues at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels.
2. Engaging key participants including civil society, youth-relevant bodies at the national, regional, and international level through meaningful dialogues and activities.
3. Expanding influences with other significant groups in ASEAN and beyond.
4. Strengthening capacity of this body/organization/ network and other related groups in the region.
5. Bringing youth in the region to take part in the movement towards the ASEAN Community 2015. The AYF believes that the pursuance of a Youth Development Index, initiated by ASEAN and its Member States, will open doors for young people to be involved in more meaningful engagements at the regional and national levels.

Technopreneurship provides a way and guidance for the progress of ASEAN countries to achieve and realize the vision of the Industrial Revolution 4.0. This is reflected in the development of science and technology in vital sectors that support the economies of ASEAN countries. With population growth increasing every year and supported by human resources, which constitutes the many young people, ASEAN is becoming ready to face the Industrial Revolution 4.0. The development of Technopreneurship or e-commerce is often associated with the younger generation, who, recently, has become the originator of the largest e-commerce in ASEAN.

The youth are the country’s biggest treasure, in which they will become future leaders in ASEAN countries. Therefore, the government and related institutions should establish good cooperation with the younger generation, so that the generation of pride in ASEAN countries can be created to bring ASEAN to unity in the world.

REFERENCES

Article

http://infobanknews.com/asean-menciptakan-kewirausahaanterbanyak-di-dunia/

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https://asean.org/asean-enhance-roles-young-women-entrepreneurs/

https://bebusinessed.com/history/history-of-entrepreneurship/

https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/4301/Prospek+Cerah+Technopreneurs%20hip +di+Masa+Depan/0/sorotan_media/

https://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-southeast-asia-2017.

https://businessinsight.kontan.co.id/news/christin-djuartofigur-anak-muda-di-bisnis-e-commerce/

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Journal

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https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf

Written by Rahina Dyah Adani, University of Gadjah Mada (picture: Reuters)

The unimproved situation in the South China Sea has questioned ASEAN’s so-called ‘centrality’ in security of the region. The association is said to be more divided in regards to the South China Sea dispute as U.S. and China have divided the group by working arduously behind the scenes in lobbying the members to support their positions in the South China Sea. Regarding ASEAN centrality, the superpowers are more likely to be treating the claimed position of ASEAN only by paying lip service without actually treating it in a way ‘centrality’ should be faced.

The overall image of how ASEAN Centrality is handling the situation in the South China Sea does not make it any better. It is agreeable that security matters in the region are not inseparable from both U.S. and China as proven by the recent dangerous, physical confrontation of U.S.’s USS Decatur and China’s Luyang Destroyer. However, despite the need to involve both superpowers in security issues of the South China Sea, the Centrality’s role in this matter seems to have lesser relations to the U.S. and becoming more Sino-centric. With increasing skepticism about ASEAN’s ability in bridging the competition in the South China Sea, the ideal implementation of the centrality of ASEAN remains unachieved.

Indeed, ASEAN is not staying silent in showing its centrality. There have been several occasions where the member states remind other powers about the centrality belonging to the Association. This includes expressing concerns over several situations in which one of them is the aforementioned physical confrontation of the powers’ warships. In addition to that, ASEAN has been working on the Code of Conduct (C.O.C.) for the South China Sea since 2002, along with China, who finally agreed on the first single draft in 2018. Despite the slow progress in approaching the final draft, this is seen as a huge step as ASEAN has been urging China to cooperate with the making of C.O.C. for years.

For years now, ASEAN has insisted that it must be central in security issues regarding this. Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen offered three reasons for this argument. First, any other alternatives would be worse both collectively and for the larger powers. Second, ASEAN member states border two key maritime domains—the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca which are pivotal for global trade. Lastly, ASEAN’s values assure the larger powers as the Association is “neutral, inclusive, and open.”

Regrettably, even with the efforts and arguments given, centrality seems to remain unobtainable. The actions taken by ASEAN are perceived as less assertive in carrying out its centrality. No bold decision has been made as the Association could only express concern and question things without doing anything aside from working on the gradual drafting of the C.O.C.

As a result, the questioning of ASEAN centrality is more heard. Though Ng had argued that ASEAN’s values would assure the larger powers, it is never what the superpowers want. Both China and U.S. are fighting for dominance in the region. It is less likely for ASEAN to properly mitigate the strong competition of dominance when its values are rather soft and meant to play safe. At the end of the day, the ability of the Association in making bolder decisions have prompted questions to arise regarding the competence of it carrying out centrality.

This inability is not without cause. It is said that the key barricade for ASEAN in reaching its highest potential in centrality is the asymmetrical relations of power existing between the actors involved. Holding the position of centrality, ASEAN has to face two of the global superpowers whose influences exist in most, if not all, of its member states. With each of its member states having their own dependency on the superpowers, ASEAN has become more fragile compared to the two. This surely affects ASEAN’s power in relations to U.S. and China as well as to how the superpowers view it in the South China Sea.

The idea of ASEAN as the weaker one has influenced the actors’ actions toward one another. Meanwhile, China and U.S. show regular acts of two competing powers against each other, their actions towards ASEAN leaves the impression of ignorance. U.S. acts as if ASEAN is not to be thought of as the issue and China knows very well that the Association would not be daring enough to take a strong stand against it.

China’s impression of the weaker ASEAN explains how it managed to take advantage of the delays in the arrangement of C.O.C. by distracting the Association to build reclamation island in the South China Sea. Ideally, ASEAN should act upon this. However, as ASEAN’s dependency on

China is now greater than ever, the Association seemed to have turned a blind eye. This shows how the asymmetrical relations of powers in the South China Sea have affected ASEAN centrality’s effectiveness in ensuring security of the region.

This is not to be separated with how ASEAN’s solidarity is considered to be weak. It is divided both by differing dependency to superpowers and by interests. Taking a bold unified decision for the group would not be easy, especially with consensus decision-making. A strong stand in facing the superpowers might affect members’ individual interests as they are under the influence of the greater powers. This low solidarity has become the reason of ASEAN’s weakness in facing the powers in the South China Sea. With the member states not having enough unified interests in facing the external actors, ASEAN has become rather fragile in the region.

Now that the problems barricading ASEAN centrality’s effectiveness are discussed, it is considered that ASEAN should focus first on strengthening its solidarity at the fundamental level. It has been urged to re-examine its Charter and redefine its consensus-building mechanism to become more flexible and adaptive to achieve unity. This might be agreeable as ASEAN has been too rigid in keeping its peaceful system that conflicts are more likely to be buried rather than solved. Still, the rigidness of ASEAN and its principles are not something that can be easily changed as they were built and agreed on by the member states with strong backgrounds. Redefining these values would not be simple and the possibility of it becoming a distraction for ASEAN is bigger.

Thus, an alternative is given as a solution. It is said that ASEAN’s member states with high bargaining power should step up to take initiatives to face the superpowers on behalf of ASEAN. Member states with considerable bargaining power are said to have the potential to push ASEAN’s bargaining position in facing the superpowers if they agree to take collective initiative to use their bargaining positions as a weapon for ASEAN. Member states such as the ASEAN-5 are considered strong enough to take this initiative as they are important enough for U.S. and China despite being dependent on U.S. and China as well. These interdependences, when perceived as unified, are enough to ‘put the larger powers in their place’ for they will start to take the ASEAN member states seriously.

It is to be noted that it is important for other ASEAN member states to prepare themselves to support these initiating states as this solution might be dangerous for the states’ interests if anything goes wrong. With this solution, it is believed that at least the asymmetrical relations of power in the South China Sea will not be as severe as how it is currently playing out to be.

Unfortunately, this solution is much easier said than done. Knowing that some member states’ interests might be in danger, it will not be easy just to take one starting step. Trust issues will be a hindrance if the initiating states start to question one another’s sincerity. The possibility for betrayal is big if one party decides to step back to protect its interests.

In addition, the assurance of ASEAN’s complete support is severely needed. There has to be a way to prove to the initiating states that the whole member states of ASEAN are all in to support them in this initiative. Above all, taking the daring first step is not easy. Unless the member states are brave and faithful enough for this action, this initiative will not go well and even lessen ASEAN’s solidarity more than ever.

Whether this solution is taken or not, ASEAN will have to keep walking on eggshells in the South China Sea. Its solidarity is challenged as it is forced to step away from its comfort zone when people are questioning its so-called ‘centrality.’ As the U.S. and China keep its grip on the main roles in the region, ASEAN is faced with the choice of playing along with the superpowers’ game or taking a stronger and bolder position. Unless ASEAN fixes the asymmetrical relations of power in the region, the game in the South China Sea will never belong to the Association.

Written by Firstya Dizka Arrum Ramadhanty, International Relations Undergraduate Student, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

 

In the last two decades, ASEAN’s battle on acknowledging the increasing trend of transnational crimes and human rights and security matter has been interesting to look at. Progress have been considerable. In 2004, there was the first ASEAN Declaration Against Human Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children. The blueprint for ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) 2015 also resulted in the creation of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and a set of actions planned to combat transnational crimes, including trafficking in persons (TIP). In November 2015, the 2004 declaration was updated with the ASEAN Convention Against Human Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) and the creation of Bohol TOP Work Plan 2017-2020.

There are, however, three things in ASEAN’s journey in combating TIP that are problematics:the dilemma of border-control as a solution to TIP and people-smuggling, the consequence of ASEAN’s focus on women and children in the discourse of TIP, and most importantly, how labour migration, one of the key components of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), is still separated from the discussion of TIP.

Trafficking-in-Persons and People-Smuggling: The border-control dilemma

From the blueprint of APSC 2025 to the annual new set of visions and agreement in April 2018, “trafficking in persons” is considered as a transnational crime along with drug trafficking and “smuggling of people”. TIP is defined by ASEAN as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion […] to achieve the consent of a person…for the purpose of exploitation”. There has yet to be an official definition by ASEAN on people-smuggling, but the term has been used many times in the UN that inferred the difference between the two lies in consent and the existence of exploitation.

Nevertheless, people-smuggling can quickly turn into TIP.  Migrants who ‘consent’ to the risk and the journey of being illegally smuggled to another country might still end up being exploited, coerced, and trafficked. In 2015, migrants who tried to leave south Thailand to the border of Malaysia by paying smugglers were held as captives for ransom and abused in camps instead, many ended up being enslaved or become a forced-labor in Thailand’s fishing companies. The similar case also happened to the Rohingya thathad no choice but to pay smugglersin 2016 to reach Malaysia and Indonesia, only to be abused and exploited.ASEAN too had recognizedthis in 2012 that there is a close connection between TIP and smuggling of migrants.

Yet, ASEAN’s plan to prevent both issue is to tighten border control, migration policies, and other issuance of papers – which can easily backfired. While focusing on border patrol and coast watch can help spot the movement of the traffickers, such tight policies could encourage people-smuggling, since the change in policies have no automatic impact in the pushingfactors of migration. Inevitable reasons why people migrate, such as economic condition, war, and natural disaster make preconditions for legal migration impossible to access. This will make them seek for smugglers, which in its vicious cycle, will also increase the possibility of TIP. And as history tells, as long demand exists, the market sustains. In UNODC’s “Global Study of Migrants” 2018, the same concern was also expressed, saying that such policies would only shifts the transport routes and provide more opportunities for smugglers.

The Narration of Gendered Human-Trafficking: The Good and the Bad

Just like the U.N, ACTIP put a highlight on “women and children” – which reasons should not be questioned. Dana Raigrodski, in her 2015 article ‘Economic Migration Gone Wrong’ stated that women constitutes those who illegally migrate for survival due to economic struggles and gender-based repression, hence became the majority of those who are being exposed to larger risks, exploited, and trafficked. This narrative of gendered-human trafficking, however, can also have a major downside.

Having women and children as the primary focus would downplay TIP, an obvious humanitarian issue, to be a human-rights issue and a gender-issue only. This makes many sides of the issue go unnoticed. ASEAN has indeed show progress in recognizing the combination of factors as the cause of TIP, including “government corruption, poverty, economic instability…and the demand…that lead to trafficking”. However, the many-situations that makes trafficking becomes possible – from flawed migration policy, people’s perceptions and understanding, to market singularity which ASEAN is actively supporting – tends to be neglected.

The “women and children” discourse and the vulnerable sense that came with it, had, first, led ASEAN to be very victim-oriented. This reflects in how ACTIP has one full chapter that consists of six articles about criminalization, one chapter on “protection” and victim protection with two articles that has 21 points in total, and only three articles are focusing on prevention. In fact, out of thirty-one articles, only one highlights preventive measures. Second of all, it narrows people’s perceptions of TIP restricted to the market of sexual exploitation of women and children and that the traffickers are only men, which in ASEAN’s territory and history of cases, there might be a mistarget.

In the 2014 Global Trafficking In Persons Report, UNODC mentioned that between 2010-2012, trafficking for sexual exploitation Asia takes about 26% of total cases. This is a smaller number compared to forced labour, servitude, and slavery-alike that comprised about 64% of forms of exploitation detected in trafficking victims. Obviously, each country varies. In Cambodia, out of 189 repatriated victims, only 17 are under the categories of ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘others’, the rest of the 91% are forced-labour in different sectors of work. The proportions were not much different in Thailand and Singapore. In Indonesia, however, sexual exploitation and forced labour are in the exact same proportions. From 2012 to 2015, out of 195 victims, 96 are trafficked for sexual exploitation, and 96 are for forced labour.What can be concluded from the mentioned statistics is that, in a larger part of Southeast Asia, TIP for the cause of work-exploitation might outweigh sexual exploitation.

Human-Trafficking and Labour Migration should be an integrated matter

In April 2018, the ASEAN member-states leader once again sat in the same table to create a new set of visions. Amongst the statement, there are four collective agreements that will be highlighted, which are Point 1, 10, and 35. In Point 1, the ASEAN leaders agree about the commencement of ASEAN Extradition Treaty to strengthen ASEAN’s capacity and resilience to combat transnational crimes. Under “Non-Traditional Threats” in Point 10, the leaders agree to put Border Management as one of its focus. Finally, under “People and Institutions” in Point 35, migrant workers are mentioned.

The gap between each point are not far without a reason: the issue of TIP and labour migrants are seen as categorically different, handled by different bodies, and are under different ASEAN pillars. TIP, people-smuggling, and other transnational crimes are under the APSC, while labour migrants and their protection is under the ASSC. It is clear by now that both issues are seen from separate approach, while it should not be the case. The more people depart, the more exposed they are to risk. More people migrating can also reduce the cost of the traffickers. With the AEC 2025 Vision, it is safe to say that ASEAN encourage the regional labour flows and therefore, migration.

ASEAN has indeed stated its concern on the relation of labour migration and TIP. In the Bohol TIP Working Plan, for example, there is a section on how to adopt labour laws to reduce the risk of trafficking. ASEAN’s awareness of it can also be seen on how ACMW invited representatives from related-bodies such as the mentioned AICHR and ACWC in a one-time workshop regarding the border controls to prevent irregular migration and trafficking in 2016.

There has yet, however, to be a regular forum amongst those bodies that address labour migration and TIP as an integrated-issue despite the similarities in agenda. Having more than one body dealing with different dimension of the issue would be useful for the variation of information, research, and possible solution of their own respective focus. Yet, different bodies mean different structural matters, and it complicates the aim to reduce TIP itself. For instance, AICHR is allowed to exchange information and interact with intra-ASSC bodies, APSC, and AEC; while ACWC can only interact with its fellow ASSC bodies – as stated by Kranrattanasuit in ‘ASEAN and Human Trafficking’.

Having a regular forum would help these bodies to effectively work together, otherwise, the vision of a single market and regional integration will be at the cost of the increase in transnational crime.  

Towards a Resilient ASEAN: Ways Forward

Driven from the arguments above, it can be concluded that despite ASEAN’s noteworthy progress towards addressing the growing issue of transnational crime, especially trafficking in persons, there are some things that ASEAN yet to anticipate. The decision to tighten border control in response of TIP and people-smuggling must be reconsidered, as the result could be very different from the desired. ASEAN’s highlight on women and children as well as its victims-oriented procedures in TIP must also not narrow TIP’s problem scope and underplays the need of preventive measures. At last, in the light of the 2025 AEC vision, ASEAN must provide a regular forum that accommodate all bodies with the concern of TIP.