A Resilient ASEAN?: ASEAN and Resilience in Natural Disaster

October 10, 2019/0 Comments/in ASEAN Notes/by akmal.muhammad.f

By Nisrina Husnul Khotimah and Kevin Iskandar Putra (Picture: Aris Daeng)

People in Palu and its surrounds are still struggling to survive a month after the 7.5 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami had struck. As of Friday 26^th October 2018, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) has recorded a total of 2,081 fatalities – a large and dense number for the affected area. Locals and international news agencies were quick to realise that human resources and humanitarian aid did not come quickly enough and hastily turned their attention towards ASEAN as they questioned their role in rescue operations. The high number of deaths is a red flag that signalled that ASEAN is still not resilient towards natural disasters and much assessment is needed on the regional organisation’s response to these events.

This article intends to examine the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) – the body that was mostly involved in efforts to recover Palu and past post-natural disaster operations –under the intention to understand why ASEAN’s response was not evident until almost a week after the tsunami struck. This article also intends to critique the placement of natural disasters in ASEAN’s communities’ blueprints, emphasising how natural disasters should be seen as a security issue rather than a socio-cultural one. Finally, this article would like to propose the rudiments of what could possibly be an addition to the AHA that could improve their agility in terms of action.

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management serves as a platform for intergovernmental efforts in cooperating and coordinating the ASEAN Member States, with the United Nations for disaster management and emergency response in the region. There are some frameworks used as the basis to run the organization, which entail Disaster Monitoring, Preparedness and Response, and Capacity Building; all playing their respective important role. As another focus, AHA also developed its Emergency Operations Centre (OEC), shedding an integral part of the importance of collective response. Through the Web Emergency Operations Center (WebEOC), an online-based platform that AHA provides, the organisation intends to provide a mechanism to monitor and share the information related to regional disasters.

ASEAN’s inadequate response towards, and involvement in, the aftermath of the tsunami in Palu is a clear illustration of the organisation’s lack of political willingness to clamp regional cooperation. Not only does this allow us to question why there is a lack of urgency, but it also allows us to identify issues in its institutional structure as well. Areas of concern include the fact that disaster management is under the socio-cultural community blueprint in which we believe would be most suitable if it were under the political-security community blueprint instead.

Placing disaster management under the socio-cultural community blueprint has many relatively troubling implications. Primarily, it indicates that ASEAN sees disaster management as an opportunity to “lift the quality of life of its peoples through [people-orientated] activities”, as stated in their ASCC Blueprint 2025, rather than a means to prevent conflict and instability – which could easily arise after a natural disaster hit. Disaster management in the socio-cultural community blueprint, thus far, has only attempted to enhance the capacity of communities to adapt to vulnerabilities through people-centred initiatives such as the provision of resources and management support, as exemplified by what was reported in AHA’s situation updates on the Palu tsunami and also other post-natural disaster situations such as Typhoon-Mangkhut.

As one could deduce, there is still a need for a troop-based response from this regional organisation. It is important to realise that natural disasters represent a very major threat to security of human life. Allowing the wounds of a natural disaster to linger for an extended period of time without recovery would allow a plethora of other security issues to penetrate the affected area. Security issues such as the displacement of people, increasing population density elsewhere and cross-border migration are easily in the foresight of post-natural disaster consequences and all possess “the potential for instability and conflict…conflict due to scarcity”. With this in mind, it is imperative for ASEAN to see natural disasters as, not only an urgency, but a threat to its well-guarded peace.

In addition, another reason why disaster management should be a part of the political-security community blueprint lies on the fact that ASEAN’s harmonious environment is easily at risk when natural disaster strikes. This was especially evident during the haze crisis in 1997 where winds swept acrid smoke across Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, causing these countries to confront Indonesia after they were unable to cope with the disaster due to the Asian Financial Crisis happening at the same time. From here, one could identify the lack of regional cooperation as they turned to denouncement rather than incentives to undertake the haze crisis together as member states of the same organisation. A regional effort is therefore critical so that every member state has a stake in relief operations and preventive measures.

Relating back to the aftermath of the tsunami in Palu, such regional effort was evidently absent in relief operations. Based on situation updates provided by the AHA, most actions taken and resources mobilised were done by the Indonesian government. It was not until situation update no. 9, out of fifteen, where one could read about responses from other ASEAN member states (which, in situation update no. 9, was humanitarian assistance from the Philippines and Singapore, and a THB 5 million contribution from Thailand). Moreover, what could also be revealed from the situation updates was the fact that most operational management was done by the Indonesia’s National Board of Disaster (BNBP), indicating that a great deal was being handled by Indonesia alone and ASEAN only served as a subsidiary force of aid.

ASEAN’s, as a regional organisation, involvement in the Palu tsunami aftermath was primarily done through the AHA. Although it did coordinate resources and activities done by incoming NGOs through the ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT), it is still better described as a management body comprised of experts from different organisations. This further emphasises the fact that ASEAN’s disaster management is still socially oriented as its motions are dependent on other actors’ proposal of actions.

This calls for an enhancement in ASEAN’s framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management, in which we propose an ASEAN-Emergency Operation Team (ASEAN-EOT) that is able to conduct rescue operations and provide human resources in order to ease access for medical personnel to disaster-stricken areas in the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN-EOT would be established by ASEAN itself, giving the AHA the power to oversee and coordinate collective action. ASEAN-EOT would be composed of experienced and trained military personnel from all 10 countries of ASEAN, training together specifically for disaster rescue missions.

Military personnel will remain members of their respective national forces as the ASEAN-EOT does not intend to act as an independent “ASEAN force”, but rather a collective-action unit for disaster operations. With the existence of this unit, we should expect ASEAN to be one of the first actors to respond to a natural disaster, increasing humanitarian aid and consequently reducing the amount of possible deaths. With the information collected and coordinated by AHA, the ASEAN-EOT should effectively know how much military personnel and air transportation is needed within a realistic time-frame of 48 hours.

From our analysis, it could be concluded that ASEAN’s agility and involvement in natural disaster rescue and relief operations remain inadequate. This article theorised that placing disaster management under the socio-cultural community has many worrying implications as it implied that ASEAN treated post-natural disaster situations as an opportunity to improve quality of life rather than a threat to their security and peace.

Therefore, we suggest to put natural disasters under the political-security community, allowing us to also propose what could be a potential ASEAN-Emergency Operation Team. This team serves as a collective-action unit under the oversight of AHA, ensuring that ASEAN would be one of the first actors to respond when natural disaster strikes in the Southeast Asian region. Such unit would not only enhance the ASEAN’s agility in terms of response, but it would also reduce the number of subsequent fatalities due to quick responsiveness. Failure to improve their natural disaster management framework would inevitably deteriorate the international stature of ASEAN states.

References:

AHA Centre Situation Update No. 15 – FINAL: M 7.4 Earthquake and Tsunami, Sulawesi, Indonesia – Friday, 26 October 2018, 12:00 hrs (UTC+7), AHA, https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/aha-centre-situation-update-no-15-final-m-74-earthquake-and-tsunami-sulawesi

“About the AHA Centre”, The AHA Centre, https://ahacentre.org

“What we do”, The AHA Centre, https://ahacentre.org/what-we-do/

A Strategic Framework for ASEAN-UN Cooperation, UNESCAP, https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Session%201.%20Cooperation%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf

“Introduction.” in ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, March 2016.https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/8.-March-2016-ASCC-Blueprint-2025.pdf

The UK UN delegation in a debate on impact of climate change on peace. Hough, Peter. “Environmental Security.” in International Security Studies, ed. Peter Hough et al. 211 – 224. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Nguitragool, Paruedee. “Negotiating the Haze Treaty: Rationality and Institutions in the Negotiations for the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002).” Asian Survey 51, no. 2 (2011): 356-78. doi:10.1525/as.2011.51.2.356.

AHA Centre Situation Update No. 9: M 7.4 Earthquake and Tsunami, Sulawesi, Indonesia – Monday, 8 October 2018, 17:00 hrs (UTC+7), AHA, https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/aha-centre-situation-update-no-9-m-74-earthquake-and-tsunami-sulawesi-indonesia

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

A Resilient ASEAN?: ASEAN and Resilience in Natural Disaster

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