Written by Turin Airlangga, student at the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University Tokyo, Japan. He can be reached atturin.a@fuji.waseda.jp

Abstract

ASEAN as an entity and Southeast Asia as a region emerged as important key players in the global political landscape after 51 years of its establishment. Economic growths and prosperity has propelled ASEAN member countries to important roles in the world. However, ASEAN still face challenges in dealing with certain issuespredominantly due to the non-interference and consensus-based principles it adheres to. How can ASEAN move forward as new challenges and opportunities emerge? This article examines the importance of giving ASEAN greater mandate through pool of sovereignty, requiring a more progressive approach to the political-security pillar that will result in stronger mandate and power for ASEAN governing bodies.

Keywords: pool of sovereignty, political-security pillar, ASEAN.

 

Introduction

The year 2018 marked the 51^st anniversary of ASEAN. After its establishment in 1967, half a century has passed since the five original founding members signed the Bangkok Declaration (Keling et al., 2011; Intal, Jr.&Chen, 2017).The momentum of ASEAN establishment correlated deeply with the global political situation at the time, mainly due to the heightened tensions between the two camps during the Cold War. At that moment, it was understandable for all founding members to put political and security issues at the top of the priorities to address for the newly established association, especially when the fighting in Vietnam has developed a concern that it could have had tremendous impacts and affected the entire region. After 51 years, however, Southeast Asian countries prove that it could transform as one of the fastest and robustly growing sub-region in Asia Pacific. ASEAN as an entity has been praised as one of a success story of regional integration that brought not only peace and security among its member countries, but also wider socio-economic growth and has seen tremendous increase in general prosperity (Minh, 2017).

In achieving and becoming ASEAN as we know today, the ‘ASEAN way’has been a core principle among its member countries, especially when it touches upon a highly sensitive issue of non-interference principle among the member countries. Ultimately, through non-interference principle, ASEAN member countries can manage the regional dynamics without disturbing the security balances among the members, particularly due to the fact that Southeast Asian region is, until today, one of the most politically and culturally diverse region where political unrest can trigger massive domino-effects throughout the region (Masilamani & Peterson, 2014). Through the ASEAN way, member countries can utilize informal approaches to resolutions and peaceful dialogues that could address the situation without causing considerable damages and affect to other countries (Masilamani & Peterson, 2014). The political and security pillar as one of the fundamental elements of ASEAN, has been under heavy scrutiny when national interests and security-related issues became a major roadblock for some ASEAN member countries to move forward and achieve specific milestone on certain issues because each member countries put forward their national interests beyond the regional interests as a whole and often times cited ASEAN’s non-interference principle as the basis of such deliberation (Mogato&Grudgings, 2018).

As ASEAN needs to continue moving forward to have greater regional integration dynamics that are more robust, progressive, and inclusive, how can the member countries approach the political-security pillar? Should a different approach be applied in order to strengthen ASEAN’s political bargaining position in the global world?

Pool of sovereignty forstronger ASEAN Governing Bodies

The non-interference principle that ASEAN chose to embed in its political culture has been widely debated in the academic and professional realms (Jones, 2009). The debates have been revolving mainly on the humanitarian issue and the sovereignty issue, the majority of which ended in deadlock and left more questions than it tried to initiallyanswer. ASEAN’s governing body in Jakarta did not sit idle on the matter either. The ambitious Political-SecurityCommunity (APSC)laid out a comprehensive plan which ASEAN member countries aimed to achieve, particularly building a community of nations based on rule of law, oriented towards the prosperity of its people, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). As stipulated on the APSC, the existing and emerging challenges require ASEAN to adopt a ‘comprehensive approach’ to security issues (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017).

When we think of existing and emerging challenges, traditional and non-traditional security threats came to our minds, such as territorial disputes among or with other countries, or newly emerging threats such as terrorism and piracies. However, I argue that one of the most important issues to address in the APSC is how ASEAN member countries pool their sovereignty into making the ASEAN governing body stronger as an entity. More often than not, ASEAN member countries opt to preserve their sovereignty by advocating for the non-interference principle, fearing that allowing outside involvement will inevitably translate to breach of one’s own sovereignty. Now, I am not advocating ASEAN to rebuild the entire political-security pillar as a mean of engaging the emerging challenges that ASEAN and its member countries face (Camroux, 2008; Ha, Thuzar, Das &Chalermpalanupap, 2016),yet as intra- regional dynamics become more complex and global opportunities emerge, ASEAN member countries need to embark on a new set of political-security approach that will effectively bring forward the member countries in one direction.

In order to effectively move forward in addressing challenges, ASEAN member countries need to bestow greater mandate to the ASEAN governing bodywhich result in more efficient policy-decision making for the greater good of the region instead of individual member countries. An international organization harness its authority based on two factors: membership and scope of policy it possess (Hooghe& Marks, 2014). This means the greater size and responsibility of an organization will decide whether the central governing body of that organization can be effective in delivering results or will it be constrained by the interests of its members.Pooling of sovereignty does not necessarily translate to loss of it per se, but rather a process where joint decision is formulated, consisting of three principal factors: rules where member countries formulate a decision, ratification of the decision, and legally-binding mechanisms after they are ratified (Hooghe& Marks, 2014).

When ASEAN member countries pool their sovereignty together to the ASEAN governing body, they harness stronger political bargaining for ASEAN because all member countries have the firm support and legitimacy from the other members instead of going it alone in the international fora.

Insofar, the non-interference and consensus-based principles that ASEAN adhere to have been proven to mimic the function of a brake when the challenges that the region faces required a full function of a throttle. The consensus-based principle hinders the ability for all member countries to move forward as an entity because one disagreement from a member will translate to failure as a whole. Consequently, when all member countries have veto powers, the barrier to reach considerable reform will be difficult, if not relatively impossible (Hiep, 2016).

As ASEAN needs to continue progress forward to achieve better regional integration and more comprehensive organization that delivers greater results for its member countries, non-interference and consensus-based principles need to be reevaluated. Sudden changes such as complete abolishment of the two will most likely to deliver faulty results or worse. If ASEAN member countries realize that having greater power as one entity could very well translate to greater bargaining position in the international stage, ASEAN governing body can have stronger mandate in dealing with the challenges that the region faces. While the socio-cultural and economic pillars have received more attention for growth and integration, political-security pillar will function as a firm foundation within ASEAN that will provide a forward trajectory as an entity. Consider such issue: if one member countries decide to cast its own political trajectory independent of what ASEAN has decided to pursue, this leeway can be a loophole for bigger powers to divide ASEAN. When critical issue such as the South China Sea disputes require tremendous political commitments from the member countries, having one member divert from the others will only cause internal rift that could result in

As regionalism becomes more important and governments realize that their individual size and power can be multiplied through the membership and power of ASEAN as a regional entity, political-security integration will embark on a fresh start which includes new sets of policy aims and goals for the interests of all ASEAN member countries.The APSC blueprint provides yet another firm trajectory for the region as a whole, but a leap forward in realizing the different approach on the pool of sovereignty among the members can provide ASEAN governing body greater political and bargaining power in the future.

Conclusion

Five decades have passed since the formation of ASEAN and new challenges as well as opportunities are emerging to the surface. As one of the fastest growing regions in the world, Southeast Asia and ASEAN itself needs to reconsider its political-security approach in order to form a solid foundation to address numerous challenges both in the regional and global levels. By pooling of sovereignty, thus adding a firm structure at the political-security pillar and giving more mandates to the ASEAN governing body, member countries can enjoy more bargaining power and greater political prowess in the global political arena. Doing so will require ASEAN member countries to rethink its political-security approach which accommodates for greater political integration in the future.

Converging into a more comprehensive approach to the political-security pillar might take considerable efforts and time by the ASEAN member countries as each regime must come to understand that the regional interests are more important to achieve greater integration and forward progress. Consensus-based and non- interference principles shall be reconsidered to harness ASEAN’s potential prowess in the global fora, thus creating effective decision-making mechanisms within the ASEAN governing body and interests that represent the entire region. ASEAN’s tremendous potential in innovation and resilience can be further increased if all member countries come together and realize that in today’s hyper-connected global dynamics, standing alone in the global fora is not a favorable position to be in. ASEAN has come a long way, and being resilient and innovative will require more than solely national interests; it require stronger ASEAN that delivers and promotes prosperity for its members. New approach to the political-security pillar might just be the key towards achieving that goal.

 

 

References

ASEAN Secretariat. (2017)‘Fact Sheet of ASEAN Political-Security Community

(APSC)’, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC),1-4

Camroux, David.(2008)‘The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango?’, Notre

Europe.1-32

Ha, Hoang Thi, Thuzar, Moe, Das,SanchitaBasu, andChalermpalanupap,Termsak.

(2016) ‘Diverging Regionalisms: ASEAN and the EU’, ASEAN & The EU In Perspective, YusofIshak Institute.,4-13

Hiep, Le Hong.(2016)‘Can ASEAN Overcome the ‘Consensus Dilemma’ over the

South China Sea?’, YusofIshakInstitute: Perspective, No. 58., 1-8

Hooghe,Liesbet and Marks, Gary.(2014)‘Delegation and pooling in international

organizations’, Rev Int Organ, Springer Science + Business MediaNew York. pp. 1-24

Intal, Jr., Ponciano and Chen,Lurong (Ed).(2017)‘ASEAN and Member States:

Transformation and Integration’, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Vol. 3., 1-244

Jones, Lee.(2009)‘ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A

Quest for Social Order’, Nuffield College Politics Group Working Paper.,1-29

Keling, Mohamad Faisolet. al.(2011)“The Development of ASEAN from Historical

Approach.”Asian Social Science, Vol. 7., 169-189

Masilamani, Logan and Peterson, Jimmy.(2014)‘The “ASEAN Way”: The Structural

Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement’, Foreign Policy Journal.,1-21

Minh, Le Luong.(2017) ‘ASEAN at 50: Looking Back to Move Forward’, Konrad

Adenauer Stiftung.,9-17

Mogato, Manuel andGrudgings, Stuart.(2018) “ASEAN Way” founders in South China

Sea Storm.Accessed through

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-china-idUSBRE86G09N20120717

Shah Suraj Bharat/Jakarta

Photo by Uri Tours (Wikipedia)

The peace process between the two Koreas is exactly– a peace process – something that has eluded the peninsula after 70 years of hostility. Investors, policymakers and the international community will have to be patient on the potential for market reform in North Korea. Yet, there is reason for quiet optimism, judging by the actions and statements of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

After becoming leader in 2012, Kim signaled a change in economic strategy to a focus on development, saying North Koreans would no longer have to “tighten their belts twice”, a subtle acknowledgment of the shortcomings of the command economy. In March 2013, Kim called for byungjin (parallel advance) on developing nuclear capabilities while building the economy. This contrasted to his father Kim Jong-il’s focus on defense, implicitly survival, as the paramount concern of the state.

State and regime survival is, of course, of paramount concern for the younger Kim. But the emphasis has shifted, from a stance of defensive (and sometimes offensive) neorealism through promoting nuclear capabilities, to deriving legitimacy and strength from economic growth. Confirming this strategic shift in April 2018 prior to meeting South Korean President Moon Jae-in, Kim declared that his signature policy of byungjin was to be retired and replaced with “all-out socialist economic reconstruction”.

After Kim’s summit in Singapore with the United States President Donald Trump in June 2018, war-like rhetoric markedly decreased. The economy has taken center stage in state propaganda and media coverage has shown Kim visiting farms, factories and tourist resorts. Going beyond rhetoric, the seeds of  market-oriented policies are quietly flourishing. Black markets have long been a vital means of acquiring daily necessities for ordinary Koreans, but they have been given more freedom to operate in recent years. Kim has also softly decentralized some economic controls, giving greater freedom to farmers selling crops and factory managers over wages and production.

Kim’s unprecedented steps of lifting economic controls are underpinned by the notion that economic openness does not necessarily pose a threat to the regime. This is underlined by the experience of reform and opening up in China and doimoi reforms in Vietnam, which led to phenomenal growth but cemented rather than eroded the power of the communist parties.

Moreover, such a reform strategy is something of an enigma for supposedly socialist economies. University of North Korean Studies professor Yang Moon-soo sees Kim’s strategy as mimicking China’s early period of opening up and reform, which itself was based on Soviet Union leader Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy, characterized as capitalism subject to state control. Indeed such a reform strategy would suit Kim’s economic ideology, as state-led development will be imperative given the absence of an indigenous industrial class.

The question remains on whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons as demanded chiefly by the US. It would, however, be naive to assume that North Korea will completely denuclearize. This is a regime paranoid about its survival with an ingrained neorealist worldview of an anarchical international system, which views maintaining a balance of power through nuclear power as the key to survival.

It is worth noting that in 2003, Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan regime decommissioned its weapons of mass destruction, winning favor from Western powers. Yet in 2011 during the First Libyan Civil War, NATO enforced a no-fly zone over Libya, which turned into a bombing campaign against government and loyalist forces, leaving Gaddafi feeling betrayed by the West. When Gaddafi  was apprehended in a culvert, he was subsequently tortured, sodomized with a bayonet and shot several times as he pleaded for his life. North Korea will certainly take note of this episode.

In this scenario, a quantum of utilitarianism may be necessary: An isolated, under pressure, nuclear armed and offensive neorealist North Korea with a hemorrhaging economy is more dangerous than a defensive neorealist, nuclear armed North Korea that is enjoying the fruits of economic growth and trading internationally as a result of market reform. The message needs to be sold to North Korea that being a member of international society, which is empathetic to North Korea’s worldview of the anarchic order but recognizes areas for mutual cooperation – in the spirit of raison de systeme (it pays to make the system work) – will give the regime a survival and power advantage as opposed to isolation.

Crucially, South Korea has shown that it understands and is sympathetic to North Korea’s strategic conundrum. During President Moon’s visit to Pyongyang where he addressed a crowd of 150,000 North Koreans, he pledged to “hasten a future of common prosperity”, praising North Korea’s “remarkable progress” and said he “understood what kind of country chairman Kim and his compatriots in the North want to build”.

South Korea’s stance means it is likely to continue pursuing cooperation with North Korea even if denuclearization falters, which would put it at odds with the US, although lifting international sanctions will be critical to kick-starting growth. Indeed this understanding is arguably a key reason as to why diplomatic overtures have made progress and kept North Korea at the negotiating table.

In the broader region, peace on the Korean Peninsula is certainly in everyone’s interests. The question also arises as to whether there is a role for ASEAN in contributing to peace on the peninsula and reforming North Korea’s economy.

ASEAN is certainly neutral ground in which to bring all stakeholders together, indeed Singapore was the host of the summit between Trump and Kim in June 2018 and Hanoi played host in February 2019.

Skeptics may point out that once again Southeast Asia acts as a venue instead of power broker, and ASEAN’s chief asset is its ability to organize meetings that have little tangible outcome.

On reflection, however, we must not underestimate the importance of the norms, socialization and legitimacy that ASEAN can bring in welcoming North Korea into a club of international society. The norms of the “ASEAN way” are surely attractive to North Korea as it seeks regime survival while ending its isolation. Peace and stability is often taken for granted, but in the context of development it is a mandatory precursor to growth and lifting ordinary people out of poverty. China and Vietnam are testament to this.

A dose of realism, however, for ASEAN member states is also necessary. A North Korea open to trade and investment will be another economic competitor for Southeast Asia’s developing economies. From afar, North Korea does appear to have the right conditions for takeoff growth. Similarly to South Korea before it began its journey of phenomenal growth, North Korea has the advantages a highly centralized state, high levels of elite unity, a relatively well educated but low waged labor force, a strategic geographical position and supposedly under Kim a developmental ideology.

Significantly, a reforming North Korea will capture precious value-added industries from South Korea, and all the technology, expertise and opportunities that come with it, something that ASEAN member states desperately need as they try to climb up the value-chain.

If we truly believe North Korea is on a path to market reform, then there is added urgency for ASEAN member states to upgrade economic relations with South Korea to remain competitive, and ensure that the economic benefits of a peaceful Korea can be shared by all.

The writer is an emerging markets editor and analyst. Find him on Twitter @ShahSurajBharat.

By Matthew LoCastro, illustration by Lommes (Wikipedia)

The Belt and Road Initiative within ASEAN

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), is one of the most prominent and one of the most shrouded global development initiatives in modern history. With estimated investments of about US$150 billion over the next decade with a total price tag ranging from US$1trillion to US$4 trillion, BRI still remains only a singular part of China’s larger desire to invest, connect, and craft a sphere of influence, or as President Xi describes it, “a community of common destiny,” across Asia.

As of 2018, China has funded 96projects across South East Asia. China’s projects, a variety of roads, railroads, ports, power plants, and other infrastructure projects have provided insight into China’s grand strategy. ASEAN member states will have to determine if China’s investments and influence will support or disrupt ASEAN’s commitments to resiliency and innovation within the realm of its socio-cultural, economic, and political/security pillarsoutlined in the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together. As with many investment and economic development initiatives, ASEAN members can expect tangible benefits aligned with the ASEAN development framework but should ultimately air caution to China’s advances due to long term and deeply embedded costs.

A Positive Outlook for the BRI

China’s BRI and larger foreign investment goals have the potential to bolster the ASEAN 2025 vision. China has been a leader in poverty alleviation within its own boarders, uplifting 800 million people out of poverty since the 1980’s with the goal of eliminating all domestic extreme poverty by 2020. China’s success has the potential to carry across ASEAN as investments lead to job creation and infrastructure development, and consequentially reducing spatial inequality.

The potential for successful investment impacts are further supported by a 2018 study conducted by The Brookings Institute. Brookings evaluated the national economic impacts of approximately 4,300 Chinese government financed development projects in 138 countries and found that on average, Chinese aid and investment yielded economic growth dividends. For the average host country, a doubling of Chinese official development assistance produced a 0.4% point increase in economic growth two years after the funding was approved.

Reducing inequality, ensuring equitable economic growth, and developing an interconnected ASEAN that can effectively and easily trade goods and services are accomplishments that fall within the ASEAN 2025 vision. By evaluating the benefits of China’s investments, policymakers can be convinced to welcome BRI funding with open arms. However, it is important to recognize that China’s ambitions do not remain in a silo of intentions to promote regional economic growth.  China’s larger goal is to strengthen its international influence. Such a goal will come at a cost to ASEAN’s socio-cultural, economic, and political and security pillars and negate the economic benefits incurred by these investments.

The Adversarial Nature of the BRI and ASEAN’s Three Pillars

The ASEAN socio-cultural pillar states that it is a pivotal goal for ASEAN members to promote equitable access to quality opportunities and to protect human rights. BRI financing is not beholden to these standard. Other institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank Group, will limit financing to causes that may violate the human rights of an ASEAN member country’s citizens. The BRI allows an option to seek financing from a source that does not abide to a standard of respecting human rights. This outlet inherently undermines that drive and motivation for all member countries to strive to uphold the same obligation. It can be more cost effective or convenient to ignore universally agreed upon standards of human rights when there are limited consequences. This issue is further compounded by the appeal of the ease in structuring financing and receiving funds from China.

China’s investments have also been linked to instances of supporting local corruption, degrading the environment, and weakening trade union participation.

In a 2016 case study of Chinese investment in Africa, empirical results consistently indicated more widespread local corruption around active Chinese project sites. This corruption would linger after the project implementation period, seemingly not driven by an increase in economic activity, but rather signifying that the Chinese presence impacts norms.

Chinese investments also do not have an incentive to support the development of renewable infrastructure or low-carbon investments. As China aims to achieve its own sustainability goals, locating financing for high-carbon projects internationallyallows for China to take credit for emission reduction and environmental quality improvements when in reality the environmental damage is occurring abroad.

Among the projects that BRI supports, researchers have also found a tendency for China to maintain control over development projects throughout the entire implementation phase, using Chinese contractors for work performed in the recipient countries. These contract workers weaken the ability of trade unions to advocate for reasonable labor protections and decrease the overall economic benefits received by locals.

Despite promises of potential economic growth, the economic pillar of the ASEAN 2025 framework is also threatened by BRI investments. Chinese banks are worried about the safety of current lending. Since 2015, commercial banks have cut new BRI financing. Furthermore, China is finding it hard to identify profitable projects in belt-and-road countries leading to BRI being commonly referred to as “One Road, One Trap” amongst the business community.

The investment environment is further complicated by the lack of investment transparency and at times, predatory nature of investments. Chinese backed projects have a uniform contractor base. 89% are Chinese companies, 7.6% are local companies from the country of investment, and 3.4% are foreign companies, non-Chinese companies from a country other than the one where the project was taking place. Compared to multilateral development bank funded projects, 29% are Chinese, 40.8% are local, and 30.2% are foreign.China’s investment strategies also provide little room for local organizations to secure contracting opportunities. The lack of contract diversity coincides with the lack of project transparency preventing ASEAN members from understanding the investment activities occurring in the market and discouraging investment.

Several of China’s infrastructure investments, though not the majority of infrastructure investments, have also been labeled as “debt-traps.” A debt-trap occurs when China finances projects on unfair and unequal terms taking advantage of lower income countries financial needs. The trap component occurs when payment deadlines approach and the borrowing country is no longer able to pay its debts.This leads to Chinese intervention to gain control over the physical assets or gain some other distinct advantage to collect on what they are owed.

In Sri Lanka, the Hambantota Port project fell victim to this scheme. Upon striking a deal with a Chinese state-owned enterprise, Sri Lanka borrowed $307 million from the Chinese Export-Import bank, then $700 million, and finally, $1 billion. Once Sri Lanka found itself unable to pay these loans back, it ceded control and sovereignty of the port to China under a 99-year lease agreement.Similar instances of “debt-trap” financing have occurred in Malaysia, the US$20 billion East Coast Rail Link Project, and in Laos, the China-Laos railway project, among a few examples.

China’s investments abroad have become recognized as attempts to dominate smaller economies. Such actions strip ASEAN members of their economic and political sovereignty. This loss of sovereignty can expand into concerns of security and directly affect the third and final ASEAN 2025 framework pillar of promoting political and physical security.

As seen in Sri Lanka and Laos, there is the potential for vital domestic assets to be under the direct ownership of a foreign entity in the instances of defaulting on project payments or loans. Control over ports and harbors, especially in South East Asia poses a large security threat as the acquisition of these assets could bolster Chinese presence in contested areas such as the South China Sea.

Considering several BRI projects involve maritime infrastructure, China could potentially influence ASEAN member states’ ability to use maritime trade routes and block the development of comprehensive maritime cooperation. Chinese ownership of power plants and access to other supply chains, raw materials and natural resources poses a major security risk in the event of conflict and will increase Chinese soft power over the governance decisions of ASEAN due to this looming threat.

The Need for Caution When Addressing the BRI

As ASEAN member states plan to forge ahead together, it is vital that the 2025 framework for the region takes into consideration the external influences that seek to threaten the ASEAN community. Though investment opportunities from China may appear lucrative, they pose a serious threat to the leadership and success of the ASEAN community. The BRI’s goals are vast and this initiative has the potential to produce a network of infrastructure projects unlike anything the world has yet to see. However, the ambitions and intentions of the BRI must be policy maker’s first consideration. Unlike multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions, China’s intention is not focused on aid and mutual global development. It is driven by a desire to control and dominate the actions of other sovereign nations.

Matthew LoCastro attended Hunter College in New York City and is a Luce Scholar

by Carter Anne Jones*
Pictures: Forest and Kim Starr

Indonesia produces 3.2 million tons of mismanaged trash ever year with nearly 1.3 million tons ending up in the sea. This makes Indonesia the second-largest plastic polluter after China. Last year, Bali declared a trash emergency and used 700 cleaners to collect nearly 100 tons of trash on their beaches. Although, plastic waste does not only effect Indonesia’s marine life, but it can also be found in rivers throughout Indonesia. The Citarum River was declared the world’s most polluted river, yet it’s believed that over 28 million people depend on the river every day for water. Plastic pollution threatens Indonesia’s tourism industry which supplies the country with US$4.6 billion of foreign exchange income annually and employs 13 million Indonesians. It also impacts Indonesia’s overall public health as plastic has been found in 114 different aquatic species with half of those species ending up on our dinner plates. Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s coordinating minister for maritime affairs, announced during the 2017 World Oceans Summit in Nusa Dua, Bali that Indonesia pledged to contribute up to US$1 billion annually to reduce plastic waste. He proposed developing new industries using biodegradable materials such as seaweed and cassava to create plastic alternatives. Indonesia has also talked about a plastic bag tax and has already banned single use plastic in Denpasar. The ultimate goal is to reduce 70% of marine waste by 2025. Indonesia is located at the center of the Coral Triangle, which contains one of the world’s richest coral reef ecosystems. The Coral Triangle is vital for both food security and tourism within Indonesia. It is predicted that if we continue polluting at this rate we will have more plastic than biomass in the world’s oceans by 2050. Poor waste management infrastructure, lower socioeconomic communities, and lack of public understanding are a few of the problems Indonesia will face in its efforts to combat marine waste and reach the goal of reducing marine waste by 2025.  

 

Local Government Initiatives in Indonesia

Indonesia has been criticized for being too eager when it comes to eliminating 70% of its marine waste in seven short years. During 2016, Indonesia implementation of a plastic tax of Rp.200 (1p) per plastic bag was trialed in 23 cities across Indonesia. The results did show a decrease in plastic bag use, but the tax was met with notable resistance from retailers and has been the reason the Indonesian government is hesitant to enact a nationwide tax. The concern is that if you just impose a plastic tax on bags or expand the tax to plastic packaging it will only affect the country’s poor populations, as they have limited access to clean water meaning that Indonesians are already spending a large amount of their income on bottled water. Due to criticism of the excise tax, some have suggested a tax on plastic packaging that cannot be recycled, such as “straws, microbeads, and Styrofoam”, but not include water bottles, which can be recycled. Government initiatives are a good starting point, but if they are not paired with public education it will not create a long lasting impact. It is important the local communities understand why recycling and the decreasing of single use plastic is important. A focus also needs to be directed to Indonesia’s waste management plan. This process loses 1.1 million tons of local plastic trash, because it becomes too dirty in the landfills to be used in Indonesia’s recycling industry. Luckily, a developmental plan has just been released. It has a broad focus on the handling of trash transportation and minimalizing the spillage from pick up to drop off. It also aims to create a safe working atmosphere for waste pickers. Jokowi also plans to issue new regulations to speed up the prosecution of river polluters, especially corporations. The Indonesian military has also started a large-scale clean-up operation with the hope of preventing public littering, as well as to help villagers build septic tanks.

 

International Cooperation among Indonesia and other Countries

If successful Indonesia could be used as a model for many different countries around the world attempting to lower their amounts of single use plastic. Indonesia recently joined the Global Plastic Actions Partnership (GPAP) which works with local businesses and global partners to create solutions to reduce plastic pollution and advance a roadmap for implementation. GPAP is hosted by the World Economic Forum and aims to redesign the global “take-make-dispose” economy. As Indonesia continues to work to reduce marine plastic this creates and issue for Australia. Indonesia has taken 19% of Australia’s total waste, but now it vows to enforce tight restriction around what recyclable waste will be accepted. At this point, the recyclables from Australia are not always in the best condition, which means Indonesia is not able to use them. Hopefully, Indonesia’s new environmental stance will force Australia to stop offloading trash to other countries and invest in their own re-manufacturing facilities.

 

NGO’s and the Individual

Avani Eco is a company within Indonesia that is currently converting cassava into plastic bags and straws, but the bags are 50 percent more expensive than regular plastic bags. This would again force many lower socioeconomic families to bear the brunt of these environmental efforts. While looking for alternative methods for packaging is necessary, it is also important to ensure the production cost remains relatively low. Education is another important tool the Indonesian government can do to help combat marine waste. Programs such as the Bali Environmental Education Center (PPLH) and the Indonesia Plastic Bag Diet Movement (GIDKP) have mentor programs for high school students encouraging them to become leaders in solving environmental problems. While beach clean ups are not the answer to solving the plastic issue throughout Indonesia they are a good way for students to gain a better understanding of the plastic crisis that Indonesia is facing. Beach cleans ups can be used to motivate communities throughout the country, and teach them about the effects plastic pollution has on the marine life and their own communities.

The new pledge is at least a step in the right direction. The Indonesian government has admitted it is facing a problem and has created a platform for discussion. They are actively seeking for new ideas and solutions. It is important that Indonesia remains proactive about finding a solution and not back away from taking hard stances, even as large corporations or fellow countries continue to push for the overturn of restrictions. As Indonesia continues to head into the 5-year countdown it is important that these initiatives begin to yield concrete results and not just remain as empty promises.

 

*Carter Anne Jones is a member of Baylor University’s Class of 2020 with a major in International Studies and Russian. She is currently learning Bahasa Indonesia at UGM and works as a program intern for ASEAN Studies Center from March-May 2019.

By Jonathan Evert Rayon

Based on the World Drug Report in 2018, 31 million people worldwide suffered from drug use disorders resulting in millions enduring health risks such as hepatitis C and HIV. Drug trafficking is defined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as illicit trade which involves the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances subject to drug prohibition laws, and is a prevalent issue in Southeast Asia. As discussed at the 7^th ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network (ADMN) during 5^th-7^th March 2019, drug cases in 2018 experienced an increase, with most drug cases taking place in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The fact that over 90 percent of drug offences were conducted by ASEAN nationals despite serious measures taken by member countries, such as the Philippines’ war on drugs or Indonesia’s potential death penalty, emphasises the realisation of a Drug-Free ASEAN remains a challenge.

The Problem of Drug Trafficking in Southeast Asia

Drug trafficking is a major security threat in Southeast Asia which targets people from different backgrounds, ages and genders. Based on the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Report in 2017, there were 357,443 illicit drug cases in the region, with 64.6% of them involving Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS). In 2017, there were more than 300,000 drug users admitted to drug treatment. Furthermore, the worsening drug situation in the region is also linked to ASEAN’s geographical proximity to the Golden Triangle. This 950,000-square kilometre area, where the borders of Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and China meet, has a reputation as the centre of the world’s drug trafficking.

In spite of not being a drug producing country, Cambodia has been affected by regional and international drug trafficking. Located in the Golden Triangle, Cambodia is used as a transit place before drug syndicates transport the illegal substances to third markets. There was also a steep increase of 35.1 percent in the total seizure of drugs in 2017 in this country. In Indonesia, a country’s population which makes up slightly over 40% of ASEAN’s total population, the drug situation also remains problematic. In 2017, the National Narcotics Board and Indonesian National Police uncovered more than 51,000 drug cases with the total seizure of 151.5 tons of cannabis and 3.8 tons of crystalline methamphetamine (or shabu). Similar cases were also reported by Myanmar and Thailand where drug traffickers used a number of techniques in concealing drugs to be distributed or transported to other areas. Although drug abuse may vary, narcotics, namely cannabis, heroin, opium, methamphetamine tablets and crystalline methamphetamine, have been recognised as five major problems in every ASEAN country. Despite the alarming status, data related to the number of drug users remain imprecise as many ASEAN member countries do not conduct regular surveys while some do not even conduct them at all. This lack of consistent data creates its own unique problems.

ASEAN’s Cooperation in Dealing with the Problem of Drug Trafficking

The idea to create a Drug-Free ASEAN first emerged at the 31^st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in July 1998, where ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN. The Declaration asserted each country’s commitment to eradicate the production, processing, trafficking and use of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia by the year 2020. Although the idea was formalised in 1998, ASEAN has started to demonstrate its commitment to addressing the issue of drug trafficking since its establishment in 1967. In 2000, at the 33^rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, all countries agreed to advance the target year to realise a drug-free region to 2015, even though the goal of Drug-Free ASEAN was not yet decided. It was in 2007 that the Association formulated the vision of Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 which was to successfully and effectively control illicit drugs activities and mitigate its negative consequences to society.

The vision of Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 was highlighted in 2009 by the adoption of the ASEAN Work Plan on Combating Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking and Use 2009-2015. The implementation of the Plan was regularly monitored and assessed by ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and UNODC. Based on its final assessment in 2014, UNODC recommended ASEAN to take significant steps to reduce supply and demand since challenges were still widespread and new threats were emerging. As a result, the regional body adopted the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025 as a continuation of previous work – proposing several activities, starting from preventive education, law enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation, research, alternative development and extra-regional cooperation. In addition, ASEAN member countries have also been cooperating with other non-member countries to implement the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to Tackle Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle 2017-2019.

Even though drug abuse conditions may vary from one country to another, it is important for ASEAN not to leave any countries to face the problem alone. Firstly, a regional problem requires a regional solution. Instead of focusing on addressing the issue alone, ASEAN countries must acknowledge that drug trafficking is often a transnational crime conducted by an extensive criminal network operating beyond national borders. This implies that no country in the region is immune to drug trafficking as each can be targeted as a transit place or a prospective market. As an example, Thailand authorities explained that a large amount of drugs had been moved from neighbouring Laos into Thailand before they were taken south towards Malaysia. Secondly, complimenting national policies which have been implemented by countries, thereby strengthening regional cooperation to combat the issue, also signifies ASEAN’s foundation as a unified organisation. Since its formation, ASEAN has always adhered to one of its principles of effective cooperation among its members. This principle was reaffirmed when all member countries agreed to create a resilient community in a peaceful, secure and stable region with the ASEAN Political-Security Community. Thus, a comprehensive approach is needed to respond to this non-traditional security threat.

All in all, a number of responses which have been taken indicate ASEAN’s resolute commitment to tackling the issue of drug trafficking. However, to promote a Drug-Free ASEAN, all countries must work side by side to get to grips with this non-conventional threat. Therefore, several actions can be taken. Due to different national capabilities, it is recommended that ASEAN establish a region-wide capacities curriculum for law enforcement and provide common language training since the lack of a common language often limits the ability to communicate effectively among countries. Furthermore, it is also crucial for ASEAN member countries to enhance information and experience sharing activities, especially related to border seizure to help create effective strategies to prevent criminals from evading border security checks. In line with recommendations by UNODC, ASEAN is also advised to cooperate with numerous non-governmental organisations and establish regional monitoring to measure the effectiveness of civic awareness campaigns in reducing the demand as high demand is one of the most contributing factors of the increase in drug cases in Southeast Asia.

Jonathan Evert Rayon is an intern in ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada