Decoding the Indo-Pacific outlook

June 28, 2019/in ASEAN Notes/by akmal.muhammad.f

See original post in Bangkok Post

The 34th Asean Summit wrapped up last week in Bangkok, with the adoption of a crucial document known as the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Prime Minister, Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, regarded the AOIP as a milestone as the bloc now has a unified perspective on how to deal with external partners in the region.

In terms of the text, the AOIP has changed from the first draft distributed by Indonesia in August 2018 during the 51st Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore. The first draft was still very Indonesia-centric in a sense, as it weighs on connecting the Indo-Pacific vision with Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy. In that draft, Asean’s role is projected to become the fulcrum of connectivity and inclusive norm-setter.

While principally the AOIP shares a similar objective with its previous draft, there are not so many strategic directions outlined that champion Asean’s role to become a central Indo-Pacific driving force. The previous draft is rather more concrete providing action proposals, such as developing a Master Plan on Indo-Pacific Connectivity, creating the Indo-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development Goals, and establishing the Indo-Pacific Forum for Safety Navigation and Mitigating Natural Disasters.

The adopted version is instead built on traditional principles of Asean, but with similar goals of building perspective and providing narrative on how Asean should be driving the region in the midst of global uncertainty and great powers’ rivalry.

The AOIP is not a product, but a process. The instrument is non-legally binding, different from what Indonesia’s former foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, suggested in 2014 for an Indo-Pacific Treaty, to which, in its Chairman Statement of the 24th Summit, Asean leaders “welcomed Indonesia’s efforts to propose a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in the wider Indo-Pacific region”.

Rather, it emphasises norm-building processes, setting up a wide range of principles, notably Asean centrality, habit of dialogue, and inclusivity.

The AOIP serves as a “learning module” for all Asean member states in dealing with external powers’ expanding influence in the Southeast Asian region and beyond through different visions of regional architecture concepts brought forward by other competing powers. What comes after the adoption for Asean is to exercise these guidelines in responding to various Indo-Pacific, or other geostrategic proposals.

While it seems like there is limited content in the AOIP, the adoption signalled Asean’s take on maintaining order in an age of uncertainty and deficit of multilateralism, primarily in the changing regional architecture influenced by the expansion of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), perceived as its counter balance. The AOIP does not take sides. Although, for some, picking “Indo-Pacific” as a title could be regarded as a “containment policy” against China, Asean’s proposal is claimed as the only geostrategic concept grounded on inclusive collaboration with any players in the international community and avoiding rivalry. This was seen from Indonesian President Joko Widodo expressing his keenness to invite China as a potential partner in advancing Indo-Pacific cooperation at the 21st Asean-China Summit 2018.

The AOIP adoption indeed stole some momentum as it was consensually approved in the midst of an accelerated trade war between Beijing and Washington, which has already started to bite Asean members’ economies. It still remains a challenge to reconcile these two competing powers, especially as the US report that came out recently already pointed a finger at Chinese coercion towards Southeast Asian countries being an identified threat. Nonetheless, if utilised strategically, it can play a significant role serving as a “buffer zone” towards the spread of the major powers’ influence in Southeast Asian, depending how Asean, or Indonesia as the key drafter, can better make use of this strategy.

As an Indo-Pacific vision that exerts collaboration without leaving anyone behind, credit for the AOIP goes to Jakarta for its success in extending and promoting its foreign policy; free and active principles, to Asean — fundamentals of Indonesia’s foreign policy that amplify non-alignment with any major powers. If Asean members are able to adhere to AOIP to avoid disunity, it can turn into a powerful instrument. If not, then it will remain a ceremonial document like other Asean meeting outcome documents.

The vision appears to be idealistic. Past experience shows Asean hardly maintains its centrality on issues that are sensitive in nature, such as the South China Sea dispute, despite the grouping’s stance on the region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. While it is still too early to assess the future trajectory of Asean in taking the AOIP in its steps forward, assessing the success rate of all member states sticking to these principles could be a question as its members have historically aligned to a certain “patron” country.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing is a Senior Fellow with the Asean Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada in Indonesia and Vicky Barreto is a MA Candidate in Development Studies at Sussex University in the UK.

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Decoding the Indo-Pacific outlook

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