ASEAN Notes – Page 17 – ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Rethinking the Role of ICSID in Investor-State Dispute Settlement in ASEAN Economic Community

March 8, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Andika Putra, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The establishment of ASEAN Community aims to improve the welfare of all ASEAN member states to be able to compete in regional and global scope. Furthermore, higher levels of investment between ASEAN member states will increase the number of disputes arising between private investors and governments in South East Asia. To settle this issues, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) was signed by ASEAN Member on 2009, which regulated about the investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. On the one hand, the parties may settle their dispute through Alternative Dispute Resolution. On the other hand, ACIA allow the investor to submit a claim to the courts of disputing Member State, or even submit their claim to the arbitration institution, such as International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala Lumpur or any other regional center for arbitration in ASEAN that agreed by the disputing parties. This article will discuss about the role of ICSID in ASEAN Economic Community.

What is ICSID and why choose ICSID?

Arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (Additional Facility Rules) is a profitable choice for investors, since founded in 1965, ICSID has significant experience handling a dispute over investment. As of October 1, 2015, ICSID had registered 539 cases under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules. Forty-two (42) of these cases (8%) involved a State Party from the South & East Asia & the Pacific (SEAP) Region (Chart 1).

There are some advantages offer by the ICSID, the first is neutral and self-contained system, as detailed in Chapter 5 of ICSID Convention provides that the arbitration law of the places of arbitration, wherever it may be, has no impact whatsoever on the proceedings. Second, as in other international arbitration, ICSID hearing generally is private, however as a result of the 2006 ICSID amendment, it is possible for non-parties and NGO to observe the hearing process and publish the decision. Third, ICSID provides a transparent cost structure and keeps its administrative fees relatively low, and the last, it remains true that most of ICSID awards have been either successfully settled or voluntarily executed by the parties, this success may be due to ICSID being an organ of the world bank, and the perception that failure to respect and ICSID award would have indirect political consequences in terms of credibility with the world bank.

Chart 1: Geographic Distribution of All Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules (click on picture to enlarge)

The Role of ICSID in Investor-State Dispute Settlement in ASEAN

To resolve the dispute through ICSID, both of the host country and the investor’s country of origin are parties to the Washington Convention. However, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam did not ratify this convention. For the cases involving these countries, ICSID Additional Facility Rules is possible to be used by the parties. ACIA allows arbitration based on Additional Facility Rules when one of the host country or the country of origin of the investor is a member of the Washington Convention. However, if both of the disputing parties are not the parties in Washington Convention, they cannot submit their claim to the ICISD. For example, the dispute between the Governments of Myanmar and Thailand investors, will not be handled by the ICSID, because both of parties did not ratify the Washington Convention.

In conclusion, ASEAN as a regional organization in South East Asia was enacted ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, it is good momentum for the investor and ASEAN Member States to develop the South East Asia region, because ASEAN has provided the investment protection and dispute settlement mechanism. However, we have to optimize the role of ICSID as one of the remarkable institution, who have good reputation and good experience in investment dispute settlement. However, ICSID Arbitration is not the best option in every situation. In fact, there are some ASEAN Member who has not ratify the Washington Convention yet, it will be the challenges in the future, because the role ICSID is very important in investment dispute settlement. Even, there are some other arbitration institution, in this case ICSID will be the alternative solution to settle the investment dispute in ASEAN. Therefore, the ratification of Washington Convention for the rest member of ASEAN will be good idea for the investment protection in ASEAN.

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Changing Global Architecture

December 10, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM) studies Politics with Research Methods at the University of Sheffield, UK.

Muhammad Rosyidin’s article in the October-December 2015 edition of Strategic Review provides an insight into contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Rosyidin argues that Indonesia needs to embrace the concept of “niche diplomacy” as the way forward, with our foreign policy focusing on a single international issue in order to make its voice heard.

Despite the article’s convincing argument for Indonesia’s improvement in its international performance, I believe it missed one important point: foreign policy doctrine. While the nation needs to embrace improvement in its diplomatic agenda, first it has to address what it actually wants in global politics. To that end, this article examines the current foreign policy doctrine of President Joko Widodo.

Unclear direction?

There is some confusion among international relations observers when looking at Indonesia’s current foreign policy. Since taking office, President Joko’s administration has delivered strong nationalist rhetoric on the global stage, a reversal from the pragmatist approach of the previous administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

In a speech at the Asian-African Conference this year, President Joko called for radical reform of international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. He said considers those institutions “obsolete” and a better global architecture is needed to develop Asian and African countries.

Many international relations scholars share the optimism of this speech. It reminds us of the rhetoric used by former President Soekarno to lead Asian African countries, at that time, calling for independence and the end of colonialism. Observers such as Hikmahanto Juwana, for example, optimistically said that Jokowi’s strong position on his foreign policy approach reflected a need to make Indonesia more visible in international politics (The Jakarta Post, 25/6).

However, several policies taken by the Jokowi administration, as well as statements from ministers, show that the President lacks a consistent, strong foreign policy doctrine in dealing with contemporary global issues.

In October, at a meeting with US President Barrack Obama, Jokowi declared Indonesia’s interest in joining the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. It is unclear whether this statement was serious or not, but declaring such an interest in the presence of the US President was inconsistent with a speech he made several months previously that was more negative on the TPP, something that was picked up on by the Indonesian media.

President Joko’s approach to regional politics is also vague. Taking an unclear position at several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) ministerial meetings (most recently at a meeting of Asean defense ministers, he seems to be relegating Asean unity to the sidelines. One example is the statement to the press that China’s growing involvement in South China Sea should be taken to an international arbitration forum. This position reflects inconsistency with Indonesia’s previous stance of not taking sides in the dispute.

Indonesia seems to place bilateral meetings as the priority in conducting foreign policy, but tends to be very selfish in responding to regional issues (such as the South China Sea) rather than maintaining Asean unity. Although his speeches at several regional forums (such as the G-20 and Asean summits) delivered strong rhetoric, follow-ups have yet to be seen.

It is important for us, before moving on to Rosyidin’s “niche diplomacy” to be clear on Indonesia’s position. How can Indonesia deal with the prevailing global architecture? Understanding the changing concept of foreign policy and the need for a consistent doctrine would be a good starting point.

Changing architecture

So what is at stake? From a foreign policy perspective, it seems that Indonesia has yet to develop a clear, strong doctrine that guides its foreign policy at all ministerial levels. While Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi, at her first press briefing in November 2014, mentioned a shift to “Pro-People Diplomacy,” a more strategic derivation of this approach has yet to be formulated.

It is important to bear in our mind that foreign policy nowadays is not merely related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since international politics has developed and reached across various sectors and actors, the concept of foreign policy should be broadened. It now comprises multi-sectoral approaches (involving economics, environment, energy, and many other ministerial bodies) and is connected with many actors other than representatives of the state, such as business actors and international non-government organizations (NGOs). Foreign policy requires a more strategic framework to deal with a diverse range of issues.

Asean is a prime example, bringing together many sectors as foreign policy actors. For example, it now deals with education, sport, and maritime as well as defense or economic issues that belong to specific ministerial bodies. Therefore, Asean is no longer a club for the foreign affairs elite in Pejambon, but should also involve related ministers.

It is also visible that foreign policy stakeholders are not only state officials. Multinational corporations and NGOs use the international sphere as a place for negotiation. The Asean People’s Forum is a good example of how non-state actors participate in the regional decision-making process, challenging the state’s orthodox position as the unitary actor in international politics.

This shifting concept of foreign policy implies the importance of stronger policy coordination, particularly when Indonesia has to deal with regional issues. It is here that Jokowi’s foreign policy lacks a comprehensive doctrine. Overlapping statements from different ministers in Indonesian or foreign media reflects our confusion when dealing with complex global/regional issues.

This problem needs to be resolved. The lack of a foreign policy doctrine can prevent Indonesia taking a leading position in the upcoming Asean Economic Community (AEC), where we are expected to act as a stabilizing hand in the region as the biggest member state. On a global level, this confusion can also put Indonesia in a vulnerable position in the power politics between the United States and China

President Joko needs to formulate two important things to solve this problem.

Firstly, a specific foreign policy roadmap that comprises all ministerial elements dealing with global issues. He should formulate this concept through a relevant analysis of world politics and its approach to engagement, as well as a multi-sectoral analysis and approach to deal with global issues.

Secondly, he needs to formulate guidelines for each ministerial body to deal with global issues that often intersect various ministerial sectors. It is in this case that we need guidelines to welcome the AEC at the end of 2015, both for particular ministerial bodies and local government. Improving policy coordination is also important to ensure Indonesia’s position in Asean does not overlap other ministerial/local government business.

In this regard, appointing foreign policy advisors/special staff will be important to formulate a concise, comprehensive foreign policy. It is likely that foreign policy will only become more complex in the future; therefore, building a strong, comprehensive foreign policy doctrine is a vital, immediate task for President Joko and his administration.

This article was originally published by Strategic Review Indonesia

Can the Subaltern Speak in ASEAN?

November 6, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ahmad Rizky M Umar, Postgraduate Student at Department of Politics, University of Sheffield and formerly a Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Centre, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Can the subaltern speak? Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, a prominent postcolonial and Indian scholar, raised this question in her popular article (1985). She attempted to draw an analysis of the subaltern, those who were excluded from existing power-relations and thus unable to speak of themselves.

Drawing an analysis through the lens of postcolonial India, Spivak concerned with how the ‘elite’, ‘intellectuals’, and other kind of people in power has failed to make the subaltern speak of themselves. Rather than make the subaltern speaks, intellectuals has attempted to speak about the subaltern as if they were subaltern themselves.

This creates something like ‘camera obscura’ –to quote Marx— in seeing the subaltern. There were some biases over the construction of subaltern in dominant view. This view has made a subordinate relation between the Colonizers and the Colony. When the Colony has been proclaimed independent, this colonial view has been preserved. In many postcolonial states, including those in Southeast Asia, it is somehow believed that only ‘elite’ or ‘intellectuals’ –those who are educated in modern system— are legitimate to speak representing the country, and thus speak of the ‘subaltern’ in their countries.

Against this backdrop, we can raise the same question: can the Subaltern speak in Southeast Asia, where ten states have been agreed to form a new regional community –namely Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— to maintain peace and stability in the region?

ASEAN was formed in 1967 in a meeting of 5 leading states in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Phillippines. Its primary objective was actually simple: to maintain peace and security in the region. Those states have agreed to take ‘non-intervention’ position to reach that goal. At the end of the Cold War, its membership was expanded to five other states: Myanmar, Laos, Brunei, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

It is important to take a look at the region’s historical conjuncture. Before 1945, Southeast Asia has been divided by four big colonial states –Spain (Phillippines), Dutch (Indonesia), British (Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei), and French (Indochina States). Thailand becomes the only state that is free from colonialism –it was becoming a boundary that separated British and French.

Given such a context, politically. geographical construction of Southeast Asia is thus a colonial construction. Indonesia could only be a united nation-state when the Dutch, with its ‘ethical politics’, allowing the Indonesians to get some educations and subsequently awaken nationalism in Indonesian pribumi.

The Malay identity, which is central in the sovereign state of Malaysia, is also in fact British-constructed. The Malaysian state was inherited by British Colonial Sdministrations that had been in power since the 19th century. French colonialism in Indochina divided the region in some ethnic-based countries.

In this context, Southeast Asian identity should be traced in its colonial origins. We cannot simply identify Southeast Asia merely on its existing state –since it has been constructed by the colonizers. We have to critically re-identify Southeast Asia by acknowledging the ‘subaltern’ –those who are marginalized due to their few numbers or apolitical positions.

Nowadays, several ‘subaltern’ communities exist in Southeast Asia. There are some minority ethnic groups such as Papuans in Indonesia, Dayaks in Malaysia, Pattani and Mons in Thailand, or Rohings and Karens in Myanmar.

Many of them have resisted. We have witnessed some groups who are attempting to express their form of resistance through separatism or political insurgency. There are, for example, Komite Nasional Papua Barat in Indonesia or Moro Islamic Liberation Front who have been accused as national threat by each national authority.

In another prominent case, there are Rohing people in Myanmar, who were externally displaced and taken refugees and hence leaving new problems in other Southeast Asian Countries.

These subalterns remain with their own problems in each country. But as we are getting closer with the upcoming ASEAN Community, which is aimed at gathering all Southeast Asian countries to a ‘people-oriented’ regionalism, we have to ask the same question as Spivak did: can those subalterns speak in the upcoming ASEAN Community?

Since its establishment, ASEAN tends to be very state-centric. It has been formed as a place to negotiate state’s interest. There is a weakness in this state-centric tendency: ASEAN only serve as ‘arena of negotiation’ from state’s elite who have been, by Law, acclaimed as representative as the State.

ASEAN governing structure also proves this argument. ASEAN Structure acknowledges the ASEAN Summit as the highest structure that can produce legally-binding decision for each member states. The Summit is obviously attended only by State’s representatives. It is proven to be very elitist, and thus left not enough room for the subalterns to speak of themselves in front of ASEAN People.

Thus, instead of giving rooms for the subaltern to speak, the ASEAN State’s representatives seem to acclaim themselves as the representation of the Subalterns, which was rarely discussed in the Summit.

Indeed, it is very problematic. ASEAN has been entrapped by its ‘colonial legacy’ which perceives the state as the only subject who can speak and articulates their interests in political arena. They have repressed voices of the Subaltern in the making of ASEAN –which only makes the ASEAN States as the reincarnation of the colonizers in Southeast Asian skin.

Thus, it is therefore important for the ASEAN State’s representatives, who will be representing their states in the upcoming ASEAN Summit, to reflect its nature of regionalism. If the upcoming ASEAN Summit can’t address this problem, it is likely that the idea of ‘ASEAN Community’ has not yet ready to be faced by both people and the state.

Is Jokowi Turning His Back to ASEAN?

September 9, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

25th ASEAN Summit, Myanmar. Photo Credits: Strait Times

Dr. Avery Poole
Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Melbourne and 2013 Visiting Fellow at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia appears less oriented toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While this may true, the explanation is more nuanced than proposed by many regional analyses. Many observers see Jokowi as more inward looking than his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and point to his lack of foreign policy experience. I would argue that Jokowi is, in fact, not less oriented than Yudhoyono to Indonesia’s foreign relations as a policy priority; rather, he approaches it differently, for reasons that reflect a distinct approach to contemporary East Asia.

Indonesia under Jokowi is less oriented towards multilateralism in general. Yudhoyono emphasised Indonesia’s role in international organisations, including the G20 (in which Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian member), the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations. He also sought to advanceIndonesia’s role in regional forums, including ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Bali Democracy Forum. His Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, pointed to the importance of Indonesian diplomacy in “high-level forums” to address challenges that require international cooperation (such as food security, natural disasters and transnational crime).

In contrast, Jokowi criticised the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank at the Asian-African Conference in April this year, for failing to deliver solutions for global economic woes.

Jokowi, in fact, appears to see greater value in Indonesia’s bilateral relations than in multilateralism. He and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi have indicated that they will concentrate on strategic bilateral relationships that benefit the Indonesian people. While it is to be expected that political leaders would emphasise national interests and benefits to citizens, it is notable that multilateralism – assumed by many to be the preferred setting for international cooperation in the interests of mutual gains and addressing common challenges – is no longer depicted as the means to that end. For example, while the current government regards trade as facilitating Indonesia’s economic growth, it does not appear to see ASEAN as the preferred forum in which to pursue beneficial trade arrangements.

Analysts such as Felix Utama Kosasih have expressed concern that Indonesia will suffer from its lack of commitment to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). A recent editorial in The Jakarta Post argued that unwillingness to prepare for the AEC “will greatly impact the effectiveness of economic integrity. In the end it will be Indonesia itself that has to pay the price for its reluctance to accept reality.” Certainly the AEC could create the potential for gains through freer trade and investment among ASEAN member states. But it is not at all certain that it will actually form a “bloc” with a combined population and GDP of approximately 620 million and $4.7 trillion. It is therefore not clear that deprioritising the AEC will be harmful to Indonesia’s economic interests. In fact, Jokowi’s state visits early in his presidency to Japan and China – Indonesia’s largest and second largest export markets respectively – reflect the importance of states outside ASEAN to Indonesia’s economy.

Of course, it is not only economic relations that shape Indonesia’s evolving approach to ASEAN. There is a general frustration among some key officials with ASEAN’s inability to provide substantive outcomes and benefits for Indonesia – and there were rumblings about this in influential quarters long before Jokowi took office.

In 2009, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Rizal Sukma, wrote an oft-cited piece in The Jakarta Post arguing that Indonesia needs a “post-ASEAN foreign policy”. Indonesia has always, he wrote, been “forced into compromise”, and its initiatives on human rights, democracy and peacekeeping have “fallen on deaf ears” or been ridiculed. In late 2014, he argued that ASEAN is now just a cornerstone – no longer the cornerstone – of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Should Jokowi be concerned about possible damage to Indonesia’s reputation as a regional and global player by a move away from ASEAN? It could be argued that it will demonstrate that he has a distinct foreign policy strategy. He also may feel a political need to respond to the nationalist sentiment that was highlighted during the presidential race against Prabowo Subianto in 2014. But Jokowi’s deprioritisation of ASEAN is not just driven by domestic political concerns. He also seems less concerned with satisfying the expectations of other states.

As a major regional power, Indonesia is expected to play a central role in engaging in regional dialogue and addressing common challenges. It has traditionally been seen as the default leader of ASEAN, particularly because it has the largest population, land mass and GDP (in absolute terms). But as Dr Evi Fitriani recently noted (in a podcast for Indonesia at Melbourne), Jokowi’s government seems less concerned with the expectations of foreign countries, and with wanting to be seen as a “good citizen”.

Jokowi has been depicted in regional news media as tending towards nationalism, but the image of him as simply “inward-looking” is inaccurate. Rather, his administration has moved away from liberal internationalism in its foreign policy. For example, he is more reticent about the notion that Indonesia might facilitate a resolution in ASEAN dialogue to the South China Sea disputes, claiming: “that is a problem for other countries”.

Instead, Jokowi emphasises the idea of Indonesia as a “global maritime fulcrum” and seeks to strengthen bilateral ties with other states in the Indian Ocean, such as India and South Africa. Rather than lacking interest in foreign policy, Jokowi is forging his own path. This raises concerns about the future of ASEAN, but it is not yet clear whether it is particularly problematic for Indonesia.

This piece was previously published at Indonesia at Melbourne website: http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean/

ASEAN dan Penanggulangan Terorisme: Beberapa Catatan

August 27, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Oleh Agung Hidayat, Staf Intern di ASEAN Studies Center UGM, Mahasiswa Ilmu Komunikasi UGM

Aksi ektremisme, terorisme serta militansi Islam menjadi ancaman nyata bagi keberagaman masyarakat ASEAN. Baru-baru ini, kasus Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) di Irak-Suriah diyakini mampu membangkitkan dan menginspirasi makar maupun aksi teror di regional Asia Tenggara. Pihak berwenang di setiap negara ASEAN harus mulai menyadari potensi tumbuhnya bibit-bibit radikalisme Islam di area masing-masing. Sebab kali ini, ISIS sangat masif, kreatif, serta menarik minat pemuda melakukan propaganda dibandingkan Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) ataupun al-Qaeda pada satu dekade yang lalu.

Ada beberapa opini yang berkembang terkait isu ini. Menurut penasihat senior International Crisis Group Sidney Jones, Warga Negara Indonesia yang akan bergabung dalam perang di Irak-Suriah melampaui jumlah yang pernah pergi ke Afghanistan paruh 1985-1994 (Brennan 2015). Pada Desember 2014 Kepala Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) mengatakan, 514 orang Indonesia telah melakukan perjalanan ke Irak dan Suriah (Straitstimes.com). Namun tidak menerangkan berapa banyak yang bergabung dengan ISIS.

Di Malaysia sendiri jumlah warga negara yang direkrut ISIS sekitar 40 dan di Filipina sekitar 200 (Hashim 2015). The New Straits Times menerbitkan laporan, kelompok teror yang independen seperti JI, al-Qaeda dan ISIS berlangganan ideologi serupa. Ideologi itu direproduksi ulang dan ditawarkan kembali kepada kelompok-kelompok milisi lainnya. Seperti pendahulunya, ISIS pun mengadakan kontak dengan militan di Filipina Selatan, Abu Sayyaf.

Sementara itu, ISIS juga terlihat gencar melakukan propaganda di media sosial. Pemimpin senior ISIS Abu Muthanna al Yaman menyiarkan video berjudul There Is No Life Without Jihad di youtube (thediplomat.com 2014). Dalam video tersebut, warga negara Inggris itu mengklaim, ISIS telah mengumpulkan milisi-milisi muslim dari seluruh dunia. Mulai dari Bangladesh, Irak, Kamboja, Australia, UK. Namun para pemimpin Muslim di Kamboja menolak klaim tersebut. Meskipun denukian, diplomat mereka mencatat bahwa ratusan siswa maupun mahasiswa dari Kamboja yang belajar di madrasah di Timur Tengah turut bergabung.

Pengalaman-Pengalaman Menghadapi Terorisme

Bagaimana ASEAN merespons masalah-masalah semacam ini? Jika melihat konteks historisnya, ancaman ekstrimisme dan radikalisme yang berujung pada aksi-aksi teror mulai mendapat tanggapan besar dari ASEAN pasca peristiwa 11 September di Amerika Serikat (AS) dan bom Bali 12 Oktober (Emmers 2003). Beberapa pengamat melihat Asia Tenggara sebagai ‘front kedua’ dalam proyek global melawan terorisme yang diusung oleh Amerika Serikat (lihat Choiruzzad, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002). Respons terhadap terorisme tersebut mencapai puncaknya pada November 2001 saat para pemimpin ASEAN mendeklarasikan perang terhadap terorisme.

Namun demikian, terlihat bahwa deklarasi tersebut tidak berasal dari konsensus nyata di antara negara-negara anggota. Adanya kepentingan domestik yang berbeda-beda antara Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina dan Singapura membuat pencapaian kesepakatan regional dan perumusan langkah-langkah nyata tidak berjalan dengan baik (Emmers 2003).

Di sisi lain, dimensi politik domestik juga sangat kental dalam respons ini. Sebagai contoh, Perdana Menteri Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad dan Presiden Filipina Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo dengan cepat mendukung perang Amerika melawan terorisme dan menggunakannya untuk keuntungan politik. Mahathir mengambil keuntungan 11 September untuk mendiskreditkan Partai Islam se-Malaysia dengan menggambarkannya sebagai partai militan Islam. Arroyo yang menggambarkan Abu Sayyaf sebagai gerakan teroris internasional bersedia menerima bantuan militer AS untuk menumpas anggotanya di Pulau Basilan. Singapura, yang semenjak pasca perang dingin sudah menjadi bagian dari sekutu AS (Hafiz ed. 2006), memberikan kontribusi langsung untuk mendukung proyek tersebut.

Sebaliknya, Presiden Indonesia saat itu Megawati Soekarnoputri menghadapi situasi yang sulit. Indonesia bergantung pada organisasi-organisasi muslim moderat yang menentang respon politik terhadap kelompok-kelompok teror yang diidentikkan dengan islam tersebut. Tidak adanya langkah-langkah anti-teroris di Indonesia, seperti tidak melakukan penangkapan terhadap pimpinan Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), menyebabkan Menteri Senior Singapura Lee Kuan Yew meresponnya dalam bentuk pidato pada Februari 2002 (Emmers 2003). Yew menyatakan bahwa Singapura akan beresiko terkena serangan terorisme selama pemimpin ekstremis itu tidak ditangkap. Hal ini tentu saja membawa sedikit ketegangan pada hubungan kedua negara di kawasan.

Beberapa Catatan tentang Respons ASEAN

Dengan demikian, terlihat bahwa sebagai sebuah entitas regional, pendekatan yang digunakan oleh ASEAN masih bertmpu pada inisiatif negara-negara anggotanya. Hal ini dapat dipahami, sebagaimana kritik dari beberapa analis, kelahiran ASEAN tidak dilatari oleh fondasi institusional yang kokoh (tidak seperti Uni Eropa, misalnya), oleh karenanya stabilitas bukan hal yang dapat dijelaskan secara objektif apakah mampu bertahan lama atau tidak (Kivimäki 2012). ASEAN juga dikritik punya kelemahan karena sebagai organisasi internasional memiliki sumberdaya yang minim yang secara kelembagaan tidak efisien (Kivimäki 2001; (Jasudasen 2010).

Namun demikian ASEAN sebetulnya masih memiliki cita-cita regional dalam memandang realitas masa depan. Oleh karena itu ASEAN masih harus terus mengembangkan konstruksi sosial dalam masyarakat, pentingnya ASEAN dan kekuatannya di ranah global.

Sementara itu, dampak utama propaganda ISIS di Asia Tenggara diyakini menjadi inspirasi bagi gerakan Islam ekstrimis secara langsung. Potensi ini mendatangkan ancaman serta menyinggung masalah keamanan regional. Propaganda ISIS juga harus ditangani dengan hati-hati dan efektif. Sebab, prioritas mereka untuk menghadirkan tenaga dan sumberdaya militan mulai melirik ke daerah non-inti konflik, yakni kawasan ASEAN ini mulai besar. Pengalaman kelompok militan dan ekstrimis di Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina dan Thailand menyimpan potensi besar guna memasok kebutuhan calon yang direkrut.

Aksi radikalisme dan teror dalam regional tentunya dapat mengganggu prospek stabilitas ASEAN kedepannya. Namun, prospek tersebut tidak sebegitu mudah runtuh jika norma-norma dalam ASEAN Way diresapi. Poin-poin dari ASEAN Way (Kivimäki 2012) yaitu, (1) non-intervensi urusan dan penggunaan militer; (2) Berfokus pada hal-hal yang menyatukan ketimbang memisahkan musuh potensial; (3) Prioritas pada pembangunan (developmentalisme); (4) Praktek personalistik, berbasis konsensus, dan negosiasi yang menjunjung martabat semua pihak, menyimpan potensi besar untuk mengoptimalisasi arah kebijakan keamanan nantinya.

Respon ASEAN menanggapi aksi teror dan radikal ini seringkali hanya berupa perangkat retoris belaka. Sejauh ini, negara-negara anggota ASEAN lebih banyak berfokus pada tindakan-tindakan yang tidak mengikat, tidak spesifik, dan tanpa membangun mekanisme monitoring kemajuan melawan tindakan-tindakan teror tersebut. Masyarakat modern ASEAN perlu melepaskan diri dari kecenderungan untuk mengeluarkan statement tanpa ada aksi afirmatif yang serius di tingkat regional.

Dengan mendefinisikan ulang ASEAN Way, norma ditingkat regional dalam menghindari radikalisme mampu membangun semangat demokrasi dan ekonomi lebih baik. Fokus pada isu-isu yang lebih dapat menyatukan semangat regional seperti kesamaan menjaga budaya lokal, pertumbuhan menjadi negara yang modern, demokratis serta developmentalis mampu membuat ASEAN bertaji dan menggalang kekuatan internalnya memupus radikalisme sempit tersebut. ASEAN belum kehilangan kemampuan menghela kasus-kasus tersebut. Hanya saja instrumen pendekatan kebijakan dan strategi penanganan radikalisme perlu dikerucutkan: apakah sudah membawa semangat satu ASEAN atau masih suka berjalan sendiri-sendiri? mari kita lihat dalam konstruksi regionalisme di masa depan.

Referensi:

Brennan, Elliot (2015) How Southeast Asia is responding to ISIS, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Artikel dapat dibaca: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How-should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in-Southeast-Asia.aspx?COLLCC=633658114&COLLCC=2562866333&COLLCC=1147516275&

Emmers, Ralf (2003) ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia, The Pacific Review, 16:3, 419-438, DOI: 10.1080/0951274032000085653, diunduh pada http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0951274032000085653

Hadiz, Vedi R (2006) Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia (ed.), Routledge: New York.

Hashim, Ahmed S. (2015) The Impact of The Islamic State In Asia (Policy Report), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, diunduh pada http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PR150211_The_Impact_of_the_Islamic_State_in_Asia.pdf

Jasudasen, T. (2010) ASEAN’s legal framework: lost its stripes or back with a roar?, Address by Singapore Ambassador to Malaysia, before the ASEAN Law Association of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 9 March 2010; diunduh pada http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/Speech-TJasudasen.pdf

Kivimäki, Timo (2012) Southeast Asia and conflict prevention. Is ASEAN running out of steam?, The Pacific Review, 25:4, 403-427, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2012.685094, diunduh pada http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2012.685094

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/isis-a-threat-well-beyond-the-middle-east/

http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/alarming-rise-support-isis-indonesia-says-counter-terrorism-chief-20

ASEAN People’s Forum 2015: Menuju ASEAN yang People-Centred dan People-Oriented?

June 16, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Nitia Agustini, Research Intern di ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Salah satu isu penting yang agak terabaikan dalam perkembangan Masyarakat ASEAN dewasa ini adalah keterlibatan Masyarakat Sipil di ASEAN. Bersamaan dengan penyelenggaraan ASEAN Summit di Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN People’s Forum (APF) diselenggarakan di Wisma MCA Kuala Lumpur Malaysia pada 21-24 April 2015.

Pelaksanaan APF tahun ini bukan saja menandai kiprah 10 tahun masyarakat sipil dalam proses regionalisme di ASEAN (pertama kali APF/ACSC digelar di Malaysia, satu dasawarsa silam), tetapi juga menandai beberapa peningkatan keterlibatan. Antara lain, sebagaimana nanti akan dijelaskan, adanya kesempatan bertemu kepala negara ASEAN melalui interface meeting.

Pertemuan ASEAN People’ Forum tahun ini dihadiri sekitar 1400 orang yang merupakan perwakilan civil society di ASEAN dengan berbagai isu. Walaupun memiliki bidang yang berbeda-beda, peserta dalam forum ini sepakat untuk mendorong keterlibatan masyarakat dalam pembuatan kebijakan-kebijakan ASEAN.

Isu ini penting, karena sejauh ini ruang partisipasi masyarakat sipil di ASEAN memang tidak banyak terakomodasi di struktur formal. Kajian ASEAN Studies Center tahun 2014 melihat bahwa baik di isu HAM dan UKM, keterlibatan aktor non-negara dalam proses regionalisme belum sekuat negara. ASEAN masih menjadi bagian dari skema besar ‘kepentingan negara’.

Meng-address keterlibatan masyarakat sipil ini menjadi penting agar Masyarakat ASEAN tidak diidentikkan hanya pada sektor ekonomi. Selama beberapa tahun terakhir, kebijakan ASEAN lebih fokus pada pembangunan ekonomi dan liberalisasi sektor perdagangan. Konsekuensinya, ASEAN hanya menjadi domain dari kepentingan pemerintah serta pemaim bisnis besar. Hal ini berakibat pada kesenjangan pendapatan, problem pembangunan, hingga kesejahteraan yang tidak terdistribusi dengan merata.

Problem HAM

Dalam forum tersebut, muncul kegelisahan dari peserta bahwa walaupun ASEAN telah membuat Komisi ASEAN untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (AICHR) dan Deklarasi HAM ASEAN (AHRD) yang ditandatangani pada tahun 2012 silam, pelanggaran HAM masih terus terjadi. ASEAN sebagai sebuah asosiasi regional dinilai belum mampu melakukan intervensi untuk menyelesaikan itu.

Kita bisa lihat beberapa kasus, Misalnya, beberapa waktu lalu terjadi penangkapan oleh pemerintah Myanmar terhadap mahasiswa yang berdemo. Problem lain adalah yang baru-baru ini terjadi: statelessness yang menimpa beberapa kelompok etnis di Myanmar , terutama Rohingya. Di Malaysia, Laos dan Thailand, beberapa aktivis oposisi pemerintah yang menghilang, ditangkap dan direpresi. Ini belum termasuk kasus-kasus pelanggaran HAM lain di negara-negara ASEAN.

Dalam rangka mendorong percepatan pemenuhan hak masyarakat ASEAN, peserta ASEAN People’s Forum 2015 membuat sebuah rekomendasi yang berjudul “Reclaiming The ASEAN Community For The People”. Rekomendasi ini menyoroti beberapa priotitas yang penting untuk dilakukan yaitu, (1) Menjamin Keadilan dalam Pembangunan; (2) Melindungi Proses Demokrasi, Pemerintahan, serta pemenuhan Hak dasar dan Kebebasan; (3) Komitmen dalam mewujudkan Perdamaian dan Keamanan; dan (4) Mengakhiri Diskriminasi dan ketidaksetaraan.

Peserta ASEAN People’s Forum 2015 berharap adanya dialog terbuka yang konstruktif antara pemerintah dan perwakilan civil society. Hal ini agar rekomendasi yang telah dibuat dapat dipahami oleh pemerintah. Serta dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan ASEAN.

Salah satu perkembangan menarik dari ASEAN People’s Forum 2015 adalah adanya interface meeting antara perwakilan NGO, Business Advisory Council, Pemuda, dan Think-Tank dengan perwakilan Kepala Negara di ASEAN. Kendati dihadiri oleh hampir semua Kepala Negara (termasuk Presiden Joko Widodo), tidak banyak pembicaraan yang bisa dilakukan dalam forum ini.

Ada statement menarik tentang hal ini. Wathslah Naidu dari Organisasi Perempuan Malaysia pun mengatakan bahwa “Kami berharap melalui pernyataan ini, suara-suara dari semua orang akan didengar oleh para pemimpin ASEAN. Kebijakan ASEAN harus menguntungkan masyarakat yang paling terpinggirkan, tidak bekerja melawan mereka”. Hal ini menunjukan bahwa sudah saatnya pembangunan ASEAN mendengarkan aspirasi masyarakat.

Dengan demikian, prinsip ASEAN yaitu people-centred oriented tidak hanya sebuah “simbol” atau jargon yang diulang-ulang setiap kali Summit, namun benar-benar terwujud dalam proses-proses formal yang ada.

Tantangan Regionalisme ASEAN

Apa pelajaran yang bisa diambil dari keterlibatan masyarakat sipil ini?

Setidaknya, APF 2015 memperlihatkan pada kita bahwa regionalisme ASEAN dengan pendekatan people-centred oriented masih mengalami banyak kendala. Kritik banyak pihak bahwa kebijakan ASEAN selama ini berbasis kepentingan elit ASEAN, belum menemukan solusi yang benar-benar bisa dilaksakan.

Melihat pola relasi antara negara dan aktor-aktor non-negara saat inji, Mewujudkan ASEAN yang lebih inklusif dan berdampak langsung pada masyarakat masih belum bisa diwujudkan dalam waktu dekat. Alex Chandra (2009:11) menjelaskan alternatif strategi untuk mewujudkan ASEAN yang lebih “membumi”. Menurutnya, People-Centred dan People-Oriented ASEAN berarti bahwa organisasi non pemerintah (LSM) yang ada di ASEAN harus dilibatkan dalam pembuatan keputusan.

Alexander Chandra memberikan rekomendasi menarik terkait hal ini. Menurutnya, dalam proses pembuatan keputusan,. pembuat kebijakan harus memfasilitasi masuknya aspirasi konstituennya (civil society) dalam menyusun rencana kebijakan. Selanjutnya saat final drafting kebijakan, konsultasi antara negara dan perwakilan non-negara menjadi penting.

Hal ini dimungkinkan dalam format kelembagaan ASEAN, mengingat Konsultasi adalah salah satu dari dua mekanisme pengambilan keputusan di ASEAN (selain ‘Konsensus’). Ironisnya, dalam praktiknya, hal ini cukup sering diabaikan.

Jika model perumusan kebijakan dapat lebih ‘konsultatif’, kita bisa mengharapkan kebijakan-kebijakan ASEAN akan berdampak pada kesejahteraan masyarakat ASEAN. Terpenting, kebijakan ASEAN dapat bermanfaat bagi seluruh elemen masyarakat, transparan, merangkum kepentingan bersama, partisipatif dan inklusif.

Mari mengawalnya di KTT ASEAN Kuala Lumpur yang akan datang.

Refugee Crisis Meeting Should Learn from Indochinese Solution

June 10, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Atin Prabandari, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center and Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Representatives from 17 countries and three international organisations meeting in Bangkok to discuss South-East Asia’s migrant crisis may learn from the previous refugee crisis that hit the region during the Indochina war.

Last week, after having played a game of human water polo at sea, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments agreed to temporarily shelter 3000 boat people who had been rescued – mostly by fishermen – and taken ashore. Around 4000 people are believed to still be languishing at sea, waiting to be rescued.

Most of the migrants are Rohingya Muslims fleeing persecution in Myanmar and Bangladeshi people migrating for largely economic reasons.

Learning from the Indochinese refugee crisis

The two most pressing issues to discuss are the safety of the thousands of people at sea and refugee resettlement.

South-East Asia has faced such a crisis before. As a result of the Indochina war, 1,436,566 refugees fled Cambodia and Vietnam and arrived in South-East Asian countries looking for asylum between 1975 and 1995.

The United Nations sponsored two international conferences on the Indochinese refugee crisis in 1979 and 1989. The latter produced the “Comprehensive Plan of Action”.

Under this agreement, South-East Asian countries agreed to provide temporary asylum. The US, Australia and several European countries provided resettlement for the refugees. The Vietnamese government also cracked down on fleeing boats, halting the exodus.

Up to 1995, 1,311,183 asylum seekers were resettled. The rest were repatriated.

Several countries have sent positive signals about resettling refugees. Representatives at Friday’s meeting can model the solution for the current crisis on how the international community solved the Indochinese refugee crisis.

The US has declared its willingness to accept Rohingya refugees. The Philippines, one of two countries in South-East Asia that has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, is also willing to take some of the refugees.

Gambia, a not-so-wealthy country in West Africa, has offered permanent asylum to the Rohingya as “fellow Muslims”. Gambia, however, still requests financial assistance from international organisations and developed nations to support its effort.

Yet Australia, a signatory to the Refugee Convention, has refused to accept any refugees from the current crisis. Prime Minister Tony Abbott said his government:

… will do absolutely nothing that gives any encouragement to anyone to think that they can get on a boat, that they can work with people smugglers to start a new life.

As party to the convention, Australia should grant asylum to some of the refugees, ensuring their rights are protected in accordance with legal and humanitarian standard.

Addressing ‘root causes’

To provide a lasting solution, the meeting should address the root problems that compel the migrants to flee their countries and take the arduous and dangerous journey on boats.

For people from Bangladesh, extreme poverty and lack of jobs have motivated them to migrate. Rohingya people from the Burmese Rakhine state have been denied citizenship by the government, resulting in multiple human rights violations and discrimination by both the government and Myanmar’s Buddhist fundamentalists.

The meeting should discuss how to ensure Myanmar’s government stops its prolonged discrimination against Rohingya people. The government should acknowledge the Rohingya as their ethnic minority and grant them citizenship.

To this end, ASEAN should continue its “constructive engagement”, the organisation’s way of using political dialogue instead of coercive measures such as economic sanction or diplomatic isolation, with Myanmar.

Meanwhile, countries such as the United States and Australia should continue to pressure Myanmar to end its human rights violations. Governments may use trade or aid as an incentive to improve human rights in the country.

The meeting should also discuss other, related causes of the crisis. Human traffickers target stateless and devastated Rohingya people. Many have ended up being enslaved, such as those forced to work in the Thai fishing industry or held for ransom in jungle camps in Thailand and Malaysia.

In this regard, Australia’s efforts in combating human trafficking and smuggling in South-East Asia – through the Bali Processon People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime – should be applied in this crisis too. Since 2002, Australia together with Indonesia has been co-chairing the voluntary forum, now joined by 45 members, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC).

The Rohingya people are caught between persecution at home and human traffickers. Members of the international community should do all they can to end their misery.

This article was previously published at The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/refugee-crisis-meeting-should-learn-from-indochinese-solution-42426

Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN dan Tantangan Reformasi Birokrasi

June 1, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Muhammad Prayoga Permana, MPP
Kepala ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN (selanjutnya disingkat EA) akan segera diluncurkan akhir tahun 2015 ini. Disadari atau tidak, MEA akan sangat terkait dengan kompetisi yang makin tajam di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Kendati idealnya MEA dirancang untuk memberikan manfaat bagi semua negara anggota ASEAN, Presiden Joko Widodo dalam beberapa kesempatan memaparkan bahwa MEA merupakan persaingan antar negara.

Dalam hal ini, negara dan segenap aparatur birokrasi di dalamnya akan menjadi katalisator. Mereka akan menentukan nasib setelah MEA efektif diberlakukan per 31 Desember 2015.

Pertanyaan yang perlu diajukan, apakah Indonesia akan menjadi pemenang bersama dengan kesepuluh anggota ASEAN lainnya ataukah justru Indonesia hanya akan menjadi pasar? Berbagai pendekatan telah dilakukan dalam mengukur kesiapan masyarakat menjelang MEA. Namun, ironisnya, belum ada yang berhasil menggambarkan secara komprehensif kesiapan pemerintah sendiri.

Dalam menghadapi MEA, cara bekerja birokrasi harus berubah. Catatan ASEAN Community Progress Monitoring System (ACPMS) 2012 memaparkan proporsi ekspor Indonesia dalam produk berteknologi tinggi berada jauh di bawah rata-rata ASEAN. Artinya, kapabilitas pengembangan teknologi Indonesia masih cukup rendah dan hanya mengandalkan ekspor bahan mentah. Selain itu, ongkos ekspor Indonesia menduduki posisi ke-3 termahal di ASEAN dan untuk impor justru termurah ke-3 di ASEAN. Tanpa intervensi yang tepat dari pemerintah, MEA hanya akan menguntungkan importir untuk pasar domestik dan eksportir komoditas tanpa nilai tambah.

Memenangkan Peluang

Memenangkan peluang MEA membutuhkan adaptasi dan ketangkasan (operational agility). Ketangkasan yang dimaksud adalah bagaimana merespon perubahan lansekap ekonomi maupun ketidakpastian dengan pergerakan cepat (Kasali, 2013). Berbeda dengan sebelumnya, birokrasi publik di era baru MEA dihadapkan pada situasi yang bersifat VOCA (Volatility (bergejolak), Uncertainty (memiliki tingkat ketidakpastian yang tinggi), Complexity (saling berhubungan, saling tergantung dan rumit) dan Ambiguity (menimbulkan keragu-raguan). Oleh karena itu capaian kinerja birokrasi tidak lagi harus bersifat rule based namun harus bergerak maju ke arah yang lebih dinamis.

Situasi dalam VOCA membutuhkan setidaknya pendekatan berpikir ke depan (thinking ahead) yakni kapabilitas untuk mengidentifikasi perkembangan, memahami implikasi perubahan sosial ekonomi dan menentukan investasi kebijakan strategis maupun menciptakan lingkungan yang memungkinkan bagi masyarakat untuk memanfaatkan peluang dan meminimalisasi ancaman (Neo & Chen, 2007).

Secara fundamental, arah pengembangan birokrasi pasca-2015 perlu untuk memahami dinamika relasi antara birokrasi dan pasar misalnya. Paradigma lama yang menekankan pada minimalisasi peran birokrasi untuk merespon globalisasi telah usang. Shin (2005) menjelaskan fenomena integrasi ekonomi, seperti MEA, memiliki 2 dimensi utama yakni mobile factors dan non-mobile factors.

Dimensi pertama terfokus pada pilar investasi. Kemudahan teknologi dan integrasi perbankan membuat modal dengan cepat berpindah. Sementara itu, pada dimensi kedua, kualitas non-mobile factors seperti respon sektor publik terhadap tantangan perbaikan pelayanan, percepatan infrastruktur dan harmonisasi regulasi menjadi hal krusial yang menentukan kemana mobile factors tadi berpindah.

Dalam kasus ini, Indonesia merupakan negara dengan proses pengurusan investasi terburuk di ASEAN. Indonesia juga tercatat sangat restriktif dalam memfasilitasi mobilitas investor dalam wilayah domestiknya (Soesastro & Atje dalam Basu Das, 2012). Kondisi ini, disadari atau tidak, kan menurunkan daya tarik Indonesia dalam sektor investasi.

Competitive and Representative Government

Bagaimana menyikapi beberapa tantangan tersebut? Selama ini, reformasi birokrasi cenderung hanya dipahami dalam tataran teknis. Meskipun penting, kitat patut mempersoalkan bagaimana arah dan cara kerja reformasi birokrasi yang berjalan selama ini terkait dengan tantangan eksternal yang muncul. Artinya, dalam menghadapi MEA, perlu adanya pembenahan paradigma aparatur birokrasi agar mampu bersiap menghadapi dan merespons transformasi ekonomi kawasan.

Pembenahan paradigma tersebut dapat dilakukan dengan memperkenalkan cara pandang competitive and representative government sebagai bagian dari Reformasi Birokrasi di Indonesia. Cara pandang tersebut menghadirkan kembali negara pada pemerintahan yang kompetitif, namun tetap memiliki kapasitas untuik merepresentasi kepentingan publik. Pemerintahan yang kompetitif berarti pemerintaan yang mampu beradaptasi dengan konstelasi global maupun regiona. Sementara itu, pemerintahan yang representatif berarti pemerintahan yang yang konsisten mengutamakan kepentingan masyarakat dan mendorong partisipasi publik di dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan (lihat Hameiri, 2010).

Tantangan bagi birokrasi Indonesia, dalam konteks ini, tidak hanya bekerja untuk merespon tuntutan regionalisasi ekonomi ASEAN. Pada dasarnya, birokrasi juga dituntut untuk hadir meminimalisasi ekses pasar. Dengan kata lain, birokrasi perlu menyeimbangkan antara tuntutan scorecard liberalisasi di tingkat regional dengan implementasi paket-paket kebijakan untuk mencegah eksternalitas pasar.

Berkaca pada pendekatan yang dianut pemerintah saat ini, perlu adanya evaluasi menyeluruh terhadap kecenderungan pendekatan mekanis yang berujung pada birokratisasi reformasi birokrasi perlu. Reformasi birokrasi harus mampu lepas dari kekangan tumpukan dokumen bukti kinerja. Lebih dari itu, birokrasi perlu baham betul apa sebenarnya titik peluang, tantangan dan kerawanan MEA bagi unit kerjanya masing-masing.

Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN merupakan titik tolak bagi birokrasi untuk berani keluar dari pakemnya. Inovasi, dengan demikian, menjadi sangat penting. Sudah saatnya standar pelayanan birokrasi mengakomodasi input dan ekspektasi sektor privat.

A Paradox of Multitrack Diplomacy

May 19, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Special Meeting of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission (AICHR) » Special Meeting March 2015 KL – AICHR.org

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 1996, John MacDonald and Louise Diamond wrote the book, Multi-track Diplomacy, which promoted the role of non-state actors in diplomatic theory. This concept is now considered an alternative way of doing diplomacy.

Diplomacy is perceived as a simultaneous system of interaction between the state and non-state actor in order to gain peace. Previously, diplomacy was understood only as a matter of “politics among nations” where the state was the only actor in international relations.

Since the 1990s, the world has witnessed shifts in international politics, mainly the emergence of non-state actors, such as NGOs, multinational corporations and transnational networks of think-tanks.

MacDonald cofounded the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy in 1992, which was influential in endorsing the concept to many stakeholders, particularly the UN.

ASEAN also recognizes “track two” diplomacy through ASEAN-ISIS (Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) Network and its endorsement of the ASEAN People’s Assembly, now the ASEAN People’s Forum.

However, this concept has limits in addressing contemporary problems in international politics.

As an illustration, I was once invited to attend a dialogue with the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives and ASEAN Secretariat. Several participants highlighted the importance of dialogue between the state, the ASEAN Secretariat and NGOs.

However, civil society members were reminded that they could come up with ideas, but they had to be delivered through the existing channels established in ASEAN to accommodate civil society’s voices. So such dialogue does not necessarily reflect negotiation between state and non-state actors.

Similarly, at the latest ASEAN People’s Forum in Kuala Lumpur, activists were disappointed because of a lack of dialogue between state representatives in discussing prominent issues in the region. Cambodian civil society organizations, for example, expressed disappointment because their expected representatives for interface meeting were replaced with lower-level officials.

These illustrations reflect a paradox in multitrack diplomacy in the political reality. Two lessons can be learned. First, multitrack diplomacy can be turned into a form of cooption or “corporatism” when perceived by non-democratic states.

Instead of endorsing stakeholder participation, this concept was used to prevent transnational networks of NGOs from advocating their interests at the international level.

Second, multitrack diplomacy can prevent dialogue and negotiations with non-state organizations that are critical of states. Through “diplomatic tracks”, every demand would be responded to based on state-defined national interests and potentials for negotiation could be reduced.

In ASEAN, which still includes states with authoritarian backgrounds, states used multitrack diplomacy as a political tool to conserve state hegemony in ASEAN and a pretext for the state to avoid negotiation and talks with non-state actors.

These lessons have led us to search for more comprehensive approaches and solutions for state-non state relations in diplomatic theories. Multitrack diplomacy should also be an arena of negotiation between all stakeholders. Participation in a separate, partial track is not enough. Stakeholders should be given enough space to negotiate with the state.

In ASEAN, radicalizing multitrack diplomacy means giving a wider place for civil society to express their interests with their leaders. So far civil society’s engagement with the state, in several countries, was primarily conducted only informally.

Before the ASEAN Community comes into effect at the end of this year, a challenge lies for every stakeholder. ASEAN is not a community of diplomats or businesspeople. ASEAN belongs to its people. Thus, every voice should be heard ; they should be given an opportunity to express their voices.

To go beyond multitrack diplomacy and propose a people-oriented diplomacy is a necessary task for every ASEAN stakeholder in the future.
____________________

This article was published at The Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/17/a-paradox-multitrack-diplomacy.html

China and The ASEAN: A Need for Shifting Paradigm

May 11, 2015/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Dedi Dinarto – Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada (dinartodedi@gmail.com)

Even though China has successfully controlled the entire Spratlys on January 1974, the discourse on China’s presence in South China Sea remains the most debated issue in Southeast Asia. Accordingly the economic, strategic and political interests of involved ASEAN member countries cannot be separeaed with this problematic issue. China’s presence in the South China Sea cannot be separated from the historical trajectory, which is claimed as its own territory. However, the establishment of the ASEAN consequently resulted the demarcation of South China Sea by several ASEAN countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, claimed the South China Sea as their territory. Soon afterwards, this complexity of interest sparked the border dispute among them, which until now, has not been able to be resolved.

There are some scholarly discussions over this issue. For example, Ralf Emmers explained his main argument justifying the China’s naval position in the Spratlys has continue to be weak due to its limited power projection (Emmers, 2007:53). At that time, China naval capability did not arrange the external mission instead of remaining stay at its mainland bases. However, the transformation of China’s foreign policy, particularly during the leadership of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, triggered anxiety and caution of its neighbor countries, in which its action is predicted to control over some disputed border through assertive behavior.

In the sense of China’s past behavior, many diplomatic efforts have been done politically despite of military projection. But the current condition seems to be very different and any attempts to involve in the conflict will be regarded as a threat to the balance of power in South China Sea dispute. since the rise of China’s military budget has correspondingly shown its assertive behavior due to the naval presence in South China Sea. From 2013 to 2015, China’s military budget is rising year-to-year approximately US$ 114.3 billion in 2013, US$ 131.57 billion in 2014, and US$ 141.5 billion in 2015 (Erickson, 2013, 2015; Keck, 2014). Having Hua Chunying as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, she underlined the reason behind the extensive presence of China’s naval in South China Sea with the statement to maintain the military personnel, safeguard the maritime and territorial integrity, respond the maritime search and rescue, and increase the observation and research, as well as enhance fishery production (Tiezzi, 2015).

This statement has also been revealed as the main reason of China’s reclamation projects in the conflicting area. These projects remains debatable because they have larger political functions, particularly for military bases. Nevertheless, the most important thing that we can see is all about the diplomatic way endorsed by Hua Chunying, in some purpose to hide the more political and assertive behavior toward this issue, as explained by Fareed Zakaria as an effort of Chinese to hide consciously the ‘bully’ action from international view (Li, 2009:2). In the sense, this kind of political issue is successfully reframed by Chinese using soft power approach despite of military intervention.

Understanding Regional Security in ASEAN

In general, it is worth necessary to understand how the ASEAN member countries manage their conflict or dispute internally and externally. The ‘ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea’ stated ASEAN’s position toward the disputed area by means of peaceful way, without resort to force, and to be concerned on exercise restraint (Morse, 1992:2-3). Hence, the ASEAN Way as the basic principal of member countries shows its essence to solve every bilateral or regional disputes using consultation and consensus despite of forces.

Besides that, since 1967, the ASEAN member countries have built the principle of non-interference, which means of no military conflict in every internal affairs. This principle has long to affect the relationship of ASEAN member countries. On the other hand, results some prominent principles to understand ASEAN, which are the respect of sovereignty, and the high acknowledgement on freedom, independence, and integrity.

Basically, the ASEAN member countries also stated on the Bangkok Declaration 1967 about how they should dealt with external interference, especially several Great Powers after World War II, which are Uni Soviet, United States of America, and China as the nearest and biggest neighbor. They seek to defend their regional stability by ensuring the security of ASEAN territory from external interference in any form or manifestation. Therefore, it is necessarily important to underline the framework of regional security in ASEAN which do not acknowledge the use of force and military action.

A Need for Shifting Paradigm?

Accordingly, the old understanding of regional security framework in ASEAN is justified to set aside the material purposes in which the cooperation was basically made through value and norms as the product of inter-subjectivity. It is worth to say that the construction of security community in ASEAN is non-sense and rhetorical instead of developing the substantive cooperation (Acharya, 2001:63). The unconsciousness of ASEAN member countries to accept the nature of materialismm in one hand, has been used by China to expand its military presence in the South China Sea. In the other hand, China is not only to use its soft approach getting closer to the South China Sea, but also taking some materialistic advantage in this situation, which according to the ASEAN member countries as the irrelevant factor in term of regional security.

In terms of South China Sea conflict issue, the ASEAN member countries shall re-understand the behavior of China over some disputed areas. Giulio M. Gallarotti promoted the cosmopolitanism power as the new framework to understand the current international politics. It acknowledges the possibility of soft power and hard power being practiced simultaneously. To maintain good relationship and image with all possible countries and to concern on military capability development are the two most prominent elements to define cosmopolitan power. Hence, what has China has shown to the world, particularly in the South China Sea, is worth to be described as the practice of such power. Expanding its economic cooperation is included as the practice of soft power. On the contrary, the increasing of military budget, and spreading of military presence are the concrete action of China to practice its hard power.

ASEAN member countries should also seek a new paradigm to handle the South China Sea dispute. The consciousness over the military expansion needs to be discussed further for a new strategy balancing the Chinese military presence. Not to be collided with the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint 2009-2015, it is important for ASEAN member countries to address their common interests on the military cooperation, particularly on the provision of common military equipment and personnel for regional integrity despites of the exclusive cooperation among disputed ASEAN member. With the notion of ASEAN centrality, a ‘common interest’ will overcome ASEAN’s passive attitudes towards Chinese military development in the South China Sea.