Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: Where Malaysia Stands and What It Means

/in /by

malaysia

Photo source: https://ripplesoftruth.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/kuala-lumpur-25.jpg

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 2012, The Edge Malaysia published a concise explanation regarding Malaysia’s position and how it sees ASEAN.  It stated that ASEAN has never been the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy and he emphasized on the fact that the condition will not likely to be altered anytime soon. Malaysia’s foreign policy will aim for her own national goals which is becoming a developed country; the agenda included the need of cohesive nation, constructing a strong, effective, transparent and accountable state that is responsive to her citizens, transforming the economy into a human capital intensive, deepening the democratic form of government, high income one to achieve global competitiveness and recognition (Alagappa, 2012). Lastly, Malaysia opted to ensure national security and regional stability, and only from that factor Malaysia took the existence of ASEAN into account. Was the analysis proven right that there will be not much of alteration by the Malaysian government regarding its position for the ASEAN?

According to the latest publication by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia had shifted its vision and as a state it has explicitly accepted ASEAN as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. It mentioned the urgency for Malaysia as Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN, therefore the foreign policy of Malaysia continues to emphasize on the relevance and importance of ASEAN as the forum and catalyst for regional dialogue.  The principality of Malaysian foreign policy had been divided into specified pillars, mainly it includes in maintaining peaceful relations with all countries regardless of its ideology and political system; adopting an independent, non-aligned, and principled stance in regional and international diplomatic affairs; forging close relations and economic partnerships with all nations, particularly with ASEAN and other regional friends; promoting peace and stability in the region through capacity building and conflict resolution measures; playing an influential leadership role as Chair of the ASEAN, Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); participating actively and meaningfully in the United Nations, especially in the efforts to end injustice and oppression, and to uphold international law; and lastly projecting Malaysia as a leading example of a tolerant and progressive Islamic nation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2016).

Malaysia’s Pragmatism

According to the given principals of Malaysia’s foreign policy, it reflected the pragmatic way of shaping its foreign policy in order to gain Malaysia’s best interest. As Datuk Seri Anifah Aman mentioned on the dynamic of Malaysia’s foreign policy that the status quo requires Malaysia to implement its foreign policy initiatives and make it a realization in order to remain relevant and necessary in response to changing regional dynamics and the ‘recessionary global economy’,  Anifah said that this will enable the country to continue building on its good relations with strategic partners and to have more focused relations with key countries (Divakaran, 2016). To assure its chairmanship role in ASEAN, Malaysia has also been promoting the idea of strengthening ASEAN’s internal institutions, particularly by the ASEAN Secretariat.  Moreover, Malaysia has launched the idea of AEC 2025, which builds upon ASEAN’s earlier idea of a ‘single market and production base’ extending it further to include sustainable economic development (Das, 2015). However, the chairmanship failed to meet its expected target of further negotiation on the status of South China Sea, Malaysia was expecting to gain statements on the South China Sea during its April Summit and ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, yet they could not secure a joint declaration for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in November. Nonetheless the failure of joint declaration could not solemnly be pinpointed on Malaysia’s chairmanship but also on the mechanism of ASEAN itself, the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been claimed as slow and redundant since it is subject to parties’ consent on such measures; an opposed party can thus prevent the ASEAN High Council from being formed (Nguyen, 2015).

 

As a state Malaysia’s foreign policy really portrayed the domestics’ tendencies in Malaysia, starting from the pragmatic approach of foreign policy pairing it up with economic preferences in fostering economic environment for the other ASEAN member states as how the agenda will be fruitful for Malaysia and furthering ASEAN economic integration. Although due to this blunt tendency and its current chairmanship position it is only fair to question where Malaysia will position itself in between the Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, its back and forth reaction signaled others that Malaysia wanted the best of both world Malaysia’s, considering that Malaysia’s membership in the TPP does not imply that she is shifting away from China and moving closer to the United States. Much like Singapore, Malaysia will spread both its wings, courting the United States and China; extending concessions to both in equal measure or as opportunities arise, regardless of their source (Nambiar, 2016). Where does Malaysia stand now cannot be easily defined, as we can see Malaysia stands for itself, despite of its current Chairmanship Malaysia is utilizing its position to gain what is needed for the country. Moreover, Malaysia juggles over the influence of superpowers out of its strategic means. Future steps are being observed by many, as Malaysia is heading either the TPP or RCEP and her decision will affect the dynamic of the region.

 

Source:

Alagappa, M. (2016, November 19). Is ASEAN Malaysia’s Cornerstone of Foreign Policy? The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved April 26, 2016, from <http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/1288_MA_TheEdge_19Nov2012.pdf/>

 

Das, S. (2015, December 5). Evaluating Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/05/evaluating-malaysias-asean-chairmanship/>

 

Divakaran, P. (2016, January 07). Anifah defends Malaysia’s foreign policy record. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/01/07/anifah-defends-foreign-policy-record/>

 

Nambiar, S. (2016, February 13). Is the TPP really a leap forward for Malaysia? Sun Daily.

 

Nguyen, C. (2015, November 21). ASEAN’s uncertain stance in the South China Sea. Retrieved

April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/21/aseans-uncertain-stance-in-the-south-china-sea/>

 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia – Objectives. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/objectives/>

Mahathir, Identitas, dan Masa Depan ASEAN

/in /by

mahathir

Photo source: http://www.katariau.com/foto_berita/16Mahathir%20Muhammad.jpg

Dedi Dinarto, Asisten Riset ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Beberapa menit yang lalu, saya menutup lembar terakhir dari sebuah otobiografi mantan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad. Bacaan tersebut sengaja saya baca untuk melihat bagaimana beliau mengungkap identitas sebagai fondasi utama bangsa Asia di tengah-tengah modernitas sebagai implikasi dari globalisasi. Dengan bahasa yang lugas dan ‘terus-terang’, beliau menyampaikan secara jelas apa yang hendak ia bicarakan soal wacana ‘Pan-Asianisme’. Namun, saya menemukan hal lain yang membuat saya kembali berpikir.

Keterlibatan aktif dalam kegiatan politik, yakni sebagai pendiri Persatuan Melayu Kedah (sekarang UMNO) dan agen ‘bawah tanah’ kemerdekaan Malaysia dari status protektorat di bawah Inggris berhasil membentuk seorang Mahathir yang cakap dalam mengambil keputusan dari tiap permasalahan yang ada. Ia menunjukkannya melalui strategi mengelola masyarakat multi-ras di Malaysia, yang notabene sempat mengalami masa kritis di tahun 1969. Kala itu, ia memprotes kebijakan PM Tunku Abdul Rahman di tengah melakoni peran publiknya sebagai anggota parlemen dan dokter di saat yang bersamaan. Menurutnya, UMNO telah gagal mengatur kesenjangan yang ada di antara warga Malaysia etnis Tionghoa dan Melayu.

Protes ini tak sekedar protes. Ketika ia diberi kesempatan untuk menjabat sebagai PM, ia segera menuangkan ide taktisnya dalam kebijakan ekonomi kontroversial (karena mengedepankan kepentingan etnis Melayu), New Economic Policy (NEP). Kendati demikian, kebijakan ini berhasil mengurangi kesenjangan pendapatan dan kontrol kapital antar etnis. Menurutnya, kesenjangan adalah persoalan yang sering kali tidak dihiraukan oleh pemimpin bangsa sehingga berimplikasi pada instabilitas sosial dan politik, seperti halnya yang terjadi di Indonesia.

Di tengah-tengah itu, sebaik-baiknya ilmu adalah untuk direfleksikan atas persoalan yang ada di sekitar kita. ASEAN sebagai sebuah rezim kawasan yang telah mengatur interaksi antar negara-negara di Asia Tenggara perlu ditelaah melalui cara pandang Mahathir. Ibarat etnis, negara-negara di Asia Tenggara memiliki cara pandang sendiri dengan latar belakang identitas yang berbeda. Kesenjangan di antara negara-negara dapat menjadi persoalan serius di masa depan. Membayangkan integrasi ASEAN sama halnya dengan membayangkan keharmonisan masyarakat multi-ras di negara manapun. Namun, perlu disadari bahwa logika bernegara berbeda dengan logika bermasyarakat.

Meski demikian, hal ini tidak berarti bahwa integrasi ASEAN harus dipandang secara pesimis. Dalam konteks Malaysia, Mahathir berperan untuk mengurangi atau menghilangkan kesenjangan yang ada antar etnis. Di sisi yang lain, tidak ada figur utama yang dapat menghilangkan ketidaksepahaman atas konsekuensi perbedaan identitas dan kepentingan negara anggota ASEAN. Artinya, ASEAN hanya akan digiring oleh negara-negara anggotanya yang berinteraksi satu sama lain di bawah Piagam ASEAN,  dan agenda Komunitas ASEAN, yang notabene menuntut adanya ‘kesadaran’ mematuhi mekanisme regulasi tersebut.

Maka dari itu, ASEAN sungguh digerakkan oleh negara anggotanya sehingga perlu adanya suatu upaya untuk menutup ‘kesenjangan’ dalam sektor ekonomi dan sosial sehingga tercipta sebuah kesepahaman atas masa depan ASEAN.

Questioning ASEAN’s Legitimacy from Its Charter

/in /by

flag

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM 

Not to be surprised anymore that each of ASEAN member states are given veto power to reject Draft Communique which threatens their national sovereignty. Non-interference policy and consensus-based in decision-making process are the ASEAN Way which reflects full appreciation towards its member-states sovereignty. However, if ASEAN is seen to be threatening its member’s sovereignty, why bother to have ASEAN? Why bother to have complex integration? This article aims to question ASEAN member-states’ commitment in having a complex integration within Southeast Asian region through the establishment of a greater governance ruling the region.

In order to do so, let us present article 2 (2e) of the Charter, which states that,[1] “ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles of these principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states” This provision of the charter strongly declares that ASEAN and its member states shall not interfere in domestic affairs of its member states. It is true that ASEAN member states shall respect each of member states’ sovereignty and ASEAN too, however, in this case ASEAN remains to hold responsibility as Southeast Asian Nations’ primary regional organization. Even there have been many claims that ASEAN has brought itself to be people-centric by upholding human rights values and establishing the AICHR. Therefore, it leads ASEAN to be a legitimate regional organization within the region, but here reflected the progress is hampered by the non-interference policy upon the progress to improve human rights development. For instance, if AICHR does not do something significant towards the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, there is a little chance for this commission to maintain its legitimacy.[2] The question raised here would be, where is ASEAN member-states’ seriousness in building a regional governance?

True that ASEAN member-states should not interfere against each other’s domestic affairs however, ASEAN, to maintain its legitimacy as a primary regional organization, should be granted an extended right to assist its member states in handling their domestic problems, even if they are “quote, unquote” unable to bring domestic stability within their region. A proposal to respond against the question towards ASEAN member states’ commitment in building ASEAN would be that article 2 (e) of the charter shall be revised to, “ASEAN Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.” By removing ASEAN from the article it increases opportunity for the organization to be more legitimate in handling problems and issues faced by each of member states. And when its member states are failing to respond towards domestic issue. If a member state’s problem that could spread massively towards Southeast Asian region can be prevented by increasing ASEAN’s legitimacy, why not doing so? Thus, to conclude in order for ASEAN to maintain its legitimacy, its member states should commit on extending ASEAN’s role in assisting its member states’ development for the benefits of regional integration.

  1. ASEAN,. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007. Print.
  2. Arendshorst, John. ‘The Dilemma Of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, And The ASEAN Charter’. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights1 (2009): 120. Print.

The United Nations World Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction: The ASEAN Commitment

/in /by

SUMMER LIGHTING STORM, NEVADA

Mohammad Arumbinang, Intern staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Throwback in 1990’s, as remembered as the declaration of the international decade for natural disaster reduction. Nowadays, disaster risk is increasingly of global concern and its impact and actions in one region can have an impact on risks in another, and vice versa. This, compounded by increasing vulnerabilities related to changing demographic, technological and socio-economic conditions, unplanned urbanization, development within high-risk zones, under-development, environmental degradation, climate change, geological hazards, and competition for scarce resources, points to a future where disasters could increasingly threaten the world’s economy, and its population and the sustainable development of developing countries. In the past two decades, on average more than 200 million people have been affected every year by disasters. Therefore, the United Nations (UN) trough United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), comes up with World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, as a series of UN conferences focusing on disaster and climate risk management in the context of sustainable development.

The World Conference has been convened three times, with each edition to date having been hosted by Japan: in Yokohama in 1994, in Kobe in 2005 and in Sendai in 2015. The conferences bring together government officials and other stakeholders, such as NGOs, civil society organizations, local government and private sector representatives from around the world to discuss how to strengthen the sustainability of development by managing disaster and climate risks.

 

The ASEAN

The Southeast Asian region is remarkably vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters which repeatedly cause devastations to both human lives and properties. Geographically, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are located in one of the most disaster prone regions of the world. The ASEAN region sits between several tectonic plates causing earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. The region is also located in between two great oceans namely the Pacific and the Indian oceans causing seasonal typhoons and in some areas, tsunamis. The countries of the region have a history of devastating disasters that have caused economic and human losses across the region. Almost all types of natural hazards are present.

Often these disasters transcend national borders and overwhelm the capacities of individual countries to manage them. Most countries in the region have limited financial resources and physical resilience. Furthermore, the level of preparedness and prevention varies from country to country and regional cooperation does not exist to the extent necessary. Because of this high vulnerability and the relatively small size of most of the ASEAN countries, it will be more efficient and economically prudent for the countries to cooperate in the areas of civil protection, and disaster preparedness and prevention.

The Commitment?

Due to that issue, The ASEAN as the regional organization in Southeast Asia playing an importance role to building a well-prepared disaster management through join collaboration among ASEAN member by reason of humanity. Following with the 2nd of World Conference on Disaster Reduction “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015” (HFA 2005-2015), ASEAN proposing the first legally-binding HFA-related instrument in the world named ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and on 24 December has been ratified by all ten Member States and entered into force. It also affirms the ASEAN’s strong commitment to the HFA 2005-2015 as well as the world commitment to reduce disaster losses with regard the sustainable development. The AADMER spirit and consent is to reaffirming the ASEAN vision of disaster resilient nations and safe communities by 2015.

The AADMER set the foundation for regional cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management and emergency response. Moving towards 2025, ASEAN will need to recognize these changes and adapt the implementation of AADMER accordingly to ensure a comprehensive and robust disaster management and emergency response system is in place. This strategic policy document outlines the directions that may be considered by ASEAN in the next 10 years, and identifies the key areas to move the implementation of AADMER forward to a people-centered, people oriented, financially sustainable, and networked approach by 2025. Three mutually-inclusive strategic elements-Institutionalization and Communications, Finance and Resource Mobilization, and Partnerships and Innovations-were identified that may guide the direction of the implementation of AADMER to 2025, with regard with The UN 3rd Word Conference, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

 

Sources:

Sushil Gupta et al, Synthesis Report on Ten ASEAN Countries Disaster Risk Assessment; ASEAN Disaster Risk Management Initiative, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.

 

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2004.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Geneva: UNISDR, 2015.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2013, “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme 2010-2015 (4th Reprint)” taken from http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint, accessed on April 14, 2016 at 04:14 PM.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “The World Conference” taken from https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/wcdrr, accessed on April 14, 2016 at 05:22 PM.

Report on Progress: 100th days of ASEAN Economic Community

/in /by

report

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Last Monday, 11th of April 2016 marked the 100 days of the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community. From this point it is only necessary to question where has ASEAN brought themselves into in the past 100 days? There are several of policies planning and activities brought by member states government, but had the member states discussed what matters for them in the practicality of the community? Through the political economic scope we will assess the progress of the ASEAN Economic Community in the last 100 days, progress in the sense of comprehensive improvements and agendas in all economic aspects macro and micro.

Early on April,  a meeting was held among finance ministers and central bank governors from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the meeting had agreed upon the forming of collective interest  and to make efforts toward realizing financial integration in the region by 2025 (Kyodo News, 2016), During the meeting which was held in Vientiane, the representatives from the 10-member states of ASEAN welcomed the launch late last year of the ASEAN Economic Community and pledged to promote financial inclusion and stability based on a blueprint for the coming decade for the AEC. True, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint requires mature economic policies and regulates the flow of finance among each state before furthering the integration; therefore out of the meetings the representatives had set their agenda in putting in place the appropriate monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies. This is a gesture of continued efforts toward liberalizing financial services and developing capital markets as pillars for realizing regional financial integration.

The financial integration focused on the creation of ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, where the representatives formulated a standard of Qualified ASEAN Bank or QAB, in the status quo QAB system has been studied on a limited trial basis through bilateral agreements, not yet implemented in the ASEAN scale. However, ASEAN put its commitment through the AEC meaning that there is a need for broader implementation. As the meeting in Vientiane set a new time line, it also calls for creating by 2025 a system letting eight of the 10 ASEAN members share bond market disclosures and framework for retail investors to buy government bond (Tamaki, 2016). As part of the ASEAN economic community agenda these policies viewed to be critical as it could make fundraising within the bloc simpler, more flexible, and it will speed the infrastructure development.

Still within the finance platform, the outcome of the meeting addressed the Seventh Package of Financial Services Commitments and aimed on fully liberalizing the insurance sector. On May the 3rd the commitments would be ratified making several ASEAN states to abide the new “fully liberalized the cross-border supply of international maritime, aviation and transit insurance” (Boon, 2016). The meeting basically reviewed tasks in the ASEAN financial and monetary integration roadmap in terms of liberalization of financial services and capital. Through capital and market development, the states members came up with the seventh package of financial services liberalization and are ready to launch the eighth round of negotiation this year (Vietnam News, 2016), these packages are created and ratified to further open the financial services market, with a focus on further liberalizing insurance services in the region. Ministers and central governors from the member states had pledged to continue removing existing obstacles to trade and direct investment.

It is reflected the readiness of ASEAN member states through the meetings and how they set the finance environment after the launch of ASEAN Economic Community. Supposedly this meetings and ratified commitments were conducted before the launch of the community, regulation and liberation of finance should have been part of the preparation towards AEC back in 2015; therefore within the last 100 days the policies are created to touch the community better rather than just government meetings discussing financial matters. Whether it is part of the members’ strategy or another form of ASEAN’s way of hindering themselves from an actual community-based integration, the AEC does make progress. Hopefully within the next 100 days the progress will not only cover higher institution agenda nor will it postpone what is critical for the community. It is the time for the regional community to be included in the policies and implementations and what is best for the community discusses in the next summit, not until ASEAN could talk and asses what is practical and viable for the community and set aside the tedious agendas actual progress can be made. It is only logical that the involvement and contribution of the community will facile the path towards economic union

Sources:

Kyodo News. (2016, April 5). Asean ministers push for financial integration by 2025. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/922381/asean-ministers-push-for-financial-integration-by-2025>

 

Tamaki, K. (2016, April 5). ASEAN cautiously speeds steps toward financial integration. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/ASEAN-cautiously-speeds-steps-toward-financial-integration?page=1>

 

Boon, R. (2016, April 06). AEC makes progress on insurance, investment schemes. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/aec-makes-progress-on-insurance-investment-schemes>

 

Vietnam News. (2016, April 5). ASEAN finance ministers commit to cautious fiscal policies. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/294831/asean-finance-ministers-commit-to-cautious-fiscal-policies.html>

Natural and Man-made Disaster Relief as Soft Diplomacy between ASEAN States and Other States

/in /by

victim

Photo credit: http://writingserviceiya.dynu.net

Mohammad Hazyar Arumbinang, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

During the past decade, natural and man-made disasters at various scales continue to increase by the year in Southeast Asia Region. Experience has shown that local government and holders with their capacity have proved their ability to handle small and medium scale emergency response, but under the circumstance of mega scale disaster which can cause a massive destruction to society and economical loss. Therefore, the host State sometimes cannot deal with this issue and need the support and assistance from international community.

Taking an example, the large scale and mega scale disaster mitigation beyond the capacity of the local stakeholders as demonstrated in the Southeast Asia earthquake and tsunami, which struck on 26 December 2004, affected 11 countries, killing more than 225 000 and displacing an estimated 1.2 million. The crisis required governments, civil society, humanitarian actors (including non-governmental organizations and donors) and the international organization to respond on a scale that had never been seen before.

The ASEAN Commitment

Learning form the history, ASEAN as the regional organization in Southeast Asia playing an importance role to building a well-prepared disaster management through join collaboration among ASEAN member, since Southeast Asia has a lot of potential natural disaster.

On 24 December 2009, The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) has been ratified by all ten Member States and entered into force. The AADMER is a regional framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management. It also affirms ASEAN’s commitment to the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) and is the first legally-binding HFA-related instrument in the world. Therefore, it would allow all ASEAN countries will work together and giving humanitarian assistance as disaster response to host state.

Disaster Relief as Soft Diplomacy?

Recently, China and ASEAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Disaster Management Cooperation on Monday October 2014. Under the agreement, China will provide 50 million RMB ($8.1 million) to build ASEAN’s capabilities to respond to regional disasters. The funds will support the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Work Program, the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance, and the ASEAN Secretariat’s programs to build capacity for disaster management. This is one of the example of collaboration on disaster management in international level. At this stage all ASEAN countries must have a collaboration on this matter since it will strengthen the relation among Southeast States.

There is no state may refuse the assistance from other countries if the result of natural or man-made disaster involves the loss of many lives and is beyond the capacity of the affected country. It also as part of commitment towards partnership and local as well as global cooperation. By that means, disaster response nowadays is not considering as humanitarian assistance but also as the soft diplomacy between the states. Cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is one of the easiest ways to build trust and goodwill between two States.  It will provide ample ground for diplomatic and even military cooperation. As such, many analysts have argued that cooperation between ASEAN members and other both international and regional organization can help build mutual trust. By providing greater assistance in disaster relief.

ASEAN Economic Community: Road to a Community Friendly Economic Integration

/in /by

labour

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The road to a complete economic integration promoting higher productivity and trade activity for ASEAN is filled with challenges and opportunities. Gradually, within the Economic Blueprint ASEAN aims for a deeper economic and political integration. Theoretically, this transition equals to ASEAN’s movement towards Custom Union and deeper will be better, as simplified and more harmonized border procedures facilitate trade, common product standards enable longer production runs, and a common competition policy serves to unify the market (Basu Das, Sen, and Srivastava, 2015). However, a very important question must be answered by each ASEAN states in regards of who will be benefited from ASEAN economic community? If the changes focused only for capital holders then this integration would definitely neglected the community, the people, hence the labors.

One of the pillars which were introduced by AEC’s pillars is endorsing the free flows of services; the point emphasized on the free flow the free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and skilled labor. Alongside to other technical difficulties among ASEAN states in terms of infrastructure, state stability, and other political aspects, deepening the scope of competition without any preparation only leads to a detrimental point for labors, if not the community is not free from exploitation possibilities (Chia, 2013).

Naturally, through all of the changes ASEAN must not allow opportunistic actors to perform a race to the bottom where due to open opportunities states will try attracting corporations and will seize the action by reducing social welfare of labors (Suranovic, 2010). This particular transition should not lead us to a condition where labors became the victim of big corporations and international laws. The danger of race of the bottom is real, not only it will undermine the ASEAN’s aim for the community it will be a prescription towards widened income gap between the rich and the poor, inexistence of job security among ASEAN people, and in AEC will be utilized for massive multinational corporations to milk the benefits of the free flow and hurts the small to medium enterprises which represents almost 90% of ASEAN’s source of employments (Palatino, 2014), not to mention killing opportunities for low skilled workers, traditional and agricultural industries.

This is the part where ASETUC (ASEAN Services Employees Trade Union Council) must play its role and should be strengthened. ASETUC as a representative legal platform of regional labor union must be able to perform its duty in protecting the welfare of labors within the region.  It is only necessary for the union to enforce the fundamental principles and rights of work ratified by the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2002) for both local and migrant workers.

Through this representation, unions showed its participation in defining the fates of ASEAN labors, more importantly in negotiating their terms with the government and employers. A balance within the economic integration shall bridge the needs of capital and labor movements in order to pursue the desired collective development without violating the differences each state have (Felipe and Hasan, 2006). Regardless of the differences, what must be seen in this context is that labor welfare stand on the same ground, and only if they were involved within the union ASEAN labors would recognize their bargaining position. Lastly, the reinforcement of ASETUC will be obsolete without the commitments of ASEAN members. Each state also have their own homework in order to assure the increasing quality of labors within the region, expand the social security programs, and in accordance to the ASEAN Socio-Cultural that governments should invest in workers’ education, lifelong learning, and skills development programs.

 

 

 

Bibliography

Basu Das, S., Sen, R., & Srivastava, S. (2015). The Feasibility of an ASEAN Customs Union Post- 2015. Institute of South East Asian Studies, (13), 5-7.

Chia, S. (2013). The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects. Asian Development Bank Institute, (440), 4-8.

Felipe, J., & Hasan, R. (2006). Labor markets in Asia: Issues and perspectives (1st ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Suranovic, S. M. (2010). A Moderate Compromise: Economic policy choice in an era of globalization (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The International Labour Organization’s fundamental conventions. (2002). Geneva: International Labour Office.

Electronic Media

Palatino, M. (2015, May 05). Who Will Benefit from the ASEAN Economic Community? Retrieved February 10, 2016, from<http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/who-will-benefit-from-the-asean-economic-community/>

A People-Centered ASEAN without Human Rights Regime

/in /by
Photo credit: projectdialog.com

Photo credit: projectdialog.com

Dio H. Tobing, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

ASEAN is always at risk when there is a call to faithfully implement human rights values within Southeast Asian Region, yet at the same time the organization has entered a new phase of complexity when large-scale integration between all of the member states has taken into force under the greater umbrella of what-so-called, ASEAN Community. The willingness to direct back ASEAN into precolonial period, to make everything old, new again (Noor, 2014) are hindered by the negligence of one of three important pillars that construct the establishment of the Charter, the Political-Security. And this cannot be achieved if ASEAN is still seen as a legacy of colonialism, where the organization is emphasizing on sovereignty as the fundamental aspect of a country. Similarly goes to the uphold of human rights value by ASEAN through the creation of ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the establishment of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Although the term of human rights and the approach of human security is relatively new in the organization, however, this shall not be neglected. The reason is simply because the obligation to ensure human-security falls under ASEAN Political Security Community, and this is what ASEAN has missed.


The former Secretary-General of ASEAN, argued that in accordance to the implementation of ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will be a rules-based, people-oriented and more integrated entity (Pitsuwan, 2008). Therefore ASEAN should be careful to take concern on human rights issues that present within the region by playing a significant role. If not the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and even ASEAN itself will be lacking on legitimacy. What ASEAN currently has within the framework at this is time is only focusing on promotion and protection, but lacking on the enforcement. Not to mention that it is not feasible seeing that there is a difficulty to reconcile the principle of human rights with non-interference principle, but whatever it takes should be extending the mandate of AICHR in promotion and primarily ‘protection’ of human rights in ASEAN by granting power to the organization to conduct investigation within its member states. A type of approach, namely ‘Carrot and Stick’ approach should be taken into account by the organization in order to fully take concern on human rights issues within the region. In this regard, after empowering or extending the mandate of the AICHR, ASEAN may take a look on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on how this mechanism in the European Continent is working properly in upholding core human rights values.

Rethinking the Role of ICSID in Investor-State Dispute Settlement in ASEAN Economic Community

/in /by

Poster-Woman-Development

Andika Putra, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The establishment of ASEAN Community aims to improve the welfare of all ASEAN member states to be able to compete in regional and global scope. Furthermore, higher levels of investment between ASEAN member states will increase the number of disputes arising between private investors and governments in South East Asia. To settle this issues, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) was signed by ASEAN Member on 2009, which regulated about the investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. On the one hand, the parties may settle their dispute through Alternative Dispute Resolution. On the other hand, ACIA allow the investor to submit a claim to the courts of disputing Member State, or even submit their claim to the arbitration institution, such as International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala Lumpur or any other regional center for arbitration in ASEAN that agreed by the disputing parties. This article will discuss about the role of ICSID in ASEAN Economic Community.

 

What is ICSID and why choose ICSID?

Arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (Additional Facility Rules) is a profitable choice for investors, since founded in 1965, ICSID has significant experience handling a dispute over investment. As of October 1, 2015, ICSID had registered 539 cases under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules. Forty-two (42) of these cases (8%) involved a State Party from the South & East Asia & the Pacific (SEAP) Region (Chart 1).

There are some advantages offer by the ICSID, the first is neutral and self-contained system, as detailed in Chapter 5 of ICSID Convention provides that the arbitration law of the places of arbitration, wherever it may be, has no impact whatsoever on the proceedings. Second, as in other international arbitration, ICSID hearing generally is private, however as a result of the 2006 ICSID amendment, it is possible for non-parties and NGO to observe the hearing process and publish the decision. Third, ICSID provides a transparent cost structure and keeps its administrative fees relatively low, and the last, it remains true that most of ICSID awards have been either successfully settled or voluntarily executed by the parties, this success may be due to ICSID being an organ of the world bank, and the perception that failure to respect and ICSID award would have indirect political consequences in terms of credibility with the world bank.

tabel1

Chart 1: Geographic Distribution of All Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules (click on picture to enlarge)

The Role of ICSID in Investor-State Dispute Settlement in ASEAN

To resolve the dispute through ICSID, both of the host country and the investor’s country of origin are parties to the Washington Convention. However, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam did not ratify this convention. For the cases involving these countries, ICSID Additional Facility Rules is possible to be used by the parties. ACIA allows arbitration based on Additional Facility Rules when one of the host country or the country of origin of the investor is a member of the Washington Convention. However, if both of the disputing parties are not the parties in Washington Convention, they cannot submit their claim to the ICISD. For example, the dispute between the Governments of Myanmar and Thailand investors, will not be handled by the ICSID, because both of parties did not ratify the Washington Convention.

In conclusion, ASEAN as a regional organization in South East Asia was enacted ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, it is good momentum for the investor and ASEAN Member States to develop the South East Asia region, because ASEAN has provided the investment protection and dispute settlement mechanism. However, we have to optimize the role of ICSID as one of the remarkable institution, who have good reputation and good experience in investment dispute settlement. However, ICSID Arbitration is not the best option in every situation.  In fact, there are some ASEAN Member who has not ratify the Washington Convention yet, it will be the challenges in the future, because the role ICSID is very important in investment dispute settlement. Even, there are some other arbitration institution, in this case ICSID will be the alternative solution to settle the investment dispute in ASEAN. Therefore, the ratification of Washington Convention for the rest member of ASEAN will be good idea for the investment protection in ASEAN.

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Changing Global Architecture

/in /by

Feature - Jokowi Foreign Policy

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM) studies Politics with Research Methods at the University of Sheffield, UK. 

Muhammad Rosyidin’s article in the October-December 2015 edition of Strategic Review provides an insight into contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Rosyidin argues that Indonesia needs to embrace the concept of “niche diplomacy” as the way forward, with our foreign policy focusing on a single international issue in order to make its voice heard.

Despite the article’s convincing argument for Indonesia’s improvement in its international performance, I believe it missed one important point: foreign policy doctrine. While the nation needs to embrace improvement in its diplomatic agenda, first it has to address what it actually wants in global politics. To that end, this article examines the current foreign policy doctrine of President Joko Widodo.

Unclear direction?

There is some confusion among international relations observers when looking at Indonesia’s current foreign policy. Since taking office, President Joko’s administration has delivered strong nationalist rhetoric on the global stage, a reversal from the pragmatist approach of the previous administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

In a speech at the Asian-African Conference this year, President Joko called for radical reform of international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. He said considers those institutions “obsolete” and a better global architecture is needed to develop Asian and African countries.

Many international relations scholars share the optimism of this speech. It reminds us of the rhetoric used by former President Soekarno to lead Asian African countries, at that time, calling for independence and the end of colonialism. Observers such as Hikmahanto Juwana, for example, optimistically said that Jokowi’s strong position on his foreign policy approach reflected a need to make Indonesia more visible in international politics (The Jakarta Post, 25/6).

However, several policies taken by the Jokowi administration, as well as statements from ministers, show that the President lacks a consistent, strong foreign policy doctrine in dealing with contemporary global issues.

In October, at a meeting with US President Barrack Obama, Jokowi declared Indonesia’s interest in joining the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. It is unclear whether this statement was serious or not, but declaring such an interest in the presence of the US President was inconsistent with a speech he made several months previously that was more negative on the TPP, something that was picked up on by the Indonesian media.

President Joko’s approach to regional politics is also vague. Taking an unclear position at several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) ministerial meetings (most recently at a meeting of Asean defense ministers, he seems to be relegating Asean unity to the sidelines. One example is the statement to the press that China’s growing involvement in South China Sea should be taken to an international arbitration forum. This position reflects inconsistency with Indonesia’s previous stance of not taking sides in the dispute.

Indonesia seems to place bilateral meetings as the priority in conducting foreign policy, but tends to be very selfish in responding to regional issues (such as the South China Sea) rather than maintaining Asean unity.  Although his speeches at several regional forums (such as the G-20 and Asean summits) delivered strong rhetoric, follow-ups have yet to be seen.

It is important for us, before moving on to Rosyidin’s “niche diplomacy” to be clear on Indonesia’s position. How can Indonesia deal with the prevailing global architecture? Understanding the changing concept of foreign policy and the need for a consistent doctrine would be a good starting point.

Changing architecture

So what is at stake? From a foreign policy perspective, it seems that Indonesia has yet to develop a clear, strong doctrine that guides its foreign policy at all ministerial levels. While Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi, at her first press briefing in November 2014, mentioned a shift to “Pro-People Diplomacy,” a more strategic derivation of this approach has yet to be formulated.

It is important to bear in our mind that foreign policy nowadays is not merely related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since international politics has developed and reached across various sectors and actors, the concept of foreign policy should be broadened. It now comprises multi-sectoral approaches (involving economics, environment, energy, and many other ministerial bodies) and is connected with many actors other than representatives of the state, such as business actors and international non-government organizations (NGOs). Foreign policy requires a more strategic framework to deal with a diverse range of issues.

Asean is a prime example, bringing together many sectors as foreign policy actors. For example, it now deals with education, sport, and maritime as well as defense or economic issues that belong to specific ministerial bodies. Therefore, Asean is no longer a club for the foreign affairs elite in Pejambon, but should also involve related ministers.

It is also visible that foreign policy stakeholders are not only state officials. Multinational corporations and NGOs use the international sphere as a place for negotiation. The Asean People’s Forum is a good example of how non-state actors participate in the regional decision-making process, challenging the state’s orthodox position as the unitary actor in international politics.

This shifting concept of foreign policy implies the importance of stronger policy coordination, particularly when Indonesia has to deal with regional issues. It is here that Jokowi’s foreign policy lacks a comprehensive doctrine. Overlapping statements from different ministers in Indonesian or foreign media reflects our confusion when dealing with complex global/regional issues.

This problem needs to be resolved. The lack of a foreign policy doctrine can prevent Indonesia taking a leading position in the upcoming Asean Economic Community (AEC), where we are expected to act as a stabilizing hand in the region as the biggest member state. On a global level, this confusion can also put Indonesia in a vulnerable position in the power politics between the United States and China

President Joko needs to formulate two important things to solve this problem.

Firstly, a specific foreign policy roadmap that comprises all ministerial elements dealing with global issues. He should formulate this concept through a relevant analysis of world politics and its approach to engagement, as well as a multi-sectoral analysis and approach to deal with global issues.

Secondly, he needs to formulate guidelines for each ministerial body to deal with global issues that often intersect various ministerial sectors. It is in this case that we need guidelines to welcome the AEC at the end of 2015, both for particular ministerial bodies and local government. Improving policy coordination is also important to ensure Indonesia’s position in Asean does not overlap other ministerial/local government business.

In this regard, appointing foreign policy advisors/special staff will be important to formulate a concise, comprehensive foreign policy. It is likely that foreign policy will only become more complex in the future; therefore, building a strong, comprehensive foreign policy doctrine is a vital, immediate task for President Joko and his administration.

This article was originally published by Strategic Review Indonesia