Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: Where Malaysia Stands and What It Means

April 27, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Photo source: https://ripplesoftruth.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/kuala-lumpur-25.jpg

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 2012, The Edge Malaysia published a concise explanation regarding Malaysia’s position and how it sees ASEAN. It stated that ASEAN has never been the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy and he emphasized on the fact that the condition will not likely to be altered anytime soon. Malaysia’s foreign policy will aim for her own national goals which is becoming a developed country; the agenda included the need of cohesive nation, constructing a strong, effective, transparent and accountable state that is responsive to her citizens, transforming the economy into a human capital intensive, deepening the democratic form of government, high income one to achieve global competitiveness and recognition (Alagappa, 2012). Lastly, Malaysia opted to ensure national security and regional stability, and only from that factor Malaysia took the existence of ASEAN into account. Was the analysis proven right that there will be not much of alteration by the Malaysian government regarding its position for the ASEAN?

According to the latest publication by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia had shifted its vision and as a state it has explicitly accepted ASEAN as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. It mentioned the urgency for Malaysia as Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN, therefore the foreign policy of Malaysia continues to emphasize on the relevance and importance of ASEAN as the forum and catalyst for regional dialogue. The principality of Malaysian foreign policy had been divided into specified pillars, mainly it includes in maintaining peaceful relations with all countries regardless of its ideology and political system; adopting an independent, non-aligned, and principled stance in regional and international diplomatic affairs; forging close relations and economic partnerships with all nations, particularly with ASEAN and other regional friends; promoting peace and stability in the region through capacity building and conflict resolution measures; playing an influential leadership role as Chair of the ASEAN, Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); participating actively and meaningfully in the United Nations, especially in the efforts to end injustice and oppression, and to uphold international law; and lastly projecting Malaysia as a leading example of a tolerant and progressive Islamic nation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2016).

Malaysia’s Pragmatism

According to the given principals of Malaysia’s foreign policy, it reflected the pragmatic way of shaping its foreign policy in order to gain Malaysia’s best interest. As Datuk Seri Anifah Aman mentioned on the dynamic of Malaysia’s foreign policy that the status quo requires Malaysia to implement its foreign policy initiatives and make it a realization in order to remain relevant and necessary in response to changing regional dynamics and the ‘recessionary global economy’, Anifah said that this will enable the country to continue building on its good relations with strategic partners and to have more focused relations with key countries (Divakaran, 2016). To assure its chairmanship role in ASEAN, Malaysia has also been promoting the idea of strengthening ASEAN’s internal institutions, particularly by the ASEAN Secretariat. Moreover, Malaysia has launched the idea of AEC 2025, which builds upon ASEAN’s earlier idea of a ‘single market and production base’ extending it further to include sustainable economic development (Das, 2015). However, the chairmanship failed to meet its expected target of further negotiation on the status of South China Sea, Malaysia was expecting to gain statements on the South China Sea during its April Summit and ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, yet they could not secure a joint declaration for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in November. Nonetheless the failure of joint declaration could not solemnly be pinpointed on Malaysia’s chairmanship but also on the mechanism of ASEAN itself, the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been claimed as slow and redundant since it is subject to parties’ consent on such measures; an opposed party can thus prevent the ASEAN High Council from being formed (Nguyen, 2015).

As a state Malaysia’s foreign policy really portrayed the domestics’ tendencies in Malaysia, starting from the pragmatic approach of foreign policy pairing it up with economic preferences in fostering economic environment for the other ASEAN member states as how the agenda will be fruitful for Malaysia and furthering ASEAN economic integration. Although due to this blunt tendency and its current chairmanship position it is only fair to question where Malaysia will position itself in between the Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, its back and forth reaction signaled others that Malaysia wanted the best of both world Malaysia’s, considering that Malaysia’s membership in the TPP does not imply that she is shifting away from China and moving closer to the United States. Much like Singapore, Malaysia will spread both its wings, courting the United States and China; extending concessions to both in equal measure or as opportunities arise, regardless of their source (Nambiar, 2016). Where does Malaysia stand now cannot be easily defined, as we can see Malaysia stands for itself, despite of its current Chairmanship Malaysia is utilizing its position to gain what is needed for the country. Moreover, Malaysia juggles over the influence of superpowers out of its strategic means. Future steps are being observed by many, as Malaysia is heading either the TPP or RCEP and her decision will affect the dynamic of the region.

Source:

Alagappa, M. (2016, November 19). Is ASEAN Malaysia’s Cornerstone of Foreign Policy? The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved April 26, 2016, from <http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/1288_MA_TheEdge_19Nov2012.pdf/>

Das, S. (2015, December 5). Evaluating Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/05/evaluating-malaysias-asean-chairmanship/>

Divakaran, P. (2016, January 07). Anifah defends Malaysia’s foreign policy record. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/01/07/anifah-defends-foreign-policy-record/>

Nambiar, S. (2016, February 13). Is the TPP really a leap forward for Malaysia? Sun Daily.

Nguyen, C. (2015, November 21). ASEAN’s uncertain stance in the South China Sea. Retrieved

April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/21/aseans-uncertain-stance-in-the-south-china-sea/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia – Objectives. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/objectives/>

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: Where Malaysia Stands and What It Means

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