Bara E. Brahmantika, Guest Contributor 

The result of 2016 US election has paved the way for Donald Trump to be the 45th president of United States,  and many people are scrambling to figuring out what it means for the world. Two of my colleagues, Dedi Dinarto and Habibah Hermanadi in ASEAN Studies Center had tried to analyze the the implication of ‘Trump’s Triumph’ on the future of ASEAN. But while both of the analysts are sound, I have serious reservation on how both writers overlook the implication of Trump’s foreign on the ASEAN regional politics.

In my view, Dinarto’s argument on the possibility of the remaking of the global triangle politics is an overestimation on the current global power dynamic between major countries, while Hermanadi’s argument that Trump’s Triumph will inspire a strongmen approach among ASEAN countries leaders who are trying to emulate him is an underestimation of the possible impact of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. Both I argue are stem from the authors misconception on the core idea of Trump’s foreign policy. So it is imperative for us to understand what Trump’s Foreign Policy is, a transactional policy, with a combined flavor of isolationism and protectionism

Trump’s Foreign Policy.

It is understandable for many to have misconception about Trump’s policy, because for one, Trump isn’t known as a well articulate candidate. In hindsight, hearing Trump talks on foreign policies gave an impression that Trump foreign policy is just a mishmash of ideas with no core philosophy, thus making it difficult to pin point exactly what is Trump’s outlook on foreign policy. But if we look carefully, underneath all of his incoherent rants, a silver lining could be found

And this is where Hermanadi is right about where Donald Trump might be going. Hermanadi describes Donald Trump as Strongman Leader, which will emphasizes on the strength of greatness based on national unity, and national interest. There is no clearer indication of it, than Trump’s vision on America First.

Trump said, in one of his rallies that, “Under a Trump administration, no American citizen will ever again feel that their needs come second to the citizens of a foreign country.”

According to Trump, America First is an attempt to put American citizen’s priority above citizens of foreign countries. Trump has signaling on reduction of US engagement in international stages, and to put national interest above all else, creating this mixed of political isolationism and economic protectionism. But the more interesting bit is on how Trump define US national interest.

According to Dreazen, Vox’s foreign editor, Trump has this simple and basic view on what is US national interest, which is transactional. In the word of Dreazen; “In Trump’s conception, all of foreign policy is motivated by assessment of what’s better, in a narrow financial sense…. Trump believes the everything comes down to the art of transaction, with countries that spend their money the way he wants them to getting more than countries the don’t”

Just take a look at Trump’s statement during his final presidential debate, explaining about his outlook on US foreign policy:

“As far as Japan and other countries, we are being ripped off by everybody — we’re defending other country. We’re spending a fortune doing it. They have the bargain of the century. All I said is we have to renegotiate these agreements because our country cannot afford to defend Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, South Korea and many other places. We cannot continue to afford.”

So America First foreign policy basically a policy of which United States will disengage from any international involvement unless U.S. has a clear financial benefit from such arrangement. This is pretty clear from Trump’s statements regarding pulling out from NATO, and Japan if they are not willing to pay an equal amount for funding in exchange for their protection. Or Trump willingness to put up trade barriers, and go to trade wars with China until U.S get a better deal from their trade.  So how does this play out in South East Asia region?

The Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrine. 

During the presidency of Obama, under the rudder of Secretary Clinton, U.S has put forward a ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrines, as U.S new strategies to face the new challenges of China growing presence in Asia region. Pivot to Asia was US decision to shift their priority and presences from Middle East and East Europe to Asia. This drove mainly because not only the growing global influence of China, but also the decline of Russia’s sphere of influence. Pivot to Asia was Obama’s solution to help the Asia region mitigates the international conflict, by providing a counter balance to China.

The South East Asia region is included within Obama’s Pivot to East Asia, and has proven to be resulting in greater engagement of the US in South East Asia region, which is evidently pointed out by Obama thirteen times visits, to nine different ASEAN countries during his two terms in office, this in contrast with his predecessor, President Bush, who only managed to visit South East Asia eight times and only to five different ASEAN countries. US has put considerably more resource in South East Asia, raising investment, greater military presence, and overall better relationship with ASEAN Countries. But this ASEAN re-engagement might come to an end, as President Trump is unlikely to follow the suit.

Take a look at few of his statements when it comes to US foreign policy in Asia, in one his foreign policy speech Trump said;

“We have spent trillions of dollars over time on planes, missiles, ships, equipment, building up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”

And also during one of his TV interview, he mentioned about what he thinks on US presence in Asia:

“Japan is better if it protects itself against this maniac of North Korea, we are better off frankly if South Korea is going to start protecting itself … they have to protect themselves or they have to pay us.”

Given President-elect Trump statement during his campaign, on how Japan and Korea are better off defending themselves with nuclear, instead of burdening United States financially to provide them with military defence, and how likely he would scrap TPP away. That was a clear signal on how President Trump is eager to end the US re-engagement process in East Asia, which in this case will likely include ASEAN.

This is sentiment that shared by many analysts such us Gillen from National University of Singapore, and Sa from S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, as well as Bisley from La Trobe University. Three of them believe that under Trump, there will be significant realignment of US Foreign Policy, to the point of significant diminish of US political and military presence in ASEAN, or even to the point of disappearing all together. With Sa particularly mentioning that Trump might not know that ASEAN existed in the first place.

Within ASEAN member itself, there are growing concern on how the US-ASEAN relations could be deteriorating under Trump, as rightly pointed out by Dinarto in his piece, that many ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia to name few, that are seeing deeper relationship with China as more beneficial relationship.

And if we took what president Trump said during his campaign seriously, we probably will see a more traditional approach on US foreign policy to refocus themselves to Middle East, especially on the issue of ISIS and Israel-Palestinian conflict. While at the same time reducing many of US global involvement when it comes to political, and security issues, and refocusing US foreign policy effort to crafting better economic strategy against China domination.

“If China does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets, I will use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs consistent with Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.” Trump said

So how does it affect ASEAN ?

Dinarto has pointed out that the Trump presidency will likely affect ASEAN in two ways, first it will create Global Triangle dynamic among great powers, or as also pointed out by Hermanadi, that it will force ASEAN to reinvigorate the notion of ASEAN Centrality and unity to attain their own national interest and fending off global powers.

The first scenario of the creation of global triangle politics is very unlikely happen in South East Asia, for few reasons. First, the Trump’s foreign policy doctrine dictates that US will reduce all of their involvement to a minimum, and Trump is more than willing to look away from what happened to Crimea and Syria, just to improve US relations with Russia, and preventing the US government to be dragged away to a conflict that doesn’t financially benefiting US. Japanese brokerage firm Nomura, also predicting that Trump would eventually limit investment in South East Asia in an attempt to bring job backs to the US, and with the TPP is likely to be put to shelf by Trump, and also the possibilities of dismantling US military base in Philippines, the US presences in South East Asia, and globally would be reduced significantly.  So US would likely to pull away from intervening in the matter of South China Sea, and would focus their attention on to getting a better trade deal with China, even if it has to comes to trade war.

Second, Russia’s presence in ASEAN is minimal, with Asia- Pacific ranked number four in Russia’s foreign policy priorities, and it is for a reason, because Russia has no significant military objectives in South East Asia, other than selling weaponry and maintaining ties with Vietnam. The share of Russian export in ASEAN is only reach 2.7% in 2014, and Russia’s investment in ASEAN is a meager 0.2% of total Russian investment, or equivalent to 698 million dollars, with almost half of it goes to Vietnam. Currently, when it comes to ASEAN, Russia only hold a status s partnership, in comparison US, China, and Japan all have hold the status of strategic partner. Russia is also in relatively weak position, after the economic embargo and sanction that has been put by US and EU after the Crimea debacles, Russia has been hurt economically, and pretty much dependent on the trade relations with China. Russia and China also hold pretty much the same position on almost every international issues, thus they are more likely to be an ally in South East Asia than adversary. For example, when it comes to South China Sea disputes, despite trying to maintain neutrality for long, the deepening ties between China and Russia, has shift Russian position in favor for China, with Russia clear objection on the use of international court to solve the South China Sea dispute.

Third, all the reasons above left China as the only dominant power in South East Asia region. With TPP likely gone from the picture, the RECP regional bloc and OBOR initiative under the leadership of China are the only major comprehensive economic framework that will affect the ASEAN greatly, thus raised China economic bargaining power greatly within ASEAN. Not to mentioned the ever increasing defence budget and modernization of China’s military that put new emphasize on Navy and Airforce, of which surely increase the ability of Chinese military to project their power in South East Asia.  With China as the only major power that actively engaging with ASEAN, the triangle power dynamic between US-China-Russia in ASEAN is very unlikely to happen, at least not in Trump’s first term.

The more likely scenario is that with China as sole major power influencer in ASEAN, ASEAN countries will band together to strengthening their bargaining position to check China’s influence in the region. But with the rise of the populist movement, nativism, and strongman leader in ASEAN countries, as predicted by Hermanadi, ASEAN countries might use and strengthening ASEAN to serves their national ego and protect them from the global power influence such as China.

But one other point that Hermanadi fails to mention is that the absence of US political presence might strengthening the strongman leaders in ASEAN region and slowing down the advance of human rights implementation in ASEAN. Because US has traditionally become the stable actor that has often claim higher moral ground along with EU when it comes to human rights, which can be shown from the topic discussed at US-ASEAN Summit in the past few years. But under Trump presidency, that will colored by unpredictable isolationist foreign policy, and little regard on human rights, ASEAN might find itself reluctant in pursuing the advancement of human right as their priority. And with no global power to put pressure and scrutiny for those strongmen leaders in ASEAN to respect human rights, then we might find ASEAN to be a less friendlier place for human right to flourish.

So in conclusion, while it is difficult to predict where Donald Trump going to take U.S. foreign policy, as he haven’t yet to took the office, it is fair to say that his foreign policy will focus on re-engagement with US traditional pivot to Middle East, improving relationship with Russia, while at the same time reducing US engagement in other regions, including South East Asia. Coupled with Trump reluctant in resuming the implementation of TPP, and his little regards on promoting democracy and human rights as part of U.S foreign policy, would likely resulting not the re-creation of global power politics, but on sole domination of China as the only great power country in South East Asia, therefore would forces many ASEAN country leaders to unite under ASEAN to better fend off China domination in the region.

Habibah Hermanadi,

Research assistant of ASEAN Studies Center UGM

 

Donald Trump has been elected as the 45th President of the United States. As predicted, the result triggered massive reaction from all over the world including Southeast Asia. Previously, the scenarion of “Trump’s Triumph” has been unimaginable among academics and political commentators, for he was seen merely as an anecdotal figure with bleak chance of winning. Even media has forecasted the failure of his campaign, which is now proven to be wrong.

This is clearly a global situation. However, it is not unpredictable. I argue that “Trump’s Triumph” reflects the rising trend of ‘strongman leader’ in world politics, which is reflected upon the current leadership trends in many parts of the world, including in Southeast Asia.

Strongman Leaders

Financial Times described the condition as the rise of “Strongman Leaders”. Their argument is simple: the world is witnessing the rise of tough leaders, paired with assertive approach, strong rhetoric, and, most importantly,put great emphasis on the strength of greatness based on national unity. A classic study from Anthony Birch nationalism has been the most successful political doctrine to promote a political agenda, particularly in electoral campaign. The concept of national unity itself is contrasted from Rousseau’s vision of nationalism, which highlights how a community living based on shared customs and a single way of life, could be expected to feel affection from their own societies. Moreover, national unity also poses constant exposure to conflicts and internal fragmentation that could drive society to elect a ‘strongman leaders’.

It is against this backdrop we could understand how Trump won in the recent US General Election.

This is also the case in Southeast Asia. Rodrigo Duterte, the current president of Philippines, shows how a “strongman leader” arouses from the practice of democratic politics. Even though he was democratically elected, he also confront international society by embracing a tough war on drug dealers, which became an international human rights concern.

On the regional level, the recent 36th ASEANPOL Conference last July was marked by powerful remarks from leaders, such as from Malaysian current Prime Minister Najib Razak, who deemed that national security is a paramount issue in which he will not be apologetic. The trend also includes Thailand, whose currently undergoing the military government has been showing potentials of shifting its constitutions.

In the recent referendum, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the Prime Minister of Thailand, even has legitimacy to exercise some sorts of ‘martial law’, for he is given a permanent super-crisis powers and  maximum power to the army to resolve political crises in the countiry.

Indonesia, on the other hand showed a different demands in terms of what the society demands in a leader. During the 2014 election, he beat , Prabowo Subianto a former charismatic general who promised a turn for ‘developmentalist politics’ characterised by strong leadership. Known for his straightforward, down-to-earth, and populist politics his popularity declined in 2015 as he was seen as an indecisive leader unable to take decisive actions. Even though he could survive Indonesian politics (with his unexpected maneouvre in some political occassions), there has been some criticisms from Indonesian for his inability to challenge strongmen and oligarch in the .

A Cold War Legacy

“Strongman leaders” is in fact a Cold War legacy. It is a trend where transparency endless and democratic politics are not a common practice in world politics. At the end of the War, endless political revolutions and internal reformations has been resulted by this trend. It was a time where popular demands rise and challenge the politics of oligarchy in many states, including Indonesia.

Strongman leaders relies upon popular demand from their followers/voters. They tend to neglect a more technocratic view in doing diplomacy and foreign policy.

Take Phillippines as an example. The Cold War has brought Phillippines under the shadow of US Foreign Policy, placing the nation as the pivot of the power politics against the Communists. But it also witnessed the popular protest, when, for example, President Marcos has been toppled down by people’s protests in 1986. It since then witnessed the emergence of strong leaders from different political factions.

More interestingly, when Duterte strongly call for the end of the country’s special relationship with the United States, he insisted that Phillippines do not fear foredooming wars. The Diplomat observed this condition as ‘Duterte effect’, in which other ASEAN member states could replicate Duterte’s tones in doing diplomacy in the region.

Implication for Regional Politics

What does this “strongman leaders” imply for Southeast Asian politics? I suggest that this trend could lead to a US-China re-balance in Southeast Asia. Even though we shall also need to wait for upcoming events, particularly following Trump’s administration, we could assume that this trend could lead to the re-emergence of ‘national interest’ in Southeast Asian politics, followed by the rhetorics of strong leaders in each ASEAN member states.

Therefore, ‘strongman leaders’ could start a new trend of putting ASEAN aside and putting national interest first, for it constitutes the way e strongman leaders deliver their messages to be acknowledged in world politics.

If it is true, then the rise of strongman leaders could revoke the strong state’s vision in ASEAN. It could probably strengthen ASEAN, but not in the ‘people-oriented’ way. It could, to some extent, revive ASEAN’s ideal of planned unity, backed by strong national ego. It could also means a revival for ‘non-interference’ doctrine in the region.

We could nonethelessly learn from Donald Trump’s strategy that takes him to the White House. Trump’s triumph is not a surprising event. In the current tumultous world, it is likely that society demands the type of leaders who could speak louder than the others. Strongman leaders, therefore, is a very product of the world that we currently live in.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar

In his recent article in The Jakarta Post (18/5), Rizal Sukma (now Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom) embraced an interesting argument: it is time to invoke a post-ASEAN regional order in East Asia. The polarisation in ASEAN, marginalisation of ASEAN’s role of ‘manager of order’, and the growing Sino-US rivalry in recent years, he argued, has demonstrated ASEAN’s inability to deal with emerging geopolitical issues in the region.

Moreover, he argues, any regional order in Southeast Asia will require a stable balance of power among major powers, which is important to be addressed in the future.

However, Even though Sukma convincingly demonstrates ASEAN’s failure in managing order and balance of power in the region, and therefore suggests a post-ASEAN regional order, his argument misses one important point: the internal dynamics of ASEAN that leads to such failures (if we agree with Sukma’s argument).

On the other words, to argue that ASEAN has failed to maintain regional order, we need to also acknowledge that ASEAN’s failure has also been determined by its member states, due to ASEAN’s state-centric nature. In this context, we could recall a famous word from Alexander Wendt, that ASEAN is, in fact, what its member states make of it.

In this article, I propose two inter-related arguments to respond to Sukma’s idea of “Post-ASEAN” regional order in Southeast Asia. First, shifting regional focus to broader East Asian context can only work if Indonesia could maintain its hegemonic position. Second, it is important to revitalise Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN through ASEAN-centered foreign policies

ASEAN and Regional Order

Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has been preserved as a diplomatic forum by its member states. State has been the only acknowledged actor until the 2nd ASEAN Summit in 2003, where its member states have agreed to expand the institutionalisation under one community.

State-centrism in ASEAN has also maintained through its long-standing principles, non-interventionism, which put state’s strong position in the regional institution. ASEAN’s institutional design has also put strong state’s presence in maintaining day-to-day activities, albeit with some space for non-state actors (such as CSOs or Business Actors) to engage in decision-making processes.

Putting the state as inseparable actor in ASEAN is important to understand why ASEAN failed to address major issues in ASEAN, most recently the South China Sea Crisis. The latest ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held recently in Vientiane, Laos, demonstrate this problem: ASEAN’s failure to reach a consensus to deal with South China Sea has been caused by the absence of ‘common ground’ among states to propose a roadmap to overcome the crisis.

Therefore, it can be argued that ASEAN relies on its member states. Sukma’s argument therefore illustrated the absence of a strong institutional rule that bind all its member states in dealing with major geopolitical issues in world politics.  Institutionalists might argue that this failure could be caused by the absence of institutional backdrop in ASEAN, due to state-centric nature of the regional organisation.

However, I found that this is not the case. Even the European Union, which has a stronger institutional power than ASEAN, has to face some internal crisis and democratic drift in its internal member-states, as we most recently witness with ‘Brexit’ and refugee crisis.

The Need for Leadership

I shall argue that what is at stake is ASEAN is not its failure to deal with main geopolitical issues as Sukma has demonstrated. Rather, I argue that it is the absence of a leadership to maintain ‘hegemonic order’ that leads to ASEAN’s ineffective role in East Asia and, more broadly, world politics.

The latest 49th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Laos could be a good point of departure. While ASEAN has produced a remarkable concern over growing crisis in the South China Sea, it has yet to design a common platform to overcome the crisis. Instead, the joint communiqué has recommended establishing the MFA-to-MFA hotline to manage maritime emergencies, which clearly brings the solution to bilateral forum.

What is at stake here, in my humble view, is not that it fails to produce a clear statement to overcome the crisis, which is a difficult thing to do, but that it abandons ASEAN centrality as an approach to peacefully settle the ongoing dispute and instead bring it as a state-to-state business.

It is true that ASEAN does not have a strong institutional binding to deal with such issues, and that ASEAN-based regional order has been limited. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that ASEAN has been less important for Indonesia, since ASEAN constitute an important geopolitical basis for Indonesia’s regional outlook, even with the recent emphasis on ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ that has been endorsed by Jokowi.

Due to ASEAN’s state-centric nature, I argue that this case demonstrate that ASEAN needs a leadership from a particular member state to maintain, to use neorealist argument, hegemonic stability and cooperation in the region. It is the area that Indonesia has declined to play in the region.

As Political Scientist Donald Weatherbee argues (2013), Indonesia has missed important opportunity to be a regional leader during Hassan Wirayudha era, in which Indonesia has committed to ASEAN-centred foreign policy. Despites some achievement in institutionalising Human Rights and Democracy in the regional body, many Indonesia’s proposal has been rejected by ASEAN fellow members.

Sukma might be partly true to say that Indonesia needs to broaden its vision to regional order by encompassing realist, normative, and institution-based order, which implies to an enlargement to East Asian regional order. However, it does not necessarily mean that Indonesia has to shift its focus from ASEAN, which I believe has been ongoing since early Jokowi’s presidency.

Rather, especially with emergent crisis in South China Sea, I suggest that Indonesia needs to re-strengthen its focus to ASEAN by maintaining hegemonic leadership. Indonesia could do so by, for example, utilising ASEAN’s institutional rules and procedures to resolve the emerging regional problems.

A Comeback to ASEAN?

I therefore suggest that rather than abandoning ASEAN-based regional order in Southeast Asia, Indonesia needs to re-strengthen its leadership in ASEAN. It means that Indonesia needs to integrate the so-called ‘national interest’, which is executed through bilateralism, with the use of multilateral foras in order to secure peace and stability in the region.

It implies the use of institutional decision-making process in ASEAN to deal with emerging regional problems, such as South China Sea crisis or several humanitarian issues.

Reviving a collective decision-making process through ASEAN’s institutional norms is therefore important. The recent ASEAN Summit and Ministerial Meeting has evidently shown that ASEAN member states have, to some extent, abandoned ASEAN-centrality to resolve regional problems, in particular the South China Sea crisis.

Indonesia could resolve it by functioning ASEAN institutional foras to facilitate dialogue in such crisis. The spirit of ASEAN centrality, in order to create peace and stability in the region, should be held rather than the old-fashioned ‘non-interventionism. Although it is not an easy task, I believe that Indonesia could maintain ASEAN-centrality as a basis to move to a bigger regional foras, such as East Asian Summit.

To do so, it therefore implies a clear direction on Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN. Indonesia might be, as Sukma suggested, shift its focus to East Asia due to its strategic position in building diplomatic order. However, without Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN, such attempts might not be congruent with Indonesian national interest as envisioned in Foreign Policy Direction.

I believe that in a rapidly changing international order, Indonesia should play a greater role as emerging power in world politics. It is the task that needs to be emboldened in our foreign policy.

*) Ahmad Rizky M. Umar studies Politics with Research Methods at the University of Sheffield, UK and a Research Associate with the ASEAN Studies Centre, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

 

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In the past few days, Indonesia’s first Right of Reply in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has attracted nation-wide Indonesia medias. Not because Indonesia’s statement was outstanding, but merely because of its firmness and the beauty of Indonesia’s representative. However, we found out that to some extent Indonesia’s statement focused heavily on sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as, the institutionalization of human rights commitment by the numbers of ratified conventions. This does not show any advantages. It opens a loophole that Indonesia was unable to show evidence of the progress made in Papua related to the human rights violation.

Meanwhile, the second Right of Reply embraced by Solomon Islands, shows intelligence, diplomatic, and well-researched information. Solomon Islands, though, only a very small archipelagic country showed its concern on human rights issue in West Papua by reminding Indonesia that although Indonesia has ratified the Convention against Torture (CAT), progress has not yet been made in Papua. In fact, Indonesia has not yet submitted its Periodic Review since 2008. The Solomon claimed that they received information on the lack of human rights protection of the Melanesian people in West Papua from the Respected UN members and head of civil societies.

Furthermore, it is also regretful to hear that in another right of reply utilized by Indonesia to respond against Solomon Islands, the Republic again justified that Solomon Islands’ concern has breached Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and claiming that Solomon Islands is trapped in trash information of the separatist group in West Papua. Again, without elaborating on what progress has been made and what form for commitment has been implemented by the Indonesian government towards promotion and protection of human rights in West Papua.

In fact, this occasion reminded us of Southeast Asian countries conducting their diplomatic activities. The ASEAN’s method of diplomacy, has been seen upholding the norm of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, and the principle of quiet. ASEAN members in their decision- and policy-making process have always refrained from criticizing others, claiming that criticizing other respective members of ASEAN will fall into the violation of non-interference principle and respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is similar, on what the delegation of Indonesia delivered in her right of reply, that the concern of Solomon Islands’ towards human rights situation in West Papua will only disrespect Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, in other occasion, ASEAN has a method famously known as ‘constructive-engagement’. ASEAN and particularly, Indonesia, have been progressively utilizing this tool to put concern on the human rights situation in Myanmar. In 2009 Indonesia had bilateral talk with Myanmar in regards to the Rohingya massacre. This occasion became a cornerstone because during the talk, it was the first time that Prime Minister Thein Sein finally acknowledged that he paid great attention to this issue. Myanmar finally accepted that Rohingya was also their concern. Wasn’t the talk breach Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity? Actually, it was too, yet the difference is the operation of ASEAN’s constructive engagement remains invisible. Because the diplomatic-negotiation has never been done in public spaces, claiming that it is the feature of ASEAN’s diplomacy, backdoor diplomacy, or for some, how ASEAN conducts its intra- or inter-ASEAN relations have become a model named as “Asian Diplomacy”

Therefore, reflecting on the case of Solomon Islands-Indonesia in the UNGA and Indonesia-Myanmar in ASEAN, the conduct of ASEAN Diplomacy shows only an excuse for ASEAN in particular, Indonesia, upon their inability to demonstrate a proper diplomatic behavior in public spaces.