Digitalizing ASEAN (2): Three Key Pillars

July 20, 2017/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

In the second of two-series article, we introduce ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme, a one-week program for ASEAN Youth organized by ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. The theme of the program is “Digitalizing ASEAN”, which will be explained in this article and the following article.

We have acknowledged the importance of “digitalizing ASEAN” as an inseparable part of ongoing regional integration. What is to be done in the future? What would ASEAN youths do to socially integrate people across the region through emerging digital platforms?

In this context, we develop three pillars of “digitalizing ASEAN” that encapsulates the need for digital integration in ASEAN, namely (1) digital diplomacy; (2) digital activism; and (3) digital citizenship.

Where do we start? Standard understanding on ASEAN and regional integration project usually depart from the relationships between “state” and “society”. Two positions are in contention. The first view perceives ASEAN as merely “state project”. Diplomatic practices makes ASEAN. Diplomats represent ASEAN. The future of ASEAN, from this viewpoint, is the future of statecraft and diplomacy.

We argue that understanding ASEAN merely from a “statist” lens is not sufficient. ASEAN is also built upon the “people” –businessmen, activists, academics, youths, religious leaders and many other elements in a complex society. This is the virtue of the second view, that perceives ASEAN as a relationship between state and non-state actors.

Thus, we need to go beyond “traditional” understanding of ASEAN as merely “state-led project” to ASEAN as a complexity. This is how “digitalizing ASEAN” should be perceived. “Digitalizing ASEAN” isn’t merely a state-led program; it should also be at the heart of people-to-people interaction in the future

This is where the role of young people is essential.

From this viewpoint, we could identify two key pillars of “digitalizing ASEAN” in the future: importance of digital diplomacy in ASEAN and the growing digital activism across the region. Both of them are intertwined. The complexity between the two pillars be framed under the idea of digital citizenship: a complex relationship between state, markets, and civil society in a newly established digital environment in Southeast Asia.

First Pillar: Digital Diplomacy

The traditional conception of “diplomacy” often refers as the relationship among states conducted by a formal representative. However, in this globalized era, the important of citizens role in could not be neglected. For example, civil society organisations have used diplomatic apparatuses to advance their interest to embrace ‘alternative regionalism’. Various elements of peacemakers have been involved in the so-called “multi-track diplomacy”. Recently, multinational corporations have also considered as an actor of diplomacy through lobbying and trade.

It is thus safe to say that emerging digital landscape creates opportunity for a new platform for diplomacy, too. Jan Melissen calls this trend as ‘digital diplomacy’. Indonesian Foreign Minister, HE. Retno LP Marsudi, has also used similar term in one of her speech.

Digital diplomacy come as a solution to address the complexity of regional politics. In Digital Diplomacy, the growing use of ICTs and social media platforms by a diplomat is acknowledged as a part of diplomatic practices. As a consequence, a diplomat needs to engage with ‘digital native’. Diplomatic pratices have since transformed: from a formal roundtable meeting to livetweet; from an official press conference to a live Facebook video.

The instrument might be changing, but the purpose is still the same: to achieve foreign policy goals. It benefits not only diplomats, but also ordinary citizen. This is obviously an opportunity to further bring ASEAN at the heart of its citizen.

Second Pillar: Digital Activism

As the diplomatic practices have been evolved, our understanding of state-society relations in ASEAN should be updated, too. ASEAN not only encompasses state-facilitated activities through ‘formal’ diplomatic practices, but also through social movement. We need to acknowledge the rise of social movement and NGO activism in ASEAN, including youth.

ASEAN has also witnessed the rise of various youth movements that take part in advocating youth-related issues in ASEAN. The rise of these movements is also accompanied by the use of technological devices, such as mailing list and other forms of media and communication.

Rapid technological development brought by ICT industries in the region connect the people across the region. However, it is not necessarily new. In Indonesia, the Reformasi itself has been the very product of the use of internet in driving social change. The internet connects not only pro-reform activists in Indonesia but also with broader social movements abroad .

In emerging youth activism in ASEAN, the growing uses of ICT is inevitable. Telegram, Whatsapp, and Facebook has been the main medium of interaction among the young people. They publish the program through Instagram, Twitter, and connected Website. Some of them uses it for political purposes –a campaign to release Mary Jave Veloso, for example. Some of them merely spread the opportunities for regional events. Some of them are embracing social entrepreneurship. And so on.

It is thus necessary to understand how social activism in ASEAN is forged through the medium of ICT. Let us see this happen in ASEAN.

Third Pillar: Digital Citizenship

What connects the first and second pillar? We introduce the third pillar, digital citizenship. This might be a complex concept. Put it simply, we regard digital citizenship as a complex relationship between state and society in the region. It connects digital diplomacy and digital activism in everyday life.

The emergence of ICT industries has raised further questions over civic engagement and political life. So does in ASEAN. It brings us questions as to where the rapid digital advancement would be heading to. Would it tackle inequality among the people? Or would it instead raise racist sentiment in social media?

As the digital society is taking further steps forward, a good sense of digital citizenship is required. ASEAN should raise a sense of ‘collective identity’, which is lacking in the people across the region due to the lack of regional engagement in the past.

Taking together the idea of digital diplomacy and digital activism, the ICT development in the region should not be merely understood as a part of growing ‘regional market’. It should be seen as a tool for cultivating active citizens participation, too. Moreover, both digital diplomacy and digital activism should craft a more vibrant sense of belonging between ASEAN citizens.

Thus, we put the idea of digital citizenship as a part of our call for ‘social integration’ in ASEAN. It should be embraced by all ASEAN people in the future. Information and Communication Technology should not be put as an end in ASEAN integration. Instead, it should be utilised as a means to put forward deeper integration among ASEAN citizens and redefine our identity through engagement with technology.

The Rationale for AYIEP 2017

So here were are. We attempt to incorporate these key pillars by introducing the The 2nd ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme (AYIEP) in 2017, which will be held between 23-29 July 2017 in Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta. All of the programs are organised along these key pillars. We hope it consistently brings the participant to take part in our call for “digitalizing ASEAN” throughout the programs.

The 1st AYIEP has been successfully put forward the agenda for bringing social awareness among ASEAN youths, with various visits to NGOs in Yogyakarta and Working Groups. Critical thinking is at the heart of our event.

The 2nd AYIEP embarks upon the success of the previous program to bring social awareness and embrace critical thinking through digital platform. We intend to address the need for regional integration by bringing about youths across the region. To do so, we adapt three sub-themes engage all of the elements of youhts from all ASEAN countries, as well as other regions that might be interested with ASEAN-related issue.

We have a simple mission here. We pledge to pave the way for “digitalizing ASEAN” through youth engagement. So that, ASEAN could be more “people-oriented” and “people-centred” in the future. Let us see this happen in the future!

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Digitalizing ASEAN (2): Three Key Pillars

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