Year of Laos: Queries for the New ASEAN Chair

May 10, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

The role of ASEAN chairmanship will be held in the hands of Laos in 2016; despite the fact that it is not the first time the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to hold the role as the chair of ASEAN since 2004 questions still arose due the fact that conditions had shifted as the global political course had changed. It is perceivable since ASEAN had ratified new treaties, the dynamics of states had been refined according new pillars and agreements among state members and Laos had changed within the last decade. Many deemed Lao’s leadership will bring significant changes for the region but there are also others who query this particular leadership turnover.

As ASEAN gradually walk towards a more human rights oriented path by creating an identity which could cohesively represent its community, Laos has been seen unfit to represent such agenda, recent case would be reflected from Laos who has been unresponsive in regard to 80 human rights recommendations by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2015). And instead it is visible that international pressures to improve transparency and protect human rights have only reinforced the government’s resolve to suppress public and political opposition. More importantly media has limited freedom when it comes to dealing with Laos (Hunt, 2016), as the existence of draconian media monitoring laws with the country’s current role as the 2016 ASEAN Chair; the laws have potentials to constrain international reporting on important transnational issues discussed at ASEAN meetings and conferences (Sims, 2016)

However, as part of the integration initiatives this landlocked country might serve a fresh perspective for the rest of the other ASEAN member states. Thongloun Sisoulith declared it not long ago prior to his appointment as Prime Minister of Laos that the top priorities for Laos’ chairmanship are narrowing the development gaps between member states, promoting connectivity by promoting small and midsize enterprises. Under this chairmanship Sisoulith emphasized the need to improve trade facilitation, encourage more subsistence workers to enter the formal economy, and step up efforts to preserve and promote ASEAN’s cultural heritage (Chongkittavor, 2016). It cannot be eluded the fact that Laos was the one who pushed a successful joint declaration on the basis of ASEAN during the United States-ASEAN Summit last February hosted by Barrack Obama, That document will serve as the foundation for stronger ASEAN-U.S. cooperation in the years to come, tangible progress on advancing the U.S.-ASEAN relationship a step further from November 2015, when the United States and ASEAN elevated their relationship to the level of a strategic partnership and laid out a concrete plan of action to implement it out to 2020 (Prameswaran, 2016).

Laos has show its potential in balancing how ASEAN should steer itself among the superpowers, as another interest shown by another contending actor in the ground known as the South China Sea, we cannot outlook People’s Republic of China as the largest trading partner of Laos and perceptible role among the ASEAN state members, most importantly China’s diplomatic approach had been fully committed in gradually courting smaller countries in ASEAN mainly Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia (Johnson, 2016). Laos will also have to stand its ground to be the chair the ASEAN aspired to be in positioning itself facing the ongoing negotiation between Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership which had sparked the interest of other member states, Laos can navigate the issues relating to overlapping maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and the rise of China and its increasingly competitive rivalry with the US rebalance in Asia (Vilavong, 2016). Yet under this chairmanship whichever the institution leaned itself towards ASEAN must not to neglect the core of ASEAN Economic Community and its extension due in 2025.

Amidst the internal human rights inside of Laos’ political regime and inherent fragmentation within the ASEAN itself the new set of chairmanship must be able to attain the integration which is the main aim of ASEAN. If the agenda of gap elimination could be fulfilled as it was mentioned by Sisoulith the next step for deepening the integration and acquiring an ASEAN standard would seem near foreseeable future. Laos’ new leadership must be able to answer some difficult questions and challenges regionally and internationally. Will Laos be capable of hosting the ASEAN summit and related meetings? The AEC aspects of being ASEAN Chair have increased significantly since the last time Laos held position as chair, as have the Political-Security and Socio-Cultural community aspects. Such responsibilities, along with the logistical burdens that would come with having two ASEAN Summits in 2016, led Laos to propose having the two summits mandated by the ASEAN Charter on a back-to-back basis in November 2016, effectively resulting in a single meeting (Sim, 2015). Laos has a whole year to prove itself as these meetings hold the key of uniting ASEAN’s states members in facing external influences and balancing their powers in the region.

Photo source http://havokjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/throne-dpc.jpg

References:

Amnesty International. (2015). Laos 2015/2016. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/laos/report-laos/

Chongkittavorn, K. (2016, May 05). Kavi Chongkittavorn: Laos' new leader faces big challenges -- at home and as ASEAN chief. Retrieved May 9, 2016, from http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160505-DEMOCRACY-DEFERRED/Viewpoints/Kavi-Chongkittavorn-Laos-new-leader-faces-big-challenges-at-home-and-as-ASEAN-chief?page=2

Hunt, L. (2016, April 03). What If They Gave an ASEAN Summit and the Media Failed to Turn Up? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/what-if-they-gave-an-asean-summit-and-the-media-failed-to-turn-up/

Johnson, J. (2016, May 1). Beijing launches charm offensive ahead of South China Sea court ruling | The Japan Times. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/01/asia-pacific/beijing-launches-charm-offensive-ahead-south-china-sea-court-ruling/#.VzC4n9J97IU

Sim, E. (2015, June 10). Can Laos Lead ASEAN in 2016? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/can-laos-lead-asean-in-2016-2/

Sims, K. (2016, April 15). Is Laos' ASEAN Chairmanship a Threat to Southeast Asian Regionalism? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-laos-asean-chairmanship-a-threat-to-southeast-asian-regionalism/

Prameswaran, P. (2016, February 11). Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-the-us-asean-sunnylands-summit-matters/

Vilavong, B. (2016, May 07). ASEAN needs Laos' leadership. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/07/asean-needs-laos-leadership/

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Year of Laos: Queries for the New ASEAN Chair

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