Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

The South China Sea dispute has been the main focus of this year’s ASEAN summit, which was held twice under Myanmar’s leadership. In a joint statement at the 24^th and 25^th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders have expressed concerns over increased tension in South China Sea and further urged all parties to exercise restraint and avoid using ‘hard approach’ to deal with this problem.

Indonesia’s position is quite unique. Arif Havas Oegroseno has stated, at his articles, that Indonesia has no business in the South China Sea dispute and many observer’s endorsement to make Indonesia getting involved in this issue were misleading. However, Indonesia cannot avoid the conflict if the tension is raising, since it will heavily affect the regional security.

Former President Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo responded this issue in different manner. President Yudhoyono addressed the need of strengthening ASEAN Political Security Community at to handle security threats in the future. He spoke that ASEAN Community will be able to respond to those challenges without taking military actions.

However, Jokowi, without directly pointing to the South China Sea, spoke that maritime cooperation will be a priority on Indonesia’s foreign policy under his leadership.

 

The ‘China Threat’?

What happened in this year’s summit and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting reflects the rise of ‘China threat’ among ASEAN member states. China has long placed its interests in Southeast Asia, given its geopolitical proximity.

Among the most prominent Chinese interest is the South China Sea. Geo-economically this sea provides oil and gas reserves as well as Islands. As of 2012, China controls several Islands around the sea, which leads to territorial disputes.

This decade witness a growing tension between China and several ASEAN member states over the sea. Vietnam is the most prominent state who has been in confrontation with China over the sea, along with the Philippines who has another problem.

We can interpret this South China Sea problem in two perspectives. Firstly, territorial dispute between China and ASEAN reflects China’s attempt to construct hegemony in Southeast Asia. By challenging several ASEAN Member States in the sea dispute, China will be able to define who are ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ based on Bejing-defined national interest.

Secondly, the territorial dispute also reflects ASEAN’s lack of ‘common identity’ that leads to the absence of ASEAN single approach to deal with the problem. Although there has been the notion of ‘ASEAN Centrality’ in many talks on ASEAN Regionalism, in fact any issues were responded by each state’s foreign policy.

Since long time ago, ASEAN has failed to address many regional issues that involve external actors. This is not only happened South China Sea dispute. So far ASEAN was absence in many intraregional disputes, such as Thai-Cambodia or Indonesia-Malaysia border disputes.

Thus, within this perspective, South China Sea problem is in fact reflects ASEAN’s inability to solve political problems. Even though it has been widely criticized because of the more complex problem in the region, ASEAN’s quiet attitude towards conflict has found its root on the ‘ASEAN Way’ particularly the ‘non-interference’ norm which respects ASEAN member state’s souvereignty.

It is true that ‘non-interference’ norm can avoid can protect the souvereign rights of ASEAN Member States in managing their domestic environment. However, with the rising tension in South China Sea between China and the Philippines, the relevance of this norm in shaping ASEAN’s relations with other external forces shall be brought into question.

To this extent, we can raise a question: how can ASEAN resolve such political conflicts with ‘non-interference’ norms, while China and other political forces seemed to be more expansionists these days?

I argue that ASEAN should ease its ‘statist’ position over several serious international problems. It is important not to overemphasize the ‘non-interference’ norm when dealing with such problems that threaten regional environment. So far non-interference norm has proven to be an obstacle in dispute settlement in ASEAN, including in South China Sea.

In accordance to President Yudhoyono’s endorsement of ASEAN Political Security Community as main card to deal with international problems, it is important for ASEAN to create a more progressive foreign policy approach that directs every negotiation with external forces.

 

Bringing ‘ASEAN Centrality’ Back In

ASEAN Political Security blueprint (2009-2015) has stated that ASEAN seeks to strengthen ASEAN proactive role and centrality in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive while remaining actively engaged, forward-looking, and non-discriminatory.

To this extent, ASEAN should be regarded in the future as a regional institution, not only a group of state in region, thus bringing a more strategic approach to open dialogue and negotiation with other external forces. In this sense, ASEAN needs a specific foreign policy doctrine that can strategically respond challenges regional and international problems.

Thus, ‘ASEAN Centrality’ shall be recalled in order to minimize the conflict. Bringing the ‘ASEAN Centrality’ back in means that ASEAN shall have a more flexible approach to deal with regional issues and ASEAN member states shall involve regional institutios or norms to deal with this problem. On the other words, ASEAN need a ‘common foreign policy’ to deal with South China Sea issue.

There have been many approaches that can be transformed into a more progressive foreign policy approach in ASEAN. For example, in 1990s, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan embraced ‘flexible engagement’ concept as a formula in managing ASEAN’s relations with other states. This concept was rejected –because some states feel that ASEAN should not tamper its non-interference rule— but is in fact more progressive than the traditional ‘ASEAN Way’ approach.

Surin’s proposal, at that time, was to include ASEAN in any negotiations that affect regional stability and dynamics. According to his explanation, if a dialogue partner pursues economic policies that ASEAN perceives as detrimental to its interests, it should be within ASEAN’s rights to call for changes in that policy.

There are also many other concepts, besides Surin’s flexible engagement’, that can be proposed as an alternative for ASEAN to deal with rising international problems. We should consider other ideas from Brunei or other Southeast Asian states to make sure that ASEAN can be truly served as ‘people-oriented’ community.

To welcome the upcoming ASEAN Community, it is important for ASEAN leaders to modernize ASEAN institutional framework by having a specific doctrine on its post-2015 foreign policy. Failure to do so will prevent ASEAN to strategically address territorial disputes in South China Sea.

 

 

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN has held its 24^th and 25^th Summit in Myanmar this year. The latest Summit has just held this month, discussiong several important topic about ASEAN’s future, including those happened in South China Sea.

The ASEAN Summit is formally regarded as the highest level in ASEAN Structure. It means that the result of the summit will determine the future of ASEAN.

Thus, for ASEAN leaders, the ASEAN Summit is highly important to craft their own interests in Southeast Asia. It is not only a place to discuss important issues in building ASEAN Community (which will be established by 2015), but also an arena to negotiate state’s interest in the regional.

However, I doubt the issue will be concerned by the ordinary people who do not directly engaged with the ASEAN issues. Every year I regularly travel to Banjarmasin and Martapura (a fair town located in South Kalimantan) and rarely I hear any discussion about ASEAN in the public space, traditional market, or warung. ASEAN is still located outside of their minds –even the villagers have no idea what the ASEAN is.

The phenomenon portrayed an unresolved gap in ASEAN: while the ‘talk’ about regionalism is getting more complicated in the elite level, people’s perception about it is still very low. It is, as Amitav Acharya analysed, has been a main constraint to make a participatory regionalism in ASEAN.

Why do the people of ASEAN seem to be ignorant, or in other words, disengaged, with the ASEAN Summit that will direct this regional organisation in the future? John McCormick, in his popular book criticising the European Union, described this phenomenon as ‘democratic deficit’ –the lack of democracy that is generated by the inability of people to articulate their interests in decision-making process.

McCormick argued, following deliberative approach to democracy, that democracy is determined by people’s ability to influence the decision-making process. According to this approach, one can say a transnational governance model (like ASEAN) is democratic if it supports political participation from internal interest group within it.

Participation is central in deliberative democracy. To make a democratic or –to borrow a slogan— ‘people-centred’ ASEAN, the most important aspect that should fulfilled is maintaining participation from any interest group inside ASEAN Member States. In other words, we have to include regional Civil Society in ASEAN governing forum or institutions.

Since 2003, ASEAN has been institutionalised into a more complex form of regionalism. There has been three community inside ASEAN, which are aimed to be established by 2015 –ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. According to deliberative approach, to make democratic ASEAN, these institutions should be openned for participation and engagement from civil society entities.

But in fact, the development of those institutions has turned into a bureaucratic-technocratic form within ASEAN Secretariats. Thus, we can see a new configuration within ASEAN decision-making process: the political decision will be discussed in a summit which is highly elitist and state-based, while the implementation of those decisions will be conducted in ASEAN Secretariat.

It has emerged a question: where was the space for civil society organisations to engage in ASEAN decision-making process? To respond the existed regime, some Non-Governmental Organisations launched ASEAN Civil Society Conference in 2005, which contained many NGOs in ASEAN Member States to participate and voice their interests in the forum.

At the beginning, the Conference has been greeted by ASEAN Leaders by inviting the Conference representative to the Summit to present the result before the Summit (Dang, 2008). However, as time passes by, relations between NGOs and ASEAN leaders weakened. There is still no room allocated for civil society to engage in decision-making process, particularly at the summit. The political decision still belongs to representative of the States.

Thus, the ASEAN Civil Society Conference –later changed as ‘ASEAN People’s Forum’— still left a gap: it is not adequate to accommodate people’s interests in decision-making process. The ASEAN People’s Forum is suitable to mobilise and consolidate interest group in Southeast Asia, but in the context of advocacy and engaging in decision-making process, there is no adequate room.

I argue that the lack of room for people’s participation in ASEAN is prominently caused by two variables. First, the elitist and state-centrist nature of ASEAN. Historically, ASEAN has been constructed by a consensus of state which was aimed to promote regional peace and stability as well as cooperate in social, economic, and cultural sectors. It is originally designed as a room for states, not people, to negotiate its interest in regions, and consequently makes the regionalism to be very state-centred.

Second, there is no significant effort from ASEAN Leaders to accommodate people’s participation in decision-making process. The 2003 ASEAN Summit only transformed ASEAN’s institutions (into Community) but not the decision-making process. It still lies on the hand of ASEAN leaders who attend the Summit. Thus, the state-centrist nature is still preserved until present and becomes a constraint for people’s participation in ASEAN.

To make ASEAN more democratic, on the context of the upcoming I hereby propose two steps. First, making ASEAN Summit as an inclusive meeting. This step can be conducted by allowing civil society organizations and interest groups to participate in the Summit, not only as observer but also as participant. The ASEAN Summit, therefore, should be perceived not only as an ‘arena of negotiation’ but also ‘place for dialogue’ between ASEAN leaders and its people.

Second, building some institutional bridge to connect ASEAN People and ASEAN leaders. It can be conducted through formalising ASEAN People’s Forum as a part of ASEAN Governing Institution, and then transform it as an influential institution in ASEAN decision-making process. Building a more representative institution as place for people’s representative is necessary, so that the people can articulate their interest in ASEAN.

I believe that if ASEAN leaders have a little political will to open more chances and opportunities for non-state actors to participate in the upcoming Summit, we can optimistically make a more democratic ASEAN in the future.

By Farish Ahmad-Noor, For The Straits Times

It is a question that may strike some as being somewhat simple: Where is Asean? However, the simplicity belies a deeper and more complex line of inquiry.

In reply, someone may simply pick up a map and point to the region designated as South-east Asia, and say, “There is where Asean is located”.

But is it? This leads us to ask: What is Asean?

Over the last few decades, the Association of South-east Asian Nations – as a multi-state pact of nation-states – has proven itself successful in many respects, from the prevention of war in South-east Asia to dealing with complex multilateral issues, ranging from cross-border pollution to the movement of Asean citizens to smuggling and terrorism.

These achievements, however, may pale in comparison to what may follow from next year, with the creation of the Asean Economic Community (AEC), a move that will bring about greater economic integration and cooperation.

As far as knowledge of the AEC is concerned, it would appear that not all the countries of Asean are equally prepared.

However, since 2012, Indonesia has begun to invest in think-tanks, departments and research centres in universities to promote the idea of Asean and the AEC, with one such being the newly minted Asean Studies Centre at the faculty of politics and social sciences at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Central Java.

These centres have been set up “to socialise”, or popularise, the concept of Asean and the AEC, in preparation for the changes ahead.

The Asean Studies Centre at Yogyakarta has conducted public awareness campaigns among workers and members of the public to inform them further about the importance of Asean and what the AEC can do for them.

Here lies the answer to “Where is Asean?”

For surely Asean – as a complex abstract idea – cannot simply lie in the buildings and institutions associated with its work, impressive though those buildings may be architecturally.

Complex ideas are not things that are embodied in non-sentient monuments, but rather embedded in the collective socio-psychological architecture of societies. Asean may be symbolised by objects like buildings, flags and logos, but as an idea, it is carried in the hearts and minds of people.

 

Giving life to an idea

SO WHAT would make Asean something real, and less of an abstract concept to people across South-east Asia?

Here we need to distinguish two processes: While Asean integration has been happening on a multi-state level, driven by governments and capital, centuries before Asean was even concocted, there was already the longer history of South-east Asian integration and social movement.

The latter is still evident today. Across many parts of South-east Asia, ordinary people continue to live as their ancestors have always done: Field-working researchers will tell you that in the waters of the region, nomadic itinerant communities like the Bajao Laut sea nomads still move across the archipelago with ease, and are spread across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Communities, such as the Dayaks of Borneo, straddle the political frontiers of both Indonesia and Malaysia, as do many cross-border communities in other parts of mainland South-east Asia.

When we speak about the “global age” of “cosmopolitan citizens”, we tend to focus more on urbanised elite communities, but we forget that along the border zones of the entire region, there remain communities who are hybrid, polyglot, who have multiple identities and who are just as comfortable with the reality of living in complex plural environments.

For millions of South-east Asians like them, the prospect of living in an integrated AEC is hardly new: Many of them already cross borders on a daily basis, and sometimes without passports or identity papers.

It is here that the connection has to be made, between the abstract idea of Asean integration and the realities of people who live in a South-east Asia that is intertwined and inter-connected. When bodies such as the Asean Studies Centre of Yogyakarta try to socialise the idea of Asean among ordinary Indonesians, they are rooting that abstract legal-political concept in the lived experience of people who will soon feel the impact of Asean economic integration, but who do not have the vocabulary to express it.

It provides them with the language and the means to understand the impact of multilateral arrangements upon their personal lives, and allows them to take part in that process and claim some ownership of it.

The reasons why this is so important at this stage are twofold:

 

The concept of a common home

FIRST, in order to give societies the means to appreciate and understand the processes of change as a result of closer Asean cooperation and integration, and to buffer against the possibility of a hyper-nationalist reaction against that process – should the inflow of capital and other influences from neighbouring countries be seen as “foreign” or “predatory”.

Second, to remind South-east Asians that living in an Asean economic community that is more inter-connected and inter-dependent is not a new or threatening thing, but in line with the history of movement, migration and investment in the region for hundreds of years.

Yet, many of us still do not know one another well enough: A glance at history textbooks used across the region will show that young South-east Asians may know more about the French Revolution or World War II than the history of the country next to theirs.

With the AEC almost upon us, the need to socialise and popularise the concept of Asean – and the notion of a collective belonging to South-east Asia as the common home to all in the region – is greater than ever before.

This has to be a comprehensive effort which extends beyond legislatures and debating chambers, and must reach the schools, streets and living rooms of the 600 million people who inhabit this part of the world.

And the end goal has to be the situation where the answer to “Where is Asean?” is “in me, and all of us”. For no amount of concrete or monuments can give life to Asean identity unless there are Asean-minded people who see the region as their home in the first place.

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Farish Ahmad Noor is an Associate Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. This article first appeared in The Straits Times on 6 November 2014.

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