ASEAN at 50: Has the Philippines Enhanced the Power of ASEAN’s People?

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ASEAN agreed to put its concern on the importance of its people through the pillar of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Among the three pillars, ASCC is conceivably the one given least attention. The critics have risen along the establishment of ASEAN as an elite-centered institusion where the policies outcome is not relevant for its people. Enhancing the people centrality of ASEAN will create more inclusive institution within the ASEAN to narrow the inequality between the elite and the society. In this sense, ASEAN must ensure in its 50th year of its establishment, to benefit its people and to become more inclusive.

The celebration of 50th anniversary for ASEAN is going to be under the chairmanship of Philippines. President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has officially accepted the chairmanship of the ASEAN during the closing ceremony of ASEAN Summit in September 2016. He declared his priorities, one of them is People-oriented and People-centered ASEAN. The commitment dwells in the Philippines’ initiative to hold the 17th ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council Meeting on March 2017. The ASCC meeting resulted a Joint Communique, which aims to enhance the power of people by eliminating the causes of grassroots problem, such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, and lack of address to education and healthcare. Moreover, under Manila’s watch, ASEAN would like to finalize the Cebu Declaration on protecting the migrant worker.

However, the Philippines is unlikely able to progress in enhancing the power of its people.

This is evident as this year becomes the 50th ASEAN celebration, the Philippines’ chairmanship is facing some challenges. Firstly, the Philippines is disturbed by the stagnancy of resettlement towards territorial disputes in South China Sea together with Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The tension more or less influences the relations among member states. Secondly, regarding the step taken by the Philippines to place the realization of “people-oriented and people-centered” as its first priority of this year’s chairmanship, I argue that newly inaugurated President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines is unfit to promote this agenda as chairman. As the recent allegations towards human rights violation of killing over 2,000 people in his anti-drugs policies and the request from the United Nations to conduct investigation on the extrajudicial killings in his administration. These skeptical perspectives see that ASEAN will not be able to solve the human rights issue in its member states. In this sense, the Philippines’ burden is the assurance that ASEAN will be able to strive for improvement.

In order to create the solid integration among its member states, the awareness of ASEAN identity is measured important. I believe to create more inclusive organization, ASEAN should embrace the roles of non-state actors. Marguerite Afra Sapiie argued that the role of Civil Society Organization can push ASEAN to accommodate peoples’ needs. The inclusiveness of this intra-governmental organization will invite the participation of people. Then, I believe it could create more transparency in the process of decision making process in the ASEAN and lead to the awareness of people.

To create this solid integration of ASEAN, the Philippines needs to emphasize the notion of people-centered and people-oriented is not only as a thematic priority under its chairmanship, but it should bring ASEAN to progress forward. Responding towards the Philippines priority on enhancing the power of people, ASEAN Secretary General stated that ASEAN needs to sustain a positive impact among its people especially the poor and underprivileged people.

In conclusion, the Philippines’s priority to put “people-oriented and people-centered” agenda in its chairmanship must be able to attain the enhancement of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community amidst the stagnancy of ASEAN Member States’ cooperation. Along with the burden for commemoration of ASEAN 50 Year, Philippines’ chairmanship should be able to prove in this period of chairmanship.

 

Siti Widyastuti Noor is a research intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and a Student at International Program of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

Is Single-sex Education Promoting Education Equality?

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Seeking to promote the education equality for boys and girls, ‘Single-sex Education’ has become a growing trend. Sex segregated education, which separates boys and girls, or commonly known as Single-sex Education, has become a question of considerable value in both developed and developing countries. In ASEAN, some member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have a number of primary schools operating as the single-sex school, in which Indonesia has already established the first all-girl school since 1857.

However, I argue that the single-sex education is unlikely to promote education equality.

Single-sex school legitimized their status based on the common value that boys and girls have different interest. Proponent of single sex education extended the reason to some ideological beliefs, including: a) male crisis, b) biological differences, c) achievement gaps, and d) distractions. In the case of male crisis, The National Assessment of Educational Progress had proved that male reached lower achievement (National Centre for Educational Statistics, 2005). It is evident that a rate of male being dropout from school is higher than female. The problem of biological differences dwells in the brain capacity, where each respective sex needs different educational treatment. Another reason to uphold single-sex education is the achievement gap. Jimeneez and Lockheed on their study about student’s achievement in single-sex and co-educational school in Thailand found that girls accomplished higher score for mathematics in single-sex school than in co-educational school. Single-sex education was also effective to control male’s behaviour and lessen the distraction in interaction between male and female. It also proved that girl is likely developing their self-esteem, confidence and leadership skill in an all-female school.

However, another perspective argued that single-sex education is creating disparity and greater polarization of gender stereotype. A survey from National Institutes of Health (NIH) found that gender differences in personality were undeniably vigorous across all cultures studied including Malaysia, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Segregating male and female will clearly portray gender differences. It will strengthen the hegemony in society about the differences between male and female. The tendency of sexism will get higher along the practice.

While one believes that “learning preferences” and “brain processing” categorizes the difference between male and female, it cannot significantly point out the gender-specific. The learning process is influenced by many factors including socio-cultural and environmental factors. Additional concern deal with impaired social skill. It potentially happens since single – sex school provides limited opportunity for male and female students to socialize. It may cause problems in adult relationship as children get older. Single-sex education can also foster the sensitivity awareness. As in Indonesia, single sex school mostly operated due to religion, in similar with Malaysia that it mostly operated due to ethnicity, and religion.

Therefore, it is viable to assure that segregation based on the merit of socioeconomic status, race or culture, sex or gender is unacceptable. Students also deserve an opportunity to interact and engage with each other, regardless of the perceived ‘differences’. Enhancing the quality of teachers and education system while triggered by parent’s support are the solution to treat the difference in learning process. In order to embody the respect for gender difference and encounter the gender stereotype, students should be involved in the process of creating ‘learning space’ consisting both male and female.

Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha is a research intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and a Graduate Student at Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Socialising Human Rights in ASEAN

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U Ko Ni, a legal advisor of National League for Democracy (NLD), was shot in Rangoon  Airport on February. He was returning from an official visit to Indonesia addressing crisis in Rakhine State. Mr Ko Ni has been an outspoken lawyer, who has always committed to political reform and democracy, and a notable defender of minority rights in the country.

His death was undoubtedly a huge loss, both for Burmese Human Rights activists and Burmese Muslim Community.

What is worrying from his murder is not only that U Ko Ni was shot in the midst of Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, but also the fact that there has been a rising hate crimes and intolerance in the country. This is, however, not only the case in Myanmar, but also in several other countries in Southeast Asia, for example with rising anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia or political turbulence in Malaysia.

This rising problem of intolerance and hate crimes –along with the murder of Mr U Ko Ni— is therefore a regional problem that must be taken seriously by ASEAN.

It has, therefore, posed some serious concerns over the future of Human Righs in ASEAN. Can Human Rights and Democracy stand against the rising hate crimes and sectarian violence in the region? What could ASEAN do to tackle these problems?

ASEAN has followed a dynamic path to embrace Human Rights and Democracy in the region. It dated back to 1993, when ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to coordinate a common approach on human rights and actively provide some institutional venues for the promotion and the protection of Human Rights in the region. A decade later, under the new ASEAN Charter, the member states have stepped forward to establish ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009.

It was then followed by the establishment of ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2013, although being considered by Human Rights activists as a controversial declaration.

Despite of some controversies regarding the declaration or lack of AICHR role in its Terms of Reference, it should be noted that ASEAN had taken a progressive path to institutionalise Human Rights in the region. However, with the rising hate crimes, intolerance, or some accusations of Human Rights abuse conducted by state officials in some countries, it is evident that ASEAN’s constructive role in promoting Human Rights is insufficient.

We need a more progressive effort to promote Human Rights to broader elements of Southeast Asian society.

What is at stake? The problem of Human Rights in ASEAN is not merely related to the lack of role that AICHR owns in dealing with Human Rights issues in the region, but also with the lack of understanding over Human Rights among people in ASEAN. So far, Human Rights is often associated with Western norms that is unsuitable with the so-called ‘Asian Values’ or state sovereign jurisdictions to rule their own people.

This misunderstanding has also been related to ASEAN’s non-intervention’ principle that has been the core of decision-making process in ASEAN since its establishement. State obligation to tackle Human Rights problem is often obscured with this principle, even though the problem has been widespread over the region, such as the Rohingya crisis.

I shall argue that this should be not the case in ASEAN if we could re-understand Human Rights not as a ‘value’ that should be imposed in particular subject (or state) through international law or regional politics, but as the ‘duty’ to treat other people as a part of ‘community’.

This obligation is enrooted in the often neglected pillar of ASEAN community, namely ‘ASEAN Social and Cultural Community’ (ASCC). The blueprint of ASEAN Social and Cultural Community, described in the newly-adopted ASEAN Vision 2015-2025, has provided some new understanding of Human Rights that is based upon the human development and the fulfillment of social and economic rights of the people.

The blueprint of ASEAN Social and Cultural Community also infers the need for ‘ASEAN single identity’, which thus implies the need for a ‘multi-cultural understanding’ among Southeast Asian people. Through this concept, ‘Human Rights’ should not be understood merely as a value to be imposed through state or regional authority, but instead as obligation to be fulfilled by both states and society.

The murder of U Ko Ni should then be the case for reconstructing Human Rights in ASEAN beyond legal perspective. Two aspects needs to be addressed.

First, ASEAN needs to strengthen the promotion of Human Rights not only to state elites or civil society organisations, but also to broader elements of society such as business entities, small and medium enterprises, or social organisations. It means that the promotion of Human Rights should not be spared with the socialisation of ASEAN in grass-root level.

Second, we need to develop ASEAN not only as a matter of state-related business, but also as a part of broader discourse of citizenship. We could begin with understanding the citizens of ASEAN member states as a part of our community that encompasses different cultural and social background as one community of people. The murder of U Ko Ni reflects the failure to acknowledge difference within the country, which needs to be addressed by ASEAN through its grass-root socialisation.

Finally, the rising hate speeches, intolerance, racism, or the failure to treat different should not be the case to dissolve Human Rights in the region. Rather, by taking into account the importance of ASEAN’s social and cultural community, ASEAN could bring Human Rights as the case for building a more prosperous and stable region in the future.

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, Executive Secretary at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

 

Modelling International Lawmaking in ASEAN

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ASEAN and its model of international law has always being questioned by many international lawyers for its informal nature of law-making processes in concluding agreements among member states. For them, this phenomenon is unusual because normally international law is being concluded in a formal manner to show its commitment in tackling global problems.

In 2012, The University of Oxford released a book entitled, “Informal International Lawmaking”. This book is written after the realization on the increasing number of Informal International Law (IN-LAW), which being made within the international community. In this book, Joost Pauwelyn identifies the characteristics of IN-LAW which consists of output informality, process informality, and actor informality.

All of these characteristics are reflecting the way of ASEAN in concluding its agreements. However, interestingly, only a limited amount of reference to ASEAN is being included in this book to understand the nature of IN-LAW.

The emergence of IN-LAW is not a new phenomenon. Since ASEAN’s inception in 1967, the characteristic of this organization is underpinned by ‘informality’. Therefore, the blame towards ASEAN’s inability to conclude legally-binding agreements should be argued further. It is common that many legal scholars arrive at mistakes in assessing international law in ASEAN because the tendency of assessing and framing ASEAN law through the ‘western-based’ conception of international law.

I argue that many of ASEAN agreements are IN-LAW based on the following evidences. First, IN-LAW is entrenched strongly in ASEAN’s vessels that by the time of ASEAN founding fathers had a meeting to conclude ASEAN’s establishment, the foundational treaty was simply a declaration. Only when ASEAN member states realized that the organization is missing of a constituent treaty, the ASEAN charter was created.

This unique characteristic of ASEAN in law-making process is driven by the ASEAN Way, especially on ASEAN’s procedural norm that endorses the principle of seeking agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic (Soesastro, 1995). In short, all of these principles lead to the informal aspect of ASEAN.

In fact, if to be traced back any further, ASEAN’s predecessors, both Associations of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (Maliphindo), have already practiced similar norms on managing intra-regionalism affairs (Goh, 2003). Thanat Khoman, the key architect of ASA who was then Thailand’s Foreign Minister declared that ASA’s norms were deeply rooted in “Asian Culture and Traditions”. Similar view is shared towards Maliphindo, where consultation or musyawarah serves as the basis of settling differences among ASEAN members.

Second, non-legally binding instruments are the nature of ASEAN agreements. Due to the informal nature of cooperation among ASEAN member states, the output of decision-making is often to be informal as well. Even for ASEAN external agreements, 104 out of 175 are non-legally binding (Cremona et al, 2015). If more than a half of agreements concluded with external actors are non-legally binding, what is to be expected in ASEAN’s inter-state cooperation. The number of ASEAN’s legally binding agreements is far fewer than those formed in legally-binding instruments. It is clearly that non-legally binding nature of cooperation is the foundation and custom of ASEAN inter-state cooperation.

Third, actors engaged in ASEAN diplomacy are not exclusively the head of state or foreign minister. ASEAN hosts various annual meeting, ranging from state representatives to non-state actors. All this type of ASEAN meetings concludes the making of ASEAN agreements. Different than the United Nations (UN) or any other international organizations that facilitate committee of experts which focus on the technicalities of that particular chamber, ASEAN does not offer similar facilitation, yet some of ASEAN’s meeting are filled with non-state actors. The involvement of non-state actors in ASEAN diplomacy shows the characteristic of ASEAN informality.

These three aspects conclude the nature of IN-LAW in ASEAN law-making process. Therefore, in assessing international law in ASEAN, legal scholars must refrain from using the conventional approach of assessment to international law due to the nature of ASEAN cooperation. Furthermore, in developing a study related to IN-LAW, such discipline must not neglect the fact that such international law has been well developed in Southeast Asian region, thus reference to ASEAN should be made.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing is the Research Manager of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Why Indonesia Needs to Reform Maritime Security Governance

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President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) seems not to show any significant progress in the aspect of maritime security governance. The reason lies under the ignorance towards the existence and role of maritime security governance as a guarantor of Indonesia’s maritime economy development. As if we invite and let people invest in our company, President Jokowi did not realize that there has been a high rate of crimes occurring inside the company, which will be taken into consideration by investors. To that end, President Jokowi needs to gaze slightly the issues of maritime security governance in Indonesia before figuring the way to reform it.

Indonesia as a maritime country holds two roles: First, Indonesia plays key role  as a bridge of the global shipping and trade through Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia. Second, Indonesia could also become a hotbed of pirates in Southeast Asia. According to the report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Indonesia was ranked 8th from a total of 80 developing countries with unloading capacity to 9,638,607 TEUs of containers in 2012, 11.27345 million TEUs in 2013, and 11,900,763 TEUs in 2014. Through this potential contribution of 200 trillion rupiah per year for Indonesia’s GDP (Jompa, 2014), Indonesia has the opportunity to be a stopover point for global shipping and trade.

However, Indonesia arrived as the first-rank country for piracy and armed robbery against ships incidents. Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is highly vulnerable to the pirate attacks. Moreover, ports have served as a conquerable spot for most of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Indonesia. The percentage incident happening at ports has respectively reached 65% of total cases in 2012, 79% in 2013, 77% in 2014 and 82% in 2015. These findings assure that port is the vulnerable areas targeted by pirates.

Thus, the question lies in whether the Jokowi’s government has seen the importance of maritime security governance. If so, how has the maritime security governance been progressing?

Maritime security governance, as a policy system, consists of three main aspects, namely the legal framework, institutions, and resources. In the context of Indonesia, there has been no adequate legal framework. Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime and Law No. 17/2008 on Shipping do not regulatethe function and role of maritime security institutions in combating piracy. Even so, it cannot be ruled out that Indonesia has shown an early commitment in terms of maritime transportation security by authorizing the Draft Law on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 into a law to ensure the safety of the crew.

In term of institution, Indonesia experienced a fairly problematicalissue in managing the existing maritime security institutions. After the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, there is a mixed response from the stateswhich have intensively utilized their maritime domain. One is preparing its civil maritimelaw enforcement agency, such as marinepolice and coast guard, where some are involving naval armyfor maritime patrol and law enforcement. However, in the case of Indonesia, it remains equivocal.

Law No. 32/2004 on Marine has clearly dictated the role of Badan Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) as a civil maritime law enforcement agency and the TNI-AL as an institution whose role is to manage, maintain, and protect national sovereignty. However, in practice, TNI-AL perceives that the function of law enforcement at sea remains the duty of TNI-AL through the successful apprehension of pirates who hijacked KM Hai Soon 12 in Tanjung Puting, South Kalimantan, where the Head of the Information Office of the Indonesian Navy First Admiral Edi Sucipto explained that the TNI-AL as a law enforcement agency at sea must prevent all forms of violence within the jurisdiction, and always exercising patrols to maintain security in the territory of Indonesia.Although according to the former Chief of Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Army Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo, the function of law enforcement in national waters must be carried out by civilian law enforcement agencies. This situation indicates the problem of coordination among Indonesian maritime security institution,in which requires a significant political role of President Jokowi to dictate agencies in accordance to the authorized role.

The last is the resources issue including fleets’ capabilities and system, as well as personnel with ample experience and training. Bakamla obtained financial support from the government with a budget of 520 billion rupiah per year plus three patrol boats, which is then be added with the approval of the Parliament of 726.3 billion rupiah per year with an additional 30 units patrol boats. However, Bakamla is experiencing a shortage in human resources aspects. According to the Head of Operations Management of Bakamla Colonel Andi Achdar, human resources persists as main problem.

The small number of human resources encroaches the performance Bakamla covering many aspects, such as the formulation of national policies in the field of security and safety, the implementation of early warning systems, custody and supervision, monitor execution, and so on. With these limitations, carrying out all the functions in a wide range of work areas by Bakamla is unlikely for a country with huge maritime size like Indonesia.

At this point, it is necessary for Indonesia to consider the maritime security governance reform by performing two-level efforts.

At the national level, the Indonesian government needs to consider the availability of a legal framework that specifically regulates the issue of maritime security with the aim of establishing a strong legal basis and to facilitate the creation of laws derivation into specific instruments, such as the making of action plan and blueprints. Indonesia should also strengthen the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency despite the high stake of TNI-AL whose deterrence effect may exacerbate the border disputes in Southeast Asia’s waters. Moreover, lifting the role of civil maritime law enforcement agency will be much more effective and efficient using affordable commercial-standardized fleets to subdue pirates.

At the regional level, Indonesia needs to intensify the existing maritime security cooperation, such as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and newly-established Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative (SSPI), overcoming resource limitations in the maritime security governance through joint training and exchange of knowledge and manpower.

Given such condition in which Indonesia possesses limited resources, Indonesia needs to consider an involvement in a particular area or sector in international relations. President Jokowi along with the ranks of government can build a prototype of a policy initiative where the issue of the maritime economy can be associated and overlaid with maritime security issues, thus promoted in the region as a mechanism of cooperation to face common non-traditional maritime security threat.

Finally, this complexity signifies the importance of Indonesia to regard maritime security governance. Otherwise, Indonesia may experience the loss of its potential strategic ports as a transit point, and the breakdown of its image as a maritime nation.

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Is Indonesia Choosing the Indian Ocean Rim Association Over ASEAN?

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Indonesia’s substantial involvement in IORA signifies a stage of crisis for ASEAN.

From March 5 to 7, Jakarta played host to the leader’s summit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which was also commemorating its 20th anniversary. Given the chance to lead the summit, Indonesia has pursued significant initiatives, including the enactment of the IORA Concord, or so-called Jakarta Concord. This document, which will be used to govern the Indian Ocean and IORA members, highlights several important agendas, including maritime safety and security, the blue economy, and gender empowerment.

Indonesia’s substantial work to play a leadership role in the vast Indian Ocean, however, also indicates the failure of Indonesia’s natural leadership in ASEAN.

Why did IORA become important for Indonesia? IORA can be seen a new forum that is strategically aligned to the Nawa Cita, President Jokowi’s nine-point leadership agenda. IORA not only is a platform to attract investment for accelerating Indonesia’s infrastructure development policies, it also provides an opportunity for Indonesia to show its teeth as a “global maritime fulcrum.” As Ibrahim Almutaqqi has pointed out, through a series of economic cooperation policies contained within the IORA document, Indonesia has become actively and strategically involved in IORA to explore the potential of new economic markets and investments.

However, in evaluating Jakarta’s contributions to IORA, it is necessary to look back on the argument that Indonesia has turned away from ASEAN as a multilateral forum, instead focusing more on strategic bilateral cooperation (see: Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?). In this context, Indonesia might see IORA as an alternative means of regional cooperation. Desra Percaya, the Asia Pacific and Africa directorate general at the Foreign Ministry, has expressed his concern that IORA not let any conflict similar to the South China Sea disputes happen in the Indian Ocean. This apple-to-apple way of thinking signifies that Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry sees a new opportunity in the Indian Ocean, an opportunity that a divided ASEAN can no longer present. At this point, Indonesia’s foreign policy maneuver hints that ASEAN has entered a state of crisis.

Indonesia has appeared to lose interest in its position as the natural leader in the region. During the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos, Indonesia presented no serious initiatives to find an alternative solution to the lack of agreement on a joint communique. This stands in contrast to 2012, when then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa conducted shuttle diplomacy to the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore in order to craft a unified statement on the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. In 2015, Natalegawa emphasized that Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN cannot be seen as an event but rather as a process.

ASEAN’s current leadership seems to be ready to accept the stalemate, rather than actively pursuing a breakthrough. The current ASEAN chair, the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, has not provided any certainty for the region, only calling for the code of conduct (CoC) to settle down the South China Sea disputes. Manila is unlikely to use its legal victory in a Permanent Court of Arbitration case from last year to solve the conflict and instead is likely to repair its economic relationship with China. The Philippines perceives that they it engage in war, but remains hostile if China’s activity seems to affect the Philippines’ interests. It is difficult to see Manila playing an important role under the ASEAN framework due to the Duterte’s nationalist approach, which includes a foreign policy accommodating China’s economic interests.

If Indonesia continues to set aside the importance of ASEAN as a multilateral body, while looking more toward the IORA, it will jeopardize its history of deft diplomacy in the region. Since ASEAN has entered a stalemate, Indonesia must consider taking up its “natural” role in promoting dynamic and fluid negotiations in ASEAN. Instead of celebrating its successful bid to establish the IORA’s governance, Indonesia should look to the political future of its neighborhood, which, if neglected, may disrupt its economic-oriented foreign policy.

 

Dedi Dinarto is a researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

This article has been published in The Diplomat.

ASEAN Economic Community Today: From Neo-liberalism to New Structuralism?

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In 2010, the World Bank published a book that shed light on a new framework for world development: New Structural Economics. Authored by the Bank’s Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin, this book aims to combine old neoclassical economics with the tradition of structuralism in political economy.

This attempt was resulted in what Lin called as “new structural economics” (NSE).

Basically, this idea is not necessarily new. During 2000s, some idea of ‘neostructuralism’ has also been developed by Latin American economists to refer to the economic strategies undertaken by extractive-rich countries, which did not follow neoliberal prescription. The idea was soon dissolved after the low commodity price in 2010s, which leads the regional economy in crisis.

There are, of course, critiques and debates over NSE particularly among economists. From China itself, there is Weiying Zhang, who challenges Lin’s Keynesian prescription with his libertarian thinking. In the West, some leading political economists, such as Dani Rodrik or Ben Fine put forward some critical comments against this idea.

However, the most interesting point within international political economy (IPE) framework is not about the economic ideas that NSE offers. Rather, it was because NSE comes amid the concurrent global crisis, which makes global leaders to rethink the current political and economic framework that governs world politics.

I argue that NSE is important for two distinctive reasons. First, NSE offers a new theoretical framework to resolve the concurrent crisis in global political economy, which was marked by global financial crisis and low commodity price in stock market.

Second, NSE has recalled the ‘old’ debate in IPE whether the state should be given prominent rules in managing economy. NSE strongly called for strong state intervention in maintaining industrial policy, which goes side-by-side within its role providing good infrastructures for industrial purposes.

It is precisely the topic, in which Weiying Zhang, a prominent Chinese economist from Peking University, disagreed with Lin’s argument. A Hayek-inspired economist, Zhang demands for a bigger role for Chinese entrepreneurs in economy with minimal state intervention.

Whatever the result of the debate is, NSE seems to slightly put an alternative against the old-style neoliberal regimes in world politics, including ASEAN Economic Community.

For instance, Yifu Lin recently wrote for Project Syndicate over ‘African Industrial revolution’, in which he argues that Africa desperataly needs a significant industrial policy to catch-up with global economic development. He suggests that government needs to revitalise its role in spurring industrialisation based on state’s comparative advantages. Through this scheme, state-led industrialisation could lead African states to catch other regions in more developed countries.

On the other hand, the question over industrial policy should start with one key variable: how could the state finance the industries? The question is thus straight-forward: international cooperation. It is through cooperation with Multinational Companies (MNCs) and other governments, as Yifu Lin argues, that the ‘industrial revolution’ could be financed.

Yifu Lin’s illustration over Africa has raised another question on ASEAN: does ASEAN also pave its way for renewing industrial policy, which therefore abandons the ‘free-trade’ regime that was established through ASEAN Economic Community since 2003?

In 2015, ASEAN member states has agreed to renew their commitments over ‘ASEAN Economic Community’, which is centred over four key points: (1) a highly integrated and cohesive economy, (2) a competitive, dynamic, and innovative region, (3) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation, and (4) a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centred ASEAN.

These points shown that the idea of ASEAN Economic Community is still a continuation of integration commitment that was agreed in 2003 (Bali Concord II) and 2009 (the first blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community).

However, since 2011, ASEAN has also stepped forward a commitment for ‘industrial cooperation’, which was among others marked by the establishment of ASEAN Infrastructure Fund through partnership with Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is coincided with growing ‘infrastructure-related’ initiatives among ASEAN member states, including Indonesia.

Since the reign of Jokowi, for example, Indonesia has put forward some commitments to improve infrastructures and build national industries in many areas, particularly in Java Island.

It is of course not without cost. Several international cooperation schemes, as well as maximising tax revenues, have been set out by the Government to finance infrastructures and industries. It is in this context the intellectual leadership of Sri Mulyani, Jokowi’s Finance Minister and former World Bank’s Managing Director, plays significant role.

This new trends are also initiated by some other Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Indochinese states. In four Indochinese states (Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam), some cooperation schemes to boost infrastructures have resulted in the fast growth and modernisation in those countries.

So, will ASEAN undergo some shifts from neo-liberalism to the new trend of ‘new structuralism’ in the future? Even though some integration agenda in ASEAN Economic Community still maintains some classic ‘neoliberal’ agenda, such as free trade or competitive economic region, the ‘new structural’ wave is also move slowly within the region. It takes place bilaterally, under Chinese leadership in providing infrastructures and supports for industrialisation, rather than through regional economic integration.

This wave needs to be taken seriously by everyone who concerns with ASEAN development. Will these new waves of ‘new structuralism’ provide a better chance to narr0w development gap in the region? Or, in contrast, is it only ‘the same old wine in a new bottle’?

Whilst the idea of ‘industrial cooperation’ is not new for ASEAN (similar initiatives have ever been initiated in the 1980s) we still need to rethink the future of economic integration. It is because what happen in the region will affect the future of our country—as the 1997 financial crisis taught us.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar is the Executive Secretary of ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN Countries Should Find a Solution to End the Persecution of Rohingya

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Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are transported to a temporary shelter in Krueng Raya in Aceh Besar in 2013. Photo: Reuters

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar – Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s non-intervention is aggravating the plight of ethnic Rohingya Muslims suffering widespread abuse by the Burmese military in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Rohingya are one the of the world’s most persecuted ethnic minorities.

Human Rights Watch reported the Burmese military launched a campaign of killings, rape and arson against ethnic Rohingya following attacks by militants against government border guards in Rakhine State on October 9, 2016. HRW reported in December that, since the day of the attack, at least 1,500 homes have been burned in retaliation, displacing thousands of Rohingya people.

The United Nations has expressed concern about the military operations against the Rohingya. One UNHCR official reportedly called the attacks “ethnic cleansing”. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights, Yanghee Lee, is visiting Rakhine State. But the Myanmar government is denying her access to some areas and reportedly only allows her to speak with individuals it has pre-approved.

In a closed-door meeting in Yangoon in December, ASEAN’s foreign ministers discussed the violence following the October attack. But they avoided talking about the issue in human rights terms.

Among leaders of ASEAN member states, only Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, has condemned the violence in Myanmar. He described the military operations as “genocide”.

In Indonesia, despite pressure from rights groups and Muslim groups in the country, President Joko Widodo stopped short of condemning Myanmar, but offered humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees.

Regional problem

The persecution of ethnic Rohingya is a regional and global problem. Thousands of stateless Rohingya fleeing persecution end up in refugee camps in Bangladesh or become victims of human trafficking. They have been held ransom in death camps in Thailand and Malaysia, and sold to work in plantations or on fishing boats.

In 2015, a crackdown against human traffickers in Thailand prompted traffickers to abandon their boats. Thousands of Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants were left stranded in the Andaman Sea. The plight of the Rohingya people hence become a regional problem, sparking debate among Southeast Asian leaders.

At least 1,500 homes of ethnic Rohingya have been burned since October 2016. Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters

Where do Rohingya belong?

Historically, the Rohingya people have inhabited Burmese lands for hundreds of years. This dates back to before the British colonial age in Myanmar, which began in 1824. But the Burmese mostly still view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

When Myanmar gained independence from the British in 1948, it enacted a citizenship law that excluded the Rohingya people as one of the country’s many ethnicities. Almost 140,000 Rohingya people have been displaced and between 800,000 and 1.3 million Rohingyas are without citizenship.

Bangladesh, which borders Myanmar, also does not accept them, although thousands have escaped and sought refuge in Cox Bazaar, a border town within the country.

ASEAN’s non-intervention approach

Myanmar has insisted that the problems in the Rakhine State are a domestic matter. Within ASEAN, countries commonly refrain from intervening in domestic issues.

But ASEAN’s state-centric nature has prevented the regional organisation from protecting the rights of all people in the region.

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the main human rights institution in the region, could not even form an investigation committee to look into the problem. This is because, according to AICHR’s Terms of Reference, the commission does not have any mandate to carry out such an investigation. Any decision made by the commission should be accepted by all state representatives.

ASEAN members’ non-intervention approach has effectively blocked ASEAN’s own institutions – AICHR and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre – from protecting human rights.

Despite the change of political regime in Myanmar – with the appointment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi as de-facto prime minister – the persecution of the Rohingya continues. Soe Zeya Tun

Forging a caring and sharing ASEAN community

Talks among ASEAN leaders are often limited to political and economic issues, pushing problems with deep social and cultural roots like the persecution of ethnic Rohingya to the margins.

This should not be the case. Since 2015, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, with the aim of forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society in the region. ASEAN states adopted the ASEAN Vision 2025, which put forward the idea of a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN in the upcoming decade.

Forging a common platform for socio-cultural regionalism should not leave out state protection of human rights. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that the state bears responsibility to protect basic individual rights. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN that’s people-oriented must go hand-in-hand with the protection of human rights.

Yet, to date, ASEAN member states have not discussed a “people-oriented” mechanism to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

ASEAN member states should discuss the crisis in the upcoming ASEAN summit in the Philippines. ASEAN should combine these diplomatic talks with non-state initiatives, such as advocacy networks and humanitarian organisations.

We could learn from community initiatives in dealing with the Andaman Sea crisis in 2015. When governments were slow to rescue Rohingya and Bangladeshi people languishing on boats off the coast of Indonesia’s Aceh province, the local fishing community saved them from drowning. NGOs gave the refugees shelter. The strong role of non-governmental organisations and community-based initiatives to deal with humanitarian issues prompted the governments to sit down and find a solution.

ASEAN has equipped itself with various institutional mechanisms that encompass political security, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This means that ASEAN should not only deal with matters relating to economic growth and a free ASEAN market. It should also tackle issues relating to multiculturalism, be that religion, national identity, or ethnicity. Otherwise, we will only be waiting for Godot to end the persecution of ethnic Rohingya.

This article has been previously published by The Conversation

The Future of ASEAN-Russian Relations

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Shane Preuss, Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

ASEAN’s strength is demonstrated by its ‘convening power’ and its ability to attract the courtship of the world’s great powers. However, these strengths also present challenges, as ASEAN must not only navigate its relations of these powers, but also the various relationships of its individual members with respective powers. In light of this, significant commentary has been dedicated to the threat of rising US-China tensions for ASEAN’s unity and coherence. These tensions, often centered on the South China Sea dispute, are set to amplify as President-Elect Trump establishes a firm, even aggressive position toward China.

There is, however, another great power in the region, whose increasingly eager courtship of ASEAN, combined with its complex and evolving relations with both China and the USA, is set to play a significant role in the region’s geopolitics; Russia.  

The Origins of ASEAN-Russian Cooperation

Russia became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996 and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. It has since gained membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. The First ASEAN-Russia summit was held in 2005, and the second in 2010. The third Russia-ASEAN summit to commemorate the 20th anniversary of their dialogue relations was held in Sochi, in 2016.

Despite these developments, Russia-ASEAN relations have remained relatively unfruitful and Putin has shown a lack of interest in the region. This has been evidenced by his lack of presence at the East Asia Summit, the modest level of achievement yielded by first ten years of the Russia-ASEAN action plan, and the relatively low level of trade with ASEAN, especially when compared to other major powers, China and the USA.

In 2016, however, there were clear indications that this trend is beginning to shift. Russia is now eagerly engaging with the regional body and its member states. Over the two days of the Third ASEAN-Russia Summit, from May 19-20, Russia held bi-lateral members with every ASEAN member. The summit culminated in the announcement of a ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action’ to promote a cooperation between ASEAN and Russia in the areas of political-security, economic, socio-cultural and development cooperation. This increase in diplomatic activity was followed on December 23, when the UN General Assembly approved, by consensus, a Russian co-authored resolution, for Cooperation between the UN and ASEAN.

At the 2016 Russian-ASEAN ministerial conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined Russia’s approach to security, while recognizing, and supporting ASEAN’s centrality in the region. Russia, he said is building ‘a modern security architecture in Asia-Pacific,’ while ‘staunchly and consistently’ defending the role of ASEAN in regional affairs.

In the first week of 2017, two Russian warships Russia also made a visit to the Philippines. Eduard Mikhailov, deputy commander of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, signaled Russia’s desire to cooperate on military exercises in the South China Sea, with the Philippines, other ASEAN states, such as Malaysia, as well as China.  The expression of interest was well received and it was announced on Monday, 9th of January 2017, the Philippines and Russia and are in the process of finalizing a security deal, which allows the countries leaders to exchange of visits and observe military drills.

Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said the MOU between the countries opens the prospect for joint exercises. However, he also assured Washington the military agreements will not permit the rotational deployment of Russia troops and is not comparable to the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Philippines and the USA. Nevertheless. the development is significant on the back of President Duterte angry outbursts against President Obama and his decision to scale back military ties with his countries traditional ally while deepening engagement with China and Russia.

Russia has also begun developing regional economic agreements throughout Asia. The Russian-led, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), compromised of several former Soviet states, was established in 2015 and has already signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam and memoranda of cooperation with Cambodia and Singapore. ASEAN and Russia also agreed to launch a joint feasibility study of a comprehensive free trade area between ASEAN and EAEU.

Great Power Relations and the Future of ASEAN

Russia approaches to ASEAN and ASEAN states are part of a broader pivot to Asia, which, while effectively announced several years ago, began to take shape in 2016.  In addition to the strengthening ties with ASEAN, Russia has also sought to deepen its partnership with China. In June 2016 the EAEU and China signed a joint declaration on the negotiation of a trade and economic cooperation agreement and reach an agreement to integrate activities of the EAEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.

Russia’s decision to look East for new economic and security partnerships must be understood within the context of the Kremlin’s increasing estrangement from Western powers. While not necessarily, or causally, connected, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the West has marked a major rift in their international relations. This will considerably reshape Russia’s strategic posture and leanings for the coming years.

It remains to be seen what lasting effects recent will tensions between the US and Russia have on the relations between the two powers. These include allegations of Russian interference in 2016 US elections and Obama’s decision to retaliate by expelling 35 Russia diplomats. Putin received plaudits for his strategic nous for deciding not to retaliate, and, instead, express his intention to wait for the Trump Presidency to begin before making any decisions on the future of US-Russia relations.

However, while Trump and Putin appear to have shared warm relations over the election period, it is uncertain whether Trump will maintain this tone during his time in office. In light of these uncertainties, Russia’s increasing engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN members, coupled with its evolving and shifting relationships with other major powers, will be a major point of interest in the study of ASEAN geopolitics.

The Future of ASEAN-Australian Relations

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Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

2016 was a significant year for Australian ASEAN relations. The First ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit was held on 7 September 2016 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. At the Summit Australian Prime minister Malcolm Turnbull highlighted the importance of the Strategic Partnership between his country and the regional body, focussing on opportunities for economic partnerships and the common security challenge, “that demands a united response, terrorism.”

Beyond this, Australia also promoted its role as a peace broker as a non-claimant in the South China Sea. The Summit can be seen as a major success for Australian ASEAN diplomatic relations and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong offered a significant compliment, when he said Australia “understands” ASEAN and its developmental needs. The Summit closed with Turnbull proposing a special ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ Summit in 2018. This invitation was quickly followed by Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s offer to host the ASEAN leaders summit in 2018, which, if accepted, would be the first summit held outside of a current ASEAN member state.

These diplomatic developments reflect increasing inter-linkages between Australia and ASEAN on economic, cultural, academic and security fronts. These include the signing of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2009 and the development of Australia’s New Colombo Plan initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges by supporting Australian students to study and undertake work-based placements in ASEAN Member States. Participants of the ASEAN-Australia Summit also agreed to update the 2004 Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 2014 also saw the celebration of Australia’s 40th year as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN.

These developments raise the question, what is Australia’s place in the region?

Australia in ‘Asia’

Historically ‘Australian’ identity has been defined in opposition to the idea of ‘Asia’. As part of the British Empire, Australia was understood as an outpost ‘confronting’ Asia. Following the decline of the British Empire this outpost mentality persisted and was reflected in former Prime Minister John Howard’s identification of Australia as a deputy sheriff to the US in Southeast Asia.

This identity stressed differences between Australia and ‘Asia’, conceived of as a coherent mass to the countries north, and was represented through racial identifiers, such as the ‘White Australia policy’, and ideological or cultural identifiers such as Howard’s championing of the shared values and common interests’ that bind the US and Australia together.

Culturally and politically, Australia has been tied to the Anglo sphere, while the country’s security policy has remained one of dependence, first on the UK and then on the USA.

Despite this, however, Australia finds itself drawn into its surrounding geo-graphical and geo-political region.  Not only have Australian economic interests become increasingly embedded within the region, the country’s significant strategic and security objectives are also tied to its relationship with South East Asian partners.

ASEAN and Australia: Competing visions of Regionalism?

ASEAN has positioned itself as the driver of East Asia regionalism. The Organization’s convening power and centrality to regional processes is reflected in forums, such as ASEAN + three, East Asia Forum and the ASEAN Forum, which brings together a number of states well beyond the core 10 members, to shape the evolving political, strategic and economic architecture of the region.  

ASEAN has also shown a propensity for expansion. The initial five members has expanded to the present 10, while observer status is held by Papua New Guinea (since 1976) and Timor Leste (2002). Fiji’s request for observer status also received support from former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Bangladesh has received support from Laos.

Australia’s reorientation towards Asia-Pacific was, perhaps, first evidenced, when Australia became ASEANs first dialogue partner 1974. Since then Australia has been invited to attend and participate at the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

As Australia engages with the region, however, it does so from a liminal position between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia.’ Australia has displayed an ambivalent position toward South East Asian Regionalism and ‘Asian’ regional identity and ASEAN states have reciprocated this ambivalence regarding Australia place within the region.

Former Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi expressed Australia’s outsider status at the first East Asia Summit when he remarked that Australia and New Zealand would be second-class participants in Asia’s vision, with “ASEAN+3” to be the “driver” of integration. Badawi commented that Australia’s participation at the Summit represented a convergence of “common interests’ rather than “being members of the community.”

Regarding a potential Australia application for ASEAN membership, Rodolfo Severino, a Philippines diplomat and Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002, remarked that ASEAN’s likely response would be “You’re not Southeast Asian.”

Australia’s ambivalent, or marginal position toward and in ‘Asian’ regionalism has led to the development of different, perhaps competing, visions of regional architecture. Australia’s involvement in establishing APEC, which would come to include the US, can be seen as an attempt to dilute growth of East Asia regionalism. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also made a proposal for the creation of Asia Pacific Community by 2020, which would include US, New Zealand, China and India focused on security and trade. The proposal was met with little enthusiasm, particularly from ASEAN members, and was criticized as unnecessarily multiplying regional institutions.

Ongoing debates in Australia have also seen a shift from defining the countries region as the ‘Asia Pacific’, to the ‘Indo Pacific,’ which may or may not include China, and even Africa, depending on ones viewpoint. In 2014, during a speech about Australia’s “new aid paradigm” Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, stated that Australia’s principal focus for aid allocations, would be in Australia’s region – ‘the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific.’ The Indo-Pacific has also become the defining geographic expression for Australia’s defence strategy, first articulated in the Labour Party’s 2013 Defence White paper and later embraced by the Coalition government.

The Future of Australian-ASEAN Relations

How can the recent developments in Australia-ASEAN relations be interpreted against this backdrop? Is it evidence of deepening integration, or the development of a shared community? Or are ASEAN Australia relations still mediated, purely, by a paradigm of shared interests. Is it a sign of convergence between how Australia and ASEAN understand their region, or will they continue to have different, perhaps competing, visions of regionalism?

Severino, points to Australia’s continuing ambivalence as its biggest hurdle to the integration into ASEAN. Regarding elevation to observer status he argues,

‘The problem with Australia is its ambivalence. At some point when Australia feels confident enough to say, “We are in Southeast Asia and we deserve to be in ASEAN,” then that will be the time. But this has to be worked out internally, domestically.’

However, by defining its region as the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ it can be argued that Australia is not attempting to integrate itself within the ASEAN community. The expansive definition is an acknowledgment, not only of Australia’s many geographical and strategic connections, or its maritime outlook, but also of the persistence of its ambivalent character as an island nation with no firm attachments, or connections with the countries that surround it. Australia’s region is defined by partnerships, even friendships, strengthened through social and cultural outreach. It is not, however, defined by a community. Within Australia’s new, and expansive understanding of its region, ASEAN is part of a broader picture, one partner among many.