Drivin’ the getaway car

We were flyin’, but we’d never get far

Taylor Swift’s Getaway Car is a song about high-speed betrayals, thrilling escapes, and the eventual realization that running from one mess often leads to another. It’s a song of choices that feels exhilarating at first—until you realize the road leads to nowhere. If there’s a song that best describes the socio-political condition of Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto’s presidency, this might be it.

Since taking office, Prabowo’s government has moved swiftly, reshaping policies, consolidating power, and making bold budgetary decisions. A unique paradox marks his leadership: while Indonesia witnesses growing civil society protests against military influence in governance, education budget cuts, and creeping authoritarianism, there remains a silent majority that supports his administration. Much like the song’s protagonist, who realizes too late that they were part of a doomed ride, Indonesia finds itself on a high-speed political journey with no clear exit strategy.

This paradox stems from diverging perceptions of stability and progress. On one hand, student groups, academics, and activists are raising alarms over increasing state control and the erosion of democratic freedoms. The return of military figures to civilian positions is seen as a step backward, echoing the days before Reformasi, when the military wielded extensive political and economic power. Education cuts have fueled anger among the youth, who see them as a sign of misplaced priorities. Meanwhile, concerns over media restrictions and the suppression of dissent paint a picture of creeping authoritarianism.

On the other hand, Prabowo’s supporters—primarily from rural communities, the working class, and nationalist circles—view his leadership as a necessary counterbalance to instability. To them, military governance represents discipline, order, and strength. Programs like free school meals, ambitious infrastructure projects, and nationalist rhetoric reinforce the image of a strong and protective leader. The silent majority, therefore, remains largely content, believing that protests are exaggerated or instigated by elites who fail to understand the realities of common citizens.

However, as history has shown, such dynamics rarely remain static. Public patience can wane as economic pressures mount, and once-loyal supporters can become disillusioned when promises fail to materialize. The question remains: Will this silent majority continue to ride along, or will they eventually recognize that they, too, are passengers in a political getaway car heading toward an uncertain destination?

 

The illusion of a promising start

It was the best of times, the worst of crimes

I struck a match and blew your mind

But I didn’t mean it, and you didn’t see it

In the song, Swift describes a relationship that begins with a thrilling, rebellious escape—only for things to spiral out of control. Prabowo’s presidency mirrors this, starting with high public enthusiasm. He promised stability, security, and economic transformation, particularly in defense and infrastructure.

His high hopes, particularly with his promises of economic transformation, national security, and military professionalism, offer a promising future for Indonesia. But with these promises came drastic moves. His administration has aggressively expanded the role of the military in civilian governance, reminiscent of Indonesia’s Suharto-era “dual function” (Dwifungsi) doctrine. The passing of a law allowing active military officers to take civilian posts marks a fundamental shift away from the democratic reforms of Reformasi, Indonesia’s post-1998 transition to democracy. Critics argue that this undermines civilian oversight and could open the door to unchecked military influence. Much like the song’s theme—where the excitement of an escape fades into inevitable disillusionment—the government’s bold moves (e.g., militarization of civilian roles, budget reallocations) may initially seem strategic but risk long-term consequences.

 

When the civil society hits the brakes…

We were jet-set, Bonnie and Clyde

Until I switched to the other side, to the other side

It’s no surprise I turned you in

‘Cause us traitors never win

Indonesia’s streets have not been quiet. Large-scale protests—most notably the “Dark Indonesia” movement led by students and educators—have erupted in response to Prabowo’s sweeping budget reallocations. With education and public works taking a hit to fund other priorities, including military spending and nationalistic programs, young Indonesians have voiced strong opposition, with much of the protest activity shifting to digital platforms such as social media (mostly Instagram and X) and online petitions. This trend reflects both the increasing restrictions on physical demonstrations and the changing nature of activism in a digitally connected era. While digital protests allow for wider participation and international awareness, their effectiveness is debated.

The silent majority, on the other hand, often less engaged in online discourse, may remain indifferent or even skeptical, viewing these protests as disconnected from their immediate concerns. The government’s response? A mix of crackdowns and attempts to discredit activists, reminiscent of past authoritarian tactics. In Papua, activists continue to be arrested for challenging military actions, while press freedom faces subtle yet significant restrictions. Civil society movements have raised concerns that the space for democratic expression is shrinking. The more the government tightens its grip, the more resistance builds.

 

The “silent majority”

And a circus ain’t a love story, and now we’re both sorry

Yet, despite the vocal opposition, Prabowo still enjoys broad support, particularly from rural communities, working-class citizens, and nationalist groups who see him as a stabilizing force. His appeal is rooted in a blend of strongman leadership, military discipline, and populist economic programs such as free school meals. Additionally, state-controlled media and nationalist rhetoric have played a significant role in shaping public perception, reinforcing his image as a protector of Indonesian sovereignty and progress. Many in this silent majority remain skeptical of digital protests, viewing them as disconnected from their daily struggles and driven by urban elites. Particularly among working-class Indonesians and rural communities. This is the “silent majority” who see his leadership as a promise of stability in an increasingly uncertain world. Much like the song’s protagonist, who is swept up in the thrill of the escape, many of Prabowo’s supporters believe they are on the right path—until reality catches up.

Populist policies like free school meals resonate deeply with this demographic. The government has skillfully framed its actions as necessary for national progress, and state-controlled narratives help reinforce this belief. But as inflation rises, budget cuts affect essential services, and democratic spaces shrink, will the silent majority start feeling like they’ve been taken for a ride?

 

No way out

I knew it from the first Old Fashioned, we were cursed

We never had a shotgun shot in the dark

Indonesia’s governance under Prabowo faces a potential turning point: Will it continue down a path of securitization and centralized power, or will opposition forces grow strong enough to change course? The song’s theme of inevitable downfall mirrors the uncertainty of how sustainable Prabowo’s approach will be in the long run. History suggests that unchecked control, especially when met with rising discontent, rarely ends smoothly. While the administration appears to be in control, the pushback from civil society and increasing economic pressures may eventually force a reckoning. Just like the song’s characters, who think they are free but are actually heading toward their downfall, the government’s trajectory might lead to a moment where the realities of governance catch up, forcing either reform or crisis.

Just as Getaway Car ends with betrayal and abandonment, the long-term trajectory of Prabowo’s governance remains uncertain. Will Indonesia continue down this road, or will the silent majority eventually slam the brakes?

One thing is certain: The ride is far from over. And in politics, as in Swift’s lyrics, high-speed escapes often lead straight into another trap.

 

 

Short biography

Tunggul Wicaksono is a Research Manager at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He can be reached through e-mail at tunggulwicaksono@ugm.ac.id.

Stepping further into the technological and industrial advancement age, the narration of sustainability in the international trade system has gained much attention from policymakers worldwide. Not only due to the climate crisis’s indiscriminate effect, which transverses beyond borders but also the highly disruptive implications for the international community’s economic activity, this agenda is being prioritized by governments. To make a long story short, states are looking for an answer to strike a balance in economic production, which is pivotal to our daily lives, and the climate crisis is irreversible damage. A recent initiative that has been put forward to solve these pressing issues is the carbon trading system, which places a cap and tax on corporations’ greenhouse emissions. In the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Blue Carbon ecosystem, which consists of mangroves, tidal marshes, and seagrass meadows, holds massive potential to be the global hub for carbon sequestration and storage. This article aims to explore ASEAN’s potential to fulfill its leading role in the blue carbon economy agenda and how it may contribute to our collective struggle to halt the climate crisis.

Blue carbon can be understood as carbon dioxide absorbed from the atmosphere and stored in coastal and marine ecosystems. Scott & Lindsay (2022) stated in their writings that the ecosystem’s critical components are crucial in offsetting carbon

footprint excess as the water-logged soils can isolate and store more carbon per unit than a regular forest. Statistically, in an empirical study conducted by Gruber et al. (2019), 31% of our carbon emissions are effectively absorbed into the depths of our ocean each day. Its high percentage of efficacy surely promises a critically needed way out for actors around the world whose means of production are still in the range of carbon-intensive. In 2023, fossil fuel use and energy exploration will still top the list as the biggest carbon emitters by industry; its cheapness deters the motivation to rapidly change into green energy that requires more material resources in its exploration. Aside from the dilemma of unsustainable energy scarcity, like any other political economy field of study, the answer to the question “Who gets what, when, and how?” that indicates the ‘paradox of plenty’ remains blurry, and our inability to answer it with a degree of fairness could still drag us into the edge of climate crisis injustice. In response to this issue, ASEAN created a comprehensive framework that accentuates the potential of the region’s blue economy; here, blue carbon initiatives are identified as one of the supporting pillars.

ASEAN’s Blue Economy Framework puts the values of inclusivity, cross-sectoral approach, and sustainability as its guiding principles. Correlating to the issue at hand, in its Blue Conservation Management plan, ASEAN member states are looking to achieve a neutral carbon balance using their marine and coastal-based activities. Regular emissions and sequestration capability assessments are also integrated into its strategies, along with the nationally determined contribution (NDC) system, which gives member states room to find a fine line between exploitation and preservation. The culmination of all these aspects is crystallized in the Blue Growth objective, which emphasizes the role of the ocean as the state’s engine of growth (Eikeset et al., 2018). In the writer’s opinion, ASEAN’s initiative is paramount to our collective effort to mitigate the detrimental effects of economic production. This premise holds bits of truth in the fact that the region hosts the planet’s most significant share of mangroves and seagrass, with 37% and 23%, respectively (Stankovic et al., 2023). These two components play critical roles in offsetting carbon footprints; creating a system that puts these rising states’ aspirations at the center is important. After all, we can’t negate the harsh fact that not all states are in the same stages of industrialization and development, but the climate crisis still happens indiscriminately. That logic requires us to pursue solutions that are constructed from the principles of sustainability and empowerment to make sure no one gets left behind this time.

Among the member states, Indonesia is one of the countries that possesses the ability and capacity to spearhead the effort. Along with Brazil, Nigeria, and Mexico, Indonesia owns more than 25% of the world’s mangrove population, which could absorb roughly 3.14 billion metric tons of carbon (PgC) (Sulaiman & Lutfi, 2019). Things are also pretty much the same in the same state with our seagrass reserves. Based on that fact alone, surely the international community would expect Indonesia to set the tone in this joint effort to redefine commodities in our trade system. After all, modifying something that is heavily reliant on nature’s ability presents an untapped opportunity as well as a grave danger should we fail to prevent it from getting into exploitation. Reflecting on what has been going on for the past couple of years, corporations’ unwillingness to switch their methods of production proves to be quite a challenge in implementing the carbon trading system. Instead of integrating bits of environment-based modification into their economic affairs, most of them choose to pay for the excess and thus put into question the effectiveness of the newly introduced carbon offsetting scheme. At the end of the day, those selfish actions do not contribute much to the declining amount of carbon emitted that has been set as the primary objective. In correspondence with this intricate issue, the writer thinks that Indonesia could use its capacity to influence and drive certain ASEAN policies that balance complex day-to-day economic activities and environmental preservation.

Consequently, our action to put a price tag on the ocean means that marine and coastal protection should be at the top of the list of policy priorities. ASEAN, through its Blue Economy Framework, has planned on establishing marine protected areas, such as the Sulu-Sulawesi Seascape and Coral Triangle Initiatives, to fulfill that mission. The organization aims to build a collaborative engagement between governments, NGOs, and local communities—three actors that have high stakes in how the coastal environment would be developed should it turn into a ‘carbon sink’. Moreover, this particular model of engagement that combines top-down and bottom-up approaches can also be seen as an effort to decentralize this carbon sequestration-centric issue. To achieve inclusive growth, equal rights of access to resources must be given to every actor so that they may contribute equally to the collective effort. This kind of political-economy arrangement, in the eyes of the writer, could be the entry point for ASEAN to lead in the global market. Humans and nature must be empowered equally to help us reach a state of sustainability in the future.

 

In conclusion, despite its commitment-related issue, ASEAN has managed to create a well-written plan for maximizing the potential of the blue economy in the region. Its top-down and bottom-up approach opens up an opportunity to create an inclusive environment to achieve sustainable growth. Concerning our responsibility towards the environment, ASEAN could take on the role of norm-setter to make sure inclusivity and sustainability are put into similar initiatives. This becomes increasingly important as this region possesses most of the untapped potential, and for years, it has been crucial for the local communities’ livelihood. Above all, no one should get left behind in the effort to find the balance between economic growth and nature protection.

 

References

Eikeset, A. M., Mazzarella, A. B., Davíðsdóttir, B., Klinger, D. H., Levin, S. A., Rovenskaya, E., & Stenseth, N. Chr. (2018). What is blue growth? The semantics of “Sustainable Development” of marine environments. Marine Policy, 87, 177–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.10.019

Gruber, N., Clement, D., Carter, B. R., Feely, R. A., van Heuven, S., Hoppema, M., & Ishii,

2007. (2019). The oceanic sink for anthropogenic CO2 from 1994 to 2007. Science, 363(6432).

Scott, M., & Lindsey, R. (2022, September 29). Understanding blue carbon | NOAA Climate.gov. www.climate.gov. https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/understanding-blue-car-bon

Stankovic, M., Mishra, A. K., Rahayu, Y. P., Lefcheck, J., Murdiyarso, D., Friess, D. A., Corkalo, M., Vukovic, T., Vanderklift, M. A., Farooq, S. H., Gaitan-Espitia, J. D., & Prathep, A. (2023). Blue carbon assessments of seagrass and mangrove ecosystems in South and Southeast Asia: Current progress and knowledge gaps. Science of the Total Environment, 904, 166618. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.166618

Sulaiman,  B.,  &  Lutfi,  M.  (2019).  COASTAL  COMMUNITY  PERCEPTION  OF

MANGROVES IN SULI SUBDISTRICT, LUWU. Jurnal Pendidikan IPA Indonesia, 8(4).

 

Short Biography:

Oktavianus Bima Saputra is an undergraduate in the Department of International Relations at Universitas Gadjah Mada.

 

Imagine businesses of all sizes, effortlessly trading goods and services across ASEAN borders, tapping into diverse markets, and seizing growth opportunities. Picture investors eagerly exploring investment prospects in ASEAN, fueling economic growth and creating job opportunities. Envision entrepreneurs, armed with innovative ideas and regional market access, expanding their businesses and contributing to prosperity. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint seeks to create such an environment, where businesses of all sizes can thrive and contribute to inclusive development in the region. The AEC Blueprint serves as a roadmap to transform this vision into reality, propelling ASEAN towards a new era of economic integration for inclusive development in the region.

The AEC Blueprint 2025 outlines five reinforcing characteristics for ASEAN’s economic integration, namely: (i) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; (ii) A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; (iii) Enhanced Connectivity and Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centered ASEAN; and (v) A Global ASEAN. These characteristics provide a roadmap for ASEAN’s economic integration efforts, emphasizing the need for integration, competitiveness, innovation, connectivity, inclusivity, resilience, and global engagement (ASEAN, 2015). We are currently two years away from achieving the dream, and as ASEAN continues to evolve as a regional bloc, the AEC Blueprint still presents both opportunities and challenges for member countries, including Indonesia, in its pursuit of greater economic cooperation towards 2025 and beyond. 

Unleashing Underestimated Economic Sector

The AEC Blueprint 2025 presents a plethora of opportunities for Indonesia. In essence, the blueprint creates greater market opportunities for ASEAN members. The integration of ASEAN markets under the AEC framework will hopefully drive Indonesia to improve competitiveness and efficiency for intra-ASEAN trade. This collective effort among ASEAN member countries has the potential to unlock underestimated economic sectors.

The services sector, despite its contribution of over 64.4% to the global GDP (World Bank, 2021b), has often been colloquially referred to as the “Cinderella sector”. This stems from the belief held by economists, industrial relations researchers, and innovation scholars who regard the sector as relatively unproductive compared to other sectors, despite its potential to bring significant value to the economy (Miles & Boden, 2015). In fact, William Baumol went so far as to suggest that the expansion of this low-productivity services sector could potentially hinder economic growth due to limited productivity improvement, potential labor cost savings, and price-inelastic demand (Baumol, 1967). This concept is now known as “Baumol disease”. Interestingly, the services sector’s share in Indonesia’s GDP is relatively high compared to other sectors, contributing 42.8% to its total GDP, highlighting the significant opportunities that can be tapped into for the economies (World Bank, 2021a).

However, Indonesia still faces challenges in its services sector, as indicated by the OECD’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. It reveals that Indonesia demonstrates high levels of restrictiveness, particularly in legal services (scoring 0.9), accounting (scoring 0.7), and telecommunication (scoring 0.6), where a score of zero indicates complete openness and a score of one indicates complete closure to foreign services (OECD, 2022). These restrictions can potentially limit the availability of high-quality services and productivity.  Opening up the services market can effectively address these quality issues and provide opportunities for Indonesia to access higher quality services from abroad, and of course benefiting other economic sectors as well. Just like goods, high-quality and efficient services do not necessarily have to be produced domestically. Services trade allows Indonesia to access the immediate benefits of better quality services from abroad which can support other economic sectors.

Enhancing Manufacture, Fisheries and Agriculture Sector

Indonesia, being the ASEAN country with the largest population and GDP, holds other significant opportunities from the AEC Blueprint. The country’s abundant natural resources, particularly in agriculture and fisheries, further amplify its potential for economic gains through the AEC. Despite these favorable demographic and economic factors, recent industrial performance in Indonesia has been subpar. The fisheries and agricultural sectors, in particular, face weak competitiveness within ASEAN. Additionally, Indonesia faces competition from Vietnam in prawns and textiles, as well as from Thailand in the automotive supply chain within ASEAN (Aswicahyono & Soedjito, 2016). To achieve competitiveness within ASEAN, Indonesia must focus on developing a robust manufacturing base and enhancing the quality of its human capital. However, the country is grappling with persistent challenges related to infrastructure, including logistics, energy supply, and transportation, as well as an inefficient bureaucracy and corrupt institutions.

Unfortunately, Indonesia’s Business Freedom Index by The Global Economy had a decline in its value from 71 in 2021 to 67 in 2022, giving Indonesia just 57th in the Business Freedom ranking amongst 175 countries (Global Economy, 2022). In addition to that, Indonesia only ranks 95th on the Corruption Perception Index (Global Economy, 2021), indicating that practices of administrative and political corruption are still high. In order to combat these problems, Indonesia should focus on improving the regulatory environment to enhance business freedom. This may include simplifying and streamlining business regulations, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and enhancing transparency and efficiency in administrative processes. This could help create a more conducive environment for businesses to operate, attract investment, and foster economic growth in strategic sectors like agriculture and fisheries, while also giving strict regulations to mitigate the practice of corruption.

A Shift to Green Economy

The AEC Blueprint 2025 indeed emphasizes the importance of environmental sustainability and the integration of green principles into the economic policies and practices of ASEAN member states; it is specifically stated in the second characteristic of its framework, “A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN”. This includes efforts to reduce GHG emissions, promote renewable energy, enhance resource efficiency, and address climate change impacts. The Blueprint also encourages the adoption of sustainable production, consumption patterns, and the promotion of sustainable agriculture, forestry, and fisheries practices (ASEAN, 2015). But even so, its implementation to shift to a greener economy is not as good as its vision. In fact, The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest economic cooperation initiated by ASEAN countries to accomplish AEC’s visions, does not include a single chapter or regulation about the environmental consideration (CECPHILS, 2023). Provisions of RCEP for reducing tariffs could make non-renewable energies such as fossil fuel cheaper and more accessible to member countries. This may lead to an escalation in their utilization, particularly in Indonesia, which relies heavily on coal production and consumption. In addition, a recent study revealed that if all tariffs were eliminated among RCEP members, it could significantly increase approximately 3.1% in global carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion annually. This would effectively double the average annual growth rate of global CO2 emissions observed in the last decade (Tian et al., 2022).

Bright Future for Indonesia and ASEAN 

As ASEAN advances towards the realization of the AEC 2025, Indonesia faces a dual landscape of opportunities and challenges that must be addressed within a limited timeframe of approximately two years. While the AEC 2025 offers prospects for increased economic integration that could benefit Indonesia’s economy, challenges such as the need for structural reforms, increasing competitiveness, and environmental impact mitigation must be effectively navigated. Strategic planning, policy coordination, and stakeholder engagement are crucial for Indonesia to maximize the potential of the AEC 2025 and promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth. This will not only contribute to Indonesia’s prosperity and resilience but also to that of the broader ASEAN region.

 

About Writer

M. Tora Bhanu Pandito is an undergraduate student at the Faculty of Economics and Business of University of Brawijaya. His interests extend beyond the classroom, as he is deeply invested in foreign policy issues, writing research articles, and enhancing the creative economy. He had the privilege of serving as the Head of Creativepreneur for the Student Executive Board, leading several university initiatives aimed at empowering MSMEs and fostering entrepreneurship that promotes sustainable economy. Contact can be made through his email at torapandito@gmail.com.

Bibliography

1. ASEAN. (2015). ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025. In ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814414296-012
2. Aswicahyono, H., & Soedjito, A. (2016). Trade in Goods under the AEC: A New Map of Competitiveness for Indonesia. CSIS Working Paper Series No. 02 – 2016, (November). Retrieved from https://s3-csis-web.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/doc/Trade_in_Goods_un_Indonesia.pdf?download=1
3. Baumol, W. J. (1967). Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis. The American Economic Review, 57(3), 415–426. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812111
4. CECPHILS. (2023). The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and its impacts on the environment. Retrieved from https://www.cecphils.org/read-the-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-and-its-impacts-on-the-environment/
5. Global Economy. (2021). Indonesia: Corruption perceptions – Transparency International.
6. Global Economy. (2022). Indonesia: Business freedom. Retrieved from https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Indonesia/herit_business_freedom/
7. Miles, I., & Boden, M. (2015). Services and the Knowledge-Based Economy. New York: Routledge.
8. OECD. (2022). Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. Retrieved May 26, 2023, from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STRI
9. Tian, K., Zhang, Y., Li, Y., Ming, X., Jiang, S., Duan, H., … Wang, S. (2022). Regional trade agreement burdens global carbon emissions mitigation. Nature Communications, 13(1), 408. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-28004-5
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11. World Bank. (2021b). Services (% of GDP). Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TOTL.ZS

Written by Gerald John C. Guillermo

Civil society has long been a bastion of service and advocacy—contributing to the development and uplifting of lives, particularly in marginalized and underprivileged sectors of society. The Southeast Asian region is a testament to the catalytic role that civil society plays in lobbying for positive sociopolitical and economic changes, most especially in human rights protection (Tadem, 2017). During the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society organizations (CSOs) have supported efforts to curb the effects of the pandemic, especially for the vulnerable and marginalized. Those CSOs involved in human rights and democratization have faced more constraints in operation and activities prior to the pandemic, but many have continued their advocacy to hold their government accountable (Nixon, 2020). 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has embraced a shift toward a “people-oriented” approach, aiming to widen participation in civil society but restricting engagement which includes the establishment of an accreditation system and participation in informal consultations for CSOs (Gerard, 2014). Moreover, strict restrictions on the nature of participation and a limited set of issues up for discussion narrow cooperation with CSOs further, which results in discouraging participation from human rights-based CSOs. Therefore, the civic society narratives in ASEAN-sanctioned spaces are limited and controlled. 

This is particularly true with the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). The AHRD has been criticized for being a context-dependent human rights document subject to laws, local principles, and customs. In fact, during its declaration, various civil society organizations denounced the AHRD and that it “falls far below international standards” by undermining the universality of human rights principles (Article 19, 2012). Furthermore, the drafting process was controversial, such that CSOs were primarily excluded from the drafting process except for carefully managed “consultations” and representatives were still accountable to their government (Renshaw, 2013; Davies, 2014). The exclusion of civil society in the drafting process of the AHRD illustrates the limited effectiveness of CSOs’ advocacy in having an actual human rights protection mechanism in the ASEAN (Gomez & Ramcharan, 2012).  

However, civil society has moved forward and beyond the broken dynamics between CSOs and official ASEAN processes. For instance, CSOs all over the ASEAN region has maintained a robustly critical stance toward the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in its tenth year of founding and challenge them together with ASEAN to improve on acting on rights abuses (Hanara, 2019 & Forum Asia, 2019, as cited in Langlois, 2021). Moreover, in response to constraints on civil society participation, CSOs have developed “created spaces,” i.e., pursuing a political activity that bypasses regional and state actors such as with ASEAN-sanctioned modes of engagement and political arenas such as parallel activities, protests, and production and dissemination of critical knowledge (Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007, as cited in Gerard, 2014) and supported by external actors (Sundrijo, Awigra, Safitri, Virajati, & Wening, 2020). 

While this seems as if parting ways between one of the moving spirits of the human rights agenda in the region, i.e., the civil society and the ASEAN, it is not the be-all and end-all scenario. There are ways for ASEAN to catch up to its commitment to human rights and live up to being “people-centered.” To develop and establish an institutional and normative human rights framework in the region, formal and genuine consultation mechanisms with the CSOs must be in place, which includes the establishment of formal complaints mechanisms in AICHR, expansion of the accreditation process for CSOs, particularly for human rights based CSOs, (Jones, 2019) and review of the effectiveness of the AHRD.  

The issues confronted by the Southeast Asian region, as surfaced in the recently concluded 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, such as climate change, economy, peace, and security, are to be viewed not only at the state level but also in spaces where it matters—at the ground level. Recognizing the role of CSOs in helping solve such issues is one thing but engaging them more genuinely is another. ASEAN must support on-the-ground efforts of CSOs to mainstream human rights and connect networks of CSOs to promote understanding of particular issues with various stakeholders.  

Moreover, external organizations and stakeholders must support efforts for civil society to integrate and synergize with the broader organization of ASEAN. With ASEAN welcoming more external partners to pursue areas of cooperation, such international stakeholders must steer the discussion in crafting a more inclusive human rights regime in the region with the help of CSOs. 

Indeed, CSOs in the ASEAN region have been growing both in quantity and quality, constructively contributing to regionalism and strategically maneuvering against the institutional state-centrism of ASEAN through less structured mechanisms (Sundrijo et al., 2020). While CSOs have the means to navigate this “road less traveled,” it should not be that way. ASEAN must genuinely open its arms and confront the complex issue of human rights and “living” the AHRD, facing not only government dignitaries but listening to real people, real stories, and real lives, particularly the marginalized and the oppressed. 

*The views expressed in this article do not represent any of the organizations with which the author is affiliated. 

About Writer: 

• Gerald John C. Guillermo is a Juris Doctor student at the University of the Philippines College of Law. He received his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science, with a Minor Degree in Development Management at the Ateneo de Manila University. His areas of skills and interests include youth, public policy, international relations, governance, and law. Contact information: geraldjohnguillermo@gmail.com.

Bibliography

1. Article 19. (2012). Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: AHRD falls far below international standards. https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3536/Civil-Society-Denounces-Adoption-of-Flawed-ASEAN-Human-Rights-Declaration.pdf  
2. Davies, M. (2014). An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 33(3). 107–129. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/186810341403300305  
3. Gerard, K. (2014). ASEAN and civil society activities in ‘created spaces’: The limits of liberty, The Pacific Review, 27:2, 265-287, https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/09512748.2014.882395 
4. Gomez, J. & Ramcharan, R. (2012). ASEAN needs formal civil society engagement mechanism on human rights. Asia Centre. https://asiacentre.org/asean-needs-formal-civil-society-engagement-mechanism-on-human-rights/  
5. Jones, D. (2019). ASEAN’S Human Rights Conundrum: An Analysis Of The Failures Of The ASEAN System For Promoting Human Rights (Bachelor’s dissertation). https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=ppe_honors  
6. Langlois, A. (2021). Human rights in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s rights regime after its first decade. Journal of Human Rights, 20(2), 151-157. https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/14754835.2020.1843144 
7. Nixon, N. (2020). Civil Society in Southeast Asia During the Covid-19 Pandemic. The Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/publication/govasia-issue-1-civil-society-in-southeast-asia-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/  
8. Renshaw, C. (2013). The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012. Human Rights Law Review, 13(3), 557-579. https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngt016 
9. Sundrijo, D. A., Awigra, D., Safitri, D., Virajati, K., & Wening, P.P.P. (2020). Civil Society Participation in ASEAN Regionalism Strengthening the Capacity of ACSC/APF to Advocate the Interest of the People of Southeast Asia. Human Rights Working Group. https://www.hrwg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Civil-Society-Participation-in-ASEAN-draft-2.pdf 
10. Tadem, E. (2017). New Perspectives on Civil Society Engagement with ASEAN. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://th.boell.org/en/2017/07/12/new-perspectives-civil-society-engagement-asean#_ftn2 

According to Democracy Report 2022, published by V-Dem Institute, Southeast Asian countries were reported to experience either democratic stagnation or regression, indicating a shift towards a more autocratic region. 

Although most Southeast Asian countries hold elections, they are considered to be the feature of, rather than the cause of, democratization in Southeast Asian countries. These countries cannot simply be labeled as electoral democracies. Elections and electoral institutions are vulnerable to a certain degree of abuse and corruption. In that vein, Democracy Report 2022 did not qualify these Southeast Asian countries as electoral democracies, except Indonesia and Timor-Leste.  

The political development in the Philippines under Duterte made the Philippines fall under the category of electoral autocracies following Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Despite elections being held in these countries, their electoral institutions failed to uphold democratic principles.  

Meanwhile, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam downgraded from electoral autocracies in 2011 to closed autocracies in 2021, following Laos. The citizens of these countries barely have institutional capacities to hold accountable power holders — individuals or groups of people. Military forces have become a critical player in advancing autocratic governance in the region. It is evident in the 2014 Thai coup d’état and the most recent Myanmar coup d’état in which democratic institutions and human rights were violated.  

Beyond electoral components, an autocratic turn in the region has advanced through ‘authoritarian innovations’ in a broader regional geopolitical context and within individual countries. They are new governance practices, which take different forms, intended to shrink meaningful public political participation. The COVID-19 pandemic has also further intensified the use of authoritarian practices.  

Such an autocratic turn poses a challenge to ASEAN to realize its vision of being a people-centered and people-oriented community. In this vein, unpacking how this trend further intensifies is critical to enable ASEAN as a regional bloc to curb further democratic regression. Two issues are worth discussing here. 

First, in a broader geopolitical context, the rise of China has unavoidably shaped — complicated — the ways in which Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN navigate their internal political dynamics, enabling anti-democratic forces in the region to grow.  

The 2021 Myanmar coup d’état was clear evidence. The Myanmar armed forces claimed that the coup was a ‘constitutional’ response to the election fraud committed by the National League for Democracy, which won a landslide victory in the 2020 election. The Institute for Strategy and Policy reported that over 5,600 civilians, including four democracy activists, were executed by the junta under the banner of the State Administration Council (SAC). 

Responding to the political crisis in Myanmar, the nine ASEAN leaders and the Myanmar junta chief agreed upon the “Five-Point Consensus” as the framework to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, by exploiting the ASEAN’s ‘non-interference’ principle, the SAC refused to conform to the consensus, resulting in no tangible outcomes.  

It is clear that China maintains its legitimacy as a strategic and economic partner for ASEAN countries through its Belt and Road Initiatives while leveraging the democratic decline in the region to pursue its national interests. Positioning itself as the dominant power in the region, the rise of China’s power has indirectly empowered anti-democratic forces in the region by providing support for their political survival.  

China’s support for the Myanmar junta to protect its political sovereignty has complicated ASEAN’s approach to the crisis. Keeping this in mind, the non-interference principle must be revisited to avoid its abuse by the member states in the name of sovereignty at the expense of human rights and to enable Responsibility to Protect. 

Second, the emerging new authoritarian practices to subvert democratic progress are evident in and intensified by handling the COVID-19 pandemic in Southeast Asian countries. The handling has been shadowed by shrinking civic space.  

Contact tracing essentially designed to halt the spread of COVID-19 may serve as a platform for governments’ digital surveillance unrelated to the pandemic. Digital Reach, an organization that looks into the impact of technology on human rights in Southeast Asia, monitored the use of digital contact tracing across six ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  

One big concern arising from this digital contact tracing is a privacy issue. In Singapore, despite having a personal data protection policy, data collected from its contact tracing app was made accessible for criminal investigations. The report from Digital Reach showed that it is used to silence critics of the government of Singapore. In this context, the absence of a personal data protection policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam increases the likelihood of public surveillance and violation of the right to privacy. 

Responding to the pandemic, ASEAN released the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework outlining ASEAN’s five broad strategies for recovery. Yet, this recovery framework disregards the importance of upholding democratic principles, although strengthening human security is part of its broad recovery strategies.  

Given the long-term impacts of the pandemic, democracy in the region will continue to deteriorate if ASEAN fails to center democratic principles in its COVID-19 recovery strategies. ASEAN must work closely with its accredited entities, including civil society organizations, to hold ASEAN governments accountable in their efforts for COVID-19 recovery. 

Two issues above demonstrate that ASEAN is, once again, at a crossroads. Democracy in the region is beyond fragile; it will continue to decline if ASEAN turns a blind eye to it. However, to renew ASEAN’s commitment to democratic principles in the region, it must begin from within each of ASEAN member states.  

 

*The views expressed in this article do not represent any of the organizations with which the authors are affiliated. 

 

About writers: 

1. Muhammad Ammar Hidayahtulloh is a PhD candidate at the School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland. Twitter: @muhammadammarh_ 
2. Muhammad Maulana Iberahim is Regional Media & Communications Support Officer at International Organization for Migration. Twitter: @iberahims