ASEAN After 50: Studying the Lands Below the Winds

August 9, 2017/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Dendy Raditya A.

On August 8th this year, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will celebrate its 50th anniversary. This is the right time to reflecting on what had been done from 1967 until now and what need to do in the future, not only by ASEAN as an organization but also by the whole elements within ASEAN.

What could be reflected from the 50 years of ASEAN and the studies associated with this organization? Historically, the embryo of studies about this region –which historian Anthony Reid called as ‘the lands below the winds’ could be traced back to the colonial era. The study of Southeast Asia originally developed at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes founded in Paris around 1795, followed by the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands at 1864, and finally the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London in 1917.

After the end of the colonialism, Modern Southeast Asian Studies, likes the study of other regions, was born from the interests of Western countries (especially the United States) post-World War II to understand the social, cultural, political and economic aspects of countries in Southeast Asia in a postcolonial context.

It is important to first, understand the difference between the ASEAN and Southeast Asian Studies. The most visible difference is the scope of studies: ASEAN Studies focus more on ASEAN as an institution and tends to be more policy-oriented, while Southeast Asian Studies focus more on social, cultural, economic and, to some extent, political aspects of society in the region.

Likewise, the Southeast Asia Studies faces challenges in its development. There are three interesting issues faced by Southeast Asian Studies (and also ASEAN Studies): The problem of inequality between Western countries and ASEAN countries in the terms of knowledge production; the problems of studying Southeast Asia from within; and the position of contemporary Southeast Asian Studies between state’s and market’s interests.

The disproportion between the Western countries and Southeast Asian countries (as a locus of Southeast Asian Studies and ASEAN Studies) is evident in the production of political-economy knowledge of this studies. Achmad Firas and Iqra Anugrah argues that this problem exists since the early days of the formulation of both Southeast Asian studies and ASEAN Studies. Instead by their own people, the knowledge of Southeast Asia was generated by social institutions and scientists from Western countries.

Syed Farid Alatas once wrote that the inequality of knowledge production has resulted in a growing dependence of the scientist and social science institution in Southeast Asia on the Western world. These dependencies include the idea dependence, media dependency to disseminate ideas, the dependence of educational technology, dependence on research and education funding, and dependence of Third World social scientists (including Southeast Asia) on employment in the scientific field of the Western countries.

The other problem is in regard to the possibility of Southeast Asian to study about the Southeast Asia and ASEAN of their own. According to Ariel Heryanto, there at least four issues faced by Southeast Asian researchers who came from this region itself.

First, the status of researchers as an “insider” of the Southeast Asian societies, creates a dilemma: sometimes they are too qualified in language, living experience and knowledge of their own communities, but less qualified in analytical thinking and academic theorization.

Second, the dominance of English as the language of instruction in the Southeast Asian studies, with the lack of use of the regional languages itself. One fact behind this condition is that the main consumers of the ASEAN and Southeast Asia studies are those who come from the Western countries, not from Southeast Asia itself.

Third, there is a discrepancy between the institution’s objectives, the Southeast Asia Studies Center, on what to look for and the method to use with the social reality in Southeast Asia. It leads to the fourth issue, namely the patronistic relationship in research. Ariel Heryanto illustrates it in a condition when a senior researcher “forced” his junior to quote his work.

There is also the issue of a pitfall among the interests of states and the market. The social disciplines of Southeast Asia post-independence era became a tool of the state to legitimize the policies adopted by rulers. In Indonesia for example, the use of social science for the sake of power was evident in the era known as the “New Order”, when many public intellectuals served as bureaucrats within the regime. The New Order era also put forward the idea of developmentalism and modernization, which in turn eliminating critical paradigms such as class-based analysis and critical theory.

The collapse of many authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia does not necessarily make the study of Southeast Asia more developed. This happens because nowadays, the interests of the market along with the ideology of neoliberalism has penetrated into the realm of scholars around the world. It causes marginalization and limited access to research funding, especially those from scholarships that are deemed to have no “impacts”.

Although the problems faced by the Southeast Asian Studies had made it difficult for them to academically develop in a post-authoritarian scene, there are efforts to bridging the difficulties by various Southeast Asian Studies and Review institutions. The establishment of numbers of institution in Singapore for example, such as the ISEAS (Institute for Southeast Asian Studies), ARI (Asia Research Institute) at NUS (National University of Singapore) and RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies) at the NTU (Nanyang Technological University); Thailand with the ASEAN Studies Center at Chulalongkorn University; and Indonesia with the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies and the ASEAN Studies Center at Universitas Gadjah Mada can be considered as part of these efforts.

Coinciding with the ASEAN golden anniversary, I suggest that we should rethink about the future of ASEAN Studies besides, of course, Southeast Asian Studies. ASEAN now faces many challenges such as the emergence of many new issues: the digital society, demands for inclusive and sustainable development inside ASEAN Community, global terrorism, identity conflicts, migrant and human trafficking issues, maritime governance, and more. It is necessary to further investigate these issues rather share ASEAN’s relevance in world politics.

Thus, it is important for researchers from the ASEAN and Southeast Asian studies to undertake a critical and theoretical research—and not only the policy-oriented one. It is also important to dismantle the ‘established’ concept and policy reference narrative in the existing studies. ASEAN Studies needs an emancipatory as well as practical dimension.

At the end of the day, the shout goes to all Southeast Asian researchers, especially throughout Indonesia. Call for them to keep on reading, writing and researching to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ASEAN!

*) Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito is an Undergraduate Student at the Department of Public Policy and Management, Fisipol, Universitas Gadjah Mada

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

ASEAN After 50: Studying the Lands Below the Winds

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