Trump and the Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ Doctrine
Bara E. Brahmantika, Guest Contributor
The result of 2016 US election has paved the way for Donald Trump to be the 45th president of United States, and many people are scrambling to figuring out what it means for the world. Two of my colleagues, Dedi Dinarto and Habibah Hermanadi in ASEAN Studies Center had tried to analyze the the implication of ‘Trump’s Triumph’ on the future of ASEAN. But while both of the analysts are sound, I have serious reservation on how both writers overlook the implication of Trump’s foreign on the ASEAN regional politics.
In my view, Dinarto’s argument on the possibility of the remaking of the global triangle politics is an overestimation on the current global power dynamic between major countries, while Hermanadi’s argument that Trump’s Triumph will inspire a strongmen approach among ASEAN countries leaders who are trying to emulate him is an underestimation of the possible impact of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. Both I argue are stem from the authors misconception on the core idea of Trump’s foreign policy. So it is imperative for us to understand what Trump’s Foreign Policy is, a transactional policy, with a combined flavor of isolationism and protectionism
Trump’s Foreign Policy.
It is understandable for many to have misconception about Trump’s policy, because for one, Trump isn’t known as a well articulate candidate. In hindsight, hearing Trump talks on foreign policies gave an impression that Trump foreign policy is just a mishmash of ideas with no core philosophy, thus making it difficult to pin point exactly what is Trump’s outlook on foreign policy. But if we look carefully, underneath all of his incoherent rants, a silver lining could be found
And this is where Hermanadi is right about where Donald Trump might be going. Hermanadi describes Donald Trump as Strongman Leader, which will emphasizes on the strength of greatness based on national unity, and national interest. There is no clearer indication of it, than Trump’s vision on America First.
Trump said, in one of his rallies that, “Under a Trump administration, no American citizen will ever again feel that their needs come second to the citizens of a foreign country.”
According to Trump, America First is an attempt to put American citizen’s priority above citizens of foreign countries. Trump has signaling on reduction of US engagement in international stages, and to put national interest above all else, creating this mixed of political isolationism and economic protectionism. But the more interesting bit is on how Trump define US national interest.
According to Dreazen, Vox’s foreign editor, Trump has this simple and basic view on what is US national interest, which is transactional. In the word of Dreazen; “In Trump’s conception, all of foreign policy is motivated by assessment of what’s better, in a narrow financial sense…. Trump believes the everything comes down to the art of transaction, with countries that spend their money the way he wants them to getting more than countries the don’t”
Just take a look at Trump’s statement during his final presidential debate, explaining about his outlook on US foreign policy:
“As far as Japan and other countries, we are being ripped off by everybody — we’re defending other country. We’re spending a fortune doing it. They have the bargain of the century. All I said is we have to renegotiate these agreements because our country cannot afford to defend Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, South Korea and many other places. We cannot continue to afford.”
So America First foreign policy basically a policy of which United States will disengage from any international involvement unless U.S. has a clear financial benefit from such arrangement. This is pretty clear from Trump’s statements regarding pulling out from NATO, and Japan if they are not willing to pay an equal amount for funding in exchange for their protection. Or Trump willingness to put up trade barriers, and go to trade wars with China until U.S get a better deal from their trade. So how does this play out in South East Asia region?
The Death of ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrine.
During the presidency of Obama, under the rudder of Secretary Clinton, U.S has put forward a ‘Pivot to Asia’ doctrines, as U.S new strategies to face the new challenges of China growing presence in Asia region. Pivot to Asia was US decision to shift their priority and presences from Middle East and East Europe to Asia. This drove mainly because not only the growing global influence of China, but also the decline of Russia’s sphere of influence. Pivot to Asia was Obama’s solution to help the Asia region mitigates the international conflict, by providing a counter balance to China.
The South East Asia region is included within Obama’s Pivot to East Asia, and has proven to be resulting in greater engagement of the US in South East Asia region, which is evidently pointed out by Obama thirteen times visits, to nine different ASEAN countries during his two terms in office, this in contrast with his predecessor, President Bush, who only managed to visit South East Asia eight times and only to five different ASEAN countries. US has put considerably more resource in South East Asia, raising investment, greater military presence, and overall better relationship with ASEAN Countries. But this ASEAN re-engagement might come to an end, as President Trump is unlikely to follow the suit.
Take a look at few of his statements when it comes to US foreign policy in Asia, in one his foreign policy speech Trump said;
“We have spent trillions of dollars over time on planes, missiles, ships, equipment, building up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”
And also during one of his TV interview, he mentioned about what he thinks on US presence in Asia:
“Japan is better if it protects itself against this maniac of North Korea, we are better off frankly if South Korea is going to start protecting itself … they have to protect themselves or they have to pay us.”
Given President-elect Trump statement during his campaign, on how Japan and Korea are better off defending themselves with nuclear, instead of burdening United States financially to provide them with military defence, and how likely he would scrap TPP away. That was a clear signal on how President Trump is eager to end the US re-engagement process in East Asia, which in this case will likely include ASEAN.
This is sentiment that shared by many analysts such us Gillen from National University of Singapore, and Sa from S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, as well as Bisley from La Trobe University. Three of them believe that under Trump, there will be significant realignment of US Foreign Policy, to the point of significant diminish of US political and military presence in ASEAN, or even to the point of disappearing all together. With Sa particularly mentioning that Trump might not know that ASEAN existed in the first place.
Within ASEAN member itself, there are growing concern on how the US-ASEAN relations could be deteriorating under Trump, as rightly pointed out by Dinarto in his piece, that many ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia to name few, that are seeing deeper relationship with China as more beneficial relationship.
And if we took what president Trump said during his campaign seriously, we probably will see a more traditional approach on US foreign policy to refocus themselves to Middle East, especially on the issue of ISIS and Israel-Palestinian conflict. While at the same time reducing many of US global involvement when it comes to political, and security issues, and refocusing US foreign policy effort to crafting better economic strategy against China domination.
“If China does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets, I will use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes, including the application of tariffs consistent with Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.” Trump said
So how does it affect ASEAN ?
Dinarto has pointed out that the Trump presidency will likely affect ASEAN in two ways, first it will create Global Triangle dynamic among great powers, or as also pointed out by Hermanadi, that it will force ASEAN to reinvigorate the notion of ASEAN Centrality and unity to attain their own national interest and fending off global powers.
The first scenario of the creation of global triangle politics is very unlikely happen in South East Asia, for few reasons. First, the Trump’s foreign policy doctrine dictates that US will reduce all of their involvement to a minimum, and Trump is more than willing to look away from what happened to Crimea and Syria, just to improve US relations with Russia, and preventing the US government to be dragged away to a conflict that doesn’t financially benefiting US. Japanese brokerage firm Nomura, also predicting that Trump would eventually limit investment in South East Asia in an attempt to bring job backs to the US, and with the TPP is likely to be put to shelf by Trump, and also the possibilities of dismantling US military base in Philippines, the US presences in South East Asia, and globally would be reduced significantly. So US would likely to pull away from intervening in the matter of South China Sea, and would focus their attention on to getting a better trade deal with China, even if it has to comes to trade war.
Second, Russia’s presence in ASEAN is minimal, with Asia- Pacific ranked number four in Russia’s foreign policy priorities, and it is for a reason, because Russia has no significant military objectives in South East Asia, other than selling weaponry and maintaining ties with Vietnam. The share of Russian export in ASEAN is only reach 2.7% in 2014, and Russia’s investment in ASEAN is a meager 0.2% of total Russian investment, or equivalent to 698 million dollars, with almost half of it goes to Vietnam. Currently, when it comes to ASEAN, Russia only hold a status s partnership, in comparison US, China, and Japan all have hold the status of strategic partner. Russia is also in relatively weak position, after the economic embargo and sanction that has been put by US and EU after the Crimea debacles, Russia has been hurt economically, and pretty much dependent on the trade relations with China. Russia and China also hold pretty much the same position on almost every international issues, thus they are more likely to be an ally in South East Asia than adversary. For example, when it comes to South China Sea disputes, despite trying to maintain neutrality for long, the deepening ties between China and Russia, has shift Russian position in favor for China, with Russia clear objection on the use of international court to solve the South China Sea dispute.
Third, all the reasons above left China as the only dominant power in South East Asia region. With TPP likely gone from the picture, the RECP regional bloc and OBOR initiative under the leadership of China are the only major comprehensive economic framework that will affect the ASEAN greatly, thus raised China economic bargaining power greatly within ASEAN. Not to mentioned the ever increasing defence budget and modernization of China’s military that put new emphasize on Navy and Airforce, of which surely increase the ability of Chinese military to project their power in South East Asia. With China as the only major power that actively engaging with ASEAN, the triangle power dynamic between US-China-Russia in ASEAN is very unlikely to happen, at least not in Trump’s first term.
The more likely scenario is that with China as sole major power influencer in ASEAN, ASEAN countries will band together to strengthening their bargaining position to check China’s influence in the region. But with the rise of the populist movement, nativism, and strongman leader in ASEAN countries, as predicted by Hermanadi, ASEAN countries might use and strengthening ASEAN to serves their national ego and protect them from the global power influence such as China.
But one other point that Hermanadi fails to mention is that the absence of US political presence might strengthening the strongman leaders in ASEAN region and slowing down the advance of human rights implementation in ASEAN. Because US has traditionally become the stable actor that has often claim higher moral ground along with EU when it comes to human rights, which can be shown from the topic discussed at US-ASEAN Summit in the past few years. But under Trump presidency, that will colored by unpredictable isolationist foreign policy, and little regard on human rights, ASEAN might find itself reluctant in pursuing the advancement of human right as their priority. And with no global power to put pressure and scrutiny for those strongmen leaders in ASEAN to respect human rights, then we might find ASEAN to be a less friendlier place for human right to flourish.
So in conclusion, while it is difficult to predict where Donald Trump going to take U.S. foreign policy, as he haven’t yet to took the office, it is fair to say that his foreign policy will focus on re-engagement with US traditional pivot to Middle East, improving relationship with Russia, while at the same time reducing US engagement in other regions, including South East Asia. Coupled with Trump reluctant in resuming the implementation of TPP, and his little regards on promoting democracy and human rights as part of U.S foreign policy, would likely resulting not the re-creation of global power politics, but on sole domination of China as the only great power country in South East Asia, therefore would forces many ASEAN country leaders to unite under ASEAN to better fend off China domination in the region.
