Report on Progress: 100th days of ASEAN Economic Community

April 12, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Last Monday, 11^th of April 2016 marked the 100 days of the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community. From this point it is only necessary to question where has ASEAN brought themselves into in the past 100 days? There are several of policies planning and activities brought by member states government, but had the member states discussed what matters for them in the practicality of the community? Through the political economic scope we will assess the progress of the ASEAN Economic Community in the last 100 days, progress in the sense of comprehensive improvements and agendas in all economic aspects macro and micro.

Early on April, a meeting was held among finance ministers and central bank governors from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the meeting had agreed upon the forming of collective interest and to make efforts toward realizing financial integration in the region by 2025 (Kyodo News, 2016), During the meeting which was held in Vientiane, the representatives from the 10-member states of ASEAN welcomed the launch late last year of the ASEAN Economic Community and pledged to promote financial inclusion and stability based on a blueprint for the coming decade for the AEC. True, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint requires mature economic policies and regulates the flow of finance among each state before furthering the integration; therefore out of the meetings the representatives had set their agenda in putting in place the appropriate monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies. This is a gesture of continued efforts toward liberalizing financial services and developing capital markets as pillars for realizing regional financial integration.

The financial integration focused on the creation of ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, where the representatives formulated a standard of Qualified ASEAN Bank or QAB, in the status quo QAB system has been studied on a limited trial basis through bilateral agreements, not yet implemented in the ASEAN scale. However, ASEAN put its commitment through the AEC meaning that there is a need for broader implementation. As the meeting in Vientiane set a new time line, it also calls for creating by 2025 a system letting eight of the 10 ASEAN members share bond market disclosures and framework for retail investors to buy government bond (Tamaki, 2016). As part of the ASEAN economic community agenda these policies viewed to be critical as it could make fundraising within the bloc simpler, more flexible, and it will speed the infrastructure development.

Still within the finance platform, the outcome of the meeting addressed the Seventh Package of Financial Services Commitments and aimed on fully liberalizing the insurance sector. On May the 3^rd the commitments would be ratified making several ASEAN states to abide the new “fully liberalized the cross-border supply of international maritime, aviation and transit insurance” (Boon, 2016). The meeting basically reviewed tasks in the ASEAN financial and monetary integration roadmap in terms of liberalization of financial services and capital. Through capital and market development, the states members came up with the seventh package of financial services liberalization and are ready to launch the eighth round of negotiation this year (Vietnam News, 2016), these packages are created and ratified to further open the financial services market, with a focus on further liberalizing insurance services in the region. Ministers and central governors from the member states had pledged to continue removing existing obstacles to trade and direct investment.

It is reflected the readiness of ASEAN member states through the meetings and how they set the finance environment after the launch of ASEAN Economic Community. Supposedly this meetings and ratified commitments were conducted before the launch of the community, regulation and liberation of finance should have been part of the preparation towards AEC back in 2015; therefore within the last 100 days the policies are created to touch the community better rather than just government meetings discussing financial matters. Whether it is part of the members’ strategy or another form of ASEAN’s way of hindering themselves from an actual community-based integration, the AEC does make progress. Hopefully within the next 100 days the progress will not only cover higher institution agenda nor will it postpone what is critical for the community. It is the time for the regional community to be included in the policies and implementations and what is best for the community discusses in the next summit, not until ASEAN could talk and asses what is practical and viable for the community and set aside the tedious agendas actual progress can be made. It is only logical that the involvement and contribution of the community will facile the path towards economic union

Sources:

Kyodo News. (2016, April 5). Asean ministers push for financial integration by 2025. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/922381/asean-ministers-push-for-financial-integration-by-2025>

Tamaki, K. (2016, April 5). ASEAN cautiously speeds steps toward financial integration. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/ASEAN-cautiously-speeds-steps-toward-financial-integration?page=1>

Boon, R. (2016, April 06). AEC makes progress on insurance, investment schemes. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/aec-makes-progress-on-insurance-investment-schemes>

Vietnam News. (2016, April 5). ASEAN finance ministers commit to cautious fiscal policies. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/294831/asean-finance-ministers-commit-to-cautious-fiscal-policies.html>

Latest Articles

Public Lecture on “Navigating Contemporary Challenges: Indonesian Diplomacy in a Chanching Global Changes”September 15, 2024 - 8:54 am
Partnership Policy Review Kick Off – “Strengthening the ASEAN Charter: Review of Regional Mechanisms and Policy Recommendations”September 12, 2024 - 7:19 am
ASEAN Spice: The Connecting Culture of Southeast AsiansJune 1, 2024 - 3:49 am
RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am

Facebook

RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Report on Progress: 100th days of ASEAN Economic Community

ASEAN STUDIES CENTER UGM

CONTACT US