The Future of ASEAN-Australian Relations

January 12, 2017/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Shane Preuss, Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

2016 was a significant year for Australian ASEAN relations. The First ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit was held on 7 September 2016 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. At the Summit Australian Prime minister Malcolm Turnbull highlighted the importance of the Strategic Partnership between his country and the regional body, focussing on opportunities for economic partnerships and the common security challenge, “that demands a united response, terrorism.”

Beyond this, Australia also promoted its role as a peace broker as a non-claimant in the South China Sea. The Summit can be seen as a major success for Australian ASEAN diplomatic relations and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong offered a significant compliment, when he said Australia “understands” ASEAN and its developmental needs. The Summit closed with Turnbull proposing a special ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ Summit in 2018. This invitation was quickly followed by Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s offer to host the ASEAN leaders summit in 2018, which, if accepted, would be the first summit held outside of a current ASEAN member state.

These diplomatic developments reflect increasing inter-linkages between Australia and ASEAN on economic, cultural, academic and security fronts. These include the signing of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2009 and the development of Australia’s New Colombo Plan initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges by supporting Australian students to study and undertake work-based placements in ASEAN Member States. Participants of the ASEAN-Australia Summit also agreed to update the 2004 Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 2014 also saw the celebration of Australia’s 40th year as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN.

These developments raise the question, what is Australia’s place in the region?

Australia in ‘Asia’

Historically ‘Australian’ identity has been defined in opposition to the idea of ‘Asia’. As part of the British Empire, Australia was understood as an outpost ‘confronting’ Asia. Following the decline of the British Empire this outpost mentality persisted and was reflected in former Prime Minister John Howard’s identification of Australia as a deputy sheriff to the US in Southeast Asia.

This identity stressed differences between Australia and ‘Asia’, conceived of as a coherent mass to the countries north, and was represented through racial identifiers, such as the ‘White Australia policy’, and ideological or cultural identifiers such as Howard’s championing of the shared values and common interests’ that bind the US and Australia together.

Culturally and politically, Australia has been tied to the Anglo sphere, while the country’s security policy has remained one of dependence, first on the UK and then on the USA.

Despite this, however, Australia finds itself drawn into its surrounding geo-graphical and geo-political region. Not only have Australian economic interests become increasingly embedded within the region, the country’s significant strategic and security objectives are also tied to its relationship with South East Asian partners.

ASEAN and Australia: Competing visions of Regionalism?

ASEAN has positioned itself as the driver of East Asia regionalism. The Organization’s convening power and centrality to regional processes is reflected in forums, such as ASEAN + three, East Asia Forum and the ASEAN Forum, which brings together a number of states well beyond the core 10 members, to shape the evolving political, strategic and economic architecture of the region.

ASEAN has also shown a propensity for expansion. The initial five members has expanded to the present 10, while observer status is held by Papua New Guinea (since 1976) and Timor Leste (2002). Fiji’s request for observer status also received support from former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Bangladesh has received support from Laos.

Australia’s reorientation towards Asia-Pacific was, perhaps, first evidenced, when Australia became ASEANs first dialogue partner 1974. Since then Australia has been invited to attend and participate at the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

As Australia engages with the region, however, it does so from a liminal position between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia.’ Australia has displayed an ambivalent position toward South East Asian Regionalism and ‘Asian’ regional identity and ASEAN states have reciprocated this ambivalence regarding Australia place within the region.

Former Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi expressed Australia’s outsider status at the first East Asia Summit when he remarked that Australia and New Zealand would be second-class participants in Asia’s vision, with “ASEAN+3” to be the “driver” of integration. Badawi commented that Australia’s participation at the Summit represented a convergence of “common interests’ rather than “being members of the community.”

Regarding a potential Australia application for ASEAN membership, Rodolfo Severino, a Philippines diplomat and Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002, remarked that ASEAN’s likely response would be “You’re not Southeast Asian.”

Australia’s ambivalent, or marginal position toward and in ‘Asian’ regionalism has led to the development of different, perhaps competing, visions of regional architecture. Australia’s involvement in establishing APEC, which would come to include the US, can be seen as an attempt to dilute growth of East Asia regionalism. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also made a proposal for the creation of Asia Pacific Community by 2020, which would include US, New Zealand, China and India focused on security and trade. The proposal was met with little enthusiasm, particularly from ASEAN members, and was criticized as unnecessarily multiplying regional institutions.

Ongoing debates in Australia have also seen a shift from defining the countries region as the ‘Asia Pacific’, to the ‘Indo Pacific,’ which may or may not include China, and even Africa, depending on ones viewpoint. In 2014, during a speech about Australia’s “new aid paradigm” Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, stated that Australia’s principal focus for aid allocations, would be in Australia’s region – ‘the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific.’ The Indo-Pacific has also become the defining geographic expression for Australia’s defence strategy, first articulated in the Labour Party’s 2013 Defence White paper and later embraced by the Coalition government.

The Future of Australian-ASEAN Relations

How can the recent developments in Australia-ASEAN relations be interpreted against this backdrop? Is it evidence of deepening integration, or the development of a shared community? Or are ASEAN Australia relations still mediated, purely, by a paradigm of shared interests. Is it a sign of convergence between how Australia and ASEAN understand their region, or will they continue to have different, perhaps competing, visions of regionalism?

Severino, points to Australia’s continuing ambivalence as its biggest hurdle to the integration into ASEAN. Regarding elevation to observer status he argues,

‘The problem with Australia is its ambivalence. At some point when Australia feels confident enough to say, “We are in Southeast Asia and we deserve to be in ASEAN,” then that will be the time. But this has to be worked out internally, domestically.’

However, by defining its region as the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ it can be argued that Australia is not attempting to integrate itself within the ASEAN community. The expansive definition is an acknowledgment, not only of Australia’s many geographical and strategic connections, or its maritime outlook, but also of the persistence of its ambivalent character as an island nation with no firm attachments, or connections with the countries that surround it. Australia’s region is defined by partnerships, even friendships, strengthened through social and cultural outreach. It is not, however, defined by a community. Within Australia’s new, and expansive understanding of its region, ASEAN is part of a broader picture, one partner among many.

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

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