Dedi Dinarto – Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Indonesian scholar Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad through his prominent book titled ‘ASEAN at the Crossroads of History’ criticizes the history of ASEAN which never escape upheaval. As an institution that is designed close to the important historical events in the region, ASEAN has flexibility properties serving both opportunities and downsides.

ASEAN has now entered the age of nearly half a century indicate a lengthy process of institutionalization aspects. The question would be to what extent has ASEAN been running?

To answer these questions, then there are two main layers that can be considered. First, ASEAN as an institution. Second, ASEAN as a community.

Establishment of ASEAN in 1967 is intended to fulfill both internal and external factors.

The former means to rediscover the structure of national economic growth and development, a peaceful atmosphere at that time provides an important precondition for Southeast Asia countries. Driven by the national interest, the five founding countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to immediately establish a functional institution.

On the other hand, the Cold War constellation led by bipolar power structure becomes a threat to the creation of the peaceful and neutral region. Under ASEAN framework, ASEAN member countries could eliminate as well as keep of the threat of communism.

These two main factors then pushed ASEAN member countries to create ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) treaty.

From the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the step undertaken by the ASEAN founding members is an attempt to minimize transaction costs in order to meet national interests. In other words, common interests are first defined off the international context, and then institutions are established by state actors to facilitate the achievement of their joint interests (see Keohane, 1989; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999).

However, current developments indicate ASEAN declination of the institutional aspects. This is partly reflected in the failure of ASEAN in dealing with the South China Sea case. As an institution, ASEAN failed to agree on unified voice in the face of a credible threat to the region yet neglecting the security of sea as a vital element of regional stability.

Even, it is also implicitly indicates that the ASEAN member countries are not willing to commit towards something that is not an issue for a particular country. In the context of South China Sea, the non-disputants such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Singapore, Thailand, and Myanmar would not take a credible stance because it would undermine the logic of the transactional cost efficiency which is expected to come from ASEAN.

In the end, ASEAN will only be used as a ‘stepping stone’ by member states. As long as it can freshly prepared and maximize the potential gains to the member countries, ASEAN would still be relevant.

On the other hand, ASEAN can also be seen from the aspect of community. This has to do with the view that ASEAN is a group of countries that are bound on the role of ideology, rules, and norms. Relations between countries are prepared on social expectations rather than utility maximization calculations.

In other words, institutional routines are followed even when there is no obvious self-interest involved (see March and Olsen, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

The main purpose of connecting people between countries is to construct something as an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist (see Fierke, 2007). This serves as driving factor encouraging the emergence of a community of discourse among member states are organized into three pillars of the ASEAN Community in 2025 include the issue of political-security, economic, and socio-cultural.

Nevertheless, ASEAN is still experiencing a significant issue in encouraging regionalism at the community level. Acharya (2004) was doubting the possibility of ‘participatory regionalism’. Even though several wider NGO-based regional institutions, such as ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum (ACSC/APF) and Asian People’s Advocacy have fought for people’s voice, the case of human rights abuse and trafficking remains appeared on newspaper’s headlines.

Thus, these multi-layer view provides us a reflective insight. To date, ASEAN serves as a political product working simultaneously on both institution and community. It remains a great competition between ‘the logic of consequences’ deemed by States and ‘the logic of appropriateness’ conceived by NGOs as the representative of community. This signifies the multi-interpretive of ASEAN as both an institution and community. Therefore, the development of ASEAN in the future would be depending on who does what and how. It defines the possibility of all agents to shape ASEAN either to remain state-centric or community based.

The obscurity of ASEAN facing the South China Sea issue after the victory of the Philippines against China in the tribunal ruling showed the fragmented ASEAN. Various views criticized potential to rearrange ASEAN regional integration ended nil after the result of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane, Laos. The meeting ended without a joint agreement by ASEAN member countries on the issue of the South China Sea. This situation indicates a declination of political relations between ASEAN countries within the framework of regional cooperation.

After the victory according to the result issued by the arbitral tribunal ruling, the Philippines energies a new approach for ASEAN to encourage the unification of ASEAN on the issue of the South China Sea during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Laos. The initiative was presented by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines as a step getting the international support towards ASEAN unity. The meeting was controversially reported that Cambodia and Laos refuse consensus in facing the South China Sea.

In fact, when referring to the release of a joint communique of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, all countries agreed to establish a network of communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to maritime emergencies in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the strategic measures agreed upon has not shown the existence of a single perspective in dealing with China in the South China Sea. Two of the failure to agree on a joint communiqué in Phnom Penh and Kuala Lumpur should be seen as the culmination of the change of position of ASEAN on South China Sea.

Thus, the question would be how should the ASEAN member countries facing the South China Sea issue?

ASEAN needs to establish a new constructive approach on the sea and its significance for regional integration. Sea is not only to be treated as a material element that can be exploited, but also as a political space in which the action of appropriation can be performed. Reflecting on how the Chinese build a discourse on the importance of the South China Sea is not only to meet the substantive national interest, but also as a traditional element that must be protected.

In the context of Southeast Asia, Jennifer Gaynor argues that the political instrumentalization over sea space had already happened in Southeast Asia. It was firstly brought by the Javanese who are creating the concept of ‘Nusantara’ dividing them with outside party. However, this concept developed to serve ranging purposes from nation-building, national security, and territorial demarcation (Gaynor, 2007). Since the mid-twentieth century, the term Nusantara has become the synonym for tanah air. This period demonstrated how Majapahit empire used this term making appropriation against the Dutch who claimed to restore the glorious of “Indianized” states of Java’s pre-Islamic past (Gaynor, 2007). By giving such ‘spatial ideology’ is to serve the purpose of Javanese making exclusive space against other nations outside of Java Island. In the aftermath, the concept of Nusantara denotes a national space in 1940s. The contemporary Indonesian illustrated Nusantara as a group of islands located between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean or between the Asian mainland and Australia. For the last reason, in 1957, the Indonesia government reinvented the concept of Nusantara in order to prevent the regional rebellions, thus issuing a statement of national unity called the Djuanda Declaration. The additional purpose is that this declaration also includes all of the waters between Indonesia’s islands within a single connected body: manifesting the abstract geographical signifier.

Referring the context above, the ASEAN member countries should begin to consider sea as a political space that is significant to be maintained through the process of appropriation. Instead of just dwelling on the substantive level, ASEAN members need to realize the importance of the ideological claims of the sea as a political space.

Dedi Dinarto is a research assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Mohammad Hazyar Arumbinang, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM.

A powerful Indian Ocean earthquake was constructed on December 26, 2004, with the epicenter off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The shock had a moment magnitude of 9.1-9.3. It caused the massive giant waves devastated thousands of communities along the coastline of the Indian Ocean. More than 240,000 people were killed. Tens of thousands went missing and are presumed dead, and more than a million people were displaced. It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. [1] The plight of the affected people and countries prompted a worldwide humanitarian emergency response. As part of commitment towards a partnership with local and global cooperation, especially the catastrophic involves the loss of many lives and beyond the capacity of the affected state to recover the conditions of the disaster-affected community and the environment. It just like wake up call for all human around the world. In all, the worldwide community donated more than US$ 14 billion in humanitarian aid.

The Tsunami was calculated has affected 14 countries around Southeast Asia area. Four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries: Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia including Sri Lanka and India are the most affected state during the catastrophic event. Considering the ASEAN members were not willing to give up sovereignty rights at any level of the corporation, then how the ASEAN respond the international humanitarian assistance during emergency response? Does “ASEAN Way” still remain during the crisis?

“FAILED” ASEAN?

Back to 29 June 1976, during an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the “ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disaster” was signed. It was agreed to provide a catastrophe-stricken country was supposed to designate a national government agency acting as an internal coordinating body. [2]  Yet the declaration failed to call for a central institution that could have organized an ASEAN-wide relief effort. Meanwhile, in August 1997, huge forest fires on the island of Borneo caused immense air pollution in wide parts of the region. Consequently, ASEAN set up a “Regional Haze Action Plan”. Again, the country failed to adopt and implement a national haze prevention plan. From the series, ASEAN has failed to establish a fundamental framework on mutual cooperation disaster management and unsuccessful to play their role to manage the disaster within ASEAN areas. Reflecting on those fact, does ASEAN still has a serious commitment?

AFTER TSUNAMI

In the early morning, the widespread international community has been there in various host state and giving disaster relief as an international humanitarian mission. On that moment, the Southeast Asia seems like clearly borderless due to the crisis. The national sovereignty of the host state put a side but still respected during the disaster emergency response.

On January 6th, 2005, during the tsunami aftermath meeting, the ASEAN leaders issued a “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Prevention: On the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004”. They expressed their condolences and solidarity. They stated that the tsunami disaster calls for “global response” and appreciated the vast international help received. In order to prevent such a disaster in future, the ASEAN leaders declared their will to extend their regional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitigation. This was to be done by training military and civilian personnel in disaster relief operations, as determined in the “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action “.

Further, they stated their aim to put the “ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network” into action as provided for in the “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Component of the Vientiane Action Program”. Following this case, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was signed in July 2005 and has been entered into force on 24 December 2009 [3]. ASEAN member countries also led the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 59/279 of 19 January 2005 to strengthen emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. The series efforts, led strengthening the ASEAN commitment for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management.

Finally, we have seen ASEAN playing an important role in preparing the disaster management due to minimizing the loss. It implies that ASEAN needs a massive crisis and devastating event to waking up the awareness of the community (ASEAN) in humanitarian issue.

[1] East-West Center, 2005, After The Tsunami: Human Rights of Vulnerable Populations, Berkeley: University of California Press.

[2] Gentner, heide Haruyo, “ASEAN: Cooperative disaster relief after the tsunami”, Journal of current Southeast Asian affairs, Volume XXIV, 2006.

[3] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2013, “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Response (AADMER) Work Programme 2010-2015 (4th Reprint)” http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint, accessed on April 20, 2016 at 09:54 AM.

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

The role of ASEAN chairmanship will be held in the hands of Laos in 2016; despite the fact that it is not the first time the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to hold the role as the chair of ASEAN since 2004 questions still arose due the fact that conditions had shifted as the global political course had changed. It is perceivable since ASEAN had ratified new treaties, the dynamics of states had been refined according new pillars and agreements among state members and Laos had changed within the last decade. Many deemed Lao’s leadership will bring significant changes for the region but there are also others who query this particular leadership turnover.

As ASEAN gradually walk towards a more human rights oriented path by creating an identity which could cohesively represent its community, Laos has been seen unfit to represent such agenda, recent case would be reflected from Laos who has been unresponsive in regard to 80 human rights recommendations by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2015). And instead it is visible that international pressures to improve transparency and protect human rights have only reinforced the government’s resolve to suppress public and political opposition. More importantly media has limited freedom when it comes to dealing with Laos (Hunt, 2016), as the existence of draconian media monitoring laws with the country’s current role as the 2016 ASEAN Chair; the laws have potentials to constrain international reporting on important transnational issues discussed at ASEAN meetings and conferences (Sims, 2016)

However, as part of the integration initiatives this landlocked country might serve a fresh perspective for the rest of the other ASEAN member states. Thongloun Sisoulith declared it not long ago prior to his appointment as Prime Minister of Laos that the top priorities for Laos’ chairmanship are narrowing the development gaps between member states, promoting connectivity by promoting small and midsize enterprises. Under this chairmanship Sisoulith emphasized the need to improve trade facilitation, encourage more subsistence workers to enter the formal economy, and step up efforts to preserve and promote ASEAN’s cultural heritage (Chongkittavor, 2016). It cannot be eluded the fact that Laos was the one who pushed a successful joint declaration on the basis of ASEAN during the United States-ASEAN Summit last February hosted by Barrack Obama, That document will serve as the foundation for stronger ASEAN-U.S. cooperation in the years to come, tangible progress on advancing the U.S.-ASEAN relationship a step further from November 2015, when the United States and ASEAN elevated their relationship to the level of a strategic partnership and laid out a concrete plan of action to implement it out to 2020 (Prameswaran, 2016).

Laos has show its potential in balancing how ASEAN should steer itself among the superpowers, as another interest shown by another contending actor in the ground known as the South China Sea, we cannot outlook People’s Republic of China as the largest trading partner of Laos and perceptible role among the ASEAN state members, most importantly China’s diplomatic approach had been fully committed in gradually courting smaller countries in ASEAN mainly Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia (Johnson, 2016). Laos will also have to stand its ground to be the chair the ASEAN aspired to be in positioning itself facing the ongoing negotiation between Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership which had sparked the interest of other member states, Laos can navigate the issues relating to overlapping maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and the rise of China and its increasingly competitive rivalry with the US rebalance in Asia (Vilavong, 2016). Yet under this chairmanship whichever the institution leaned itself towards ASEAN must not to neglect the core of ASEAN Economic Community and its extension due in 2025.

Amidst the internal human rights inside of Laos’ political regime and inherent fragmentation within the ASEAN itself the new set of chairmanship must be able to attain the integration which is the main aim of ASEAN. If the agenda of gap elimination could be fulfilled as it was mentioned by Sisoulith the next step for deepening the integration and acquiring an ASEAN standard would seem near foreseeable future. Laos’ new leadership must be able to answer some difficult questions and challenges regionally and internationally. Will Laos be capable of hosting the ASEAN summit and related meetings? The AEC aspects of being ASEAN Chair have increased significantly since the last time Laos held position as chair, as have the Political-Security and Socio-Cultural community aspects.  Such responsibilities, along with the logistical burdens that would come with having two ASEAN Summits in 2016, led Laos to propose having the two summits mandated by the ASEAN Charter on a back-to-back basis in November 2016, effectively resulting in a single meeting (Sim, 2015). Laos has a whole year to prove itself as these meetings hold the key of uniting ASEAN’s states members in facing external influences and balancing their powers in the region.

Photo source http://havokjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/throne-dpc.jpg

References:

Amnesty International. (2015). Laos 2015/2016. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/laos/report-laos/

Chongkittavorn, K. (2016, May 05). Kavi Chongkittavorn: Laos' new leader faces big challenges -- at home and as ASEAN chief. Retrieved May 9, 2016, from http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160505-DEMOCRACY-DEFERRED/Viewpoints/Kavi-Chongkittavorn-Laos-new-leader-faces-big-challenges-at-home-and-as-ASEAN-chief?page=2

Hunt, L. (2016, April 03). What If They Gave an ASEAN Summit and the Media Failed to Turn Up? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/what-if-they-gave-an-asean-summit-and-the-media-failed-to-turn-up/

Johnson, J. (2016, May 1). Beijing launches charm offensive ahead of South China Sea court ruling | The Japan Times. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/01/asia-pacific/beijing-launches-charm-offensive-ahead-south-china-sea-court-ruling/#.VzC4n9J97IU

Sim, E. (2015, June 10). Can Laos Lead ASEAN in 2016? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/can-laos-lead-asean-in-2016-2/

Sims, K. (2016, April 15). Is Laos' ASEAN Chairmanship a Threat to Southeast Asian Regionalism? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-laos-asean-chairmanship-a-threat-to-southeast-asian-regionalism/

Prameswaran, P. (2016, February 11). Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-the-us-asean-sunnylands-summit-matters/

Vilavong, B. (2016, May 07). ASEAN needs Laos' leadership. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/07/asean-needs-laos-leadership/

Dedi Dinarto, Asisten Riset Pusat Kajian ASEAN UGM

Berakhirnya tahun 2015 menjadi titik awal bagi integrasi masyarakat ASEAN yang menekankan aspek ‘people-centered’ sebagai fokus baru di kawasan. Beberapa dokumen ASEAN telah memasukkan istilah ini dengan tujuan agar program-program yang diimplementasikan tidak hanya berorientasi pada pembangunan negara, akan tetapi juga melibatkan masyarakat dalam proses integrasi. Merespon hal tersebut, ASCC dibentuk guna memberi celah partisipasi dan manfaat bagi masyarakat, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. Namun, hingga saat ini, terminologi ‘komunitas’ ini tidak diletakkan senyatanya untuk mengatasi permasalahan sosial. Di sisi yang lain, ASCC hanya merupakan pelengkap untuk meningkatkan sentimen dan mobilisasi tenaga kerja di kawasan. Maka dari itu, perlu ada kajian untuk melihat sejauh mana ASCC benar-benar merangkul konteks ‘komunitas’.

Berhubungan dengan isu sosial, artikel ini akan mengangkat pentingnya dialog antar-agama dalam menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang harmonis dan rukun. Kondisi nyata menggambarkan bahwa konflik antar-agama kerap terjadi di Asia Tenggara. Misalnya, konflik antara umat Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia, umat Buddha dan Islam Patani di Thailand, umat Buddha dan Islam Rohingya di Myanmar, umat Islam Mindanao dan Kristen Katolik di Filipina, dan sebagainya. Untuk itu, keberadaan ini tidak seharusnya dipandang hanya sebagai keberagaman semata, akan tetapi perlu untuk disusun dalam konteks pluralistik yang mengakomodasi eksistensi dari seluruh agama.

Kendati demikian, pembahasan ini perlu untuk digiring pada beberapa pertanyaan lanjutan, yakni sejauh mana ASCC telah menjamin toleransi antar-agama, dan bagaimana seharusnya masyarakat berperan dalam memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama?

Membaca Relevansi ASCC
Pembentukan ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) diinisiasi sebagai upaya untuk menciptakan suasana bagi setiap orang, agar merasa sebagai bagian dari masyarakat ASEAN, dan mencari jalan keluar atas permasalahan sosial yang cukup kompleks di kawasan. Turunan dari dua tujuan ini telah dijabarkan di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025 secara detail guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang inklusif, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. ASCC juga secara spesifik menaruh perhatian pada isu toleransi, pemahaman, dan penghormatan sebagai bentuk penyesuaian terhadap multikulturalisme dalam salah satu tolak ukur strategis, yakni ‘Menuju ASEAN yang Adaptif dan Terbuka’. Dengan kata lain, ASCC berupaya untuk menjamin adanya keharmonisan dalam masyarakat ASEAN.

Di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025, salah satu isu yang dianggap penting guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang terbuka dan adaptif adalah isu antaragama. Isu ini dianggap penting guna mendorong adanya budaya toleransi, pemahaman, penghormatan terhadap agama, dan dialog antar-agama. Menurut David Burrell, dialog antar-agama adalah sebuah upaya menciptakan jalan baru untuk memahami diri sendiri dan orang lain sehingga dapat menciptakan jalur persahabatan dan apresiasi antar umat beragama (Burrell, 2004:196). Sebagai salah satu ikhtiar untuk saling bertukar pengetahuan dan pemahaman antara agama yang satu dengan yang lainnya, dialog antar-agama kerap diselenggarakan dengan melibatkan berbagai tokoh agama guna menghindari misinterpretasi. Dengan kata lain, upaya pluralistik ini diadakan untuk mereduksi konflik antar agama. Pada titik ini, ASCC telah menjamin adanya peluang untuk memperkuat isu antar agama sebagai salah satu penyokong terciptanya keharmonisan di ASEAN.

Dalam segi implementasi, poin mengenai isu antaragama telah diupayakan jauh sebelum dipublikasinya Cetak Biru ASCC oleh Indonesia. Wujud komitmen Indonesia untuk melaksanakan poin dalam ASCC tersebut adalah dengan menjadi tuan rumah pertama penyelenggara Bali Interfaith Dialogue di bawah Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Tidak hanya itu, pasca penyelenggaraan, Indonesia menetapkan inisiatif untuk membangun International Center for Religious and Cultural Cooperation (The Jogja Center). Di sisi yang lain, Filipina juga menunjukkan komitmennya dengan menjadi tuan rumah ketujuh untuk forum internasional yang sama. Kelebihan dari penyelenggaraan di Manila adalah adanya rancangan pra-acara yang melibatkan tokoh agama berusia muda untuk berdiskusi dan berdialog. Melalui dua penyelenggaraan ini, Manila lebih menunjukkan adanya keterlibatan masyarakat secara komprehensif dalam isu dialog antar-agama, sedangkan Indonesia hanya diwakili oleh representasi negara.

Namun, dalam konteks ini, persoalan isu antaragama masih berada dalam penanganan pemerintah. Pengadaan fora dialog antar-agama cenderung berkesan eksklusif dan tidak melibatkan kelompok-kelompok lain yang tergolong ‘radikal’. Padahal, di sisi yang lain, isu sosial semacam ini juga menjadi tanggung jawab masyarakat sebagai komunitas ASEAN. Masyarakat sebagai elemen terdekat yang melingkupi hubungan antar-agama dapat dimanfaatkan sebagai jalur untuk tidak hanya sekadar membangun, namun juga memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama. Di tingkat yang berbeda, hal ini juga dapat mendorong pemaknaan terhadap terminologi ‘komunitas’ dalam ASCC 2025.

Mematahkan Paradigma ‘Elite-Driven’
Dalam teori hegemoni kultural, Antonio Gramsci menjelaskan bahwa dalam sebuah struktur masyarakat, terdapat dua golongan yang dibagi sesuai tingkatannya, yakni elite dan massa. Gramsci membangun konsep masyarakat modern, dimana elit ditempatkan pada bagian atas sementara massa  pada bagian bawah, yang sarat dengan dominasi kelas atas terhadap kelas bawah. Ia mengatakan hal itu sebagai hegemoni. Namun, menurutnya, tatanan semacam ini seharusnya dapat dilawan dengan melihat pada potensi massa sebagai intelektual organik. Dengan begitu, konfigurasi hubungan antara elit dan massa dapat diubah melalui dekonstruksi tatanan tersebut.

Demikian pula, dalam beragam diskursus, integrasi ASEAN cenderung dipandang sebagai sebuah proses penyatuan negara-negara yang berbasis pada intervensi elit. Dirunut dari visi dan misinya, rancangan integrasi ASEAN yang meletakkan kerjasama ekonomi sebagai tujuan utama harus diikuti oleh situasi politik yang stabil di tingkat nasional maupun regional. Dengan begitu, kontrol politik dan dominasi pemerintah adalah konsekuensi logis, dimana pemerintahan yang otoriter mulai berkuasa pasca Perang Dingin.

Namun, implementasi agenda Komunitas ASEAN 2015 di kawasan, dan relevansi mengenai dominasi pemerintah mulai dipertanyakan ketika krisis ekonomi melanda wilayah Asia Tenggara. Di saat yang sama, perluasan jaringan masyarakat dalam bentuk kerjasama antar lembaga swadaya masyarakat (LSM), aktivis, dan stakeholders lainnya mulai intensif dikerjakan oleh masyarakat. Beberapa LSM yang aktif dalam isu antar-agama, antara lain Asia Pacific Interfaith Network yang menaruh perhatian pada isu antar-agama di kawasan ASEAN, Asian Resource Foundation yang mendirikan kantor di wilayah Myanmar dan Thailand, dan International Center for Law and Religion Studies yang bekerja sama secara intensif dengan Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) dan Coalition of Indonesian NGOs for International Human Rights Advocacy di Asia Tenggara. Paling tidak, hal ini menunjukkan tumbuhnya kesadaran kelas di tingkat massa terhadap kegagalan pemerintah negara ASEAN dalam menangani persoalan antar-agama. Maka dari itu, momentum ini patut dilihat sebagai modal untuk menginisiasi dekonstruksi tatanan pemerintahan yang cenderung solid dan kaku.

Pentingnya Kebebasan Berpendapat
Dalam tataran linguistik, untuk membangun sebuah wacana yang berkaitan dengan isu-isu sosial, tidak terkecuali isu antar-agama, maka setiap individu atau kelompok perlu berdialog guna membaca ulang titik singgung di antara perbedaan yang ada. Upaya dialektis ini cenderung dikemas dalam bentuk diskusi guna mencapai inter-subjektivitas (kesepakatan antara subjek-subjek terhadap nilai tertentu). Namun, jika berbincang soal kebebasan berpendapat di ASEAN, maka sesungguhnya kebebasan berpendapat merupakan persoalan krusial untuk dibahas.

Untuk mendorong adanya dialog antar-agama yang intensif di wilayah Asia Tenggara adalah tantangan besar bagi masyarakat di negara-negara semidemokratis atau monarki, seperti Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Singapura, Brunei Darussalam, Kamboja, dan Vietnam. Kekuasaan mutlak yang dipegang oleh pemerintah cenderung membatasi ruang gerak masyarakat, sehingga kesadaran intelektual yang muncul pun tidak dapat berkembang menjadi suatu political force yang memadai. Tanpa adanya political force, maka pewacanaan mengenai pentingnya dialog antar-agama guna mencegah terjadinya konflik di tingkat nasional akan sangat sulit diadvokasikan.

Namun, di sisi yang lain, sebagai salah satu negara yang telah menaruh perhatian besar pada isu antar-agama, Indonesia memiliki potensi untuk menjadi promotor penguatan dialog antar-agama di tingkat regional. Diwakili oleh AM Fachir, sebagai Wakil Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia, ia berpendapat bahwa dialog antar-agama perlu diintensifkan untuk menghindarkan munculnya berbagai konflik yang bersinggungan erat dengan agama. Tidak hanya itu, munculnya LSM yang bergerak di bidang antar-agama, seperti Institute for Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia (Interfidei) menjadi bukti kuatnya komitmen untuk mencari solusi atas permasalahan isu agama di Indonesia. Meskipun demikian, hal ini tidak secara keseluruhan meniadakan konflik antar-agama di Indonesia.

Pada titik ini, perlu adanya kesadaran untuk memanfaatkan jaringan-jaringan antar-agama yang telah terbentuk sebagai titik awal. Keterlibatan dalam fora semacam ini dapat memberi kontribusi ide kepada masyarakat di negara semi-demokratis atau absolut mengenai kebebasan berpendapat. Dengan kata lain, masyarakat tidak lagi mengandalkan pemerintah untuk belajar memahami ide-ide mengenai kebebasan dan toleransi yang relevan dengan tujuan menciptakan keharmonisan di tingkat negara dan regional. Di saat yang bersamaan, LSM dan aktivis dapat memanfaatkan kondisi ini untuk memperluas jaringan kerjasama.

Kesimpulan
Maka dari itu, dapat disimpulkan bahwa ASCC telah memberikan fondasi bagi pengupayaan toleransi antar-agama di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025. Namun, hal ini masih berada dalam kendali pemerintah, dimana tidak ada penjaminan secara mutlak atas solusi terhadap permasalahan antar-agama yang ada. Di sisi yang lain, masyarakat perlu untuk membangun kesadaran agar tidak terjebak dalam kondisi ‘elite-driven’ dengan cara membentuk dan atau memanfaatkan jaringan antaragama yang telah bekerja. Dengan begitu, penguatan masyarakat untuk mendorong upaya dialog antaragama di kawasan dapat tercapai.

(Artikel ini sudah dipublikasikan dalam Newsletter Interfidei Edisi Juli-Desember 2015.)

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