By Robbaita Zahra

The OECD defines e-commerce as “the sale or purchase of goods or services, conducted over computer networks by methods specifically designed for the purpose of receiving or placing orders. The goods and services are ordered by those methods, but the payment and ultimate delivery of the goods or services do not have to be conducted online”. It is no doubt that this area serves as a strong interest in ASEAN as it holds much economic promise. Through technology, the costs of production can be reduced, which later encourages the growth of new business and advances communication. ASEAN has been a platform for Southeast Asia countries to integrate efforts and efficiency in terms of economic cooperation as embodied in one of the three pillars of ASEAN which is ASEAN Economic Community. To reach its vision of a regionally integrated economy, electronic commerce can be viewed as one of an instrumental component in this matter. With the rapid growth of technology and industry, e-commerce in ASEAN countries has grown rapidly and significantly within these past few years. In Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, retail e-commerce has a total market size of US$7 billion. Countries in the ASEAN region also are the fastest-growing internet markets, with approximately 330 million internet users.According to research conducted by Google and Temasek, the size of the Internet-based economy of ASEAN could reach a size of $240 billion by 2025.

In line with this development, the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce was signed on 12 November 2018, on the sidelines of the 33^rd ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings, making ASEAN as the first region in the world to have an e-commerce agreement. This agreement is part of the implementation of the ASEAN Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 2017-2025. The objectives of this agreement are to facilitate cross-border e-commerce transactions, contribute to creating an environment of trust and confidence in the use of e-commerce, and deepen cooperation among ASEAN member states to further develop and intensify the use of e-commerce to drive economic growth and social development in the region.

 Why Is It Necessary?

This agreement comprises of member states’ commitment to cooperate and collaborate with regards to electronic commerce, so that businesses–especially small and medium-sized enterprises–in the ASEAN countries can be enhanced more efficiently. Each country shall have the commitment to maintain or adopt as soon as practicable, laws and regulations governing electronic transactions. Relevant measures in each countries which contribute to the increase of trust and certainty for business operating in the region are also required to be published as promptly as possible. Moreover, ASEAN members acknowledge the importance of efficient cross-border logistic. Therefore, through this Agreement, lower costs and improvement of speed and reliability of supply chains in cross-border e-commerce are essential to be implemented. With this, it is expected to improve the accessibility of rural areas to online marketplaces.

With regards to facilitating cross-border e-commerce, it provides several mechanisms which shall be implemented, such as paperless trading between businesses and authorities which are encouraged to be used, the acknowledgment of legal validity of electronic authentication and electronic signatures, and the recognition of cross-border transfer of information by electronic means.

Further, another area of this agreement that needs to be highlighted is in terms of consumer protection. It is true, that with e-commerce, consumers are able to have more options and variety of products and services. However, engaging in a transaction in electronic commerce provides several inherent risks, such as unsecured online payments, product unsafety, and inaccessible dispute settlement. Lack of trust in online transaction are also usually become one of the problems faced with regards to consumers in e-commerce. Therefore, under this agreement, consumers engaging in electronic commerce are supposedly be given the same protection as given to consumers of other forms of commerce under each respective countries. Transaction security, cyber security and personal data protection shall be accorded to the consumers to ensure consumer protection. Dispute settlement mechanism is also regulated in this Agreement, giving more certainty and a degree of trust for the consumers.

However, despite the existence of this Agreement, each member states have to give common efforts to support the development of regional e-commerce, including but not limited to enacting the necessary laws and regulations on electronic commerce. The ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce provides a starting point which can be seen as a common reference framework guiding the enactment of domestic laws and regulations in the respective ASEAN jurisdictions. Not only enacting the needed legal frameworks, enforcement of those legal frameworks are also critical in enhancing the implementation of e-commerce.

Last but not least, aside from adopting the legal framework, it is also needed to keep developing the technology as the basis of e-commerce itself; such as telecommunication infrastructure, user-friendly online payment systems, and efficient distribution networks. For without the advancement and innovation of technology, the region’s economic condition might not be as progressive as it is right now.

Robbaita Zahra is currently a Program-Intern in ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Habibah H. Hermanadi – Research Associate to Institute of International Studies and Post-graduate candidate from University of Delhi

India imagined a larger role beyond its current dominance in South Asia, the Act East Policy had become a known concept subject to the discussion under foreign policy context. When India reaches Southeast Asia, it becomes clear ASEAN became one of the defining actors which shall complete the pieces of Indian Act East puzzle. Thus, in this article, writer will try to capture the demands and perceptions of India out of ASEAN, focusing on the great interception of Indo-pacific concept which was recently brought up in the 34th ASEAN summit in Bangkok, as India on their own had developed its own model of what New Delhi ought to be the groundwork of their foreign policy in comparison to ASEAN’s outlook on what they define as Indo-Pacific.

Naturally, when it comes to dealing with ASEAN, it has been a tricky ordeal for India. The regional organization claimed centrality has been a vague click in the realpolitik context, and this put New Delhi in a difficult position if the regional organization will instead hampers the gateway to further India’s Act East Policy, ASEAN is definitely no South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) where India’s dominance is inevitable and India can stretch its arms to fast-forward other member states compliance unlike the situation where New Delhi have to wait around for ASEAN and its sluggish narratives. Moreover, the abundance of normative entanglement caused India to strategically reach certain players who happened to be ASEAN member countries, for example, India’s commitment to Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (CMLV) economic development and cooperation and deepening maritime dialogue with Indonesia, Narendra Modi has made it clear of what India wanted all along. Reflecting upon India’s perception, we can see how this signified the lack of relevance of ASEAN might portray as a regional organization, thus we are moving to the next point, whether or not ASEAN’s response to Indo-Pacific put the organization closer to India’s arms.

Indo-Pacific: a case for unification or dissension? 

India has committed itself in actively promoting Indo-Pacific, constructively as an idea and as a regional model of cooperation. In addition to containing China’s Belt and Road initiative which India has strongly voiced against, the key point that differentiated the two models lie on Indo-Pacific’s freeness and cooperative nature and BRI that according to India ignored core concerns of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

On the ideational level, Indo-Pacific for India appeared as a challenge to the old notion of Asia-Pacific that excluded India, setting apart an East Asian led economic regime. However, as the term gained popularity, considering the responses from France, the United States, and Japan, ASEAN felt the need to reassess the infant concept into the best of its interest.

The Summit which took place last June answered such need by some key points that clarified ASEAN’s intention in complying to Indo-Pacific model. However, despite the so-called finalized version of the outlook is, the substance has been designed in such ASEAN manner, to which du Rocher deemed slow due to the narratives trap ASEAN has when it comes to the diplomatic mechanism.

While India pointed out the importance of Indo-Pacific as an advanced concept, its existence meant to face contemporary challenges and match up new power configuration. ASEAN is still assuring its outlook would recognize the organization’s significance, pointing out the need of ASEAN centrality both geographically and policy-wise. This kind of response is alien to New Delhi style of pragmatic foreign policy hoping for a rather concrete response, yet ASEAN member states’ concerns with their traditional allies were also one of the reasons of the ambivalent stance the organization took when it comes to Indo-Pacific.

Perhaps the great crossroad between what New Delhi wanted out of Indo-Pacific and ASEAN became clear in the “rule-based-order” clause, an option which indicated ASEAN common understanding with Beijing, in comparison to rule of law basis. The mechanism they proposed pointed out how international law is incapable to solve the regional problem, while New Delhi begs to differ with the importance of referring to the rule of law when it comes to diplomatic conducts within the Indo-Pacific model of regional cooperation. This difference can harbor future conflict of interests between New Delhi, which currently tries to contain Beijing, while at the same time needing ASEAN’s compliance to further its foreign policy objectives.

Conclusion

To round up the commentary, we have to refer back to what India wants out of ASEAN, and through this context, we can see that India wants the Indo-Pacific to work under India’s terms, and within that terms, ASEAN must be included. Throughout the competing concepts, models, or regional external influence from some of the major global politics players. We can see despite accepting the common idea of Indo-Pacific, ASEAN and India are not completely on the same side in the development of this idea. For ASEAN, this is subject to ASEAN’s way of diplomatic engagement among member states alongside domestic conditions which cannot be denied, and regional challenges which the organization has to overcome. For India, the open to interpretation and vast meaning of Indo-Pacific, a concept which was meant not to dictate, definitely puts New Delhi in the intricate position.

So far, New Delhi’s concern over Beijing’s next move had been matched up by deepening strategic bilateral relations with ASEAN member states, considering these strategic partnerships will result in a tangible outcome. Perhaps, despite ASEAN’s decision on the creation of its Indo-Pacific Outlook the dynamics of India to Southeast Asian countries will remain the same, when it comes to the region, New Delhi has to adjust to the region’s dynamics and diplomatic pace instead of bypassing the ambitions through ASEAN.

See original post in Bangkok Post

The 34th Asean Summit wrapped up last week in Bangkok, with the adoption of a crucial document known as the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Prime Minister, Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, regarded the AOIP as a milestone as the bloc now has a unified perspective on how to deal with external partners in the region.

In terms of the text, the AOIP has changed from the first draft distributed by Indonesia in August 2018 during the 51st Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore. The first draft was still very Indonesia-centric in a sense, as it weighs on connecting the Indo-Pacific vision with Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy. In that draft, Asean’s role is projected to become the fulcrum of connectivity and inclusive norm-setter.

While principally the AOIP shares a similar objective with its previous draft, there are not so many strategic directions outlined that champion Asean’s role to become a central Indo-Pacific driving force. The previous draft is rather more concrete providing action proposals, such as developing a Master Plan on Indo-Pacific Connectivity, creating the Indo-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development Goals, and establishing the Indo-Pacific Forum for Safety Navigation and Mitigating Natural Disasters.

The adopted version is instead built on traditional principles of Asean, but with similar goals of building perspective and providing narrative on how Asean should be driving the region in the midst of global uncertainty and great powers’ rivalry.

The AOIP is not a product, but a process. The instrument is non-legally binding, different from what Indonesia’s former foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, suggested in 2014 for an Indo-Pacific Treaty, to which, in its Chairman Statement of the 24th Summit, Asean leaders “welcomed Indonesia’s efforts to propose a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in the wider Indo-Pacific region”.

Rather, it emphasises norm-building processes, setting up a wide range of principles, notably Asean centrality, habit of dialogue, and inclusivity.

The AOIP serves as a “learning module” for all Asean member states in dealing with external powers’ expanding influence in the Southeast Asian region and beyond through different visions of regional architecture concepts brought forward by other competing powers. What comes after the adoption for Asean is to exercise these guidelines in responding to various Indo-Pacific, or other geostrategic proposals.

While it seems like there is limited content in the AOIP, the adoption signalled Asean’s take on maintaining order in an age of uncertainty and deficit of multilateralism, primarily in the changing regional architecture influenced by the expansion of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), perceived as its counter balance. The AOIP does not take sides. Although, for some, picking “Indo-Pacific” as a title could be regarded as a “containment policy” against China, Asean’s proposal is claimed as the only geostrategic concept grounded on inclusive collaboration with any players in the international community and avoiding rivalry. This was seen from Indonesian President Joko Widodo expressing his keenness to invite China as a potential partner in advancing Indo-Pacific cooperation at the 21st Asean-China Summit 2018.

The AOIP adoption indeed stole some momentum as it was consensually approved in the midst of an accelerated trade war between Beijing and Washington, which has already started to bite Asean members’ economies. It still remains a challenge to reconcile these two competing powers, especially as the US report that came out recently already pointed a finger at Chinese coercion towards Southeast Asian countries being an identified threat. Nonetheless, if utilised strategically, it can play a significant role serving as a “buffer zone” towards the spread of the major powers’ influence in Southeast Asian, depending how Asean, or Indonesia as the key drafter, can better make use of this strategy.

As an Indo-Pacific vision that exerts collaboration without leaving anyone behind, credit for the AOIP goes to Jakarta for its success in extending and promoting its foreign policy; free and active principles, to Asean — fundamentals of Indonesia’s foreign policy that amplify non-alignment with any major powers. If Asean members are able to adhere to AOIP to avoid disunity, it can turn into a powerful instrument. If not, then it will remain a ceremonial document like other Asean meeting outcome documents.

The vision appears to be idealistic. Past experience shows Asean hardly maintains its centrality on issues that are sensitive in nature, such as the South China Sea dispute, despite the grouping’s stance on the region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. While it is still too early to assess the future trajectory of Asean in taking the AOIP in its steps forward, assessing the success rate of all member states sticking to these principles could be a question as its members have historically aligned to a certain “patron” country.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing is a Senior Fellow with the Asean Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada in Indonesia and Vicky Barreto is a MA Candidate in Development Studies at Sussex University in the UK.

by Carter Anne Jones*
Pictures: Forest and Kim Starr

Indonesia produces 3.2 million tons of mismanaged trash ever year with nearly 1.3 million tons ending up in the sea. This makes Indonesia the second-largest plastic polluter after China. Last year, Bali declared a trash emergency and used 700 cleaners to collect nearly 100 tons of trash on their beaches. Although, plastic waste does not only effect Indonesia’s marine life, but it can also be found in rivers throughout Indonesia. The Citarum River was declared the world’s most polluted river, yet it’s believed that over 28 million people depend on the river every day for water. Plastic pollution threatens Indonesia’s tourism industry which supplies the country with US$4.6 billion of foreign exchange income annually and employs 13 million Indonesians. It also impacts Indonesia’s overall public health as plastic has been found in 114 different aquatic species with half of those species ending up on our dinner plates. Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s coordinating minister for maritime affairs, announced during the 2017 World Oceans Summit in Nusa Dua, Bali that Indonesia pledged to contribute up to US$1 billion annually to reduce plastic waste. He proposed developing new industries using biodegradable materials such as seaweed and cassava to create plastic alternatives. Indonesia has also talked about a plastic bag tax and has already banned single use plastic in Denpasar. The ultimate goal is to reduce 70% of marine waste by 2025. Indonesia is located at the center of the Coral Triangle, which contains one of the world’s richest coral reef ecosystems. The Coral Triangle is vital for both food security and tourism within Indonesia. It is predicted that if we continue polluting at this rate we will have more plastic than biomass in the world’s oceans by 2050. Poor waste management infrastructure, lower socioeconomic communities, and lack of public understanding are a few of the problems Indonesia will face in its efforts to combat marine waste and reach the goal of reducing marine waste by 2025.  

Local Government Initiatives in Indonesia

Indonesia has been criticized for being too eager when it comes to eliminating 70% of its marine waste in seven short years. During 2016, Indonesia implementation of a plastic tax of Rp.200 (1p) per plastic bag was trialed in 23 cities across Indonesia. The results did show a decrease in plastic bag use, but the tax was met with notable resistance from retailers and has been the reason the Indonesian government is hesitant to enact a nationwide tax. The concern is that if you just impose a plastic tax on bags or expand the tax to plastic packaging it will only affect the country’s poor populations, as they have limited access to clean water meaning that Indonesians are already spending a large amount of their income on bottled water. Due to criticism of the excise tax, some have suggested a tax on plastic packaging that cannot be recycled, such as “straws, microbeads, and Styrofoam”, but not include water bottles, which can be recycled. Government initiatives are a good starting point, but if they are not paired with public education it will not create a long lasting impact. It is important the local communities understand why recycling and the decreasing of single use plastic is important. A focus also needs to be directed to Indonesia’s waste management plan. This process loses 1.1 million tons of local plastic trash, because it becomes too dirty in the landfills to be used in Indonesia’s recycling industry. Luckily, a developmental plan has just been released. It has a broad focus on the handling of trash transportation and minimalizing the spillage from pick up to drop off. It also aims to create a safe working atmosphere for waste pickers. Jokowi also plans to issue new regulations to speed up the prosecution of river polluters, especially corporations. The Indonesian military has also started a large-scale clean-up operation with the hope of preventing public littering, as well as to help villagers build septic tanks.

International Cooperation among Indonesia and other Countries

If successful Indonesia could be used as a model for many different countries around the world attempting to lower their amounts of single use plastic. Indonesia recently joined the Global Plastic Actions Partnership (GPAP) which works with local businesses and global partners to create solutions to reduce plastic pollution and advance a roadmap for implementation. GPAP is hosted by the World Economic Forum and aims to redesign the global “take-make-dispose” economy. As Indonesia continues to work to reduce marine plastic this creates and issue for Australia. Indonesia has taken 19% of Australia’s total waste, but now it vows to enforce tight restriction around what recyclable waste will be accepted. At this point, the recyclables from Australia are not always in the best condition, which means Indonesia is not able to use them. Hopefully, Indonesia’s new environmental stance will force Australia to stop offloading trash to other countries and invest in their own re-manufacturing facilities.

NGO’s and the Individual

Avani Eco is a company within Indonesia that is currently converting cassava into plastic bags and straws, but the bags are 50 percent more expensive than regular plastic bags. This would again force many lower socioeconomic families to bear the brunt of these environmental efforts. While looking for alternative methods for packaging is necessary, it is also important to ensure the production cost remains relatively low. Education is another important tool the Indonesian government can do to help combat marine waste. Programs such as the Bali Environmental Education Center (PPLH) and the Indonesia Plastic Bag Diet Movement (GIDKP) have mentor programs for high school students encouraging them to become leaders in solving environmental problems. While beach clean ups are not the answer to solving the plastic issue throughout Indonesia they are a good way for students to gain a better understanding of the plastic crisis that Indonesia is facing. Beach cleans ups can be used to motivate communities throughout the country, and teach them about the effects plastic pollution has on the marine life and their own communities.

The new pledge is at least a step in the right direction. The Indonesian government has admitted it is facing a problem and has created a platform for discussion. They are actively seeking for new ideas and solutions. It is important that Indonesia remains proactive about finding a solution and not back away from taking hard stances, even as large corporations or fellow countries continue to push for the overturn of restrictions. As Indonesia continues to head into the 5-year countdown it is important that these initiatives begin to yield concrete results and not just remain as empty promises.

*Carter Anne Jones is a member of Baylor University’s Class of 2020 with a major in International Studies and Russian. She is currently learning Bahasa Indonesia at UGM and works as a program intern for ASEAN Studies Center from March-May 2019.