ASEAN Back in the Indo-Pacific Saddle

August 22, 2022/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Written by: Seonyoung Yang

Indo-Pacific has been one of the most spoken buzzwords regionally and globally. Discourses for conceptualizing Indo-Pacific are still in progress. The rift caused by exacerbated US-China rivalry, the Ukraine crisis, and energy and food prices ensued complex enigmas for all stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly for ASEAN. This essay, therefore, analyses the embedded meaning of various Indo-Pacific strategies, including the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, and suggests how ASEAN should maneuver the strategic reefs in Indo-Pacific.

The Asia’s Geopolitical Circumstances

The US-China tit-for-tat has gotten only worsened since the Ukraine crisis. The US, EU, and its allies have criticized Russia for its horrendous attack and supported Ukraine in an unprecedented manner not only in humanitarian aid but also militarily, albeit the very foundation of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community, aiming to deter the war under any circumstances.

A mammoth in the room, China has never been quiet per se, but its tone and demand have been stronger over recent years. Xi Jinping even started proposing new initiatives such as Global Development Initiative to regain respect worldwide after overcoming a century of humiliation [1]. From the trajectory of power dynamics, though, it is natural to observe such frictions between existing and emerging ones.

In this inimical dynamic, small and middle countries across Indo-Pacific squirm to avoid being entrapped. Amitav Acharya (2021)[2] defined that “‘Asia’ was built by nationalists, ‘Asia-Pacific’ by economists, ‘East Asia’ by culturalists, whereas ‘Indo-Pacific’ by strategists’”. This definition is succinct yet clear to understand why some countries are in favor or against ‘Indo-Pacific’.

Paradigm Shift

Geographically speaking, China is nestled within the Asia-Pacific region. Since China prioritizes economic development for regional cooperation, such as Belt and Road Initiative, hence tenaciously sticks to Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, as defined by Archarya, Indo-Pacific, encompassing two vast oceans, the maritime strategy is a salient feature. It is worth remembering Wang Gungwu[3] (2019) argued that the maritime domain has been the historians’ and strategists’ core interest for colonial expansion leading to globalization and, furthermore “the focus of global power” (p 129).

Asia-Pacific is arguably obsolete, although China and Russia grapple with holding on to it. Wang (2019) also acutely analyzed that Indo-Pacific would shed more light than ever in the era of paradigm shift[4]. He further argued that ASEAN, therefore, would be given a central role and closely watched by superpowers in the Indo-Pacific domain[5]. Conceptual geographical shifts in parallel with paradigm shifts are being occurred. Therefore, we may need to put howling arguments aside but collect heads to think of paradigm shifts within Indo-Pacific and decode various strategies, outlooks, and frameworks available until today.

ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific

The champion of ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP)[6] is undoubtedly Indonesia. As the biggest archipelago in the world, encompassing the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, Indonesia’s ambition to become the global maritime fulcrum is intrinsic. Some naysayers quickly gnaw at the AOIP’s four main areas by belittling those as nothing an inch closer to so-called a strategy. The four main areas, namely maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, and other areas, are indeed functional but clearly what ASEAN needs in high demand.

Pragmatists are dissatisfied with the progress of AOIP. They even vilified that incompetence as ASEAN’s chronic disease. The moderate argue that ASEAN threw a dummy in the name of AOIP to collect ideas and tighten its grip, a convening power, to explore, define and develop ideas of Indo-Pacific. Bearing such arguments, Endy Bayuni (2022)^[7]calls on superpowers to reconsider Indo-Pacific as a multi-player poker game, not a duel chess game. ASEAN does not wish to judge but remains relevant within and beyond Indo-Pacific to exercise its leeway and leniency for every player, whether big or small, to take part without being neglected.

Earlier this year, Indonesia proposed to mainstream AOIP in all ASEAN-led mechanisms. Still veiled to dialogue partners, this would not be a meticulous manual. Instead, it would suggest a loose guideline allowing maximum flexibility among all parties interested in implementing AOIP with ASEAN on lead. Even though EAS is explicitly mentioned twice as the relevant implementing mechanism in the AOIP, this leaders-led forum does not befit the ASEAN’s initial plan, given the challenging geostrategic circumstances. Alternatively, ASEAN might begin its ‘mainstreaming’ AOIP by incorporating the four main areas in each ASEAN+1 mechanism. In doing so, ASEAN may have multiple options and means to concretize the AOIP. This choice, however, might lead to ambivalence which may turn out as competition among dialogue partners but overlapping and redundancy on the other hand.

Psychological approach

In order to decode ASEAN’s ways of thinking, psychological approaches might be useful. Richard Nisbett wrote an eye-opening book, ‘The Geography of Thoughts[8]‘. Long story short, he argued that Westerners, precisely Europeans, and North Americans tend to think they are in control of their surroundings. They often consider that the rules and laws governed in society are concluded from lengthy discussions and subsidiary decision-making processes. Therefore rules-based and lawful society should not be interfered with or distorted by any supremacy. Asians, on the other hand, think nothing is permanent; hence adaptability to change and environment is crucial rather than sticking to control. Rules and laws are therefore meant to be changed constantly. ASEAN, in this regard, is eager to create a conducive environment where different actors and ideas could be freely floated but not necessarily conflicted. ASEAN would like to be a respected moderator who can exercise adroitness and wisdom to encourage everyone, even dichotomous actors, to try to seek a middle way. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC^[9]) is a prime example in which ASEAN has paved the way to consolidate its identity and suggest means under six fundamental principles as a proactive regional group pursuing peace and prosperity. Established in 1976 by five founding member-states, 49 countries^[10] are listed as high contracting parties within and beyond the region. TAC suggests six principles that are characterized as highly flexible yet adamant on sovereignty, independence, non-interference, and peaceful settlement. Accession to TAC is a prerequisite for any external parties to tie a knot with ASEAN. Such conditions optimize ASEAN’s leverages to set the agenda for starting businesses in ASEAN Way by maximizing flexibility and inclusivity. Leaving space for maneuvering is ASEAN’s disposition in diplomacy, which is more pronounced in dealing with external partners.

External partners’ contribution to the AOIP

Thus far, Japan, the US, Australia, and the EU, including France, Germany, and the Netherlands, have announced Indo-Pacific strategies. Among ASEAN Dialogue Partners, Japan [11] and India [12] adopted the Leaders’ Statement on pledging to seek concrete cooperation for implementing AOIP.

Dr Shofwan [13] argued that all major powers label strategies or frameworks for their Indo-Pacific concepts while ASEAN retains low-key, using a neutral term, ‘outlook’. Unlike AOIP, major powers’ strategies or initiatives outline values such as freedom, openness, and democracy. These liberal values are embedded in AOIP to some extent but not outspokenly. These values are selective depending on the areas of cooperation or even partners ASEAN wishes to work with. Clearly, options are vast and never limited.

The US allies and partners have published Indo-Pacific initiatives besides the Republic of Korea. The incumbent government has announced a plan to announce its own Indo-Pacific framework underpinning “a pivotal global state, with a focus on promoting freedom, peace, and prosperity based on Seoul’s liberal democratic values[14]” (Ramon Pacheco Pardo, 2022). Concerns and questions have loomed over the continuity of Korea’s full-fledged support to ASEAN under the New Southern Policy. Nevertheless, ASEAN is considered the centerpiece of its newly unveiled Indo-Pacific framework later this year.

Conclusion

Indo-Pacific is arguably the busiest area where multipolarity would be revealed sporadically. As long as ASEAN remains relevant as a regional group, harsh skepticism over ASEAN’s disunity or being a toothless talk shop would gradually fade away. How ASEAN could safely stay relevant in the Indo-Pacific realm lies in ASEAN’s wisdom. ASEAN needs to be more eclectic to garner various Indo-Pacific strategies and concepts to revisit and detail its very own AOIP step by step. ASEAN never rejected proposals from elsewhere bluntly, and it never will. Conflicting or coalescing into something better is up to ASEAN’s call. For the latter, ASEAN cautiously calculates its psychological strengths and weakness to converge various Indo-Pacific concepts on the ‘middle way’ to encourage ASEAN’s role in the era of paradigm shift.

About Writer:

Seonyoung Yang Senior Research Officer at the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN (2013-Present), MSc of EU Studies and Communication Science from Vrije Universiteit Brussel (2011-12), Graduate Diploma in International Relations from London School of Economics (2016-17), BA of Linguistics from University of East Anglia (2006-9)

Bibliography

The Diplomat (2020, August 20), ‘China’s ‘Never Again’ Mentality,’ Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/
Amitave Acharya (2021, July 8), Retrieved from https://twitter.com/amitavacharya/status/1413139276561145861
Wang Gungwu (2019), ‘China Reconnects: Joining a Deep-rooted Past to a New World Order,’ Singapore: World Scientific, p. 129
Ibid (2019: p. 161)
Ibid (2019: p. 18)
ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific’ (2019) Retrieved from https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/
Endy Bayuni (2022, July 19) ‘Poker, not chess, is the name of the game in the Indo-Pacific’ available on The Jakarta Post, Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2022/07/19/poker-not-chess-is-the-name-of-the-game-in-the-indo-pacific.html
Richard E. Nisbett (2003), ‘The Geography of Thoughts: How Asians and Westerners think differently,’ New York: Free Press
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020, November 12), ‘Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,’ Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100114942.pdf
ASEAN Secretariat (2022, August 16), ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),’ Retrieved fromhttps://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-tac/#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Amity%20and,in%20the%20region%20and%20beyond
ASEAN Secretariat (2021, October 28), ‘ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region,’ Retrieved from https://asean.org/asean-india-joint-statement-on-cooperation-on-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-for-peace-stability-and-prosperity-in-the-region/
Habibie Center Youtube (2022, July 6), ‘Talking ASEAN on “The US’ New Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Future of Taiwan’s Strait Stability,’ Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNXuEeJ66Rs
Ramon Pacheco Pardo (2022) ‘South Korea as a global pivotal state: the role of partners’ https://brussels-school.be/publications/policy-briefs/south-korea-%E2%80%9Cglobal-pivotal-state%E2%80%9D-role-partners Brussels: CSDS Policy Brief 07/2022

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

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