Author: Aldi Haydar Mulia
Photo by Bernd Dittrich on Unsplash
In Malaysia, another twist to the tale of the convicted ex-Prime Minister, Najib Razak, has developed yet again. The Court of Appeal ruled that Najib’s house arrest bid should be heard in the High Court, which was previously dismissed in July 2024 (Bedi, 2025). The Court of Appeal views that the Titah Addendum (Addendum Decree) purportedly given by the previous King, Sultan Abdullah (16th Yang Dipertuan Agong (YDPA)) in addition to the Royal Pardon which halved his sentence from 12 years to 6 years—plus financial penalty reduction—in January 2024 and had been the basis of Najib’s case to serve the remainder of his sentence at home, shall be considered and heard in trial scheduled to begin on January 13 (Ramayah, 2025). Although Sultan Abdullah had stated he would not give any official comment on the decree, he urged everyone to stop with the speculation and respect the established laws and procedures (“Pahang Sultan wants end,” 2025). Previously, the opposition bloc, Perikatan Nasional (PN/National Alliance) had pressured the government to be transparent regarding the whereabouts of the decree (Koya, 2025).
The Decree has undeniably caused a stir in Malaysian politics. Firstly, house arrest is not legally inscribed in the Malaysian federal law, moreover coming from such an arbitrary process that oversteps the Federal Law (Faruqi, 2025). The closest Malaysia has to a house arrest is Section 3 and 5 of the Prisons Act 1995, which enables the Minister of Home Affairs to gazette any places for detention and imprisonment lawfully in custody (Faruqi, 2025). Secondly, and more importantly, the decree exemplifies the fragility of the coalition government in the aftermath of United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) remarkable downfall. In times where Malaysian politics are characterized by rising ethnic tensions, party-hopping, and political instability, it allows for “toxic alliances” where unlikely alliances could be made even by political rivals for short-term gains (McCargo & Wadipalapa, 2024; Faruqi, 2022). It includes the enhanced role of Malaysia’s Conference of Rulers (State Sultans), who lately have been involved in the executive chamber, including brokering government formation in the event of a hung parliament—the last three Prime Ministers had been selected in the Royal Palace rather than in parliament (Faruqi, 2022).
Under this political climate, aspiring politicians are open to make deals contrary to their political bases. Yet, why Najib? A popular figure in Malaysian heartlands and son of former Prime Minister, it is known that Najib has been actively campaigning for his release at least since 2018. He cultivates the image of himself as the champion of the people under the tag #Bossku, constantly persuading the people that life was better under his rule (Welsh, 2024). In the meantime, he retained influence in UMNO via his two sons, who were elected as prominent members within the party branch in Langkawi and Kedah. But even so, why is his release supported by UMNO, which suffered heavily after the 1MDB scandal was exposed; the government, which provided acquittal to some of his charges; and the opposition, whose support is seemingly out of the blue and contrary to their proclaimed visions? It requires an examination of Malaysian politics in the tales of intertwined quests: survival, revival, and opportunity. The discussion will proceed in those separate themes that resemble the dynamics each current faction—Pakatan Harapan (PH/Alliance of Hope), Barisan Nasional (BN/National Front), and Perikatan Nasional (PN/National Alliance) are dealt with. The last section attempts to illustrate the issue of the consequences of toxic alliances in Southeast Asia.
Where The Tides Clash
PH
The primary concern of Anwar’s cabinet is its survival, given the short-lived history of the previous administrations. The government does survive three years on, yet survival has put a dent in the cabinet’s reform promises, which, except for the minimum wage increase and the establishment of Parliamentary Special Select Committees to keep the ruling government in check, is far from ideal (Bedi, 2024; Ostwald, 2025). In dealing with the diverse coalition, the government cast contradictory measures to appease Malay conservatives, seen in actions such as increasing the budget of the Malaysian Department for Islamic Development (JAKIM), despite minimal results (Tayeb, 2023). In a similar vein, the High Court decided to grant Zahid Hamidi, Anwar’s Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO’s leader, discharge not amounting to acquittal to his remaining 47 corruption cases in September 2023 (“Ahmad Zahid granted,” 2023).
Anwar’s compromising stance extends to the treatment of Najib’s cases, which can be seen as a measure to keep UMNO in the coalition (Deivasagayam, 2024). Anwar may see the partial pardon as a critical middle way to bridge the political risk in trying to hold the unity government together and pertaining to the reformist stances. The urgency is heightened by PN’s repeated attempts to claw UMNO away from PH, the latest being the blatant support from the opposition leader, Dato Seri Hamzah Zainuddin, who demanded that the government uphold the Titah Addendum in due diligence to the constitutional monarch (Koya, 2025).
Anwar certainly has to assure the PH coalition and constituents, including Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR/People’s Justice Party) and Democratic Action Party (DAP), for whom a partial pardon contradicts the reformist ideas foundational to the coalition. Even though the government did pass a few reforms, the backlashes of political deals in Najib’s case could be detrimental to maintain cohesion in the coalition. It should be noted in particular that DAP, a long-time partner of Anwar and PH, is starting to feel uneasy about the situation, and with only two years remaining before another general election (Morden & Ting, 2025), it is imperative to avoid further cracks emerging.
BN
For BN, and particularly Zahid Hamidi, the circumstances are complicated. Despite their significant role in forming a parliamentary majority, BN and its members remain a shell of their former selves. The partnership that was once based on patronage provided by UMNO slowly breaks down as their dominance falters, prompting the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) to consider an exit from the coalition due to diminishing rewards from allying with UMNO.
Amid the faltering dominance and dwindling reputation, Najib could offer hopeful aspirations for UMNO (Hamdan, 2024). UMNO members are pushing to bank on Najib’s popularity and image as a means of the party’s revival. . However, if UMNO desires a fully-fledged pardon, Najib’s comeback would be detrimental to the existing leadership, primarily for Zahid, whose seat will eventually be challenged by Najib. Najib is understood to be more popular than Zahid due to Zahid’s inability to convince party members that working with PH, particularly the Chinese DAP, is beneficial for UMNO (Sani, 2023). Thus, Zahid has to prove that the partial pardon is a symbol of progress in fulfilling the members’ desire to pardon Najib.
Furthermore, the political risk to release Najib is too grand as the recent polls have indicated UMNO’s strong association with corruptive practices that resulted in the last election, where voters instead voting for PN parties, primarily PAS who have promoted themselves as the champion of clean and Islamic voices in Malaysian politics–primarily desired among Malay youths (Chai, 2023; Mohammad & Suffian, 2023; Shukri, 2024). However, it might be possible for UMNO and BN to explore a revival of Mufakat Nasional (National Concord) with PAS, plus BERSATU, that strongly emphasises identity politics of Malays—an option that “necessitates” the removal of Zahid, who is currently embedded with the PH government (Sani, 2023).
PN
At least on paper, PN’s motive is clear: they need UMNO and BN to consolidate their claim for power. BN still holds thirty seats in the parliament, which is substantial to garner oppositional numbers. PN may realise that, at least in the short term, obtaining UMNO is crucial to establishing a winning coalition. This is particularly true for PAS, which has been in the past making close connections with Najib since he was in power to promote hudud law and strengthening Islamic law enforcement in Kelantan (Deivasagayam, 2024).
However, the practice is not so clear for two reasons. First, by aligning their ties to the corrupt image of UMNO, it will paint a confusing scenario for its supporters, who have opted for PN due to their increasing dissatisfaction with UMNO. After all, PN leaders were present at the January 6 rally, whereas they also preach anti-corruption messages to their supporters. Second, there is an internal rift within the coalition that will hinder any substantial commitment from PN. The distrust is apparent in a few occasions where PAS, BERSATU, and other parties within PN were at odds with another over a supposedly unilateral decision, such as the disunity in supporting Najib, and PAS’ decision to appoint Dr Mahathir Mohammad to become the advisor for the SG4, a group of four state governments in which PN leads (Kaur, 2025). Although it may benefit PN to show support for Najib to sway BN in the short term, they risk fracturing their constituents for an uncertain future.
The Price of Toxic Alliances The ambiguous tug-of-war between political factions in Najib’s case handling resembles a grander picture of toxic alliances normality in Malaysian politics. Najib may still have two cases awaiting (1MDB bribery and fund embezzlement worth RM2.3 billion, and SRC International fund embezzlement worth RM27 million) to add to his discharged and sentenced cases, but the focus on short-term compromises could hamper public trust towards Malaysian democracy. Instead of championing “unity” as the government claims to be, it perpetuates the alienation of voters who have been increasingly anxious and indifferent to the politicians they support (McCargo & Wadipalapa, 2024).
Furthermore, it opens a possibility for extraconstitutional measures and powerholders to step in and set a precedent for future erosion in an established political system. The increasing reliance on the Conference of Rulers in Malaysian politics to decide executive matters shall serve as a warning. Najib’s possible return and popularity amid recent circumstances shall be watched closely. Unfortunately, this toxic alliance happens across Southeast Asia. Unlikely alliances are made left, right, and centre without regard for their constituencies, except for dozens of gimmicks and electoral promises during the election. Even after the election, the deals are broken and remade to reflect the dynamism of short-term interests. Contradictory stances are the norm rather than the exception. The complicated case of the convicted Malaysian ex-Prime Minister, Najib Razak, shows that political pragmatism remains a triumphant force amid hopes for democratic reform.
Thank you to Seth Akmal, who has contributed to this article.
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Author’s Bio:
Aldi Haydar Mulia is a Bachelor of Social and Political Science from the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He is interested in the issue of international political economy and development. He is now working as a faculty staff at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.