Strengthening ASEAN’s Political-Security Pillar through Pool of Sovereignty

October 7, 2019/0 Comments/in ASEAN Notes/by akmal.muhammad.f

Written by Turin Airlangga, student at the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University Tokyo, Japan. He can be reached atturin.a@fuji.waseda.jp

Abstract

ASEAN as an entity and Southeast Asia as a region emerged as important key players in the global political landscape after 51 years of its establishment. Economic growths and prosperity has propelled ASEAN member countries to important roles in the world. However, ASEAN still face challenges in dealing with certain issuespredominantly due to the non-interference and consensus-based principles it adheres to. How can ASEAN move forward as new challenges and opportunities emerge? This article examines the importance of giving ASEAN greater mandate through pool of sovereignty, requiring a more progressive approach to the political-security pillar that will result in stronger mandate and power for ASEAN governing bodies.

Keywords: pool of sovereignty, political-security pillar, ASEAN.

Introduction

The year 2018 marked the 51^st anniversary of ASEAN. After its establishment in 1967, half a century has passed since the five original founding members signed the Bangkok Declaration (Keling et al., 2011; Intal, Jr.&Chen, 2017).The momentum of ASEAN establishment correlated deeply with the global political situation at the time, mainly due to the heightened tensions between the two camps during the Cold War. At that moment, it was understandable for all founding members to put political and security issues at the top of the priorities to address for the newly established association, especially when the fighting in Vietnam has developed a concern that it could have had tremendous impacts and affected the entire region. After 51 years, however, Southeast Asian countries prove that it could transform as one of the fastest and robustly growing sub-region in Asia Pacific. ASEAN as an entity has been praised as one of a success story of regional integration that brought not only peace and security among its member countries, but also wider socio-economic growth and has seen tremendous increase in general prosperity (Minh, 2017).

In achieving and becoming ASEAN as we know today, the ‘ASEAN way’has been a core principle among its member countries, especially when it touches upon a highly sensitive issue of non-interference principle among the member countries. Ultimately, through non-interference principle, ASEAN member countries can manage the regional dynamics without disturbing the security balances among the members, particularly due to the fact that Southeast Asian region is, until today, one of the most politically and culturally diverse region where political unrest can trigger massive domino-effects throughout the region (Masilamani & Peterson, 2014). Through the ASEAN way, member countries can utilize informal approaches to resolutions and peaceful dialogues that could address the situation without causing considerable damages and affect to other countries (Masilamani & Peterson, 2014). The political and security pillar as one of the fundamental elements of ASEAN, has been under heavy scrutiny when national interests and security-related issues became a major roadblock for some ASEAN member countries to move forward and achieve specific milestone on certain issues because each member countries put forward their national interests beyond the regional interests as a whole and often times cited ASEAN’s non-interference principle as the basis of such deliberation (Mogato&Grudgings, 2018).

As ASEAN needs to continue moving forward to have greater regional integration dynamics that are more robust, progressive, and inclusive, how can the member countries approach the political-security pillar? Should a different approach be applied in order to strengthen ASEAN’s political bargaining position in the global world?

Pool of sovereignty forstronger ASEAN Governing Bodies

The non-interference principle that ASEAN chose to embed in its political culture has been widely debated in the academic and professional realms (Jones, 2009). The debates have been revolving mainly on the humanitarian issue and the sovereignty issue, the majority of which ended in deadlock and left more questions than it tried to initiallyanswer. ASEAN’s governing body in Jakarta did not sit idle on the matter either. The ambitious Political-SecurityCommunity (APSC)laid out a comprehensive plan which ASEAN member countries aimed to achieve, particularly building a community of nations based on rule of law, oriented towards the prosperity of its people, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). As stipulated on the APSC, the existing and emerging challenges require ASEAN to adopt a ‘comprehensive approach’ to security issues (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017).

When we think of existing and emerging challenges, traditional and non-traditional security threats came to our minds, such as territorial disputes among or with other countries, or newly emerging threats such as terrorism and piracies. However, I argue that one of the most important issues to address in the APSC is how ASEAN member countries pool their sovereignty into making the ASEAN governing body stronger as an entity. More often than not, ASEAN member countries opt to preserve their sovereignty by advocating for the non-interference principle, fearing that allowing outside involvement will inevitably translate to breach of one’s own sovereignty. Now, I am not advocating ASEAN to rebuild the entire political-security pillar as a mean of engaging the emerging challenges that ASEAN and its member countries face (Camroux, 2008; Ha, Thuzar, Das &Chalermpalanupap, 2016),yet as intra- regional dynamics become more complex and global opportunities emerge, ASEAN member countries need to embark on a new set of political-security approach that will effectively bring forward the member countries in one direction.

In order to effectively move forward in addressing challenges, ASEAN member countries need to bestow greater mandate to the ASEAN governing bodywhich result in more efficient policy-decision making for the greater good of the region instead of individual member countries. An international organization harness its authority based on two factors: membership and scope of policy it possess (Hooghe& Marks, 2014). This means the greater size and responsibility of an organization will decide whether the central governing body of that organization can be effective in delivering results or will it be constrained by the interests of its members.Pooling of sovereignty does not necessarily translate to loss of it per se, but rather a process where joint decision is formulated, consisting of three principal factors: rules where member countries formulate a decision, ratification of the decision, and legally-binding mechanisms after they are ratified (Hooghe& Marks, 2014).

When ASEAN member countries pool their sovereignty together to the ASEAN governing body, they harness stronger political bargaining for ASEAN because all member countries have the firm support and legitimacy from the other members instead of going it alone in the international fora.

Insofar, the non-interference and consensus-based principles that ASEAN adhere to have been proven to mimic the function of a brake when the challenges that the region faces required a full function of a throttle. The consensus-based principle hinders the ability for all member countries to move forward as an entity because one disagreement from a member will translate to failure as a whole. Consequently, when all member countries have veto powers, the barrier to reach considerable reform will be difficult, if not relatively impossible (Hiep, 2016).

As ASEAN needs to continue progress forward to achieve better regional integration and more comprehensive organization that delivers greater results for its member countries, non-interference and consensus-based principles need to be reevaluated. Sudden changes such as complete abolishment of the two will most likely to deliver faulty results or worse. If ASEAN member countries realize that having greater power as one entity could very well translate to greater bargaining position in the international stage, ASEAN governing body can have stronger mandate in dealing with the challenges that the region faces. While the socio-cultural and economic pillars have received more attention for growth and integration, political-security pillar will function as a firm foundation within ASEAN that will provide a forward trajectory as an entity. Consider such issue: if one member countries decide to cast its own political trajectory independent of what ASEAN has decided to pursue, this leeway can be a loophole for bigger powers to divide ASEAN. When critical issue such as the South China Sea disputes require tremendous political commitments from the member countries, having one member divert from the others will only cause internal rift that could result in

As regionalism becomes more important and governments realize that their individual size and power can be multiplied through the membership and power of ASEAN as a regional entity, political-security integration will embark on a fresh start which includes new sets of policy aims and goals for the interests of all ASEAN member countries.The APSC blueprint provides yet another firm trajectory for the region as a whole, but a leap forward in realizing the different approach on the pool of sovereignty among the members can provide ASEAN governing body greater political and bargaining power in the future.

Conclusion

Five decades have passed since the formation of ASEAN and new challenges as well as opportunities are emerging to the surface. As one of the fastest growing regions in the world, Southeast Asia and ASEAN itself needs to reconsider its political-security approach in order to form a solid foundation to address numerous challenges both in the regional and global levels. By pooling of sovereignty, thus adding a firm structure at the political-security pillar and giving more mandates to the ASEAN governing body, member countries can enjoy more bargaining power and greater political prowess in the global political arena. Doing so will require ASEAN member countries to rethink its political-security approach which accommodates for greater political integration in the future.

Converging into a more comprehensive approach to the political-security pillar might take considerable efforts and time by the ASEAN member countries as each regime must come to understand that the regional interests are more important to achieve greater integration and forward progress. Consensus-based and non- interference principles shall be reconsidered to harness ASEAN’s potential prowess in the global fora, thus creating effective decision-making mechanisms within the ASEAN governing body and interests that represent the entire region. ASEAN’s tremendous potential in innovation and resilience can be further increased if all member countries come together and realize that in today’s hyper-connected global dynamics, standing alone in the global fora is not a favorable position to be in. ASEAN has come a long way, and being resilient and innovative will require more than solely national interests; it require stronger ASEAN that delivers and promotes prosperity for its members. New approach to the political-security pillar might just be the key towards achieving that goal.

References

ASEAN Secretariat. (2017)‘Fact Sheet of ASEAN Political-Security Community

(APSC)’, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC),1-4

Camroux, David.(2008)‘The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango?’, Notre

Europe.1-32

Ha, Hoang Thi, Thuzar, Moe, Das,SanchitaBasu, andChalermpalanupap,Termsak.

(2016) ‘Diverging Regionalisms: ASEAN and the EU’, ASEAN & The EU In Perspective, YusofIshak Institute.,4-13

Hiep, Le Hong.(2016)‘Can ASEAN Overcome the ‘Consensus Dilemma’ over the

South China Sea?’, YusofIshakInstitute: Perspective, No. 58., 1-8

Hooghe,Liesbet and Marks, Gary.(2014)‘Delegation and pooling in international

organizations’, Rev Int Organ, Springer Science + Business MediaNew York. pp. 1-24

Intal, Jr., Ponciano and Chen,Lurong (Ed).(2017)‘ASEAN and Member States:

Transformation and Integration’, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Vol. 3., 1-244

Jones, Lee.(2009)‘ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A

Quest for Social Order’, Nuffield College Politics Group Working Paper.,1-29

Keling, Mohamad Faisolet. al.(2011)“The Development of ASEAN from Historical

Approach.”Asian Social Science, Vol. 7., 169-189

Masilamani, Logan and Peterson, Jimmy.(2014)‘The “ASEAN Way”: The Structural

Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement’, Foreign Policy Journal.,1-21

Minh, Le Luong.(2017) ‘ASEAN at 50: Looking Back to Move Forward’, Konrad

Adenauer Stiftung.,9-17

Mogato, Manuel andGrudgings, Stuart.(2018) “ASEAN Way” founders in South China

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-china-idUSBRE86G09N20120717

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In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

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Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

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The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

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Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Strengthening ASEAN’s Political-Security Pillar through Pool of Sovereignty

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