ASEAN AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS – International Day of UN Peacekeepers

Photo by Indonesian Mission UN @indonesiaunny Twitter

Kevin Iskandar Putra

May 29th 2018 remarks the 70th Years of Service and Sacrifice of the UN Peacekeepers. Through the General Assembly Resolution 57/129 on the report of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) adopted in its fifty-seventh session held 24 February 2003, the international community decided to dedicate one day to commemorate and honor the dedication and contribution of the UN blue helmet as a front line to ensure international peace and stability. These blue helmets were first deployed by the UN Security Council to ensure the monitoring process of the Israeli-Arab Countries Armistice Agreement on 29 May 1948.

As recorded by the United Nations, 3,700 UN peacekeepers have lost their lives in the battlefield since 1948. This number includes 134 in the year 2017. The UN Charter Chapter VIII governs the Regional Arrangements, asserting that “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”. However, the utilization of such regional arrangements could also be taken with the authorization of the UNSC, according to the Article 53 (1) of the chapter.

Since its establishment in 1957, ASEAN, as a regional inter-governmental organization has been contributed greatly to the making of regional stability. The ASEAN Charter Article 1 (1), “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability in the region” reflects a commitment made to contribute to the making of the UN Charter Art. 1 (1) to maintain international peace and security. Political-security cooperation ensuring peace and security, embedded in the Plan of Action of ASEAN and the UN (2016 – 2020) 1.1.4., emphasizes the intention to further cooperate with the UN to provide continued training assistance in peacekeeping to ASEAN, including training in humanitarian affairs and civil-military coordination, gender issues such as the role of women peacekeepers, health, safety and security arrangements, and support ASEAN’s efforts in strengthening the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network, including through the sharing of lessons learned, best practices and capacity building.

Table 1: Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post
Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troop (31/03/2018)

Country Police UNMEM Troops Staff Officers Total
Brunei Darussalam 0 0 30 0 30
Cambodia 0 6 769 14 789
Indonesia 175 30 2,445 45 2,695
Laos
Malaysia 20 10 818 17 865
Myanmar 0 0 0 2 2
Philippines 0 10 0 0 10
Singapore
Thailand 8 9 0 5 22
Viet Nam 0 3 0 5 8
Grand Total ASEAN 203 68 4062 88 4421
Grand Total World 10,679 1,316 77,145 1,918 91,058
Proportion 1.2 % 5 % 5 % 4.5 % 4.8 %

To date, ASEAN countries have contributed to peacekeeping missions that include police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troops. Per March 2018, the number of personnel deployed by ASEAN accounts up to 4,419 personnel to the UN PKO with 4,239 male and 180 female personnel. In this regard, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia are the largest contributing countries measured by the number of mission and post. Such number shows the huge gap between men and women peacekeepers. The total number of the male peacekeepers are also significantly higher than that of female peacekeepers, comprising 86,723 men and 4,335 women.

Gender disparity in UNPKO is problematic because the role of women, in this regards, has not yet been considered seriously in peacekeeping process. As matter of fact, women in peacekeeping operations contribute positively to improve intelligence-gathering, deconstructing cultural and social biases in some conflicting areas, as well as breaking down the gender-based violence and exploitation. The milestones for women in PKO could be seen from the story where Major General Kristin Lund of Norway was deployed to Cyprus as the first female to serve as Force Commander in UN PKO; Gladys Ngwepekeum Nkeh in the Central African Republic, as well as Major Bettina Stelzer’s in South Sudan.

Increasing the deployment of women is an important agenda for the United Nations. It is believed that by incorporating women in peacekeeping operations the key to reduce the root causes of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN forces will be found. Based on Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers: Addressing the Gender Imbalance (as of 30 March 2018) countries in ASEAN that have contributed to 14% or more women peacekeepers are only Philippines and Thailand.  Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Indonesia belong to the countries with 0.1% or more contribution of women peacekeeping. Whereas, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are countries in ASEAN that do not contribute to women peacekeeping.

Initially, the agenda to reduce the gender gap in women peacekeepers was mentioned in the reports by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan Bulletin 2003 and the Zeid Report, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Despite the contributions of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, ASEAN is nowhere near to be a model for a regional organization that is significant in its contribution to the peacekeeping mission. In order to go to that direction, countries such as Singapore and Laos should be encouraged to submit their report on their contribution in Peacekeeping Operation to evaluate their supports in terms of human resources and funding.

Indonesia, through its Foreign Minister Retno L. P. Marsudi has pledged to send four thousand peacekeeping troops to overseas UN missions by 2019. This reflects that another effort to improve the role of one ASEAN country is in the making. However, this would not constitute as a large contribution if other  ASEAN countries has no willingness to follow Indonesia’s effort to increase its contribution to the peacekeeping mission.

In line with the expected role of PKO such as to monitor the peace process in two disputing parties, ceasefires and the withdrawal of troops to reduce the tensions and prevent the recurrence of hostilities, ASEAN should also give its paramount focus in the maintenance of international peace and security. Should the international community aim to realize its vision towards stability, a greater commitment should be put in the conflict prevention, cooperation with regional body like ASEAN, as well as allocating more money to fund and deploy peace mission. These collective efforts combined will reflect the efforts to materialize the three pillars of the UN systems, namely peace and security, development, and human rights. The road towards stability will be a long and winding, but the gap towards its end-goal could be narrowed by shedding more lights in improving the effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations.

The writer is a Research Intern at the ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

Press Release BINCANG ASEAN “Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand”

Bincang ASEAN Monday, 14 May 2018

Yogyakarta – Recently, the ASEAN Studies Center UGM held its first Bincang ASEAN in 2018 entitled “The Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Case of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand” at Digilib Café FISIPOL, UGM. This particular Bincang ASEAN featured Hestutomo Restu Kuncoro, M.A. (Alumni of Manchester University) with Ezka Amalia (Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM) moderating.

 

On this occasion, Hesutomo raised the topic of democratization in Southeast Asia, using comparative methods of Western democratic model and models adopted in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As the discussion progressed interactively, Hestutomo explained that Southeast Asia did not support the strong Western democratization model in Latin America and Eastern Europe because of differences in the type of regime. As a consequence, Huntington’s ‘universal’ model of democratization is not applicable to Southeast Asia as it could not portray a complete explanation of the process taking shape in the region.

 

Putting the context on Southeast Asia, a region that is relatively immature for its democracy, Hestutomo argued that Thailand and the Philippines subscribe to the opposition-initiated democratization theory, whereas Indonesia adopted the regime-opposition alliance theory. These two types of theory are self-explanatory in nature; both are named after the drive for democratization. The former is characterized with non-violence movements and revolts, to begin with, and started without a power overturn. These people who demanded democracy fought against the same enemy, not because of a shared vision. On the contrary, the latter emphasizes on the function of regime opposition that seeks for change. True oppositions in Indonesia, in this regards, is difficult to define.

 

To further argue, Hestutomo contended that the power of people or civil society is not evidently strong to drive the democratization in Southeast Asia. In Britain, the free flow of ideas during the democratization process was associated with the existence of a strong civil society, something that Southeast Asia did not share in common. The interdependency between business sectors and politics are deemed as the catalyst for democratization. For instance, the unintended consequence of elitist competition in Indonesia gave birth to a greater democracy after the New Order era. In the Philippines, the constituents and those who are loyal to Aquino could not give much to say in the political agenda unless Aquino gave an approval in their action. People in Thailand, however, sought to get the patronage of the country.

 

As to the goals of democratization in Southeast Asia happened primarily due to the expected outcomes of the people within the jurisdiction of the respective state, such as to provide a better opportunity to be heard and to provide a better security from the state. Such conditions depict Indonesia during the fall of well-known corrupt Soeharto’s regime that curbed the voice of the people. In comparison to Portugal and Spain whose, people strove to seek democracy to participate in deciding the budget allocation of the country, the case in Latin America showed a transitional situation from a very closed government into one with the inclusion of the people in economy and decision-making process.

 

The role of the military in government, as Hestutomo explained, dominates in the Philippines and Indonesia. As time passes, they begin to enter the political business network to gain access to national resources. A question remains, why is this clear, the power of the people in the Philippines still unable to remove the authoritarian government that unilaterally supports Marshall’s Law and the War on Drugs in the country despite their views against such practices. Borrowing the physical molecular theory that explains a state of condition with sufficient critical mass and people power and a collective action necessary to transform a particular state or condition to another, democracy is possible to make. However, in fact, is still nowhere near to happen partly because the people in the Philippines still cast their votes to the characteristics of the figure they can relate to.

 

All in all, democratization in Southeast Asia is an unfinished project due to a plethora of variables. The intertwining role of religion and democracy make us questioning the maturity of the democracy in the region. For instance, the democratic practice in Southeast Asia tends to follow a procedural matter of democracy which highly focuses on the national election. The lack of tolerance to differing views in politics has the tendency to be divisive and harmful for the maturity of our democracy. The question that arises is what kind of democracy do young people imagine as the future of Southeast Asia? and how will our civil society be more open to embracing differences? When he concludes, such a scenario will eventually arise when people adhere to the values of democracy and inculcate it in our lives.

 

(Written by Kevin Iskandar, research intern in ASEAN Studies Center UGM)

Indonesia should partner with NGOs to protect unaccompanied child refugees

Among more than 3,700 child refugees in Indonesia, close to 500 are unaccompanied minors.

Many have no access to formal education and health care. They have to go through the procedures to process their asylum claims without a guardian or legal aid to help them.

Only a few countries, such as Australia and the United States, accept child refugees without guardians. So most unaccompanied child refugees have to wait in transit countries until they are 18 years old before they can be resettled.

Because of these circumstances, these children are considered the most vulnerable among the refugees. The Indonesian government should do more to protect unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia.

In recent years a number of NGOs have provided services for child refugees. The government should consider partnering these organisations to uphold child refugees’ rights to protection.

Unaccompanied minors in Indonesia

Indonesia’s 2016 refugee decree makes explicit the duty to rescue, evacuate, monitor, register and accommodate refugees. For example, if asylum seekers reach Indonesian waters by boat, the government must rescue them.

However, none of the decree’s provisions provides specific rights for refugees post-evacuation nor does it specify the rights of child refugees.

As a result, many asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia live with very little means while waiting to be resettled, as they are prohibited from working and earning an income. Child refugees face the same hardship and, worse, they are prone to being abused.

In Indonesia, the Law on Child Protection Instrument (Law No. 35/2014) protects children. But it does not extend to child refugees because of their immigration status.

While the refugee decree and child protection law in Indonesia do not provide specific rights for child refugees, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRoC) does. Indonesia ratified the convention in 1990 through a presidential decree that provides a specialised obligation on the subject matter.

Article 22(1) of the CRoC stipulates that child refugees are entitled to:

receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments.

The convention applies to both nationals and non-nationals. Further, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child interprets that all of the convention’s provisions shall apply to children irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness and not limited to citizens of a state party.

What is urgently needed for unaccompanied child refugees is prompt appointment of guardians to provide legal advice in claiming the rights of the children in compliance with the principle of the “best interest of the child”.

For example, in the European Union, a legal guardian is appointed to represent the child in legal proceedings, take care of the child’s finances and promote the child’s well-being to the government. The guardian, therefore, should have expertise in childcare and is responsible for helping the children with the administrative and or judicial procedures of asylum claims until they turn 18.

The protection gap

Unaccompanied child refugees in Indonesia do not enjoy the rights they are entitled to under CRoC. In January 2017, 91 of 471 unaccompanied minors in total were detained by the immigration authorities.

The child refugee in detention faces worse conditions than children convicted of criminal activities. Convicted children in Indonesia are entitled to exclusive detention treatment at the Children Special Construction Agency (LPKA) or Juvenile Detention Centres (LAPAS) in cases where LPKA is absent. These centres provide them with formal education, skills training and coaching.

Due to their immigration status, child refugees are treated as adult refugees. They are kept in the same detention centres with unrelated adults.

This makes them prone to abusive treatment and sexual assault. Under Indonesian immigration policy they can be detained for up to ten years without any judicial review.

And instead of providing these children with guardianship and legal representation to “promote physical and psychological recovery” in detention, some immigration authorities have been involved in abusing children.

Partnering with NGOs for a rights-based treatment

In recent years, a number of NGOs in Indonesia have started to work on child refugee issues.

Some of them, such as Cisarua Refugee Learning Center and Roshan Learning, pay more attention to educational care and vocational training to provide children with soft skills. The Sunrise Refugee Learning Center of Sandya Institute in Jakarta offers various language, computer, arts, legal, cultural and entrepreneurial classes to refugees. At present, 15 of the total 75 registered students are underage children.

Others, like SUAKA and JRS, provide free legal assistance, but not solely to child refugees.

Church World Service, an NGO that has advocated for an alternative to detention, has been sheltering more than 80 unaccompanied minors in Indonesia.

The increasing attention from civil society organisations on the need for a rights-based treatment of unaccompanied refugee children is an opportunity for the Indonesian government to partner with them in fulfilling its human rights obligations to unaccompanied minors.

The UNHCR, in its Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, recommended that “an independent and formally accredited organisation be identified/established in each country, which will appoint a guardian or adviser as soon as the unaccompanied child is identified”.

Indonesia could delegate its responsibility to ensure protection for unaccompanied child refugees by partnering with NGOs that have been licensed under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Through this partnership, these NGOs could seek experienced legal professionals, provide them with necessary training in childcare and assign them as legal guardians.

In this way, Indonesia can meet some parts of its obligations and at the same time place the principle of the “best interest of the child” at the forefront of its refugee management by ensuring unaccompanied child refugees are treated according to humanitarian principles.

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Research Associate at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

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