Developing Halal Tourism within IMT-GT Sub-regional Cooperation

May 2, 2017/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand held the 10^th Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle in Manila, Philippines. Represented by the presence of Indonesian President Joko Widodo, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak, and Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, these three contiguous countries addressed many potential economic field for cooperation, such as trade and investment, infrastructure and transportation, tourism, halal products and services, human resources development and agriculture, and agro-industry and environment.

While the meeting has likely focused on infrastructure cooperation reflecting from the attendance of Ministry of Transport from the respective countries, Halal tourism as the new agenda can serve as a push-factor for both national and sub-regional economic growth.

Growth triangles are a unique form of international cooperation, which takes advantage of hitherto cross-border complementarities within geographical propinquity. Like Special Economic Zones (SEZs), they receive additional policy focus as a designated geographical area with the goal of accelerating economic activity.

However, they differ because growth triangles straddling two or three state borders, and exploiting economic complementarity between a metropole and periphery. The metropoles have strong industrial sectors, financial markets and infrastructure, and highly skilled labor. At the same time, it suffers from a shortage of unskilled labor and land, where periphery grabs this supportive role.

Looking specifically on the issue of Halal tourism provides a view that these three countries have adequately put its concern to this issue as one of many potential economic field for national economic growth.

Committed to establish itself as a center of Islamic civilization, Malaysia has enacted the “Halal Master Plan” program. The program is organized into three phases, namely establishing Malaysia as a world center for Halal integrity and prepares for industrial development (2008-2010), establishing Malaysia as one of the favorite locations associated with Halal business (2011-2015), and expanding the geographic footprint of Malaysia as the center of Halal development companies (2016-2020).

Furthermore, there is also an instrument of standardization of services in Malaysia, the MS2610: 2015—Muslims Friendly Hospitality Services—Requirements. The regulation contains three important components related to the supply chain of Halal travel, namely the principle of providing accommodation, tour packages, and tour guides based on Islamic principles.

In addition, the establishment of standardization rules is not initiated by the Malaysian government. Rather, it comes from the voluntary actions of actors in the tourism sector.

Actors involved in the drafting process of standardization include Islamic Tourism Centre (ITC), Malaysian Association of Hotel Owners (MAHO), Malaysian Association of Hotels (MAH), Malaysian Association of Tour and Travel Agents (MATTA), Bumiputera Travel and Tour Agents Association of Malaysia (Bumitra), and the Malaysian Tourist Guides Council (MTGC).

For Thailand, up to 2015 there are some 3,600 companies in Thailand hold the overall Halal certification, which covers 120,000 kinds of products, with export volume increase of 10 % per year in order to maintain Thailand’s position as world’s fifth biggest exporter of Halal products.

The Halal industry in Thailand is predominantly controlled by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICOT), which is supported by several institutions, such as the Halal Science Center (HSC) Chulalongkorn University and the Institute of Food Research and Product Development (IFRPD) Kasersart University.

Up to this time, CICOT has issued three regulations related to Halal products, namely National Halal Standard THS 24000: 2552, Halal Products Standard Certification Process, and Regulation of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand Regarding Halal Affair Operation of B.E. 2552.

In contrast, Indonesia does not show any significance in its Halal tourism. Although it has achieved prestigious awards in 2015 and 2016 for the nomination of the Best Halal Tourism Destination Awards through the initiative implemented by West Nusa Tenggara province, Indonesia possesses minor practical development.

Having Asnawi Bahar the Head of Association of Indonesian Tours and Travel Agencies, he mentioned that the winning of such international awards do not represent any practice for the development of Halal tourism. Rather, it works to frame that Indonesia is a country with major population of Islam.

In fact, RI Ministry of Tourism has repealed the only one regulation related to Halal tourism last year, namely Regulation of the Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy No. 2/2014 on Administration Guidelines of Sharia Hotel.

In this sense, the question thus dwells in whether Halal tourism can be institutionalized at the sub-regional level for the sake of ‘shared’ economic cooperation for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Having Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand put serious concern on the development of Halal tourism the cooperation between these three countries will promote Southeast Asia as a ‘halal hub’ for the global Halal market.

However, in our forthcoming chapter in book, my Malaysian colleague Ho Yi Jian and I perceived that the asymmetric relations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are unlikely to advance the trilateral economic cooperation.

In general, we argue that the Malaysian approach towards this sub-regional cooperation is a specific synthesis between establishing a political project for its own capacity building domestically, and as a way to create regional ties, but remains resolute to maintaining the centrality of the sovereign, unitary state.

In fact, Indonesia should be more ready to develop its Halal tourism if only Malaysia and Thailand are unlikely to disperse the potential of this new niche markets.

Dedi Dinarto, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Developing Halal Tourism within IMT-GT Sub-regional Cooperation

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