Dedi Dinarto, Asisten Riset Pusat Kajian ASEAN UGM

Berakhirnya tahun 2015 menjadi titik awal bagi integrasi masyarakat ASEAN yang menekankan aspek ‘people-centered’ sebagai fokus baru di kawasan. Beberapa dokumen ASEAN telah memasukkan istilah ini dengan tujuan agar program-program yang diimplementasikan tidak hanya berorientasi pada pembangunan negara, akan tetapi juga melibatkan masyarakat dalam proses integrasi. Merespon hal tersebut, ASCC dibentuk guna memberi celah partisipasi dan manfaat bagi masyarakat, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. Namun, hingga saat ini, terminologi ‘komunitas’ ini tidak diletakkan senyatanya untuk mengatasi permasalahan sosial. Di sisi yang lain, ASCC hanya merupakan pelengkap untuk meningkatkan sentimen dan mobilisasi tenaga kerja di kawasan. Maka dari itu, perlu ada kajian untuk melihat sejauh mana ASCC benar-benar merangkul konteks ‘komunitas’.

Berhubungan dengan isu sosial, artikel ini akan mengangkat pentingnya dialog antar-agama dalam menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang harmonis dan rukun. Kondisi nyata menggambarkan bahwa konflik antar-agama kerap terjadi di Asia Tenggara. Misalnya, konflik antara umat Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia, umat Buddha dan Islam Patani di Thailand, umat Buddha dan Islam Rohingya di Myanmar, umat Islam Mindanao dan Kristen Katolik di Filipina, dan sebagainya. Untuk itu, keberadaan ini tidak seharusnya dipandang hanya sebagai keberagaman semata, akan tetapi perlu untuk disusun dalam konteks pluralistik yang mengakomodasi eksistensi dari seluruh agama.

Kendati demikian, pembahasan ini perlu untuk digiring pada beberapa pertanyaan lanjutan, yakni sejauh mana ASCC telah menjamin toleransi antar-agama, dan bagaimana seharusnya masyarakat berperan dalam memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama?

Membaca Relevansi ASCC
Pembentukan ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) diinisiasi sebagai upaya untuk menciptakan suasana bagi setiap orang, agar merasa sebagai bagian dari masyarakat ASEAN, dan mencari jalan keluar atas permasalahan sosial yang cukup kompleks di kawasan. Turunan dari dua tujuan ini telah dijabarkan di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025 secara detail guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang inklusif, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. ASCC juga secara spesifik menaruh perhatian pada isu toleransi, pemahaman, dan penghormatan sebagai bentuk penyesuaian terhadap multikulturalisme dalam salah satu tolak ukur strategis, yakni ‘Menuju ASEAN yang Adaptif dan Terbuka’. Dengan kata lain, ASCC berupaya untuk menjamin adanya keharmonisan dalam masyarakat ASEAN.

Di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025, salah satu isu yang dianggap penting guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang terbuka dan adaptif adalah isu antaragama. Isu ini dianggap penting guna mendorong adanya budaya toleransi, pemahaman, penghormatan terhadap agama, dan dialog antar-agama. Menurut David Burrell, dialog antar-agama adalah sebuah upaya menciptakan jalan baru untuk memahami diri sendiri dan orang lain sehingga dapat menciptakan jalur persahabatan dan apresiasi antar umat beragama (Burrell, 2004:196). Sebagai salah satu ikhtiar untuk saling bertukar pengetahuan dan pemahaman antara agama yang satu dengan yang lainnya, dialog antar-agama kerap diselenggarakan dengan melibatkan berbagai tokoh agama guna menghindari misinterpretasi. Dengan kata lain, upaya pluralistik ini diadakan untuk mereduksi konflik antar agama. Pada titik ini, ASCC telah menjamin adanya peluang untuk memperkuat isu antar agama sebagai salah satu penyokong terciptanya keharmonisan di ASEAN.

Dalam segi implementasi, poin mengenai isu antaragama telah diupayakan jauh sebelum dipublikasinya Cetak Biru ASCC oleh Indonesia. Wujud komitmen Indonesia untuk melaksanakan poin dalam ASCC tersebut adalah dengan menjadi tuan rumah pertama penyelenggara Bali Interfaith Dialogue di bawah Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Tidak hanya itu, pasca penyelenggaraan, Indonesia menetapkan inisiatif untuk membangun International Center for Religious and Cultural Cooperation (The Jogja Center). Di sisi yang lain, Filipina juga menunjukkan komitmennya dengan menjadi tuan rumah ketujuh untuk forum internasional yang sama. Kelebihan dari penyelenggaraan di Manila adalah adanya rancangan pra-acara yang melibatkan tokoh agama berusia muda untuk berdiskusi dan berdialog. Melalui dua penyelenggaraan ini, Manila lebih menunjukkan adanya keterlibatan masyarakat secara komprehensif dalam isu dialog antar-agama, sedangkan Indonesia hanya diwakili oleh representasi negara.

Namun, dalam konteks ini, persoalan isu antaragama masih berada dalam penanganan pemerintah. Pengadaan fora dialog antar-agama cenderung berkesan eksklusif dan tidak melibatkan kelompok-kelompok lain yang tergolong ‘radikal’. Padahal, di sisi yang lain, isu sosial semacam ini juga menjadi tanggung jawab masyarakat sebagai komunitas ASEAN. Masyarakat sebagai elemen terdekat yang melingkupi hubungan antar-agama dapat dimanfaatkan sebagai jalur untuk tidak hanya sekadar membangun, namun juga memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama. Di tingkat yang berbeda, hal ini juga dapat mendorong pemaknaan terhadap terminologi ‘komunitas’ dalam ASCC 2025.

Mematahkan Paradigma ‘Elite-Driven’
Dalam teori hegemoni kultural, Antonio Gramsci menjelaskan bahwa dalam sebuah struktur masyarakat, terdapat dua golongan yang dibagi sesuai tingkatannya, yakni elite dan massa. Gramsci membangun konsep masyarakat modern, dimana elit ditempatkan pada bagian atas sementara massa  pada bagian bawah, yang sarat dengan dominasi kelas atas terhadap kelas bawah. Ia mengatakan hal itu sebagai hegemoni. Namun, menurutnya, tatanan semacam ini seharusnya dapat dilawan dengan melihat pada potensi massa sebagai intelektual organik. Dengan begitu, konfigurasi hubungan antara elit dan massa dapat diubah melalui dekonstruksi tatanan tersebut.

Demikian pula, dalam beragam diskursus, integrasi ASEAN cenderung dipandang sebagai sebuah proses penyatuan negara-negara yang berbasis pada intervensi elit. Dirunut dari visi dan misinya, rancangan integrasi ASEAN yang meletakkan kerjasama ekonomi sebagai tujuan utama harus diikuti oleh situasi politik yang stabil di tingkat nasional maupun regional. Dengan begitu, kontrol politik dan dominasi pemerintah adalah konsekuensi logis, dimana pemerintahan yang otoriter mulai berkuasa pasca Perang Dingin.

Namun, implementasi agenda Komunitas ASEAN 2015 di kawasan, dan relevansi mengenai dominasi pemerintah mulai dipertanyakan ketika krisis ekonomi melanda wilayah Asia Tenggara. Di saat yang sama, perluasan jaringan masyarakat dalam bentuk kerjasama antar lembaga swadaya masyarakat (LSM), aktivis, dan stakeholders lainnya mulai intensif dikerjakan oleh masyarakat. Beberapa LSM yang aktif dalam isu antar-agama, antara lain Asia Pacific Interfaith Network yang menaruh perhatian pada isu antar-agama di kawasan ASEAN, Asian Resource Foundation yang mendirikan kantor di wilayah Myanmar dan Thailand, dan International Center for Law and Religion Studies yang bekerja sama secara intensif dengan Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) dan Coalition of Indonesian NGOs for International Human Rights Advocacy di Asia Tenggara. Paling tidak, hal ini menunjukkan tumbuhnya kesadaran kelas di tingkat massa terhadap kegagalan pemerintah negara ASEAN dalam menangani persoalan antar-agama. Maka dari itu, momentum ini patut dilihat sebagai modal untuk menginisiasi dekonstruksi tatanan pemerintahan yang cenderung solid dan kaku.

Pentingnya Kebebasan Berpendapat
Dalam tataran linguistik, untuk membangun sebuah wacana yang berkaitan dengan isu-isu sosial, tidak terkecuali isu antar-agama, maka setiap individu atau kelompok perlu berdialog guna membaca ulang titik singgung di antara perbedaan yang ada. Upaya dialektis ini cenderung dikemas dalam bentuk diskusi guna mencapai inter-subjektivitas (kesepakatan antara subjek-subjek terhadap nilai tertentu). Namun, jika berbincang soal kebebasan berpendapat di ASEAN, maka sesungguhnya kebebasan berpendapat merupakan persoalan krusial untuk dibahas.

Untuk mendorong adanya dialog antar-agama yang intensif di wilayah Asia Tenggara adalah tantangan besar bagi masyarakat di negara-negara semidemokratis atau monarki, seperti Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Singapura, Brunei Darussalam, Kamboja, dan Vietnam. Kekuasaan mutlak yang dipegang oleh pemerintah cenderung membatasi ruang gerak masyarakat, sehingga kesadaran intelektual yang muncul pun tidak dapat berkembang menjadi suatu political force yang memadai. Tanpa adanya political force, maka pewacanaan mengenai pentingnya dialog antar-agama guna mencegah terjadinya konflik di tingkat nasional akan sangat sulit diadvokasikan.

Namun, di sisi yang lain, sebagai salah satu negara yang telah menaruh perhatian besar pada isu antar-agama, Indonesia memiliki potensi untuk menjadi promotor penguatan dialog antar-agama di tingkat regional. Diwakili oleh AM Fachir, sebagai Wakil Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia, ia berpendapat bahwa dialog antar-agama perlu diintensifkan untuk menghindarkan munculnya berbagai konflik yang bersinggungan erat dengan agama. Tidak hanya itu, munculnya LSM yang bergerak di bidang antar-agama, seperti Institute for Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia (Interfidei) menjadi bukti kuatnya komitmen untuk mencari solusi atas permasalahan isu agama di Indonesia. Meskipun demikian, hal ini tidak secara keseluruhan meniadakan konflik antar-agama di Indonesia.

Pada titik ini, perlu adanya kesadaran untuk memanfaatkan jaringan-jaringan antar-agama yang telah terbentuk sebagai titik awal. Keterlibatan dalam fora semacam ini dapat memberi kontribusi ide kepada masyarakat di negara semi-demokratis atau absolut mengenai kebebasan berpendapat. Dengan kata lain, masyarakat tidak lagi mengandalkan pemerintah untuk belajar memahami ide-ide mengenai kebebasan dan toleransi yang relevan dengan tujuan menciptakan keharmonisan di tingkat negara dan regional. Di saat yang bersamaan, LSM dan aktivis dapat memanfaatkan kondisi ini untuk memperluas jaringan kerjasama.

Kesimpulan
Maka dari itu, dapat disimpulkan bahwa ASCC telah memberikan fondasi bagi pengupayaan toleransi antar-agama di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025. Namun, hal ini masih berada dalam kendali pemerintah, dimana tidak ada penjaminan secara mutlak atas solusi terhadap permasalahan antar-agama yang ada. Di sisi yang lain, masyarakat perlu untuk membangun kesadaran agar tidak terjebak dalam kondisi ‘elite-driven’ dengan cara membentuk dan atau memanfaatkan jaringan antaragama yang telah bekerja. Dengan begitu, penguatan masyarakat untuk mendorong upaya dialog antaragama di kawasan dapat tercapai.

(Artikel ini sudah dipublikasikan dalam Newsletter Interfidei Edisi Juli-Desember 2015.)

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Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 2012, The Edge Malaysia published a concise explanation regarding Malaysia’s position and how it sees ASEAN.  It stated that ASEAN has never been the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy and he emphasized on the fact that the condition will not likely to be altered anytime soon. Malaysia’s foreign policy will aim for her own national goals which is becoming a developed country; the agenda included the need of cohesive nation, constructing a strong, effective, transparent and accountable state that is responsive to her citizens, transforming the economy into a human capital intensive, deepening the democratic form of government, high income one to achieve global competitiveness and recognition (Alagappa, 2012). Lastly, Malaysia opted to ensure national security and regional stability, and only from that factor Malaysia took the existence of ASEAN into account. Was the analysis proven right that there will be not much of alteration by the Malaysian government regarding its position for the ASEAN?

According to the latest publication by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia had shifted its vision and as a state it has explicitly accepted ASEAN as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. It mentioned the urgency for Malaysia as Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN, therefore the foreign policy of Malaysia continues to emphasize on the relevance and importance of ASEAN as the forum and catalyst for regional dialogue.  The principality of Malaysian foreign policy had been divided into specified pillars, mainly it includes in maintaining peaceful relations with all countries regardless of its ideology and political system; adopting an independent, non-aligned, and principled stance in regional and international diplomatic affairs; forging close relations and economic partnerships with all nations, particularly with ASEAN and other regional friends; promoting peace and stability in the region through capacity building and conflict resolution measures; playing an influential leadership role as Chair of the ASEAN, Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); participating actively and meaningfully in the United Nations, especially in the efforts to end injustice and oppression, and to uphold international law; and lastly projecting Malaysia as a leading example of a tolerant and progressive Islamic nation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2016).

Malaysia’s Pragmatism

According to the given principals of Malaysia’s foreign policy, it reflected the pragmatic way of shaping its foreign policy in order to gain Malaysia’s best interest. As Datuk Seri Anifah Aman mentioned on the dynamic of Malaysia’s foreign policy that the status quo requires Malaysia to implement its foreign policy initiatives and make it a realization in order to remain relevant and necessary in response to changing regional dynamics and the ‘recessionary global economy’,  Anifah said that this will enable the country to continue building on its good relations with strategic partners and to have more focused relations with key countries (Divakaran, 2016). To assure its chairmanship role in ASEAN, Malaysia has also been promoting the idea of strengthening ASEAN’s internal institutions, particularly by the ASEAN Secretariat.  Moreover, Malaysia has launched the idea of AEC 2025, which builds upon ASEAN’s earlier idea of a ‘single market and production base’ extending it further to include sustainable economic development (Das, 2015). However, the chairmanship failed to meet its expected target of further negotiation on the status of South China Sea, Malaysia was expecting to gain statements on the South China Sea during its April Summit and ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, yet they could not secure a joint declaration for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in November. Nonetheless the failure of joint declaration could not solemnly be pinpointed on Malaysia’s chairmanship but also on the mechanism of ASEAN itself, the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been claimed as slow and redundant since it is subject to parties’ consent on such measures; an opposed party can thus prevent the ASEAN High Council from being formed (Nguyen, 2015).

As a state Malaysia’s foreign policy really portrayed the domestics’ tendencies in Malaysia, starting from the pragmatic approach of foreign policy pairing it up with economic preferences in fostering economic environment for the other ASEAN member states as how the agenda will be fruitful for Malaysia and furthering ASEAN economic integration. Although due to this blunt tendency and its current chairmanship position it is only fair to question where Malaysia will position itself in between the Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, its back and forth reaction signaled others that Malaysia wanted the best of both world Malaysia’s, considering that Malaysia’s membership in the TPP does not imply that she is shifting away from China and moving closer to the United States. Much like Singapore, Malaysia will spread both its wings, courting the United States and China; extending concessions to both in equal measure or as opportunities arise, regardless of their source (Nambiar, 2016). Where does Malaysia stand now cannot be easily defined, as we can see Malaysia stands for itself, despite of its current Chairmanship Malaysia is utilizing its position to gain what is needed for the country. Moreover, Malaysia juggles over the influence of superpowers out of its strategic means. Future steps are being observed by many, as Malaysia is heading either the TPP or RCEP and her decision will affect the dynamic of the region.

Source:

Alagappa, M. (2016, November 19). Is ASEAN Malaysia’s Cornerstone of Foreign Policy? The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved April 26, 2016, from <http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/1288_MA_TheEdge_19Nov2012.pdf/>

Das, S. (2015, December 5). Evaluating Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/05/evaluating-malaysias-asean-chairmanship/>

Divakaran, P. (2016, January 07). Anifah defends Malaysia’s foreign policy record. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/01/07/anifah-defends-foreign-policy-record/>

Nambiar, S. (2016, February 13). Is the TPP really a leap forward for Malaysia? Sun Daily.

Nguyen, C. (2015, November 21). ASEAN’s uncertain stance in the South China Sea. Retrieved

April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/21/aseans-uncertain-stance-in-the-south-china-sea/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia – Objectives. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/objectives/>

Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM 

Not to be surprised anymore that each of ASEAN member states are given veto power to reject Draft Communique which threatens their national sovereignty. Non-interference policy and consensus-based in decision-making process are the ASEAN Way which reflects full appreciation towards its member-states sovereignty. However, if ASEAN is seen to be threatening its member’s sovereignty, why bother to have ASEAN? Why bother to have complex integration? This article aims to question ASEAN member-states’ commitment in having a complex integration within Southeast Asian region through the establishment of a greater governance ruling the region.

In order to do so, let us present article 2 (2e) of the Charter, which states that,[1] “ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles of these principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states” This provision of the charter strongly declares that ASEAN and its member states shall not interfere in domestic affairs of its member states. It is true that ASEAN member states shall respect each of member states’ sovereignty and ASEAN too, however, in this case ASEAN remains to hold responsibility as Southeast Asian Nations’ primary regional organization. Even there have been many claims that ASEAN has brought itself to be people-centric by upholding human rights values and establishing the AICHR. Therefore, it leads ASEAN to be a legitimate regional organization within the region, but here reflected the progress is hampered by the non-interference policy upon the progress to improve human rights development. For instance, if AICHR does not do something significant towards the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, there is a little chance for this commission to maintain its legitimacy.[2] The question raised here would be, where is ASEAN member-states’ seriousness in building a regional governance?

True that ASEAN member-states should not interfere against each other’s domestic affairs however, ASEAN, to maintain its legitimacy as a primary regional organization, should be granted an extended right to assist its member states in handling their domestic problems, even if they are “quote, unquote” unable to bring domestic stability within their region. A proposal to respond against the question towards ASEAN member states’ commitment in building ASEAN would be that article 2 (e) of the charter shall be revised to, “ASEAN Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.” By removing ASEAN from the article it increases opportunity for the organization to be more legitimate in handling problems and issues faced by each of member states. And when its member states are failing to respond towards domestic issue. If a member state’s problem that could spread massively towards Southeast Asian region can be prevented by increasing ASEAN’s legitimacy, why not doing so? Thus, to conclude in order for ASEAN to maintain its legitimacy, its member states should commit on extending ASEAN’s role in assisting its member states’ development for the benefits of regional integration.

1. ASEAN,. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007. Print.
2. Arendshorst, John. ‘The Dilemma Of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, And The ASEAN Charter’. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights1 (2009): 120. Print.

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Last Monday, 11^th of April 2016 marked the 100 days of the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community. From this point it is only necessary to question where has ASEAN brought themselves into in the past 100 days? There are several of policies planning and activities brought by member states government, but had the member states discussed what matters for them in the practicality of the community? Through the political economic scope we will assess the progress of the ASEAN Economic Community in the last 100 days, progress in the sense of comprehensive improvements and agendas in all economic aspects macro and micro.

Early on April,  a meeting was held among finance ministers and central bank governors from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the meeting had agreed upon the forming of collective interest  and to make efforts toward realizing financial integration in the region by 2025 (Kyodo News, 2016), During the meeting which was held in Vientiane, the representatives from the 10-member states of ASEAN welcomed the launch late last year of the ASEAN Economic Community and pledged to promote financial inclusion and stability based on a blueprint for the coming decade for the AEC. True, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint requires mature economic policies and regulates the flow of finance among each state before furthering the integration; therefore out of the meetings the representatives had set their agenda in putting in place the appropriate monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies. This is a gesture of continued efforts toward liberalizing financial services and developing capital markets as pillars for realizing regional financial integration.

The financial integration focused on the creation of ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, where the representatives formulated a standard of Qualified ASEAN Bank or QAB, in the status quo QAB system has been studied on a limited trial basis through bilateral agreements, not yet implemented in the ASEAN scale. However, ASEAN put its commitment through the AEC meaning that there is a need for broader implementation. As the meeting in Vientiane set a new time line, it also calls for creating by 2025 a system letting eight of the 10 ASEAN members share bond market disclosures and framework for retail investors to buy government bond (Tamaki, 2016). As part of the ASEAN economic community agenda these policies viewed to be critical as it could make fundraising within the bloc simpler, more flexible, and it will speed the infrastructure development.

Still within the finance platform, the outcome of the meeting addressed the Seventh Package of Financial Services Commitments and aimed on fully liberalizing the insurance sector. On May the 3^rd the commitments would be ratified making several ASEAN states to abide the new “fully liberalized the cross-border supply of international maritime, aviation and transit insurance” (Boon, 2016). The meeting basically reviewed tasks in the ASEAN financial and monetary integration roadmap in terms of liberalization of financial services and capital. Through capital and market development, the states members came up with the seventh package of financial services liberalization and are ready to launch the eighth round of negotiation this year (Vietnam News, 2016), these packages are created and ratified to further open the financial services market, with a focus on further liberalizing insurance services in the region. Ministers and central governors from the member states had pledged to continue removing existing obstacles to trade and direct investment.

It is reflected the readiness of ASEAN member states through the meetings and how they set the finance environment after the launch of ASEAN Economic Community. Supposedly this meetings and ratified commitments were conducted before the launch of the community, regulation and liberation of finance should have been part of the preparation towards AEC back in 2015; therefore within the last 100 days the policies are created to touch the community better rather than just government meetings discussing financial matters. Whether it is part of the members’ strategy or another form of ASEAN’s way of hindering themselves from an actual community-based integration, the AEC does make progress. Hopefully within the next 100 days the progress will not only cover higher institution agenda nor will it postpone what is critical for the community. It is the time for the regional community to be included in the policies and implementations and what is best for the community discusses in the next summit, not until ASEAN could talk and asses what is practical and viable for the community and set aside the tedious agendas actual progress can be made. It is only logical that the involvement and contribution of the community will facile the path towards economic union

Sources:

Kyodo News. (2016, April 5). Asean ministers push for financial integration by 2025. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/922381/asean-ministers-push-for-financial-integration-by-2025>

Tamaki, K. (2016, April 5). ASEAN cautiously speeds steps toward financial integration. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/ASEAN-cautiously-speeds-steps-toward-financial-integration?page=1>

Boon, R. (2016, April 06). AEC makes progress on insurance, investment schemes. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/aec-makes-progress-on-insurance-investment-schemes>

Vietnam News. (2016, April 5). ASEAN finance ministers commit to cautious fiscal policies. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/294831/asean-finance-ministers-commit-to-cautious-fiscal-policies.html>

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

The road to a complete economic integration promoting higher productivity and trade activity for ASEAN is filled with challenges and opportunities. Gradually, within the Economic Blueprint ASEAN aims for a deeper economic and political integration. Theoretically, this transition equals to ASEAN’s movement towards Custom Union and deeper will be better, as simplified and more harmonized border procedures facilitate trade, common product standards enable longer production runs, and a common competition policy serves to unify the market (Basu Das, Sen, and Srivastava, 2015). However, a very important question must be answered by each ASEAN states in regards of who will be benefited from ASEAN economic community? If the changes focused only for capital holders then this integration would definitely neglected the community, the people, hence the labors.

One of the pillars which were introduced by AEC’s pillars is endorsing the free flows of services; the point emphasized on the free flow the free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and skilled labor. Alongside to other technical difficulties among ASEAN states in terms of infrastructure, state stability, and other political aspects, deepening the scope of competition without any preparation only leads to a detrimental point for labors, if not the community is not free from exploitation possibilities (Chia, 2013).

Naturally, through all of the changes ASEAN must not allow opportunistic actors to perform a race to the bottom where due to open opportunities states will try attracting corporations and will seize the action by reducing social welfare of labors (Suranovic, 2010). This particular transition should not lead us to a condition where labors became the victim of big corporations and international laws. The danger of race of the bottom is real, not only it will undermine the ASEAN’s aim for the community it will be a prescription towards widened income gap between the rich and the poor, inexistence of job security among ASEAN people, and in AEC will be utilized for massive multinational corporations to milk the benefits of the free flow and hurts the small to medium enterprises which represents almost 90% of ASEAN’s source of employments (Palatino, 2014), not to mention killing opportunities for low skilled workers, traditional and agricultural industries.

This is the part where ASETUC (ASEAN Services Employees Trade Union Council) must play its role and should be strengthened. ASETUC as a representative legal platform of regional labor union must be able to perform its duty in protecting the welfare of labors within the region.  It is only necessary for the union to enforce the fundamental principles and rights of work ratified by the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2002) for both local and migrant workers.

Through this representation, unions showed its participation in defining the fates of ASEAN labors, more importantly in negotiating their terms with the government and employers. A balance within the economic integration shall bridge the needs of capital and labor movements in order to pursue the desired collective development without violating the differences each state have (Felipe and Hasan, 2006). Regardless of the differences, what must be seen in this context is that labor welfare stand on the same ground, and only if they were involved within the union ASEAN labors would recognize their bargaining position. Lastly, the reinforcement of ASETUC will be obsolete without the commitments of ASEAN members. Each state also have their own homework in order to assure the increasing quality of labors within the region, expand the social security programs, and in accordance to the ASEAN Socio-Cultural that governments should invest in workers’ education, lifelong learning, and skills development programs.

Bibliography

Basu Das, S., Sen, R., & Srivastava, S. (2015). The Feasibility of an ASEAN Customs Union Post- 2015. Institute of South East Asian Studies, (13), 5-7.

Chia, S. (2013). The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects. Asian Development Bank Institute, (440), 4-8.

Felipe, J., & Hasan, R. (2006). Labor markets in Asia: Issues and perspectives (1st ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Suranovic, S. M. (2010). A Moderate Compromise: Economic policy choice in an era of globalization (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The International Labour Organization’s fundamental conventions. (2002). Geneva: International Labour Office.

Electronic Media

Palatino, M. (2015, May 05). Who Will Benefit from the ASEAN Economic Community? Retrieved February 10, 2016, from<http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/who-will-benefit-from-the-asean-economic-community/>