Entries by aseansc

Year of Laos: Queries for the New ASEAN Chair

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Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada

The role of ASEAN chairmanship will be held in the hands of Laos in 2016; despite the fact that it is not the first time the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to hold the role as the chair of ASEAN since 2004 questions still arose due the fact that conditions had shifted as the global political course had changed. It is perceivable since ASEAN had ratified new treaties, the dynamics of states had been refined according new pillars and agreements among state members and Laos had changed within the last decade. Many deemed Lao’s leadership will bring significant changes for the region but there are also others who query this particular leadership turnover.

As ASEAN gradually walk towards a more human rights oriented path by creating an identity which could cohesively represent its community, Laos has been seen unfit to represent such agenda, recent case would be reflected from Laos who has been unresponsive in regard to 80 human rights recommendations by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2015). And instead it is visible that international pressures to improve transparency and protect human rights have only reinforced the government’s resolve to suppress public and political opposition. More importantly media has limited freedom when it comes to dealing with Laos (Hunt, 2016), as the existence of draconian media monitoring laws with the country’s current role as the 2016 ASEAN Chair; the laws have potentials to constrain international reporting on important transnational issues discussed at ASEAN meetings and conferences (Sims, 2016)

However, as part of the integration initiatives this landlocked country might serve a fresh perspective for the rest of the other ASEAN member states. Thongloun Sisoulith declared it not long ago prior to his appointment as Prime Minister of Laos that the top priorities for Laos’ chairmanship are narrowing the development gaps between member states, promoting connectivity by promoting small and midsize enterprises. Under this chairmanship Sisoulith emphasized the need to improve trade facilitation, encourage more subsistence workers to enter the formal economy, and step up efforts to preserve and promote ASEAN’s cultural heritage (Chongkittavor, 2016). It cannot be eluded the fact that Laos was the one who pushed a successful joint declaration on the basis of ASEAN during the United States-ASEAN Summit last February hosted by Barrack Obama, That document will serve as the foundation for stronger ASEAN-U.S. cooperation in the years to come, tangible progress on advancing the U.S.-ASEAN relationship a step further from November 2015, when the United States and ASEAN elevated their relationship to the level of a strategic partnership and laid out a concrete plan of action to implement it out to 2020 (Prameswaran, 2016).

Laos has show its potential in balancing how ASEAN should steer itself among the superpowers, as another interest shown by another contending actor in the ground known as the South China Sea, we cannot outlook People’s Republic of China as the largest trading partner of Laos and perceptible role among the ASEAN state members, most importantly China’s diplomatic approach had been fully committed in gradually courting smaller countries in ASEAN mainly Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia (Johnson, 2016). Laos will also have to stand its ground to be the chair the ASEAN aspired to be in positioning itself facing the ongoing negotiation between Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership which had sparked the interest of other member states, Laos can navigate the issues relating to overlapping maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and the rise of China and its increasingly competitive rivalry with the US rebalance in Asia (Vilavong, 2016). Yet under this chairmanship whichever the institution leaned itself towards ASEAN must not to neglect the core of ASEAN Economic Community and its extension due in 2025.

Amidst the internal human rights inside of Laos’ political regime and inherent fragmentation within the ASEAN itself the new set of chairmanship must be able to attain the integration which is the main aim of ASEAN. If the agenda of gap elimination could be fulfilled as it was mentioned by Sisoulith the next step for deepening the integration and acquiring an ASEAN standard would seem near foreseeable future. Laos’ new leadership must be able to answer some difficult questions and challenges regionally and internationally. Will Laos be capable of hosting the ASEAN summit and related meetings? The AEC aspects of being ASEAN Chair have increased significantly since the last time Laos held position as chair, as have the Political-Security and Socio-Cultural community aspects.  Such responsibilities, along with the logistical burdens that would come with having two ASEAN Summits in 2016, led Laos to propose having the two summits mandated by the ASEAN Charter on a back-to-back basis in November 2016, effectively resulting in a single meeting (Sim, 2015). Laos has a whole year to prove itself as these meetings hold the key of uniting ASEAN’s states members in facing external influences and balancing their powers in the region.

Photo source http://havokjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/throne-dpc.jpg

References:
Amnesty International. (2015). Laos 2015/2016. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/laos/report-laos/
Chongkittavorn, K. (2016, May 05). Kavi Chongkittavorn: Laos' new leader faces big challenges -- at home and as ASEAN chief. Retrieved May 9, 2016, from http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160505-DEMOCRACY-DEFERRED/Viewpoints/Kavi-Chongkittavorn-Laos-new-leader-faces-big-challenges-at-home-and-as-ASEAN-chief?page=2
Hunt, L. (2016, April 03). What If They Gave an ASEAN Summit and the Media Failed to Turn Up? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/what-if-they-gave-an-asean-summit-and-the-media-failed-to-turn-up/
Johnson, J. (2016, May 1). Beijing launches charm offensive ahead of South China Sea court ruling | The Japan Times. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/01/asia-pacific/beijing-launches-charm-offensive-ahead-south-china-sea-court-ruling/#.VzC4n9J97IU
Sim, E. (2015, June 10). Can Laos Lead ASEAN in 2016? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/can-laos-lead-asean-in-2016-2/
Sims, K. (2016, April 15). Is Laos' ASEAN Chairmanship a Threat to Southeast Asian Regionalism? Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-laos-asean-chairmanship-a-threat-to-southeast-asian-regionalism/
Prameswaran, P. (2016, February 11). Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-the-us-asean-sunnylands-summit-matters/
Vilavong, B. (2016, May 07). ASEAN needs Laos' leadership. Retrieved May 09, 2016, from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/07/asean-needs-laos-leadership/

ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution: The Indonesian Commitment

jokowi asap

Andika Putra, Intern staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Indonesia has finally ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) on September 2014. After 12 years, the ratification was done following a discussion by a plenary session of the House of Representatives Attended by parliamentary members, as well as some Ministers.  The decision of the plenary session marked the beginning of a new stage in the Indonesian leadership for the prevention and control of land or forest fires at the ASEAN regional level[1]

As it known, transboundary haze pollution is considered one of the major problems in the ASEAN region. Moreover, Indonesia is one of the major sources of the haze pollution in the Southeast Asia. The pollution which is caused by human activities in burning land/forest for plantation and/or agriculture does not stopping at national borders only, but also causing transboundary pollution to the neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Singapore[2]. The origins of the Agreement trace back to the regional haze crisis of 1997. In that year, Southeast Asia faced an environmental catastrophe that led to “unprecedented health and financial damages” throughout the region[3].

Thus, the importance of Indonesia’s ratification can be seen in its willingness to officially join the regional effort to address the issue[4], by ratify this agreement Indonesia recognize the issue of haze pollution not only become the domestic issue, but also the ASEAN problem that have to be solved together in line with the other members. The benefits of ratification to Indonesia and ASEAN should be enough to overcome the haze pollution. These benefits include greater coordination among the parties in addressing the transboundary haze originating in Indonesia by facilitating the spread of information and by allowing Indonesia to shape the Agreement based on its experiences as the only major source state in the region. These benefits are not limited to the current problem; they will also apply in the future when other states become source states

Furthermore, through this ratification Indonesia show their commitment to solve the haze pollution. Even, the ratification of the Agreement may not eliminate the transboundary haze pollution immediately, because AATHP is only a legal framework for cooperation and does not address important technical issues. Ultimately, additional initiative is needed to determine how countries will work together to exchange information and expertise and it can bring all the stakeholders together to facilitate a more lasting solution than they would otherwise be able to reach on their own.

Now, all ASEAN members have ratified the AATHP. Thus, it is unlikely that the ratification will quickly lead to a mitigation of haze pollution. But at least all ASEAN member states have now officially agreed that haze pollution is not a domestic problem but, rather a regional problem that have to be solved together, and Indonesia has to put their concern on how to deal with the haze pollution, not only by ratify the AATHP, but also deal with their own domestic matter, such as law enforcement and other matter related to the solution of haze pollution.

[1]  Anonymous (2014, September 16). Indonesia ratifies ASEAN agreement on transboundary haze pollution. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from < http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/95683/indonesia-ratifies-asean agreement-on-transboundary-haze-pollution>
[2] Yordan Gunawan, “Transboundary Haze Pollution in the Perspective of International Law of State Responsibility”, Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
[3] Jerger, David B. , Jr. “Indonesia’s Role in Realizing the Goals of ASEAN’s Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.” Sustainable Development Law & Policy 14, no. 1 (2014). p.40
[4] Heilmann, Daniel (2015), After Indonesia’s Ratification: The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and Its Effectiveness As a Regional Environmental Governance Tool, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34, 3, 95–121
Photo source: http://www.aktual.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/antarafoto-presiden-tinjau-kebakaran-lahan-060915-nw-3.jpg

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) dan Dialog Antar-Agama: Sebuah Tinjuauan Kritis

Dedi Dinarto, Asisten Riset Pusat Kajian ASEAN UGM

Berakhirnya tahun 2015 menjadi titik awal bagi integrasi masyarakat ASEAN yang menekankan aspek ‘people-centered’ sebagai fokus baru di kawasan. Beberapa dokumen ASEAN telah memasukkan istilah ini dengan tujuan agar program-program yang diimplementasikan tidak hanya berorientasi pada pembangunan negara, akan tetapi juga melibatkan masyarakat dalam proses integrasi. Merespon hal tersebut, ASCC dibentuk guna memberi celah partisipasi dan manfaat bagi masyarakat, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. Namun, hingga saat ini, terminologi ‘komunitas’ ini tidak diletakkan senyatanya untuk mengatasi permasalahan sosial. Di sisi yang lain, ASCC hanya merupakan pelengkap untuk meningkatkan sentimen dan mobilisasi tenaga kerja di kawasan. Maka dari itu, perlu ada kajian untuk melihat sejauh mana ASCC benar-benar merangkul konteks ‘komunitas’.

Berhubungan dengan isu sosial, artikel ini akan mengangkat pentingnya dialog antar-agama dalam menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang harmonis dan rukun. Kondisi nyata menggambarkan bahwa konflik antar-agama kerap terjadi di Asia Tenggara. Misalnya, konflik antara umat Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia, umat Buddha dan Islam Patani di Thailand, umat Buddha dan Islam Rohingya di Myanmar, umat Islam Mindanao dan Kristen Katolik di Filipina, dan sebagainya. Untuk itu, keberadaan ini tidak seharusnya dipandang hanya sebagai keberagaman semata, akan tetapi perlu untuk disusun dalam konteks pluralistik yang mengakomodasi eksistensi dari seluruh agama.

Kendati demikian, pembahasan ini perlu untuk digiring pada beberapa pertanyaan lanjutan, yakni sejauh mana ASCC telah menjamin toleransi antar-agama, dan bagaimana seharusnya masyarakat berperan dalam memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama?

Membaca Relevansi ASCC
Pembentukan ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) diinisiasi sebagai upaya untuk menciptakan suasana bagi setiap orang, agar merasa sebagai bagian dari masyarakat ASEAN, dan mencari jalan keluar atas permasalahan sosial yang cukup kompleks di kawasan. Turunan dari dua tujuan ini telah dijabarkan di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025 secara detail guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang inklusif, berkelanjutan, kuat, dan dinamis. ASCC juga secara spesifik menaruh perhatian pada isu toleransi, pemahaman, dan penghormatan sebagai bentuk penyesuaian terhadap multikulturalisme dalam salah satu tolak ukur strategis, yakni ‘Menuju ASEAN yang Adaptif dan Terbuka’. Dengan kata lain, ASCC berupaya untuk menjamin adanya keharmonisan dalam masyarakat ASEAN.

Di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025, salah satu isu yang dianggap penting guna menciptakan masyarakat ASEAN yang terbuka dan adaptif adalah isu antaragama. Isu ini dianggap penting guna mendorong adanya budaya toleransi, pemahaman, penghormatan terhadap agama, dan dialog antar-agama. Menurut David Burrell, dialog antar-agama adalah sebuah upaya menciptakan jalan baru untuk memahami diri sendiri dan orang lain sehingga dapat menciptakan jalur persahabatan dan apresiasi antar umat beragama (Burrell, 2004:196). Sebagai salah satu ikhtiar untuk saling bertukar pengetahuan dan pemahaman antara agama yang satu dengan yang lainnya, dialog antar-agama kerap diselenggarakan dengan melibatkan berbagai tokoh agama guna menghindari misinterpretasi. Dengan kata lain, upaya pluralistik ini diadakan untuk mereduksi konflik antar agama. Pada titik ini, ASCC telah menjamin adanya peluang untuk memperkuat isu antar agama sebagai salah satu penyokong terciptanya keharmonisan di ASEAN.

Dalam segi implementasi, poin mengenai isu antaragama telah diupayakan jauh sebelum dipublikasinya Cetak Biru ASCC oleh Indonesia. Wujud komitmen Indonesia untuk melaksanakan poin dalam ASCC tersebut adalah dengan menjadi tuan rumah pertama penyelenggara Bali Interfaith Dialogue di bawah Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Tidak hanya itu, pasca penyelenggaraan, Indonesia menetapkan inisiatif untuk membangun International Center for Religious and Cultural Cooperation (The Jogja Center). Di sisi yang lain, Filipina juga menunjukkan komitmennya dengan menjadi tuan rumah ketujuh untuk forum internasional yang sama. Kelebihan dari penyelenggaraan di Manila adalah adanya rancangan pra-acara yang melibatkan tokoh agama berusia muda untuk berdiskusi dan berdialog. Melalui dua penyelenggaraan ini, Manila lebih menunjukkan adanya keterlibatan masyarakat secara komprehensif dalam isu dialog antar-agama, sedangkan Indonesia hanya diwakili oleh representasi negara.

Namun, dalam konteks ini, persoalan isu antaragama masih berada dalam penanganan pemerintah. Pengadaan fora dialog antar-agama cenderung berkesan eksklusif dan tidak melibatkan kelompok-kelompok lain yang tergolong ‘radikal’. Padahal, di sisi yang lain, isu sosial semacam ini juga menjadi tanggung jawab masyarakat sebagai komunitas ASEAN. Masyarakat sebagai elemen terdekat yang melingkupi hubungan antar-agama dapat dimanfaatkan sebagai jalur untuk tidak hanya sekadar membangun, namun juga memperkuat agenda dialog antar-agama. Di tingkat yang berbeda, hal ini juga dapat mendorong pemaknaan terhadap terminologi ‘komunitas’ dalam ASCC 2025.

Mematahkan Paradigma ‘Elite-Driven’
Dalam teori hegemoni kultural, Antonio Gramsci menjelaskan bahwa dalam sebuah struktur masyarakat, terdapat dua golongan yang dibagi sesuai tingkatannya, yakni elite dan massa. Gramsci membangun konsep masyarakat modern, dimana elit ditempatkan pada bagian atas sementara massa  pada bagian bawah, yang sarat dengan dominasi kelas atas terhadap kelas bawah. Ia mengatakan hal itu sebagai hegemoni. Namun, menurutnya, tatanan semacam ini seharusnya dapat dilawan dengan melihat pada potensi massa sebagai intelektual organik. Dengan begitu, konfigurasi hubungan antara elit dan massa dapat diubah melalui dekonstruksi tatanan tersebut.

Demikian pula, dalam beragam diskursus, integrasi ASEAN cenderung dipandang sebagai sebuah proses penyatuan negara-negara yang berbasis pada intervensi elit. Dirunut dari visi dan misinya, rancangan integrasi ASEAN yang meletakkan kerjasama ekonomi sebagai tujuan utama harus diikuti oleh situasi politik yang stabil di tingkat nasional maupun regional. Dengan begitu, kontrol politik dan dominasi pemerintah adalah konsekuensi logis, dimana pemerintahan yang otoriter mulai berkuasa pasca Perang Dingin.

Namun, implementasi agenda Komunitas ASEAN 2015 di kawasan, dan relevansi mengenai dominasi pemerintah mulai dipertanyakan ketika krisis ekonomi melanda wilayah Asia Tenggara. Di saat yang sama, perluasan jaringan masyarakat dalam bentuk kerjasama antar lembaga swadaya masyarakat (LSM), aktivis, dan stakeholders lainnya mulai intensif dikerjakan oleh masyarakat. Beberapa LSM yang aktif dalam isu antar-agama, antara lain Asia Pacific Interfaith Network yang menaruh perhatian pada isu antar-agama di kawasan ASEAN, Asian Resource Foundation yang mendirikan kantor di wilayah Myanmar dan Thailand, dan International Center for Law and Religion Studies yang bekerja sama secara intensif dengan Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) dan Coalition of Indonesian NGOs for International Human Rights Advocacy di Asia Tenggara. Paling tidak, hal ini menunjukkan tumbuhnya kesadaran kelas di tingkat massa terhadap kegagalan pemerintah negara ASEAN dalam menangani persoalan antar-agama. Maka dari itu, momentum ini patut dilihat sebagai modal untuk menginisiasi dekonstruksi tatanan pemerintahan yang cenderung solid dan kaku.

Pentingnya Kebebasan Berpendapat
Dalam tataran linguistik, untuk membangun sebuah wacana yang berkaitan dengan isu-isu sosial, tidak terkecuali isu antar-agama, maka setiap individu atau kelompok perlu berdialog guna membaca ulang titik singgung di antara perbedaan yang ada. Upaya dialektis ini cenderung dikemas dalam bentuk diskusi guna mencapai inter-subjektivitas (kesepakatan antara subjek-subjek terhadap nilai tertentu). Namun, jika berbincang soal kebebasan berpendapat di ASEAN, maka sesungguhnya kebebasan berpendapat merupakan persoalan krusial untuk dibahas.

Untuk mendorong adanya dialog antar-agama yang intensif di wilayah Asia Tenggara adalah tantangan besar bagi masyarakat di negara-negara semidemokratis atau monarki, seperti Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Singapura, Brunei Darussalam, Kamboja, dan Vietnam. Kekuasaan mutlak yang dipegang oleh pemerintah cenderung membatasi ruang gerak masyarakat, sehingga kesadaran intelektual yang muncul pun tidak dapat berkembang menjadi suatu political force yang memadai. Tanpa adanya political force, maka pewacanaan mengenai pentingnya dialog antar-agama guna mencegah terjadinya konflik di tingkat nasional akan sangat sulit diadvokasikan.

Namun, di sisi yang lain, sebagai salah satu negara yang telah menaruh perhatian besar pada isu antar-agama, Indonesia memiliki potensi untuk menjadi promotor penguatan dialog antar-agama di tingkat regional. Diwakili oleh AM Fachir, sebagai Wakil Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia, ia berpendapat bahwa dialog antar-agama perlu diintensifkan untuk menghindarkan munculnya berbagai konflik yang bersinggungan erat dengan agama. Tidak hanya itu, munculnya LSM yang bergerak di bidang antar-agama, seperti Institute for Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia (Interfidei) menjadi bukti kuatnya komitmen untuk mencari solusi atas permasalahan isu agama di Indonesia. Meskipun demikian, hal ini tidak secara keseluruhan meniadakan konflik antar-agama di Indonesia.

Pada titik ini, perlu adanya kesadaran untuk memanfaatkan jaringan-jaringan antar-agama yang telah terbentuk sebagai titik awal. Keterlibatan dalam fora semacam ini dapat memberi kontribusi ide kepada masyarakat di negara semi-demokratis atau absolut mengenai kebebasan berpendapat. Dengan kata lain, masyarakat tidak lagi mengandalkan pemerintah untuk belajar memahami ide-ide mengenai kebebasan dan toleransi yang relevan dengan tujuan menciptakan keharmonisan di tingkat negara dan regional. Di saat yang bersamaan, LSM dan aktivis dapat memanfaatkan kondisi ini untuk memperluas jaringan kerjasama.

Kesimpulan
Maka dari itu, dapat disimpulkan bahwa ASCC telah memberikan fondasi bagi pengupayaan toleransi antar-agama di dalam Cetak Biru ASCC 2025. Namun, hal ini masih berada dalam kendali pemerintah, dimana tidak ada penjaminan secara mutlak atas solusi terhadap permasalahan antar-agama yang ada. Di sisi yang lain, masyarakat perlu untuk membangun kesadaran agar tidak terjebak dalam kondisi ‘elite-driven’ dengan cara membentuk dan atau memanfaatkan jaringan antaragama yang telah bekerja. Dengan begitu, penguatan masyarakat untuk mendorong upaya dialog antaragama di kawasan dapat tercapai.

(Artikel ini sudah dipublikasikan dalam Newsletter Interfidei Edisi Juli-Desember 2015.)

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Japan-Philippines Defense Pact May Worsen South China Sea Tension

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Dedi Dinarto, Research Assistant at ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada

On February 29, 2016, the signing of a defense pact between Japan and the Philippines confirmed as a strategic security partnership that does not refer to any context or circumstance, instead for increasing defense equipment supply. In the news reported by The Jakarta Post (re: Japan signs pact to supply defense equipment to Philippines), Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin stated that this move is not against certain country instead of strengthening security cooperation as both the US allies. However, this momentum should be seen beyond the mere statement that the signing of such a defense pact could exacerbate the situation in the South China Sea.

Under the reign of Xi, China’s foreign policy has been directed for the active participation and involvement at the international level. Xi’s diplomatic mapping orientation showing the possibility to override the status-quo by putting national interests as the main objectives at the global level, and take the geopolitical role that focuses on Asia.

In other words, he tries to show that China is able to become a revisionist power that does not merely consider and follow the American-driven international political structure instead of reorganizing international politics based on China’s national interests.

National security as one of the agenda prioritized by China has to be seen interestingly. Closely related to the modernization of the military that carried and operated since 2000 until today, there is a reason why such modernization needs to be done. The importance of military modernization cannot be separated from the trajectory of China as an international victim of foreign invasion. Through this historical reflection, Xi in his speech underlined the importance of carrying the national security against every external intervention.

Capture

Both the Philippines and Japan are parties to the border dispute with China in the South China Sea and East China Sea. History proves that the conflict between China and the Philippines has been initiated since the incident of Cloma at Itu Aba Island in 1956. In fact, in the historical trajectory, the Philippines has experienced an economic embargo at that time China strictly prohibited the import of bananas as a valuable commodity from the Philippines. To date, both governments still insist on unilateral claim to the Spratly Islands regardless the initiative of the Philippines to invite China’s complying on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s dispute mechanism process.

On the other hand, the rising tension between China and Japan related to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is also experiencing the same conditions without any significant resolution. Each of these countries consider that the area is not included in the boundaries that fall into dispute. However, military contacts between China and Japan are common. The latest data revealed 117 cases of military contacts between the two countries jet aircraft in the third quarter of 2015. This issue remains the main reason why the political tensions between the two countries cannot be resolved easily.

However, both the status of the Philippines and Japan as US allies may worsen dispute. In the context of the South China Sea, relations between China and the US were strained when the US conducted freedom of navigation (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. Allegations that the Chinese claims made about sovereignty is disputed by the United States Navy as a form of blaming international maritime law. In this case, the US puts real deprecation rejecting of the island reclamation project and the militarization of the South China Sea by China. Under these conditions, China may appears to look at the ‘triangle cooperation’ of US-Japan-Philippines as a threat to the stability of the region as well as the intervention for China’s long-projection structure to change world politics.

At least, there are two ways to find a resolution amidst high tension in the South China Sea. Firstly, China should communicate to external party about the real intention of island reclamation. It cannot be neglected that the rising tension in South China Sea is basically determined by lack of communication between disputed and external parties.

Secondly, both US and China has to enforce the strategic security cooperation in order to reduce the skepticism from both side’s indistinguishable intention.

Thirdly, the needs of recalling ASEAN as a regional platform. The ASEAN member states should make clear their perspective towards China’s aggressiveness. Not only put concern under every ASEAN’s statement, but also establishing real initiative for resolution reviewing the significant progress of Marty Natalegawa’s initiative on the South China Sea Code of Conduct.

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Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: Where Malaysia Stands and What It Means

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Photo source: https://ripplesoftruth.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/kuala-lumpur-25.jpg

Habibah Hermanadi, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 2012, The Edge Malaysia published a concise explanation regarding Malaysia’s position and how it sees ASEAN.  It stated that ASEAN has never been the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy and he emphasized on the fact that the condition will not likely to be altered anytime soon. Malaysia’s foreign policy will aim for her own national goals which is becoming a developed country; the agenda included the need of cohesive nation, constructing a strong, effective, transparent and accountable state that is responsive to her citizens, transforming the economy into a human capital intensive, deepening the democratic form of government, high income one to achieve global competitiveness and recognition (Alagappa, 2012). Lastly, Malaysia opted to ensure national security and regional stability, and only from that factor Malaysia took the existence of ASEAN into account. Was the analysis proven right that there will be not much of alteration by the Malaysian government regarding its position for the ASEAN?

According to the latest publication by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia had shifted its vision and as a state it has explicitly accepted ASEAN as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. It mentioned the urgency for Malaysia as Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN, therefore the foreign policy of Malaysia continues to emphasize on the relevance and importance of ASEAN as the forum and catalyst for regional dialogue.  The principality of Malaysian foreign policy had been divided into specified pillars, mainly it includes in maintaining peaceful relations with all countries regardless of its ideology and political system; adopting an independent, non-aligned, and principled stance in regional and international diplomatic affairs; forging close relations and economic partnerships with all nations, particularly with ASEAN and other regional friends; promoting peace and stability in the region through capacity building and conflict resolution measures; playing an influential leadership role as Chair of the ASEAN, Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); participating actively and meaningfully in the United Nations, especially in the efforts to end injustice and oppression, and to uphold international law; and lastly projecting Malaysia as a leading example of a tolerant and progressive Islamic nation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2016).

Malaysia’s Pragmatism

According to the given principals of Malaysia’s foreign policy, it reflected the pragmatic way of shaping its foreign policy in order to gain Malaysia’s best interest. As Datuk Seri Anifah Aman mentioned on the dynamic of Malaysia’s foreign policy that the status quo requires Malaysia to implement its foreign policy initiatives and make it a realization in order to remain relevant and necessary in response to changing regional dynamics and the ‘recessionary global economy’,  Anifah said that this will enable the country to continue building on its good relations with strategic partners and to have more focused relations with key countries (Divakaran, 2016). To assure its chairmanship role in ASEAN, Malaysia has also been promoting the idea of strengthening ASEAN’s internal institutions, particularly by the ASEAN Secretariat.  Moreover, Malaysia has launched the idea of AEC 2025, which builds upon ASEAN’s earlier idea of a ‘single market and production base’ extending it further to include sustainable economic development (Das, 2015). However, the chairmanship failed to meet its expected target of further negotiation on the status of South China Sea, Malaysia was expecting to gain statements on the South China Sea during its April Summit and ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, yet they could not secure a joint declaration for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in November. Nonetheless the failure of joint declaration could not solemnly be pinpointed on Malaysia’s chairmanship but also on the mechanism of ASEAN itself, the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been claimed as slow and redundant since it is subject to parties’ consent on such measures; an opposed party can thus prevent the ASEAN High Council from being formed (Nguyen, 2015).

 

As a state Malaysia’s foreign policy really portrayed the domestics’ tendencies in Malaysia, starting from the pragmatic approach of foreign policy pairing it up with economic preferences in fostering economic environment for the other ASEAN member states as how the agenda will be fruitful for Malaysia and furthering ASEAN economic integration. Although due to this blunt tendency and its current chairmanship position it is only fair to question where Malaysia will position itself in between the Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, its back and forth reaction signaled others that Malaysia wanted the best of both world Malaysia’s, considering that Malaysia’s membership in the TPP does not imply that she is shifting away from China and moving closer to the United States. Much like Singapore, Malaysia will spread both its wings, courting the United States and China; extending concessions to both in equal measure or as opportunities arise, regardless of their source (Nambiar, 2016). Where does Malaysia stand now cannot be easily defined, as we can see Malaysia stands for itself, despite of its current Chairmanship Malaysia is utilizing its position to gain what is needed for the country. Moreover, Malaysia juggles over the influence of superpowers out of its strategic means. Future steps are being observed by many, as Malaysia is heading either the TPP or RCEP and her decision will affect the dynamic of the region.

 

Source:

Alagappa, M. (2016, November 19). Is ASEAN Malaysia’s Cornerstone of Foreign Policy? The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved April 26, 2016, from <http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/1288_MA_TheEdge_19Nov2012.pdf/>

 

Das, S. (2015, December 5). Evaluating Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/05/evaluating-malaysias-asean-chairmanship/>

 

Divakaran, P. (2016, January 07). Anifah defends Malaysia’s foreign policy record. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/01/07/anifah-defends-foreign-policy-record/>

 

Nambiar, S. (2016, February 13). Is the TPP really a leap forward for Malaysia? Sun Daily.

 

Nguyen, C. (2015, November 21). ASEAN’s uncertain stance in the South China Sea. Retrieved

April 25, 2016, from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/21/aseans-uncertain-stance-in-the-south-china-sea/>

 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia – Objectives. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/objectives/>

Mahathir, Identitas, dan Masa Depan ASEAN

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Photo source: http://www.katariau.com/foto_berita/16Mahathir%20Muhammad.jpg

Dedi Dinarto, Asisten Riset ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Beberapa menit yang lalu, saya menutup lembar terakhir dari sebuah otobiografi mantan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad. Bacaan tersebut sengaja saya baca untuk melihat bagaimana beliau mengungkap identitas sebagai fondasi utama bangsa Asia di tengah-tengah modernitas sebagai implikasi dari globalisasi. Dengan bahasa yang lugas dan ‘terus-terang’, beliau menyampaikan secara jelas apa yang hendak ia bicarakan soal wacana ‘Pan-Asianisme’. Namun, saya menemukan hal lain yang membuat saya kembali berpikir.

Keterlibatan aktif dalam kegiatan politik, yakni sebagai pendiri Persatuan Melayu Kedah (sekarang UMNO) dan agen ‘bawah tanah’ kemerdekaan Malaysia dari status protektorat di bawah Inggris berhasil membentuk seorang Mahathir yang cakap dalam mengambil keputusan dari tiap permasalahan yang ada. Ia menunjukkannya melalui strategi mengelola masyarakat multi-ras di Malaysia, yang notabene sempat mengalami masa kritis di tahun 1969. Kala itu, ia memprotes kebijakan PM Tunku Abdul Rahman di tengah melakoni peran publiknya sebagai anggota parlemen dan dokter di saat yang bersamaan. Menurutnya, UMNO telah gagal mengatur kesenjangan yang ada di antara warga Malaysia etnis Tionghoa dan Melayu.

Protes ini tak sekedar protes. Ketika ia diberi kesempatan untuk menjabat sebagai PM, ia segera menuangkan ide taktisnya dalam kebijakan ekonomi kontroversial (karena mengedepankan kepentingan etnis Melayu), New Economic Policy (NEP). Kendati demikian, kebijakan ini berhasil mengurangi kesenjangan pendapatan dan kontrol kapital antar etnis. Menurutnya, kesenjangan adalah persoalan yang sering kali tidak dihiraukan oleh pemimpin bangsa sehingga berimplikasi pada instabilitas sosial dan politik, seperti halnya yang terjadi di Indonesia.

Di tengah-tengah itu, sebaik-baiknya ilmu adalah untuk direfleksikan atas persoalan yang ada di sekitar kita. ASEAN sebagai sebuah rezim kawasan yang telah mengatur interaksi antar negara-negara di Asia Tenggara perlu ditelaah melalui cara pandang Mahathir. Ibarat etnis, negara-negara di Asia Tenggara memiliki cara pandang sendiri dengan latar belakang identitas yang berbeda. Kesenjangan di antara negara-negara dapat menjadi persoalan serius di masa depan. Membayangkan integrasi ASEAN sama halnya dengan membayangkan keharmonisan masyarakat multi-ras di negara manapun. Namun, perlu disadari bahwa logika bernegara berbeda dengan logika bermasyarakat.

Meski demikian, hal ini tidak berarti bahwa integrasi ASEAN harus dipandang secara pesimis. Dalam konteks Malaysia, Mahathir berperan untuk mengurangi atau menghilangkan kesenjangan yang ada antar etnis. Di sisi yang lain, tidak ada figur utama yang dapat menghilangkan ketidaksepahaman atas konsekuensi perbedaan identitas dan kepentingan negara anggota ASEAN. Artinya, ASEAN hanya akan digiring oleh negara-negara anggotanya yang berinteraksi satu sama lain di bawah Piagam ASEAN,  dan agenda Komunitas ASEAN, yang notabene menuntut adanya ‘kesadaran’ mematuhi mekanisme regulasi tersebut.

Maka dari itu, ASEAN sungguh digerakkan oleh negara anggotanya sehingga perlu adanya suatu upaya untuk menutup ‘kesenjangan’ dalam sektor ekonomi dan sosial sehingga tercipta sebuah kesepahaman atas masa depan ASEAN.

Questioning ASEAN’s Legitimacy from Its Charter

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Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Intern Staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM 

Not to be surprised anymore that each of ASEAN member states are given veto power to reject Draft Communique which threatens their national sovereignty. Non-interference policy and consensus-based in decision-making process are the ASEAN Way which reflects full appreciation towards its member-states sovereignty. However, if ASEAN is seen to be threatening its member’s sovereignty, why bother to have ASEAN? Why bother to have complex integration? This article aims to question ASEAN member-states’ commitment in having a complex integration within Southeast Asian region through the establishment of a greater governance ruling the region.

In order to do so, let us present article 2 (2e) of the Charter, which states that,[1] “ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles of these principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states” This provision of the charter strongly declares that ASEAN and its member states shall not interfere in domestic affairs of its member states. It is true that ASEAN member states shall respect each of member states’ sovereignty and ASEAN too, however, in this case ASEAN remains to hold responsibility as Southeast Asian Nations’ primary regional organization. Even there have been many claims that ASEAN has brought itself to be people-centric by upholding human rights values and establishing the AICHR. Therefore, it leads ASEAN to be a legitimate regional organization within the region, but here reflected the progress is hampered by the non-interference policy upon the progress to improve human rights development. For instance, if AICHR does not do something significant towards the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, there is a little chance for this commission to maintain its legitimacy.[2] The question raised here would be, where is ASEAN member-states’ seriousness in building a regional governance?

True that ASEAN member-states should not interfere against each other’s domestic affairs however, ASEAN, to maintain its legitimacy as a primary regional organization, should be granted an extended right to assist its member states in handling their domestic problems, even if they are “quote, unquote” unable to bring domestic stability within their region. A proposal to respond against the question towards ASEAN member states’ commitment in building ASEAN would be that article 2 (e) of the charter shall be revised to, “ASEAN Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles…non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.” By removing ASEAN from the article it increases opportunity for the organization to be more legitimate in handling problems and issues faced by each of member states. And when its member states are failing to respond towards domestic issue. If a member state’s problem that could spread massively towards Southeast Asian region can be prevented by increasing ASEAN’s legitimacy, why not doing so? Thus, to conclude in order for ASEAN to maintain its legitimacy, its member states should commit on extending ASEAN’s role in assisting its member states’ development for the benefits of regional integration.

  1. ASEAN,. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007. Print.
  2. Arendshorst, John. ‘The Dilemma Of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, And The ASEAN Charter’. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights1 (2009): 120. Print.

The United Nations World Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction: The ASEAN Commitment

SUMMER LIGHTING STORM, NEVADA

Mohammad Arumbinang, Intern staff at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Throwback in 1990’s, as remembered as the declaration of the international decade for natural disaster reduction. Nowadays, disaster risk is increasingly of global concern and its impact and actions in one region can have an impact on risks in another, and vice versa. This, compounded by increasing vulnerabilities related to changing demographic, technological and socio-economic conditions, unplanned urbanization, development within high-risk zones, under-development, environmental degradation, climate change, geological hazards, and competition for scarce resources, points to a future where disasters could increasingly threaten the world’s economy, and its population and the sustainable development of developing countries. In the past two decades, on average more than 200 million people have been affected every year by disasters. Therefore, the United Nations (UN) trough United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), comes up with World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, as a series of UN conferences focusing on disaster and climate risk management in the context of sustainable development.

The World Conference has been convened three times, with each edition to date having been hosted by Japan: in Yokohama in 1994, in Kobe in 2005 and in Sendai in 2015. The conferences bring together government officials and other stakeholders, such as NGOs, civil society organizations, local government and private sector representatives from around the world to discuss how to strengthen the sustainability of development by managing disaster and climate risks.

 

The ASEAN

The Southeast Asian region is remarkably vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters which repeatedly cause devastations to both human lives and properties. Geographically, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are located in one of the most disaster prone regions of the world. The ASEAN region sits between several tectonic plates causing earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. The region is also located in between two great oceans namely the Pacific and the Indian oceans causing seasonal typhoons and in some areas, tsunamis. The countries of the region have a history of devastating disasters that have caused economic and human losses across the region. Almost all types of natural hazards are present.

Often these disasters transcend national borders and overwhelm the capacities of individual countries to manage them. Most countries in the region have limited financial resources and physical resilience. Furthermore, the level of preparedness and prevention varies from country to country and regional cooperation does not exist to the extent necessary. Because of this high vulnerability and the relatively small size of most of the ASEAN countries, it will be more efficient and economically prudent for the countries to cooperate in the areas of civil protection, and disaster preparedness and prevention.

The Commitment?

Due to that issue, The ASEAN as the regional organization in Southeast Asia playing an importance role to building a well-prepared disaster management through join collaboration among ASEAN member by reason of humanity. Following with the 2nd of World Conference on Disaster Reduction “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015” (HFA 2005-2015), ASEAN proposing the first legally-binding HFA-related instrument in the world named ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and on 24 December has been ratified by all ten Member States and entered into force. It also affirms the ASEAN’s strong commitment to the HFA 2005-2015 as well as the world commitment to reduce disaster losses with regard the sustainable development. The AADMER spirit and consent is to reaffirming the ASEAN vision of disaster resilient nations and safe communities by 2015.

The AADMER set the foundation for regional cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management and emergency response. Moving towards 2025, ASEAN will need to recognize these changes and adapt the implementation of AADMER accordingly to ensure a comprehensive and robust disaster management and emergency response system is in place. This strategic policy document outlines the directions that may be considered by ASEAN in the next 10 years, and identifies the key areas to move the implementation of AADMER forward to a people-centered, people oriented, financially sustainable, and networked approach by 2025. Three mutually-inclusive strategic elements-Institutionalization and Communications, Finance and Resource Mobilization, and Partnerships and Innovations-were identified that may guide the direction of the implementation of AADMER to 2025, with regard with The UN 3rd Word Conference, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

 

Sources:

Sushil Gupta et al, Synthesis Report on Ten ASEAN Countries Disaster Risk Assessment; ASEAN Disaster Risk Management Initiative, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.

 

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2004.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Geneva: UNISDR, 2015.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2013, “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme 2010-2015 (4th Reprint)” taken from http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint, accessed on April 14, 2016 at 04:14 PM.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “The World Conference” taken from https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/wcdrr, accessed on April 14, 2016 at 05:22 PM.

Report on Progress: 100th days of ASEAN Economic Community

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Habibah Hermanadi, Intern Staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

Last Monday, 11th of April 2016 marked the 100 days of the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community. From this point it is only necessary to question where has ASEAN brought themselves into in the past 100 days? There are several of policies planning and activities brought by member states government, but had the member states discussed what matters for them in the practicality of the community? Through the political economic scope we will assess the progress of the ASEAN Economic Community in the last 100 days, progress in the sense of comprehensive improvements and agendas in all economic aspects macro and micro.

Early on April,  a meeting was held among finance ministers and central bank governors from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the meeting had agreed upon the forming of collective interest  and to make efforts toward realizing financial integration in the region by 2025 (Kyodo News, 2016), During the meeting which was held in Vientiane, the representatives from the 10-member states of ASEAN welcomed the launch late last year of the ASEAN Economic Community and pledged to promote financial inclusion and stability based on a blueprint for the coming decade for the AEC. True, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint requires mature economic policies and regulates the flow of finance among each state before furthering the integration; therefore out of the meetings the representatives had set their agenda in putting in place the appropriate monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies. This is a gesture of continued efforts toward liberalizing financial services and developing capital markets as pillars for realizing regional financial integration.

The financial integration focused on the creation of ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, where the representatives formulated a standard of Qualified ASEAN Bank or QAB, in the status quo QAB system has been studied on a limited trial basis through bilateral agreements, not yet implemented in the ASEAN scale. However, ASEAN put its commitment through the AEC meaning that there is a need for broader implementation. As the meeting in Vientiane set a new time line, it also calls for creating by 2025 a system letting eight of the 10 ASEAN members share bond market disclosures and framework for retail investors to buy government bond (Tamaki, 2016). As part of the ASEAN economic community agenda these policies viewed to be critical as it could make fundraising within the bloc simpler, more flexible, and it will speed the infrastructure development.

Still within the finance platform, the outcome of the meeting addressed the Seventh Package of Financial Services Commitments and aimed on fully liberalizing the insurance sector. On May the 3rd the commitments would be ratified making several ASEAN states to abide the new “fully liberalized the cross-border supply of international maritime, aviation and transit insurance” (Boon, 2016). The meeting basically reviewed tasks in the ASEAN financial and monetary integration roadmap in terms of liberalization of financial services and capital. Through capital and market development, the states members came up with the seventh package of financial services liberalization and are ready to launch the eighth round of negotiation this year (Vietnam News, 2016), these packages are created and ratified to further open the financial services market, with a focus on further liberalizing insurance services in the region. Ministers and central governors from the member states had pledged to continue removing existing obstacles to trade and direct investment.

It is reflected the readiness of ASEAN member states through the meetings and how they set the finance environment after the launch of ASEAN Economic Community. Supposedly this meetings and ratified commitments were conducted before the launch of the community, regulation and liberation of finance should have been part of the preparation towards AEC back in 2015; therefore within the last 100 days the policies are created to touch the community better rather than just government meetings discussing financial matters. Whether it is part of the members’ strategy or another form of ASEAN’s way of hindering themselves from an actual community-based integration, the AEC does make progress. Hopefully within the next 100 days the progress will not only cover higher institution agenda nor will it postpone what is critical for the community. It is the time for the regional community to be included in the policies and implementations and what is best for the community discusses in the next summit, not until ASEAN could talk and asses what is practical and viable for the community and set aside the tedious agendas actual progress can be made. It is only logical that the involvement and contribution of the community will facile the path towards economic union

Sources:

Kyodo News. (2016, April 5). Asean ministers push for financial integration by 2025. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/922381/asean-ministers-push-for-financial-integration-by-2025>

 

Tamaki, K. (2016, April 5). ASEAN cautiously speeds steps toward financial integration. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/ASEAN-cautiously-speeds-steps-toward-financial-integration?page=1>

 

Boon, R. (2016, April 06). AEC makes progress on insurance, investment schemes. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/aec-makes-progress-on-insurance-investment-schemes>

 

Vietnam News. (2016, April 5). ASEAN finance ministers commit to cautious fiscal policies. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/294831/asean-finance-ministers-commit-to-cautious-fiscal-policies.html>

Natural and Man-made Disaster Relief as Soft Diplomacy between ASEAN States and Other States

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Photo credit: http://writingserviceiya.dynu.net

Mohammad Hazyar Arumbinang, Intern staff ASEAN Studies Center UGM

During the past decade, natural and man-made disasters at various scales continue to increase by the year in Southeast Asia Region. Experience has shown that local government and holders with their capacity have proved their ability to handle small and medium scale emergency response, but under the circumstance of mega scale disaster which can cause a massive destruction to society and economical loss. Therefore, the host State sometimes cannot deal with this issue and need the support and assistance from international community.

Taking an example, the large scale and mega scale disaster mitigation beyond the capacity of the local stakeholders as demonstrated in the Southeast Asia earthquake and tsunami, which struck on 26 December 2004, affected 11 countries, killing more than 225 000 and displacing an estimated 1.2 million. The crisis required governments, civil society, humanitarian actors (including non-governmental organizations and donors) and the international organization to respond on a scale that had never been seen before.

The ASEAN Commitment

Learning form the history, ASEAN as the regional organization in Southeast Asia playing an importance role to building a well-prepared disaster management through join collaboration among ASEAN member, since Southeast Asia has a lot of potential natural disaster.

On 24 December 2009, The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) has been ratified by all ten Member States and entered into force. The AADMER is a regional framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management. It also affirms ASEAN’s commitment to the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) and is the first legally-binding HFA-related instrument in the world. Therefore, it would allow all ASEAN countries will work together and giving humanitarian assistance as disaster response to host state.

Disaster Relief as Soft Diplomacy?

Recently, China and ASEAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Disaster Management Cooperation on Monday October 2014. Under the agreement, China will provide 50 million RMB ($8.1 million) to build ASEAN’s capabilities to respond to regional disasters. The funds will support the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Work Program, the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance, and the ASEAN Secretariat’s programs to build capacity for disaster management. This is one of the example of collaboration on disaster management in international level. At this stage all ASEAN countries must have a collaboration on this matter since it will strengthen the relation among Southeast States.

There is no state may refuse the assistance from other countries if the result of natural or man-made disaster involves the loss of many lives and is beyond the capacity of the affected country. It also as part of commitment towards partnership and local as well as global cooperation. By that means, disaster response nowadays is not considering as humanitarian assistance but also as the soft diplomacy between the states. Cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is one of the easiest ways to build trust and goodwill between two States.  It will provide ample ground for diplomatic and even military cooperation. As such, many analysts have argued that cooperation between ASEAN members and other both international and regional organization can help build mutual trust. By providing greater assistance in disaster relief.