Special Meeting of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission (AICHR) » Special Meeting March 2015 KL – AICHR.org

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, Researcher at ASEAN Studies Center UGM

In 1996, John MacDonald and Louise Diamond wrote the book, Multi-track Diplomacy, which promoted the role of non-state actors in diplomatic theory. This concept is now considered an alternative way of doing diplomacy.

Diplomacy is perceived as a simultaneous system of interaction between the state and non-state actor in order to gain peace. Previously, diplomacy was understood only as a matter of “politics among nations” where the state was the only actor in international relations.

Since the 1990s, the world has witnessed shifts in international politics, mainly the emergence of non-state actors, such as NGOs, multinational corporations and transnational networks of think-tanks.

MacDonald cofounded the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy in 1992, which was influential in endorsing the concept to many stakeholders, particularly the UN.

ASEAN also recognizes “track two” diplomacy through ASEAN-ISIS (Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) Network and its endorsement of the ASEAN People’s Assembly, now the ASEAN People’s Forum.

However, this concept has limits in addressing contemporary problems in international politics.

As an illustration, I was once invited to attend a dialogue with the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives and ASEAN Secretariat. Several participants highlighted the importance of dialogue between the state, the ASEAN Secretariat and NGOs.

However, civil society members were reminded that they could come up with ideas, but they had to be delivered through the existing channels established in ASEAN to accommodate civil society’s voices. So such dialogue does not necessarily reflect negotiation between state and non-state actors.

Similarly, at the latest ASEAN People’s Forum in Kuala Lumpur, activists were disappointed because of a lack of dialogue between state representatives in discussing prominent issues in the region. Cambodian civil society organizations, for example, expressed disappointment because their expected representatives for interface meeting were replaced with lower-level officials.

These illustrations reflect a paradox in multitrack diplomacy in the political reality. Two lessons can be learned. First, multitrack diplomacy can be turned into a form of cooption or “corporatism” when perceived by non-democratic states.

Instead of endorsing stakeholder participation, this concept was used to prevent transnational networks of NGOs from advocating their interests at the international level.

Second, multitrack diplomacy can prevent dialogue and negotiations with non-state organizations that are critical of states. Through “diplomatic tracks”, every demand would be responded to based on state-defined national interests and potentials for negotiation could be reduced.

In ASEAN, which still includes states with authoritarian backgrounds, states used multitrack diplomacy as a political tool to conserve state hegemony in ASEAN and a pretext for the state to avoid negotiation and talks with non-state actors.

These lessons have led us to search for more comprehensive approaches and solutions for state-non state relations in diplomatic theories. Multitrack diplomacy should also be an arena of negotiation between all stakeholders. Participation in a separate, partial track is not enough. Stakeholders should be given enough space to negotiate with the state.

In ASEAN, radicalizing multitrack diplomacy means giving a wider place for civil society to express their interests with their leaders. So far civil society’s engagement with the state, in several countries, was primarily conducted only informally.

Before the ASEAN Community comes into effect at the end of this year, a challenge lies for every stakeholder. ASEAN is not a community of diplomats or businesspeople. ASEAN belongs to its people. Thus, every voice should be heard ; they should be given an opportunity to express their voices.

To go beyond multitrack diplomacy and propose a people-oriented diplomacy is a necessary task for every ASEAN stakeholder in the future.
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This article was published at The Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/17/a-paradox-multitrack-diplomacy.html

Dedi Dinarto – Research Intern at ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada (dinartodedi@gmail.com)

Even though China has successfully controlled the entire Spratlys on January 1974, the discourse on China’s presence in South China Sea remains the most debated issue in Southeast Asia. Accordingly the economic, strategic and political interests of involved ASEAN member countries cannot be separeaed with this problematic issue. China’s presence in the South China Sea cannot be separated from the historical trajectory, which is claimed as its own territory. However, the establishment of the ASEAN consequently resulted the demarcation of South China Sea by several ASEAN countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, claimed the South China Sea as their territory. Soon afterwards, this complexity of interest sparked the border dispute among them, which until now, has not been able to be resolved.

There are some scholarly discussions over this issue. For example, Ralf Emmers explained his main argument justifying the China’s naval position in the Spratlys has continue to be weak due to its limited power projection (Emmers, 2007:53). At that time, China naval capability did not arrange the external mission instead of remaining stay at its mainland bases. However, the transformation of China’s foreign policy, particularly during the leadership of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, triggered anxiety and caution of its neighbor countries, in which its action is predicted to control over some disputed border through assertive behavior.

In the sense of China’s past behavior, many diplomatic efforts have been done politically despite of military projection. But the current condition seems to be very different and any attempts to involve in the conflict will be regarded as a threat to the balance of power in South China Sea dispute. since the rise of China’s military budget has correspondingly shown its assertive behavior due to the naval presence in South China Sea. From 2013 to 2015, China’s military budget is rising year-to-year approximately US$ 114.3 billion in 2013, US$ 131.57 billion in 2014, and US$ 141.5 billion in 2015 (Erickson, 2013, 2015; Keck, 2014). Having Hua Chunying as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, she underlined the reason behind the extensive presence of China’s naval in South China Sea with the statement to maintain the military personnel, safeguard the maritime and territorial integrity, respond the maritime search and rescue, and increase the observation and research, as well as enhance fishery production (Tiezzi, 2015).

This statement has also been revealed as the main reason of China’s reclamation projects in the conflicting area. These projects remains debatable because they have larger political functions, particularly for military bases. Nevertheless, the most important thing that we can see is all about the diplomatic way endorsed by Hua Chunying, in some purpose to hide the more political and assertive behavior toward this issue, as explained by Fareed Zakaria as an effort of Chinese to hide consciously the ‘bully’ action from international view (Li, 2009:2). In the sense, this kind of political issue is successfully reframed by Chinese using soft power approach despite of military intervention.

Understanding Regional Security in ASEAN

In general, it is worth necessary to understand how the ASEAN member countries manage their conflict or dispute internally and externally. The ‘ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea’ stated ASEAN’s position toward the disputed area by means of peaceful way, without resort to force, and to be concerned on exercise restraint (Morse, 1992:2-3). Hence, the ASEAN Way as the basic principal of member countries shows its essence to solve every bilateral or regional disputes using consultation and consensus despite of forces.

Besides that, since 1967, the ASEAN member countries have built the principle of non-interference, which means of no military conflict in every internal affairs. This principle has long to affect the relationship of ASEAN member countries. On the other hand, results some prominent principles to understand ASEAN, which are the respect of sovereignty, and the high acknowledgement on freedom, independence, and integrity.

Basically, the ASEAN member countries also stated on the Bangkok Declaration 1967 about how they should dealt with external interference, especially several Great Powers after World War II, which are Uni Soviet, United States of America, and China as the nearest and biggest neighbor. They seek to defend their regional stability by ensuring the security of ASEAN territory from external interference in any form or manifestation. Therefore, it is necessarily important to underline the framework of regional security in ASEAN which do not acknowledge the use of force and military action.

A Need for Shifting Paradigm?

Accordingly, the old understanding of regional security framework in ASEAN is justified to set aside the material purposes in which the cooperation was basically made through value and norms as the product of inter-subjectivity. It is worth to say that the construction of security community in ASEAN is non-sense and rhetorical instead of developing the substantive cooperation (Acharya, 2001:63). The unconsciousness of ASEAN member countries to accept the nature of materialismm in one hand, has been used by China to expand its military presence in the South China Sea. In the other hand, China is not only to use its soft approach getting closer to the South China Sea, but also taking some materialistic advantage in this situation, which according to the ASEAN member countries as the irrelevant factor in term of regional security.

In terms of South China Sea conflict issue, the ASEAN member countries shall re-understand the behavior of China over some disputed areas. Giulio M. Gallarotti promoted the cosmopolitanism power as the new framework to understand the current international politics. It acknowledges the possibility of soft power and hard power being practiced simultaneously. To maintain good relationship and image with all possible countries and to concern on military capability development are the two most prominent elements to define cosmopolitan power. Hence, what has China has shown to the world, particularly in the South China Sea, is worth to be described as the practice of such power. Expanding its economic cooperation is included as the practice of soft power. On the contrary, the increasing of military budget, and spreading of military presence are the concrete action of China to practice its hard power.

ASEAN member countries should also seek a new paradigm to handle the South China Sea dispute. The consciousness over the military expansion needs to be discussed further for a new strategy balancing the Chinese military presence. Not to be collided with the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint 2009-2015, it is important for ASEAN member countries to address their common interests on the military cooperation, particularly on the provision of common military equipment and personnel for regional integrity despites of the exclusive cooperation among disputed ASEAN member. With the notion of ASEAN centrality, a ‘common interest’ will overcome ASEAN’s passive attitudes towards Chinese military development in the South China Sea.