Drawing ASEAN Limits and Strengths in Tackling Terrorism: Study Case of Abu Sayyaf Group

November 17, 2016/in ASEAN Notes/by aseansc

Novita Putri Rudiany-Kholifatus Saadah

1st Winner of Call for Essay: “ASEAN Community post 2015”

ASEAN actually had discussed terrorism issue before 9/11 happened, since the summit in 1997 and continued until the signing of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism in Cebu Philippines on January 13, 2007 (Soesilowati 2011). On average in Southeast Asia, the terrorism issues come from the separatist movement or motion-based Islam. One of the terrorist movement, is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which based in the Philippines. They have the principle for attacking other religious groups and believe that violence is the only way in the fight against others (Tan 2001). ASG has close connection with the world terrorist groups, and particularly Janjalani is well-known as Afghanistan war veterans. Recently, the ASG captivity was proven to hijacking action to the vessels crew from Indonesia and Malaysia. As quoted by the BBC (2016) ASG will not release the hostages if no ransom crate desired. Indonesia’s Chief Security Minister, Luhut Pandjaitan, said conditions were carried out by ASG is an act of “New Somalia”. They also proved involved in the number of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion activities alleged to them either by the Government of the Philippines, ASEAN and the international community (Banlaoi 2006). This is a challenge for ASEAN, especially what had been done by the ASG is no longer bound by the state but transnational crime.

Regional Security Complex Theory: How ASEAN See the Terrorism as Threat

Regional Security Complex is describing how a regional look at the concept of security in the region, that revealed the concept of security will be shaped by the dynamics which occurred in a certain region. There are at least two main concepts that establish Regional Security Theory Complex (RSCT), first is power relations and second is pattern of amity and enmity. Power relations are concepts that are formed when the dynamics of a particular area then influenced by forces that are owned by its members (Buzan & Waever 2003). This conception will show how a country responds to the actions of other countries in their region, which is based on the relationship of forces between them. In the case of terrorism, as the Philippines could no longer tackle the actions of ASG, this country emphasized terrorism issue as emergency condition that should be responded immidiately. Therefore, there was effort from other ASEAN member countries to establish a framework in order to provision the common understanding in combating terrorism. Moreover, ASG was not only about terrorism but also connected with the human rights violence transnationally.

The second concept is the pattern of amity and enmity. This concept illustrates the pattern of relations between countries will establish, by construction, the dynamics in the region. ASEAN countries began to see the terrorist as a common threat, visible from ACCT formation in 2007. The dynamics that occur in ASEAN has been encouraging members to no longer see that terrorism is a threat to the security of single country, but the Southeast Asia region as a whole. In addition, the constellation internationally outside the Southeast Asian region also formed the view that the ASG is a threat to both members of ASEAN and the international community because the target they were after not only the local population but also involve foreign residents, especially the American (Sailing Totem 2014).

ASEAN Limits in Combating Terrorism

We argue that the limitations lie both in the elite side and the civil society side. First, ASEAN is good in creating framework, but weak in implementing it. Regarding the issue of terrorism, ASEAN works not only among its member states, but also with dialogue partners. Starting from 2001, member countries stipulated “ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism” (asean.org 2016). Five years later, ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism established. Then in 2015, there was special ministerial meeting to respond the rise of radicalization and violent extremism. Recently in 2016, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ announced the statement regarding terrorist attack in Jakarta (asean.org 2016). From this timeline, ASEAN is still having problem in conducting common policy. They took long time to ratification the convention and apply the real action, while the terrorist could have planned the following insurgences.

From the civil society side, first is the Islam majority, but they feel like minority. Radical to extremist Islamic militant spread the issue that the need to uphold the Islamic norms to fight the injustice treatments by the state government. Paying attention to the case of ASG, it is obvious that they demands of the recognition of their existence and aims to build a distant caliphate as it pledged allegiance to the ISIS (Almuttaqi 2016). Second, they usually recruit people from the low economic and education level and organize the training inside the unreachable zone near the states border which is out of government control. These target citizens has no enough information about the propaganda of terrorist. Therefore, they are easily provoked to the promises of the radical and extremist Islamic groups.

Strengthening ASEAN Power to Fight Terrorism

Addressing those two backgrounds of limitations, there are two approaches to strengthen the ASEAN power. On one side is, what the elite should do in creating applicable strategies regionally. On the other side is, how to empower the society and raise the awareness to the terrorist propaganda. At the government level, ASEAN framework in combating terrorism is an enough base to set up real actions. Moreover, the cooperation among some countries has been establish such as sharing intelligence from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in 2002 (David 2002). The following should be commitment to push the law enforcement to avoid the reluctant behavior of member countries, and establishing concrete instruments as well. The urgency of reinterpreting ASEAN common understanding does matter. Thus, ASEAN could conduct specific tactics to fight terrorism. Also, transparency in judicial process should be underpin so that anti-terror laws are not used for political purposes but specifically as security tools.

Later, as radical to extremist Islamic militants are targeting the mind of the people, therefore civil society should also play active role to educate each other. Southeast Asia consist of heterogenic ethnics and cultures, thus it is important to put force in respecting human beings. Besides, ASEAN needs to develop local, data-driven restorative approaches to prevent and rehabilitate radicalization (Greer and Watson 2016). In short, ASEAN needs militarily force also increase economic development, social stability, and political participation also need to work for more structural change (Swanstrom dan Bjornehed 2004).

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RELIGION: BOON OR BANE FOR DEMOCRACY?December 20, 2023 - 12:32 am
In December 2022, the Indonesian government passed a law that penalizes sex outside marriage. This is only one of the many changes in the criminal code that observers warn of the increasing conservatism in the country.

Indonesia houses the largest Muslim population in the world and is also a republic whose democratic experiences and milestones have been widely studied by scholars within and beyond the region. This makes Indonesia a compelling case for reflection on the nexus and tensions between religion and democracy. Is religion compatible with democracy? What opportunities and challenges does the “Islamic Renaissance” entail in the country? Democracy on Religion

Liberal democracy espouses secularism, the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. In an “ideal” democratic system, the state must not endorse nor support any specific religion while guaranteeing the free exercise of religion among citizens. This is essential in a democracy for many reasons. Religious freedom is a crucial civil right that enhances citizens’ individuality and relations with others. It stops one religion from dominating society, hence promoting diversity and co-existence. At the same time, it prevents policies from being framed according to religious beliefs, which may result in discrimination and repression of fundamental human rights.

Religion and its Tensions with Democracy: The Case of Indonesia

This is particularly important for Indonesia. While the country is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia also has many ethnolinguistic groups with different cultures and practices. It is a challenge in itself to build one nation with an immensely heterogeneous society. The diversity in the country resulted in years of ethnic conflict and violence. Even a religious minority, the Ahmadiyya, faces intimidation and oppression in the exercise of their faith. Indonesia’s dilemma points to the longstanding debate in human rights discourse and practice – are human rights universal, or are they relative to culture and local customs? While I am more inclined to support the former, it is important to be aware and carefully consider the context of a country when designing human rights advocacy and interventions.

However imperfect, the democratization process in Indonesia has assisted in facilitating efforts for reconciliation and balancing competing interests in the country. Recently, the President stunned the world when he acknowledged past grave human rights abuses in the country, including an anti-communist purge in the ’60s and the arrest of democracy activists during the Suharto presidency.

Indonesia sits in between secularism and theocracy. The country’s fundamental law espouses Pancasila, which is the foundational political theory of Indonesia. Through its five principles, Indonesian society believes in one God and aspires to create a just and civilized humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. This tells us that, by principle, Indonesia gives importance to pluralism and citizenship. Scholars and practitioners of the law also adopt legal pluralism and believe that different legal systems are complementary rather than contradictory. For example, community practices and customs are considered along with national and local regulations in settling disputes and conflicts at the village level.

However, in recent years, Indonesia has seen the expanding role of Islam in the country’s social and political life. Aside from Islam being a “source of ethical and cultural guidance”, many Islamic organizations have secured formal power, which allows them to easily introduce measures within the state apparatus that cement their own interests. Hardliner Islamic groups have also proliferated, and fundamentalist thought and practices are becoming more and more widespread. Islamic identity politics have also been evident since Widodo coalesced with conservative Islamic factions and appointed Amin, an influential Islamic figure, as his vice president. The new penal code tends to be more religious than secular. This has implications for Indonesia’s supposed secularism and diversity. How can the Indonesian government best represent the interests and aspirations of all?

As Indonesia continues to modernize and extend its economic and political ascendancy in the region, rapid changes in its social relations and dynamics are also expected. This demands a more careful look at the kind of laws and “social controls” that the government enforces. Suppose conservative forces are forwarding laws in the name of protecting tradition and keeping Indonesian values in check. In that case, it should not be at the expense of fundamental civil and political liberties, nor should it be to repress vulnerable groups even further, such as women, LGBT+, and ethnic communities. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Hence, political representation must reflect the diversity and vibrance of Indonesian society. If only one group dominates political and policy discourse, it ultimately jeopardizes the general will.

When religion becomes the yardstick for crafting rules and policies, it creates biases, whether intended or not. Propositions that are credible and necessary but “contradictory” to a certain religion may be rejected simply because they do not fit the personal convictions of decision-makers. Integrating religion into politics usually leads to oppressive and harmful policymaking. Religion is also a form of heuristics or cognitive shortcut that devalues deliberation and discussion. Instead of scrutinizing issues, people may resort to using their religion as the sole basis for their position on a particular matter. Democracies ought to be deliberative and pluralistic.

Human rights activists and organizations in Indonesia have sounded the alarm on many changes in the criminal code that could stifle individual freedoms and lead to setbacks in the country’s democratic progress. Aside from banning sex outside marriage, the government also reinstated laws that criminalize insulting the President and other state officials and institutions. They also increased the punishment for blasphemy. These laws can be disproportionately used against individuals and groups with legitimate criticisms and concerns about the government. It may also render already marginalized communities even more vulnerable. Religion, Populism, and Repression

This trend is not only unique to Indonesia. Much of the world has seen the rise of “nationalist” movements, often within the pretext of religion and safeguarding culture. India’s Modi has exhibited Hindu nationalist tendencies, which have meant greater intolerance against the Muslim minority in the country. Myanmar’s Tatmadaw has weaponized Buddhism to rally support from the public and account for its atrocities.

The use of religion to justify repressive and oppressive regimes is apparent. Religion is an effective tool to unify a group of people and subject them to a specific set of beliefs and values, which may be highly prejudiced and absurd. Religion acts as a moral compass that defines what is right and what is wrong. Because religion is subjective, it can easily be manipulated to serve political objectives. Populists and autocrats can bastardize religion to create a public enemy, instill an “us vs them” mentality, and sow further polarization.

Failed democracies thrive out of fear, whether it is real or manufactured. Religion can be a potent force to ingrain this fear. This hysteria against change and modernization is easy to whip up when people already have preexisting beliefs. It is not too difficult to segregate people and label them as the “other”. When this distinction is entrenched, it is convenient to normalize discrimination and violence.

It is said that Indonesia is a model for “Moderate Islam” when compared to the Middle East; the “Indonesian way” can complement Western values and democracy. It also has the potential to correct Islamophobia and promote Islam as a religion of peace. On the other hand, if Indonesia cannot find its balance and condone fundamentalist and hardliner Islamic groups to flourish, Indonesia will certainly regress in its hard-won democratic gains.

Religion has inherent contradictions with democracy. Subscribing to a religion and structuring a supposedly diverse society using its tenets is monopolistic and can bring about intolerance. It is paramount for democracies to ensure that civil, political, and socioeconomic rights are not deprived based on religion and other forms of cleavages. The access and exercise of power should be as widely distributed as possible. Public office should not be limited to certain political clans or religious organizations. For instance, at the village level, cultural and socioeconomic elites must share power and administration with vulnerable and historically marginalized groups. There are more reasons and illustrative cases, present and past, to posit that religion is more of a bane than a boon to democracy. At the moment in world history when (dis)information is fast and instant, we must maintain vigilance in dealing with autocratic agendas in the guise of “respecting” values and tradition. It is easier to believe and conform than to reflect and deliberate. But democracy dies when we rely on shortcuts to define what is good for us. Democracy dies, slowly and deliberately, when we allow a few to sabotage our freedoms and liberties to increase their own. Demagogues and despots are usually cunning and do things “in the name of God”.

REFERENCES

Evans, M. S. (2014). Religion and political decision making. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(1), 145–163. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

Evans, T. (2012). Separation of Mosque and State in Indonesia. Policy, 27(4), 35–39.

Głodek, A., & Grzywacz, A. (2020). Indonesia – between religion and democracy, Warsaw: Boym Institute. Retrieved from https://instytutboyma.org/en/indonesia-between-religion-and-democracy

Jaffrey, S. (2020). Is Indonesia Becoming a Two-Tier Democracy?, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jamaluddin, M., Chen, H. & Watson, A. (2022). Indonesia bans sex outside marriage as parliament passes sweeping new criminal code, Jakarta: CNN.

Klinken, G. v. (2019). Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 175(1), 81–135. http://doi:10.1111/jssr.12088

McWilliams, E. (2018). Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report, Washington D.C.: The Foreign Service Journal.

Nagda, A. (2020). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-islamization-of-indonesias-foreign-policy/

Omelicheva, M. & Ahmed, R. (2018). Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation. Religion, State, and Society, 46(1), 4–25.

The World Factbook. (2023). Indonesia, s.l.: Central Intelligence Agency.

Wieringa, S. E. (2006). Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists’ Discourses. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (1), 40–27.

Short Biography:

Kay Conales is a student of the Asia Pacific-Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization of the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) of Mahidol University (Thailand). She also studied in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIPOL) of APMA’s partner-university Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). She can be reached through e-mail at ksconales@gmail.com.

Drawing ASEAN Limits and Strengths in Tackling Terrorism: Study Case of Abu Sayyaf Group

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